

**The Voice of Walls: A Grounded Theory Study of the
Gezi Movement's Graffiti**

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By

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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FOREWORD

When I visited Gezi Park on May 27, 2013, to spend my lunch break and to observe what was going on as an off-duty journalist, I could never imagine the small but determined environmentalist crowd's demonstration I have encountered, will turn into the broadest and the most unexampled social movement of Turkey's history. My second visit to the park was on May 31. The crowd was bigger, slogans were more political, I was somewhere between being a protestor and a journalist. However, again, I was not aware of that little protest I was witnessing, would spark a social mobilisation that will change both Turkey (Beriş, 2013) and my life.

Understanding the importance and magnitude of what was happening became easy for everyone in the park the next day. On June 1, the surroundings of Gezi Park were like a battlefield, and protests had been already spread almost across the entire country. Whilst I observe the diversity of the people coming to Gezi Park and the slogans and action forms, and the pertinacity of the passive resistance against the police violence, I began to understand that events were signalling an unprecedented social occurrence for Turkey.

Nowadays, about the Gezi movement, the only thing that everyone is sure of is that it has changed many things and is a milestone for the country. Although I agree, I believe that is not enough. Qualified explanations, discussions and researches should be done and continued for a very long time to analyse what is changed how. Until now, besides some efforts, Gezi is still a phenomenon that appeals to hearts or biased ideological analyses rather than free minds.

As noted, Gezi was a milestone for Turkey, and also for me. I was in or around Gezi Park throughout the movement, and it was a series of events for me that brought with

it different experiences. In the same place where I was initially just an observer and photographer, I have become rapidly a protester carrying wounded people, building barricades, escaping from the police and shouting slogans. More precisely, the reasons for my presence in Gezi Park have diversified, simultaneously have become more personal and collective. As a requirement of my profession, I was writing articles about what was happening. Also, I was sharing information on the Facebook page that I founded with my three other friends, taking photos, and taking part in the actions. To be honest, I was completely fascinated by the Gezi's unique movement culture and humorous creativity, and I tried to document the movement with a firm belief on I was bearing witness the history itself.

I have to admit that the tragic events and the stance of the movement, and my personal grievances, have made me a Gezi activist, and I have lost or abandoned the objective perspective as a journalist should have.

Unfortunately, Turkey is a country where people define or differ their generations by great social, political or economic crises they witnessed; the military coups that recur almost every decade, the rightist-leftist clashes that caused tens of people to die every day for years, the great worker movement, massive economic crises and the and massive internal migration flowing into İstanbul. The number of examples can be increased. In other words, people define themselves by their memories of the great pains, deprivations, imprisonments, tortures and other various forms of systematic violence inflicted by the state.

Again, unfortunately, that is not changed. As far as I can see, my generation has already begun to define and differentiate itself with the Gezi movement. These definitions are also powered by the transformation of Turkey's political system from a broken democracy into a repressive one-man regime.

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Nevertheless, today the Gezi movement is a romantic myth that is frequently referred to for the political and social opposition in Turkey. On the other side of the coin, for the power, it is an evergreen source feeding the othering and political polarisation. The main passion of the study at your hands is to save the movement from the narrative it has become and examine its genuine narratives. The park still stands where it is, but on condition of being surrounded by the police, at every anniversary of the day that I have spent my lunch break. In the intellectual and ideational dimension, it is very ordinary to hear two phrases; pre-Gezi and post-Gezi. Also, many analysts and opinion leaders today associate the results of past two elections (the general elections on June 7, 2015 - cancelled afterwards, and the local elections held on June 23, 2019, that Erdogan's party has lost biggest six metropolitan areas) with the effects of the Gezi movement (Çakır, 2019). Briefly, Gezi continues to change and affect Turkey.

Still, the movement is in front of us as a mass that has not been adequately studied and understood. Moreover, as I have heard from my old colleagues and academicians, nowadays, to write objectively about Gezi as a journalist or a scholar in Turkey, may make you find yourselves on the wrong side of the law. The situation makes me feel more responsible for understanding and explaining Gezi and I believe it should do the same thing for many Turkish people who live outside of Turkey. I hope this study can make a small contribution to these efforts.

Lastly, as it is doing for Turkey, Gezi is continuing to change my life. Seven years later, as a doctoral candidate who writes a dissertation on Gezi, I can easily remark this study, which I tried to conduct with a methodological and scientific perspective (very different from my days in the park), is one of the most important and meaningful pursuits of my life. I am very happy to catch this opportunity and rather hopeful about the usefulness and meaningfulness of the effort that I have put forward.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to people who have lost their lives during the events of the Gezi movement.

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ABSTRACT

Gezi movement is the broadest and most unprecedented social movement of Turkey's recent history. The movement has emerged in Istanbul, diffused just in a few days into 80 cities of the country with the participation of 3.5 million people and uttered crucial issues and demands that accumulated within the Turkish society before its rapid dissolution. The questions of "What the Gezi movement means?" and "What is the emergent Gezi spirit?" have been and will be one of the major problematics for the relevant scholarship. This thesis generates a constructivist grounded theory analysis on one of the most widespread forms of Gezi movement's activism; graffiti. The study is built on the three major theoretical arch stones; social movements, space and graffiti, and in this way, it discovers, interprets and theorises the patterns of Gezi graffiti in order to build an interpretative analysis. The theory that is generated by the study, suggests that beyond all the novel forms of collective identities, actions and discourses, the movement is about the overlooked ancient and chronic issues, which pertain to Turkish social and political formation.

Keywords: Gezi movement, social movements, space, graffiti, grounded theory.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
AP	Justice Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DEV-GENÇ	Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey
DİSK	Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey
DP	Democrat Party
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DYP	True Path Party
EEC	European Economic Community
FP	Virtue Party
GTA	Grand Theft Auto
İTÜ	İstanbul Technical University
LGBTQIA	Lesbian, bisexual, transgender/transsexual, queer/questioning, intersex, allied/asexual/aromantic/agender
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MIT	National Intelligence Organization
NARO	Nuri Alço Revival Organization
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODTÜ	Middle East Technical University
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party

RP	Welfare Party
RTÜK	Supreme Board of Radio and Television
SP	Felicity Party
TC	Republic of Turkey
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TDK	Turkish Language Association
TFF	Turkish Football Federation
TGB	Turkish Youth Union
THKP-C	Turkey People's Liberation Party-Front
THY	Turkish Airlines
TİP	Workers' Party of Turkey
TMMOB	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
TOKİ	Housing Development Administration of Turkey
TOMA	Anti-riot water cannon vehicle
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces
USA	United States of America

CHAPTER 1 – PROBLEM

Introduction

This chapter explains the rationale, necessity, relevance, and purpose of the study. Also, it compactly conveys the background and context of the case that study focuses. The chapter concludes with a brief presentation of the study's content wis architecture.

Research Problem

The initial phase of the Gezi movement manifested itself as a series of demonstrations and protests for the environment and right to the city in May 2013, against an urban renewal project that would cause the removal of the trees from Gezi Park lying at the heart of Istanbul. Under the circumstances of harsh police interventions and government's uncompromising approach, these small protests have generated a social movement that mobilises millions of people, spreads all over the country, targets the political system, criticise conventional social acceptances and expresses accumulated complaints and demands.

Gezi movement is the broadest and most significant social mobilisation in Turkey's recent history and is regarded frequently as a turning point. Therefore, efforts to identify the social and political dynamics in the roots of the movement and the claims and grievances articulated by its agents, are important and essential endeavours in understanding contemporary Turkey. However, academic studies within the Gezi literature, which has been expanding since the movement's emergence, with a few exceptions, involves many scholarly efforts that reproduce or mould the movement to adapt it to various pre-agreed perspectives seeing ideological views as normative. Besides, most of these studies do not investigate adequately the expressions, opinions or the praxis of the actors and empirical data, and fall short of evaluating the movement in a meaningful and comprehensive way in terms of the up

to date social movements' literature. With the awareness of these shortcomings in Gezi literature, this study aims to contribute to the field without utilising the movement to prove some preconceptions, and in the name of closing this gap, it focuses on the discourses, narratives, contexts and articulations generated by Gezi protesters.

For this purpose, the problem of the study is to conduct an interpretative and constructivist grounded theory analysis that investigates the Gezi movement, through 984 graffiti generated, practised and performed by its own activists around Gezi Park, and thus to generate a processual theory that identifies the social, political and cultural roots of the movement.

Background and Context of the Study

Gezi movement today is recognised as one of the milestones of Turkey. However, the real significance of the movement does not spring from the number of people it mobilised or the scale of its spatial spread. Its magnitude reveals itself through its content and social dynamics it indicates. Essentially, Gezi movement has revealed three novelties. First, it has brought together social groups and actors were never to be seen clustered around shared aims and issues previously, such as Kurds and republicans or nationalists and anarchists. Second, it has enabled the emergence of new collective identities and ergo, social actors. Third, it has differed completely from antecedent social movements with its action forms, movement culture, political stance and ways of expression. These differences greatly affect the course of relevant academic analyses.

Prior to analysing Gezi graffiti for the grounded theory to be generated, the movement and changes it has brought should be contextualised through the social fabric to which it belongs. Gezi movement is one of the striking examples of contemporary urban networked movements immanent to the post-industrial programmed society (Touraine, 1977; 1985) we

live in, and is related to cultural contexts and structural conditions that reflect both local and global realities. This argument associates Gezi with the transformation and complexification of social movements that have begun to appear in the 1960s, which were ignited by the changes in power's reproduction modes, perceptions of sociality and production relations (Melucci, 1989).

Social movements can be succinctly described as “collective enterprises seeking to establish a new order of life” (Blumer, 1969, p. 99) or collective efforts to achieve a common goal while maintaining a common interest (Giddens, 2009, p. 1010), and they had been revolved around issues such as economic aspirations, class struggle and political participation since 18th century (Tilly, 2004). However, today, various forms of the capitalist system and political control mechanisms embedded in these forms, carry social conflicts and contentions of movements to the cultural field because of their transformative effects that have become penetrable to everyday life. Thus, a period has begun in which culture, identities, lifestyles and values are decisive in social mobilisation beyond the economic problems. Also, new communication technologies that enhance communicative abilities of individuals and groups for building networks, and the logic of action intrinsic to cyberspace, the emerging dimension where the social life takes place, have facilitated and accelerated both the invasion of power and the fluidization of opposition in cultural fields. Consequently, social movements have also altered in terms of emergences, organisations, hierarchies, recruitment, claims, aspirations, identities, actions and demands. This paradigm shift, present us a society, which can be no longer outlined simply through a dichotomy between, respectively, the mechanisms and actors belonging to the established system and the disadvantaged, excluded groups or rational actors who force these systems to change.

Contemporary social movements are complex networks wherein multiple identities are generated. They arise with undebatable and heterogeneous demands and tend to break

away from the political systems rather than seize the power. They demand rapid social changes and articulate these demands through identities, cultural symbols and emotional exchanges of different groups (Melucci, 1996). These movements are often urban, fragmented, less organised, networked, spontaneous, anti-hierarchical and anti-authoritarian (Castells, 2013b), and the Gezi movement can be meaningfully evaluated within this framework, especially when it is investigated through its graffiti.

Movements in the programmed society mostly occur in urban spaces for demographic and economic reasons. Many of them, like the Gezi movement, emerge as urban movements that mobilised because of urban demands and issues, and others appear as movements taking place in urban areas (Castells, 1983). Nevertheless, they are affected by urban spatialities, distinct perceptions about urban life and historicities of spaces in which they occur.

Therefore, urban social movements are in intense interaction with space, action repertoires, rituals, spatial claims and even the identities of their actors can be shaped by this interaction. Urban space is a social product (Lefebvre, 1991), and social movements play roles in this production. Thus, Gezi graffiti is convenient to reveal the relationship between Gezi movement and urban space, as both praxis and action. It interacts with the urban space, hijacks and transforms it, and as expected, is shaped by it. Moreover, the cyberspace is a new space that affects these collective actions and provides them with novel possibilities with its peculiar logic of action (Prujit, 2007). Concordantly, in cyberspace, Gezi graffiti have become recognizable by many users in a short time and have been digitised as internet memes.

Due to the circumstances of the programmed society, structural characteristics of movements such as emergence, mobilisation, organisation and diffusion have become intertwined with cultural contexts like their action repertoires and narratives. Also, these

dissident flows of autonomy (Castells, 2013b) are independent of time and space as they understood in conventional way, and organise as networks. In this sense, these movements have an intermittent continuum and overlap culture and structures. For this reason, cultural products or contexts revealed by contemporary social movements do not only refer to the cultural demands and conflicts. The issues on which these collective actions that emerged in the name of social change and their ways of articulate them, point out to the cultural field, which is not independent of structural conditions. Thus, social movements should be evaluated concerning both cultural contexts, structurality and opportunities of systems.

Seemly, Gezi graffiti should be not evaluated without considering specific structures and their effects such as Istanbul's authentic urban morphology or the existing political system and its urban policies. Within this perspective, it can be also argued that studies that consider specific and genuine conditions for a given social movement and based upon empirical data, would generate the most efficient processual analyses.

Gezi movement, as a contemporary and networked urban social movement, has uncloaked and generated many unique actions, narratives and claims that can be scrutinised thoroughly when both local and global cultural and structural factors are considered together. For instance, the occupation of Gezi Park is a first for Turkey in terms of protest forms. However, it is also a continuation of the global occupation movements that started with the Occupy Wall Street. Yet again, since Wall Street is the centre of world finance, the occupation should be interpreted accordingly. On the other hand, Gezi Park is the garden of Taksim Square, which has been the space of different massive social mobilizations of Turkey's history and owns a deep social, political and spatial historicity. Therefore, Gezi Park's occupation should be evaluated for its specific conditions. Of course, convenient comparisons can be drawn between these two movements in terms of action forms and intellectual orientations. However, the cultural backgrounds and social fabrics on which they

based, or the political systems and opportunity structures from which they emerge, are just as different. Also, the standing man, a new passive resistance action form was brought forward by the Gezi protesters, is a first both locally and globally, and after Gezi movement it has been included in the action repertoires of the various social movements and protests across the world (Seymour, 2013; “Standing man action spreads to Spain”, 2013). These transitions are not independent of the structurality of the programmed society in which flows are continuous, and culture has become an omnipresent field of conflict in which we can learn about the structural conditions that cause movements.

Besides movement’s rich content in terms of digital activism, bodily resistance and performative actions, graffiti has been one of the most widespread and continuous components of the movement. It is closely linked to the cultural contexts and thus expresses the cultural demands, and includes clues related to the structural conditions in which the movement originated at the same time. Gezi graffiti is one of the rare praxis of the movement that had continued from its beginning to its end. Hence, its trajectory is parallel to the course of the movement. During the Gezi movement, the protesters almost completely covered the urban spatial centre of the movement, which I call the Gezi node, with graffiti.

Gezi graffiti constitutes a universe of cultural contexts and spatial practices, in which the actors of the movement interpreted what happened and expressed their demands, and their social and political perspectives.

Contemporary graffiti is an area suitable for the politicisation and its path often intersects with social movements. It can be described as illicit writings (Halsey & Young, 2006) and visuals applied mostly by spray paint on the urban surfaces, and it is continuing to exist as a global phenomenon, as an artistic action of the excluded and disadvantaged people in the urban space, since the 1970s. In this sense, contemporary graffiti has an intertwined

relationship with urban space, because urban space is arranged by the life envisagement of power, and graffiti announces that those who are not affirmed by this design infiltrate the urban space.

Urban design, in this context, is a process in which power has historically organised urban life. The spatial design of a city by power reflects the idea of urban existence, forms of practices of daily life and the logic of the production and consumption that dominate the city. As long as this design is successful, the urban perception of the citizens becomes non-conflicting for the design of the power, and consent and legitimacy for the economic and social order are produced. However, the city's design is a discourse and can never fully cover all actions and experiences. Therefore, there is always a discrepancy between the conceived space of power and the experiences of the lived space, and this distinction affects urbanites' perceptions of the space. The discrepancy enables the emergence of an oppositional dynamism because it causes urban dwellers to realise the self-serving urban design of power (Lefebvre, 1991). For this reason, social movements such as Gezi, occupy urban spaces and announce that the design of the power is ceased, through graffiti or other spatial arrangements, and offer new designs suitable for the social change they aim.

Graffiti emerges as an intervention to spatial designs aimed at the internalisation of power and re-design the space and spread the non-affirmed narratives, messages and identities to the city. Therefore, the disharmony between imposed urban design and the spatial occupation of graffiti creates opportunities for questioning power. As I mentioned above, Gezi protesters produced a lot of graffiti and thus left behind a rich archive of the movement's cultural contexts, narratives, relations with space and characteristics. For this reason, the study takes Gezi graffiti as the primary data and relevant literature as the secondary data, to generate a grounded theory, which is conducted with a constructivist

approach that is maintained through the interpretations of the researcher. Finally, it builds itself on three conceptual pillars; movement, space and graffiti.

Research Question and Purpose of the Study

The research question of this study is formulated as “what Gezi graffiti tells about the Gezi movement?”.

The purposes of the study are, to theorise Gezi graffiti to obtain an explanatory analysis of the Gezi movement, to evaluate and interpret data relationally in the contexts of movement, space and graffiti concepts and to generate a grounded theory about the Gezi movement compatible with existing literature.

Relevance of the Study

The findings of this study will contribute to the scholarly endeavours understanding of Gezi graffiti and the Gezi movement. The importance and the magnitude of the Gezi movement as a social milestone for Turkey justify the need for comprehensive, comparative, effective and unbiased case analyses will be conducted through the data obtained from the field. The relevance of the study is also closely related to the methodology it adopts, as a rare attempt of constructivist grounded theory research focusing on Gezi graffiti. Because it concentrates only on data, interprets them and thus reduces the gap between facts and the literature on the movement. Finally, this study is significant because it is realised independent of the academic environment in Turkey that heavily repressed by the government, which is not distinct from the conditions induced the Gezi movement, in the first place. In this way, it has not lost its potential to articulate free-minded evaluations and determinations about the movement.

Definitions

The study is structured through three main concepts: movement, space and graffiti. Regarding these concepts, various specification and explanations are mentioned throughout the study due to scope, connotations and contexts. Also, they diverge, resemble and intersect. To adapt the reader to the study, how these three concepts were briefly addressed by the researcher can be learned through the following short definitions.

Movement: Throughout the study, the concept of movement refers to the mobilizations that are mainly directed towards social change and contain collective flows detached from the established order.

Space: Throughout the study, space is regarded as a physical and virtual social product and a historical urban morphology that determines the flows of movements.

Graffiti: For this study, graffiti refers to the illicit texts written on the walls of urban and cyberspaces that function as a medium with multiple functions and a form of action used by movements and transforms space.

Structure of the Study

The study comprises five chapters. Chapter one sets out the study's problem, question, purpose and relevance, and outlines the background and context of the problem. Chapter two investigates the literature, which is considered as a secondary data to re-evaluate the categories that emerge during the interpretation of the data, in the contexts of movement, space and graffiti. Thus, the meaningfulness of the grounded theory to be generated in terms of the current literature is increased. Chapter three explains the methodology of the study and the methods applied. Chapter four interprets and explains the categories that have reached theoretical saturation as a result of data analysis by associating them with the literature. Finally, chapter five includes the reduction of the categories and the production and

exposition of the grounded theory taking into account the relationships between these categories. Also, it provides a summary through the research problem and makes recommendations for future studies.

CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter reflects the literature review I have conducted in the late stages of my research, to meet my needs for theoretical sampling and memo writing, concept diagramming and to improve my background knowledge regarding the research problem. It was carried out under the design of the research, thus the categories I derived from the data would be evaluated without falling into a theoretical gap and would encourage the generation of a grounded theory compatible with the existing literature. For this reason, the relations of the concepts, contexts and theories discussed throughout the chapter with the resulting data can be predominantly observed in the details and background of the theory I generated. The problem of the research required this literature review to be constructed on three key pillars; movement, space, and graffiti, and headings of the sections were chosen in the same way.

Besides, since the data I have examined, coded and categorised to generate a grounded theory does not allow to conduct in-depth or focus group interviews, this literature review is structured as comprehensive and compact as possible. I approached the literature as a secondary data source that would provide rich and efficient advantages to the interpretation and inference processes that are part of my efforts to theorisation. For this reason, the chapter consists of selected and utilised sections for the sharpening and clarifying of the grounded theory, which I have already outlined, and it has a purposive eclecticism. The chapter investigates the literature on social movements, space, graffiti and the Gezi movement respectively. It also includes brief evaluations on each section and their relations.

Movement

While evaluating the concept of social movements, Mario Diani (1992) has pointed out the importance of three fundamental components; “networks of relations between a

plurality of actors; collective identity; conflictual issues” (p. 17). These three components, as will be seen later in the section, maintain their place (sometimes with original names) uninterruptedly and without losing significance in various definitions of social movements. Inspired by that argument for my research, I regarded and denominated the multiplicity of Gezi events as a social movement. This preference was related to the need of establishing a link between the data I examine and the conceptualizations that I want to interpret. It did not stem from any analytical effort of defining. In this way, I believed that I would have the chance to take advantage of the rich possibilities of existing literature. Besides, the fact that these above-mentioned essential components have appeared during the Gezi events with high social resonance and increasingly socialising goals (as far as I can observe), was also effective for my preference.

This section tries to discover concepts in the social movements’ literature that would enrich the generation of the grounded theory. It does not answer whether the Gezi movement is a social movement. Also, it examines the three main paradigms of social movements; collective behaviour, rational actor and new social movements, and includes some concepts I think to offer me extensive interpretation opportunities when evaluating Gezi graffiti; collective Identity, emotions, narratives, network society, networked social Movements, urban social movements and the connective action. The section concludes with a sub-section that investigates and assesses the Gezi literature in terms of social movements, and profiles the multiplicity of the movement.

The Crowd and the Collective Behaviour

Beyond the Marxian and Durkheimian heritages, it is possible to deepen the roots of the social movement scholarship to the crowd analyses of the 19th century. Following Tarde (1890) and Sighele's (1892) discussions on how to identify those responsible for crimes

committed by a crowd (Reicher, 2001, p. 185), French polymath Gustave Le Bon's (1895/2001) work on the crowd laid the foundations for what is now called the contagion theory. Le Bon (1895/2001) attempted to explain the collective behaviour by focusing on the transformative power of the crowd. In his work under the influence of the 1848 revolutions, benefited from the psychological concepts popular during the period, such as unconscious processes, effects of childhood and reflections of libidinous, irrational processes on behaviour. In this context, he argued that the crowd produces an unconventional kind of a mind and puts individual reasoning aside. Thus, people become vulnerable to unconscious influences (Johnston, 2014, p. 28). In this process, individuals move away from the behaviours and social patterns that they follow in the ordinary course of their lives. In this state of anonymity, they stop being members of groups and become members of the crowd. Thus, their primitive unconscious impulses control them. Because of the magnetic effect of the crowd, unconsciousness becomes a collective property, and emotions and behaviours become contagious (Le Bon, 1895/2001, pp. 17-18). If there are leaders who hypnotise the crowd, it is entirely under their control. Also, because of the size of the crowd, individuals are filled with the sense of invincibility, and they surrender to instincts that they would restrain. In this way, crowds can behave like wild barbarians or enthusiastic heroes (Le Bon, 1895/2001, pp. 11-19). Le Bon has also pointed out that the crowd is functional to eliminate old and useless practices and to bring change. However, he did not explain the discrepancy between the crowd that destroyed the individuals and put them in an irrational state and the crowd that made social change possible (Aguirre, 2007, p. 529).

Not all evaluations made within the crowd and the contagion theory adhere to the principle that the collectivity swallows the individual. For example, Tarde (1969) argued that collective behaviour comprises physical and mental interactions of people who share ideas and beliefs. He also stated that people who demand the expression of the new and have

similar opinions on specific issues caused the collective behaviour to take place. It is noteworthy that Tarde made the ascertainment that associates the collective behaviour with social contiguity, interaction and agency because these themes have been continued to be significant for social movement literature. Tarde (1969) also stated collective behaviour becomes widespread through imitation. For him, people imitate the ideas of their social superiors, and this process proceeds through the interaction of the crowd, which is limited to the obligation to share the same physical space and communicate face to face. He also pointed out that the imitation can occur among the different publics through indirect mediums such as newspapers. Under the new communicative conditions, publics do not have the same spatial and temporal limitations. Although a person's context of social presence in the crowd is only about that crowd, it is possible for them to be simultaneously from different publics through imitation (Aguirre, 2007, p. 528).

While Le Bon's work on collective behaviour continued to be estimable in Europe, another orientation was emerging in the United States to analyse the phenomenon. Under the influence of John Watson's (1913; as cited in Rakos, 2013) behavioural psychology, John Dewey's (1896; as cited in Haskins & Seiple, 1999) pragmatist philosophy and G.H. Mead's (1934/1967) social behaviour analysis, the Chicago School of sociology has created a new combination called symbolic interactionism. This perspective developed alternative approaches to collective behaviour (Johnston, 2014, p. 30).

Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (1921) claimed that the crowd begins with a milling process (p. 385). In this process, there is mutually developed responsiveness among the participants rather than common goals. It confines conventional ways of judgment, reasoning and self-control. Therefore, collective behaviour is irrational, and unexplainable by everyday social processes (Park & Burgess, 1921, p. 890). Park (1904/1972) has also argued that social discontent occurs when institutions cannot meet people's needs. For him, discontent at the

individual level is the basis for the emergence of possible collective behaviour. Collective behaviour and social unrest also cause institutions to change to overcome these problems and mobilise to restore social consensus. In this respect, it can be said that Park has examined the collective behaviour with an optimistic and pragmatist analysis perspective, as opposed to Le Bon's approach (Aguirre, 2007, p. 529).

Symbolic Interactionism. One of the pioneers of collective behaviour scholarship, Herbert Blumer (1969) has interpreted and propped the symbolic interactionism, coined by Mead (1967), that focuses on the processes, emergences, and meaningful phenomena while examining social life. Symbolic interactionism offers a frame of reference that foresees people need to build symbolic worlds to interact and sympathise, and claims that these symbolic worlds shape individuals' behaviours (West & Turner, 2010). According to Blumer (1969), social action and interaction are driven by self-consciousness. Human beings interpret others through their self-awareness and shape their behaviour accordingly. Since their interpretations on others are based on others, their interpretations of their behaviour are in line with broad social norms and values. Although this process is interactive and produces new norms and values, aforesaid characteristic remains valid (Crossley, 2002, p. 24). A social movement is initially formless and weakly organised. At this stage, it is a primitive form of collective behaviour. As the movement develops, it gains form and becomes organised. It generates leaders, traditions, customs, rules, values and labour. In short, it becomes a society (Blumer, 1969, p. 99). Blumer has analysed social movements in two main axes: *general social movements* and *specific social movements*. According to his analysis, general social movements do not focus on particular issues. They are formed around broader issues or set of issues. They also do not have specific organisational forms, coordination or mobilisation mechanisms. Therefore, their activism is temporally and spatially unstable. They can be described as changes take place in a particular society or group that understands their world,

expectations and values. General social movements are dynamic, and the potential they generate is strong. They create altering effects on people's perceptions, actions and feelings, and in this way prepare the ground for the formation of specific social movements (Blumer, 1969, pp. 65,100-114; Crossley, 2002, pp. 28-29). On the other hand, specific social movements are well organised and focused. Blumer (1951/1995, p. 65) examined the mechanisms play roles in the transformation of general social movements into specific social movements in five steps: *agitation, the formation of esprit de corps, the development of morale, the production of an ideology, and the development of tactics.*

Agitation is a mechanism initiated by agitators, which is important in the early stages of specific social movements. Agitators try to ensure that people abandon their usual way of thinking and acting. Thus, new forms of thinking and behaviour necessary for a social movement to begin and to gain momentum become able to spread among people. Agitators can also be favourable in shaping an already emerging social unrest and turning it into a movement. Social unrest and the transformation of social unrest into a movement take place thanks to the agitators (Blumer, 1969, p. 104; Crossley, 2002, p. 30). What Blumer (1969, p. 105) called *esprit de corps* is the solidarity that ensures the continuity of a movement and extends its life. It is the unification of the participants around the essential behaviours and emotions of the movement. In this way, participants develop a new and familiar perspective about themselves and the world and the *we consciousness* emerges through substantial participation of the participants. This new entity also has a symbolic dimension because, within a movement, it noticeably allows participants to mark their identities. Symbolic expressions of *we consciousness* strengthen physical practices of a movement by allowing outsiders to interact with actors through their own identities as if they were members of the movement (Crossley, 2002, pp. 31-32). When basic behaviours and emotions developed during the formation of *esprit de corps* are strengthened, the morale of movements emerges.

Morale is the sacred amalgam of the imagery and notions produced in the name of a social movement. From this perspective, it can be said that they resemble religious imagery. These imageries form stories for pre-movement and post-movement phases. Thus, the cultural fabric of the movement, which Blumer (1969, p. 173) called morale, emerges. It keeps movement together and connects participants. The morale of a group which has created a social movement, establishes the essence of that group's ideology-building process. Group ideology includes the discursive expression of group morale, its assessments on the situation and solution suggestions for the problem. It convinces participants that the movement should continue and recruit new participants. Moral and group ideology are the cultural components of a social movement (Crossley, 2002, p. 32). Tactics, on the other hand, are multi-headed mechanisms that develop according to the changes of a social movement and its different stages of struggle.

Turner and Killian (1957/1987) have continued to follow the approach of symbolic interactionism, but they brought some of its assumptions up for discussion. They have argued that the unusual behaviour of the crowds can be correctly understood when they are considered as new norms that have emerged. According to them, during collective processes, people do not entirely abandon their ordinary lives and behaviours that these lives require. They temporarily adapt to new norms of behaviour since they encounter problems that disrupt their lives. This adaptation takes place under the influence of some form of social pressure. In this way, social cohesion is ensured regarding unusual social processes such as protests or demonstrations. How these unusual processes evolve and how far they are to be taken is determined by the interactions within the crowd (Turner & Killian, 1957/1987). *The emergent norm theory* assumes that collective behaviour emerges because of a normative crisis in which the participants perceive the prior norms as problematic or invalid. The perceptions and interpretations of the participants are the core dynamic. This normative crisis

causes people to take action and create new normative structures. Therefore, collective behaviour is a rational and social process in which different participants come together and try to find out how to overcome a normative crisis (Aguirre, 2007, p. 533). Besides, Marx and McAdam (1994) expanded the emergent norm theory by considering collective behaviour from a sociocultural perspective. According to them, this emergence is not only about the new norms; it is a sociocultural emergence with many dimensions. It is a multi-layered process that determines who owns the culture initiated by the collective behaviour, how the collective behaviour will be formed and dissolved, what emotional and linguistic practices will be affirmed, how the collective action will be organised, and how it will interact with the other areas of social life. This new perspective has associated the emergent norm theory with the relational processes of collective action such as institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation (Aguirre, 2007, p. 533).

Value-Added Theory. American sociologist Neil Smelser's (1962) value-added theory was one of the most significant steps for the collective behaviour scholarship. Smelser has endeavoured to produce an encompassing umbrella concept that will explain any phenomena, in which collective behaviour arose (Johnston, 2014, p. 33). According to his (Smelser, 1962, pp. 68-69) value-added theory, certain social conditions are essential for collective behaviour to occur, and they arise through combinations of specific determinants. These determinants create an added value in the name of collective behaviour. Besides, the determinants that influence collective behaviour combine to form predictable, logical patterns (Flynn, 2011, p. 135). According to value-added theory, six social determinants must surface for the emergence of social movements; *structural conduciveness*, *structural strain*, *generalised beliefs*, *precipitating factors*, *mobilisation of participants for action*, and *social control*. The social situation should be opportune for the formation of collective behaviour, and there must be a grievance or a strain in society. Furthermore, the source of social strain,

specific characteristics of this source and the responses to this social strain should be meaningful for the actors who would form a social movement. The next step is to confirm this generalised belief or to escalate social strain by a particular action. After this step, the affected group becomes mobilised. Final determinant is the aggregation of counter-determinants that try to limit, stop, or block all the other determinants, including mobilisation (Knottnerus, 1983, p. 390). Smelser (1962) emphasised the importance of structural effects in the formation of collective behaviour. According to this perspective, on a broad scale, the individual's behaviour and the general orientation of collective action is shaped by values of the society. On a more specific scale, actions are guided by the norms deemed appropriate. In the name of organised action, motivations determine group behaviours, and situational facilities adjust the social situations on a more specific scale (Johnston, 2014, pp. 33-34). Individuals take actions on the structural tension they experience in any of these strata. If many people take these actions, collective behaviour occurs.

The characteristics of collective behaviour vary according to which of these layers, from general to specific, are concentrated (Smelser, 1962, pp. 295-351). The common point of the scholars' approaches and theories mentioned above is that they all accept the fact that collective behaviour occurs when there is a chronic social strain or a social breakdown in society. Because the strain weakens the social integration and control mechanisms, and enable people to question the moral imperatives telling people to continue their accustomed lives (Buechler, 2013, p. 633).

Mass Society Theory. During the 1950s and 1960s, with the effects of rightist McCarthyism, segregationist oppositions and fascist movements experienced in Europe, collective behaviours were viewed as destabilising, non-normative and unusual happenings (Johnston, 2014, p. 34). Works of Gasset (1932/1957), Mannheim (1940/1960) and Arendt (1951/1973) provided the basis for the variant of the breakdown approach, which can be

grouped under the title of the mass society theory. The theory brings a complex and multifaceted perspective. It examines the individuals' adaptation and integration processes that appeared under the conditions of the social transformation caused by the industrial society, with psychological emphasis. With these analyses, collective behaviour scholarship has coincided with the field of politics (Johnston, 2014, pp. 34-35). Mass society theorists have argued that industrialisation and urbanisation have led to the dissolution of pre-existing relations and institutions such as family, community or ethnic ties, which had played an essential integrative role in the previous period and they have been replaced by more formal relationships. For them, this alteration generated the mass society comprising detached and anomalous individuals. In mass society, people are mobilised by mass political movements because they are socially isolated and self-alienated individuals. In the absence of pre-existing institutions and relationships, they are susceptible to be manipulated by extremist political movements because they are alone against the powerful elites and massive bureaucracies (Kornhauser, 1959, pp. 33; 90-109; Buechler, 2013, p. 1540).

Relative Deprivation Theory. In the post-war period, after the prominence of the mass, urban riots, protests, collective violence and civil uprisings became the themes that were often discussed. The new left student movements, anti-colonial liberation movements, Marxist or nationalist movements had been the foci of the collective behaviour scholarship in the cold war period. Two main approaches were at the forefront. The first one, as noted above, was the approach that considered rapid industrialisation and urbanisation as the causes of social breakdown. On the other side, the second approach was concerned with the concept of deprivation. Political scientist and sociologist James C. Davies (1962) developed a model, which is called the *J-curve hypothesis* that describes the relationships between expectations, their level of fulfilment, and revolutionary upheavals. According to Davies (1962, pp. 17-19), rising expectations because of the steadily increased wellbeing in a society, in case of a

decline, can lead to the rise of revolutionary uprisings and social movements. If satisfaction decreases and expectations do not decrease, discontent and rebellion against the social system begin. Grievance-based approaches that emerged in this period take social grievances to the axis and derive their sources from the literature of social psychology and cognitive dissonance. According to these approaches, individuals engage in collective contentious actions because of their grievances. Frustrations turn into aggression and make people mobilised (Johnston, 2014, p. 36). The conceptual expression of the J-curve hypothesis is the relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation theory examines how objective social situations shape subjective feelings of deprivation and addresses how deprivation and frustration can lead to consequential behaviours such as political violence.

American political scientist Ted Robert Gurr (1970) argued that relative deprivation arises from the discrepancy between what people think they should achieve and what they achieve. The relative deprivation is the actors' perception of discrepancy between the goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are rightfully entitled and the goods and conditions they are capable of getting and keeping (p. 24). People's feelings about their social situation do not perfectly match with their objective conditions and are determined by comparisons with others' situations and subjective feelings such as satisfaction or dissatisfaction. "The tension that develops from a discrepancy between the ought and the is of collective value satisfaction, and that disposes men to violence" (Gurr, 1970, p. 23). The risk of collective violence increases if people's expectations of value for life's essential goods and conditions exceed their value capabilities. According to the theory, relative deprivation is transformed into collective acts of violence through psychological mechanisms. The relationship between frustration and aggression describes the function of these mechanisms. The stronger the sense of deprivation, the higher the likelihood of collective violence. A frustrated individual can attack the source of frustration when the circumstances are

appropriate and the source is vulnerable. Individual's tendency to collective violence is inherent in every human being (Gurr, 1970, p. 23). Relative deprivation has three distinct patterns, each of which has the potential to create conditions for the emergence of collective violence; *decremental deprivation*, *progressive deprivation*, and *aspirational deprivation* (Gurr, 1970, p. 46).

Decremental deprivation refers to situations where value expectations remain constant, but value capabilities diminish over time and create discontent. In this pattern of deprivation, discontent arises because people believe that they are no more able to reach the values that they previously owned or aimed to achieve. In short, this deprivation is usually caused by losses. Aspirational deprivation is the pattern in which value expectations rise with time, but value capabilities remain constant. Progressive deprivation is a mechanism that works in situations when value expectations and value capabilities initially rise, however, after a point, value expectations continue to rise and value capabilities remain constant or decline. Progressive deprivation can also be seen as a form of aspirational deprivation (Gurr, 1970, pp. 53-54). This type of deprivation is analogous to Davies' J-curve hypothesis. It is widely observed in societies simultaneously experiencing ideological and systemic changes. According to Gurr (1970), as Davies argued, revolutionary trends are driven by ongoing and dynamic expectations of more significant opportunities to address simple needs. These rising values of expectations may be physical, social and political. Also, for collective violence to emerge, these expectations must be constantly threatened without compromise. The primary mechanism here is the fear of uncertainty about the rapid loss of what is achieved through long-term efforts (pp. 52-53). Progressive relative deprivation is often associated with the inflexibility of political and social institutions that cannot keep up with the pace of social and economic change. Individuals or groups who resist change or think they will suffer from the ongoing change can also experience such deprivation (Gurr, 1970, p. 55).

A Brief Assessment of Collective Behaviour Paradigm. Strain and breakdown theories in this paradigm, try to explain the causes and emergence mechanisms of the collective behaviour, and social movements are seen as one subtype of collective behaviour, such as panics, crazes, crowds, riots, masses, and publics. The very essence of all these explanations, arguments and theories is the assumption that there is an integrated social order under normal conditions. Buechler (2004) stated that this assumption coincides with Durkheim's analysis (1893/1960), which argues the ensuring social integration in modern societies is more difficult compared to pre-modern societies. Because in pre-modern societies, conscience collective and mechanical solidarity prevented social integration from weakening enough to cause collective behaviour. Also, Durkheim's analysis of anomie and egoism in modern society provides a basis for the classical scholarship of collective behaviour. The European views that linked the social breakdown directly with the crowd mentality reinforce this basis (pp. 48-49).

The paradigm of collective behaviour began by addressing that under the conditions of face-to-face communication, intense emotions turn into the crowd logic, and the collective behaviour is irrational and dangerous. It continued by identifying other types of collective behaviour and acknowledging that not every form of collective behaviour has devastating effects on social life. However, collective behaviour was being assessed as a spontaneous, irregular, unstructured phenomenon that contains randomness, contagion, suggestibility and excitability throughout the paradigm. In this sense, it was seen different from the habitual behaviour. The analyses that claimed that collective behaviour provides the emergence of new norms showed that it was also tried to be linked to rational processes (Buechler, 2004, p. 49). Besides, the value-added theory appeared to address collective behaviour from a structuralist-functionalist perspective. In this context, collective behaviour is shaped under the relative determinism of certain structural conditions. However, these conditions are

vague, and the assumption that collective behaviour produces irrational results remained valid. The relative deprivation theory examined the emergence of collective behaviour through social-psychological mechanisms. However, it can be said that it does not explain the transition mechanisms between individual psychological processes and collectivity. Mass society theory also considered collective behaviour as an abnormal stage that would not occur when the society operates well. On the other hand, the paradigm differs from crowd analysis as it sees collective behaviour as actions that come about demanding the realisation of necessary and beneficial social change.

The paradigm is criticised for being inadequate to explain social movements from multiple aspects. First, the claim that social movements stem from social strain ignores the effects of political conditions and contexts in which movements are formed. The emergence of social movements is tried to be explained only by a rectilinear relationship between behaviours on individual scale and the tension on societal scale. Second, the identification of participants depends on their distinction by psychological abnormalities, since the emergence of movements is attributed to individual dissatisfaction. The paradigm does not explain how individual mental states turn into collective formations. Third, collective behaviour is considered separate from its relationship with politics. It was assumed that a shared social-psychological state is enough to produce movements (McAdam, 1982; Buechler, 2004). Also, paradigm considers collectivity as a purposeful phenomenon. However, it relates to the formation of these purposes, to the unexpectedly emerging dynamics. In this context, the paradigm is criticised for its inefficacy to explain what organisations, strategies and choices are formed with demand and necessity of social change (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 14).

When the paradigm is handled in general, it is seen that it produced some concepts that are still valid today and that explain some characteristics of social movements. For example, Blumer's mechanisms show how individual-level grievances are brought to public

sphere, and after this stage how collective behaviour leads to some cultural and organisational accumulations. Also, in his theory, these processes are carried out by actors with a certain agency, and social agents redefine themselves and the social world on the course of collective events. Smelser's has added structural conditions to Blumer's analysis, which bypassed the effects of existing social conditions and systems. It can be said that the relative deprivation theory is also an approach to perceptions of structural conditions that cause the emergence of collective behaviour and movements of social conditions. However, it does not explain why people consider themselves deprived ones. Besides, altruistic movements are outside the scope of the relative deprivation theory. It would make sense to consider mass society theory under the effects of the great disappointment that emerged after the Second World War. It is possible to find the approach more meaningful within the agenda of those days because today we witness strong and personalised demands and opinions as the fuel for social movements, instead of social climates where the atomised individuals are destined to be manipulated. Le Bon's crowd concept and approach, I think it may be more revealing for the approach of Prime Minister Erdogan, the government and mainstream media during the Gezi movement.

The Rational Actor

The fact that social movements took place more frequently and effectively in social life with the effect of rapid social transformations between the 1960s and 1980s caused social movements to become an independent field of scholarship by itself. The criticisms and reactions directed to the paradigm of collective behaviour led the field to the analyses that centre rationality and agency. The rational actor theory and its methodological individualism assume that social behaviour results from the behaviour and decisions of individual actors. This perspective has provided a basis for a paradigm shift in social movement scholarship and the emergence of other successive social movement theories. In this context, what

collective behaviour expressed in the previous period was redefined with the concept of collective action. Although these two concepts are used now interchangeably, they were "referring to different empirical phenomena" (Oliver, 2013, p. 106). Before examining the rational actor theory and other theories that can be collected under the title of rational actor paradigm, I think briefly mentioning the differentiation between these two concepts will provide a better understanding of the essence of this fundamental change.

Collective Action versus Collective Behaviour. Collective action is the essential element of social movements, and movements consist of various forms of it. It can be explained as everything people do when they come together or form groups. Therefore, all actions taken in the name of a social movement, such as protests, riots, rallies, marches, lobbying activities, communicative acts in the cyberspace or press conferences are collective actions. The difference of collective action from collective behaviour is that it refers to goal-oriented, purposive and rational actions rather than being emergent, non-routine, non-normative irrational behaviours. Therefore, unlike collective behaviour, collective action is not only a matter of social psychology; it is a subject of economy, politics and political sociology, and it is mentioned more frequently in social movements scholarship. With the increasing importance of rational actors in the analysis of social movements, the assumption that collective action moves for public goods within an economic framework has become widespread. However, the fact that collective action occurs for getting access to public goods does not mean that it appears every time relevant demands arise. Between the perception of interests and the emergence of the collective action, motivation and coordination processes should be experienced. For this reason, organisers, conditions, mobilisation processes, structures, opportunities, resources, decision-making mechanisms and networks have become critical issues for scholarly disputes on how social movements occur (Oliver, 2013, pp. 106-110).

Rational Actor Theory. Rational actor theory claims that to analyse the social world the actions of individuals should be examined. Because the individual is the core component of the social fabric and applicable to all social phenomena. It criticises functionalism, which examines the parts of the social world and their functions to understand it (Crossley, 2002, pp. 56-57). The theory argues that three important elements need to be examined to explain human social behaviour: *desires*, *opportunities/constraints*, and *rationality*. Accordingly, desires refer to the goals and interests of the actors. Rational actor theory sees desires as underlying, simple, asocial, selfish and private sources of the action motivation, rather than seeing them as a source to explain each action. When desires are assessed in this way, they gain an explanatory quality to the social world. Solidarity and altruistic desires that go beyond the individual interests and goals are considered as variations of these basic desires. Opportunities and constraints are external factors that determine the costs and benefits of actors' actions, and as the goals become harder to achieve, the cost increases. Therefore, opportunities and constraints are the determinants for the emergence of actions. The concept of rationality covers the calculations that individuals make to find the most efficient means to fulfil their desires and achieve their goals. For rational actor theory, rational action is the process of determination of the links necessary to attain goals, and it is unrelated to normative values, beliefs, persuasions or arguments (Crossley, 2002, pp. 57-58). It assumes that actors are fully informed about their world. They are aware of their desires, and their desires can conflict or compete.

Rational actor theory accepts that the actors are also aware of the costs that are required to satisfy their desires and as well as the profits that they will earn if they achieve their goals. Therefore, actors can rate their desires. Degrees of the significance of these desires are generally considered as constants. Thus, it becomes clear why the actors do not always pursue their strongest desires. High costs can prevent actions regarding powerful

desires. On the other hand, a low cost goal can lead to an action even if achieving it is not essential. Desires are stable, but actions diversify because of the opportunities and constraints. Accordingly, Popper (1945/1971) has argued that different actors interpret opportunities and constraints differently. Because of the differences in their social position, the information that actors obtain about opportunities and constraints varies. Therefore, actors interpret opportunities and constraints variously. In this context, what is decisive is not only the opportunities and constraints but also how the actors interpret them. For this reason, actors' subjective opinions about opportunities and constraints should be taken into consideration as much as the opportunities and constraints in a social environment. However, the recognition of subjectivity does not mean that the theory evaluates individual actors heterogeneously. Subjectivity is entirely related to the perception of environmental factors by the actors who has various social positions, and every position is attached to the same shared differences in comparison to others. These differentiated perceptions cause actions to differ. Briefly, rational actor theory claims that social life can be analysed by looking at the actions of individual actors and actions are determined by the rationality that continuously utilised to minimise the costs of efforts to achieve desires or goods and to maximise the benefits gained when the goals are achieved. Also, subjectivity appears only for the perceptions of cost and benefit that vary depending on the social positions of actors and the actions and interactions of other actors (Crossley, 2002, pp. 58-60).

A Brief Assessment of Rational Actor Theory. One criticism of rational actor theory is that it positions social actors in minimal frameworks and considers them as socially disconnected, selfish individuals. In this context, it can be argued that the theory does not explain why some actors take part in collective actions that they will not benefit and it overlooks the effects of issues such as identity on the emergence of social movements. This criticism is also related to the fact that the theory's moral axis connecting actors in a social

formation is shaped by utilitarianism. However, most of the social movements are dealing with social norms, and issues such as justice, freedom or citizenship. The theory, which does not take into account these moral values, therefore overlooks the movements formed through these moral axes I mentioned. Another criticism of the theory is that it accepts that all social actors have an equivalent agency and thusly it does not reveal how the actors are affected by their social worlds. In other words, it is blind to subjectivities. Some versions of the theory take into account the social positions of the actors but cannot determine the effects of these positions on the agency. These criticisms can be merged with the determinations stating that the rational actor theory cannot involve cultural and class analysis of social movements.

The rationality of the rational actor theory is also often seen as problematic because it consists solely of the use of reason to arrive at the means necessary to achieve goals. However, social movements use reason also for other purposes in their trajectories. They apply tactics, develop strategies, try to persuade people and consistently generate reflexive rationality during their journeys. Therefore, it can be stated that such cases in which social movement actors use the reason for these purposes, cannot be grasped by the rational actor theory. One of the recurrent criticisms of rational actor theory is again related to the subjectivity of rational actors. The theory accepts that the actors determine their preferences and goals with their reasoning. In other words, they have access to information that would be sufficient for their reasoning and possess the required perceptive and interpretative skills to perform cost/benefit calculations concerning their social positioning. Therefore, it raises the need to explain the conditions necessary for the operation of this mechanism, as it claims that actors can obtain accurate and sufficient information that allows them to calculate the costs and benefits of collective action. At this point, the theory is not explanatory about the fact that in different social conditions, the ways of obtaining information differ, and thus the rationality differentiates for the actors. For example, a Gezi actor's choice of practising

graffiti as action shows that the actor previously obtained information about how to produce graffiti. However, it cannot be claimed that the actors who did not practice graffiti had not enough information about practising graffiti as a form of collective action. Differently, it can be argued that some actors who took part in the Gezi movement and did not practice graffiti had information about practising graffiti as much as the actors who take this type of action. The theory argues that these differences appear because of the different cost/benefit calculations. However, it does not explain the mechanisms of these differentiations.

Similar criticisms are made for the theory's emphasis on the different calculations depending on how the actors interpret and understand the information that they have because the transformation of actors' information into an understanding or an interpretation also relates to class, cultural or experience-based subjectivities. The assumption that the processes of understanding and interpretation emerge as block assessments of an objective world render meaningless the efforts made by social movements to change individuals' perception of the social world. For instance, the rational actor theory does not answer the question of why Gezi movement actors interpret government policies differently than other actors in society. This deficiency limits the analyses to be made to examine how the demands of social change emerge, which is one of the main issues of social movements scholarship. Another criticism about the theory is the inadequacy of its explanation about the deliberation process that takes place before the action decision. The lack of an analytical perspective on what conditions actors are influenced when making action decisions and which negotiation mechanisms they use, make it difficult for us to understand how distinct forms of negotiation change action decisions and actions. It is one shortcoming of the theory to assume that every actor participating in a social movement has the time and chances to contemplate their rational choices for taking action. The theory is also not explanatory about how actors' desires and preferences arise. It bypasses the effects of historical and biographical accumulations on the

emergence of desires and preferences (Crossley, 2002, pp. 65-74). Briefly, when evaluated on an individual scale, rational actor theory explains the actors' actions with limited and simple selfish preferences. However, it cannot explain why actors with similar basic motivations act differently.

Free Rider Problem. The application of methodological individualism and rationality to the field of social movements was initially realised through the collective action model developed by Mancur Olson (1971). Olson argued that collective action could be explained by the rational and strategic behaviour of individuals focused on their interests and material gains. Olson's approach was methodologically individualistic, but he explained collective action through the combination of individuals' choices (McAdam et al., 2009, p. 268). It can be said that all social movement theories of rational actor paradigm mainly adopt this perspective of Olson and see collective action as the product of rational processes working for individual interests (Özen, 2013, p. 45). The concept of public goods forms the basis of Olson's (1971) view of collective action. In his view, a society can only obtain or be deprived of public goods as a whole. Public goods cannot be consumed individually by actors or hidden from others. Obtaining public goods requires a certain level of collective effort, and social movements and campaigns are forms of these collective efforts. (Olson, 1971, pp. 9-16). The inability to access public goods without collective efforts reveals the free-rider problem. Because any gains on public goods would be available to all members of the society, it is much more risk-free and logical for the actors to wait to benefit from gains, which would be obtained by collective action, taking no action. In other words, individuals take a free ride on the back of the efforts of others without taking any risks (Olson, 1971, pp. 2-3). Olson's free-rider problem is one of the fundamental matters of debate for the rational actor paradigm. The fact that a social actor knows that public goods can be attained without cost makes it irrational to mobilise and to participate in the collective action. On the other

hand, Olson's free-rider problem indicates not only a weakness in the participation of a rational actor in collective action. It also emphasises the importance of organising and organisations for the realisation of collective action and social movements.

Olson (1971) drew attention to three conditions to overcome the free-rider problem and tried to explain how collective action can be rational for the actors. The first is about the size of the group that is involved in collective action. If the group in question is small, norms that require collective action can be spread through face-to-face communication, and members who do not participate in the action can be quickly punished. At this point, the cost of free-riding exceeds the cost of participating in collective action, and participation in collective action becomes a rational choice. The second condition is that collective action would become a rational choice, or at least preferable to free-riding when the cost of participating in collective action is low for the social actor. If the cost of collective action for an actor is low because of the abundant resources it possesses, the cost-benefit balance becomes different, and participation for that becomes more effortless. The third condition in which collective action is preferred over free driving occurs with the presence of selective incentives. Selective incentives are the additional benefits that would be gained when the aimed public goods are achieved, for the actors who take part in collective action. In this context, each type of collective action generates two types of goods: public goods and additional goods. Public goods are those shared by all, which participation in collective action does not create any consumption privileges.

On the other hand, additional goods are those only given to the actors who participate in collective action. Selective incentives can be material benefits; such as money and gifts, but they can also be solidary and purposive. Solidary incentives are about the actor's and the other actors' perspectives about collective action. For example, being together with others, other people's approval for the action or to be recognised of an actor as an honourable and

respectful leader by the other members can be considered as solidary incentives. Purposive incentives are moral and related to religious, ethical or political ideologies and identities. They arise when actors believe participation will make them more virtuous (Johnston, 2014, pp. 40-41; Oliver, 2015, p. 250; Crossley, 2002, pp. 61-64). Briefly, Olson argued that selective benefits can make collective action participation more preferable than free riding. Besides, Oliver (2015) noted that factors such as social influence, ideology, identity and solidarity could also be addressed within the scope of rational actor theory through solidary and purposive incentives. This argument claims that collective actor theory can be brought to where can explain the effects of cultural forms and changeable rationality on the emergence of collective action to some extent.

Resource Mobilisation Theory. Resource mobilisation theory builds itself on the rational actor theory's perspective about the social world and Olson's determinations on collective action. Therefore, it also accepts that actors analyse the social world through the cost/benefit calculations, and act rationally (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1216). However, it differs from the rational actor theory with the determinations it makes in terms of the emergence of social movements. Scholars of resource mobilisation theory tried to understand how rational and often marginalised actors and groups mobilised to announce their demands and achieve their goals, and how their mobilisation capacity influenced social movements and agency (Gamson 1975; McCarthy & Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris & Herring, 1987; Tarrow, 2012).

One of the primary arguments of resource mobilisation theory is that the groups need resources to provide their members with selective incentives to overcome the free-rider problem. Oberschall (1973) argued that actors take part in social movement under the circumstances of bloc recruitment, and the essence of social movement mobilisation is organisation. According to him, social movements do not occur because of atomised

individuals being manipulated by influential leaders. On the contrary, actors participate in movements through their group memberships. However, groups have unique characteristics. For example, members of traditional groups are linked by cultural, local or religious identities. On the other hand, for the members of civic groups with modern social and organisational features, membership is about contracts and shared interests.

Oberschall (1973) has also stated that groups can also be evaluated based on how they determine actors' participation. At this point, internal and external relations and connections of groups come to the fore. Groups with high internal bonds are more open to mobilise, and the cost of participation is relatively low for them. On the other hand, groups with various external connections do not quickly mobilise because there are various balances at stake to be minded. Oberschall (1973) showed that traditional groups are more able to provide solidary and purposive selective incentives because such groups can easily promise and provide collective identity, companionship and solidarity. However, civic groups with organisational aspects that need material incentives for mobilisation need resources to promise and provide these incentives. These resources are often material goods, and their distribution costs are high (Johnston, 2014, pp. 39-40).

Selective incentives are generally promised, mobilised and provided by the social movement leaders for the members. Similarly, there are also incentives to mobilise social movement leaders. The promise of achieving better status in social formation could be such an incentive for a leader, for example. Especially for heavily marginalised, repressed and targeted groups and their leaders, helplessness can also be an incentive. Because in such cases, for leaders and group members, mobilising becomes the only way to gain benefits. Cost and benefit assessments to gain access to incentives provide information to understand the nature of the mobilisation and exchange of resources, which are the main dynamics of social movements for the resource mobilisation theory. To mobilise, groups need to have

resources and put them into use effectively. Therefore, the emergence of social movements is not about the increase and spread of social grievances. Because grievances are always present in society, and their abundance is not enough for collective action to appear. Movements occur when groups have the resources that they can spend to mobilise. Resources are easier to access in societies developing economically and in systems where repression is receding. Because, under such conditions, resources become abundant, and the cost of collective action decreases. Where resources are not sufficient, its effectiveness is low even if collective action occurs (Oberschall, 1973; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977). According to Oberschall (1973), obtaining the necessary resources for mobilisation is also related to interactions among various groups. External groups can inject resources to powerless groups. Since resources are not equally distributed in the societies, groups that are deprived of resources can only access them through alliances. Within this perspective, the importance of the elites in a society for the emergence of social movements emerges because they possess resources that the subordinates have to reach to mobilise (Crossley, 2002, pp. 79-80).

Sociologists McCarthy and Zald (1977) sought to establish a comprehensive conceptual framework to explain the dynamics of resource mobilisation and the principles of rational action, in terms of social movements. For McCarthy and Zald (1977) a social movement is a "set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society" (pp. 1217-1218), and a counter-movement is a "set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement" (p. 1218). Social movements represent the collective interests of various social groups with limited access to institutional politics. They aim to influence institutional politics in line with these interests (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 14). McCarthy and Zald (1977) argued that the pre-existing organisation and integration of these social groups, which share the same social preferences, is decisive in the emergence of social

movements and counter-social movements. According to their framework, there are *bystanders*, *adherents* and *constituents*. Bystanders are those who watch what is going on, adherents are the people who share the same social change preferences, and finally, constituents are the adherents who provide various resources to enable the mobilisation (Edwards & Gillham, 2013, p. 1418). Adherents become constituents because they think they will benefit from the struggles or the successes of social movements. Besides, sometimes, adherents may think if they intensify their activism for a movement, they will benefit more. However, not all potential beneficiaries turn into constituents. Free-riding and selective incentives come to the fore here again as determinants. On the other hand, not every constituent resourcing a social movement is a potential beneficiary. McCarthy and Zald have named these constituents as *conscience beneficiaries*; those who resource the movements but do not expect any benefits (1977, p. 1222). The role of elites that Oberschall emphasised in his analysis can be associated with this concept.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) termed the organisations, which turn the bystanders into adherents and the adherents into constituents, as social movement organisations. According to them, social movement organisations are complex and formal organisations that operate to achieve the goals of social movements (p. 1218). Social movement organisations try to mobilise various resources for social movements by implementing various methods (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004). They are the organisational actors that aspire to influence public policies by developing strategies in line with the collective interests they represent (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1217). The most important contribution of social movement organisations to social movements is to recruit adherents. The ability of a social movement to form its base is determined by how successful the social movement organisation(s) working for it (Schussman & Soule, 2005, pp. 1097-1098). Social movement organisations also manage cooperative relations among adherents and activists. If a social movement with a rich action

repertoire covering more than one event has emerged, this indicates the existence of a social movement organisation as well (McCarthy & Zald, 2001, p. 537). Some social movement organisations control vast resources and use professional teams. However, less formal and local organised groups manage most of them. All social movement organisations that try to mobilise resources to ensure that a social movement achieves its goals, form a social movement industry. If various social movement industries make efforts for a social movement, they constitute a social movement sector (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1220).

This conceptual framework developed by McCarthy and Zald (1977) can be restated through some economic analysis terms, as Crossley noted (2002, pp. 85-87). When core elements of their analysis are evaluated by using the logic of economic systems in which entrepreneurship dominates the market, it becomes clear how the theory explains the formation of social movements. In this very formation, adherents and constituents are those who demand social change. Social movement organisations try to meet these demands in society by supplying necessary resources for movements. Simultaneously, they continuously try to generate new demands to get more benefits. Because the costs that claimants agree to pay to meet their demands make up the selective incentives for social movement organisations. Social movement organisations are also potential beneficiaries, and these benefits can differ from the potential benefits of the movement adherents and constituents. Nevertheless, mostly they apply to the movements' struggles. Promises and opportunities for these benefits lead social movement organisations to find new demands that will generate more benefits, just like investing companies. Therefore, social movement organisations compete. This competition is the dynamic that creates social movement industries and sectors, and stems from the efforts given by the organisations to access the resources to be mobilised.

The ways social movements have access to resources and opportunities to find resources are different (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 114). Most social movement organisations use internal and external resources together and continuously develop new tactics and practices to access them. The way organizations access resources can directly affect the course and success of movements. Resource access mechanisms can be broadly grouped under four headings; *self-production*, *aggregation*, *co-optation/appropriation* and *patronage*.

Self-production is the fundamental mechanism that social movement organisations produce resources through the agency of participants, pre-existing organisations and activists. Aggregation is the mechanism that social movement organisations gather resources from various and unconnected potential or conscience beneficiaries and convert them into the forms of collective resources. Co-optation/appropriation refers to the use of resources, which produced or aggregated by existing organisations, by social movement organisations. This mechanism is generally based on the principle of mutual resource use between organisations. Finally, patronage is the mechanism in which resources are provided for social movement organisations by individuals or organisations that specialised in patronage (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004).

Just as the question of how to access resources, resource types are essential for resource mobilisation theory. Resource mobilisation scholars have identified five distinct resource types in this context: *moral*, *cultural*, *social-organisational*, *human* and *material resources* (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 117). Moral resources include legitimacy, integrity, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 125). It is argued that social movements, which can express their demands in a way that does not conflict with institutionally legitimate or popular expectations, are more successful than movements that cannot. Cultural resources guide social movements to avoid such

conflicts. Besides, a social movement must manage not to be seen as a cultural disturbance in the social fabric, and this problem can be overcome with external supports. A social movement supported by respected celebrities can have comprehensive coverage in the media in a short time and can quickly gain sympathy and support. Besides, cultural resources provide strategic information about how social movements should accomplish specific tasks. They provide knowledge on issues such as accessing new resources, generating events and mobilising. Unlike moral resources, they are not evenly distributed in societies. Therefore, not every group member has the skills and capabilities needed by a social movement to perform specific tasks. In comparison with moral resources, they are widely available, less proprietary, and accessible for use (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, p. 126) because their mobilisation does not have to depend on the decisions or support of external actors. Cultural resources give answers to questions such as how to organise a demonstration or a press conference, or how to use music in a specific action.

Social-organisational resources are essential to explain how social movements mobilise. Some of these resources are intentional, and some are appropriable. Intentional organisations are built specifically for the goals of a social movement. Appropriable resources are obtained by putting pre-existing organisations into operation for a social movement. For example, gathering volunteers for a movement is the creation of an intentional organisation. Assign a pre-existing network of volunteers for a movement indicates that an appropriable organisation becomes the resource. In this context, it can be argued that the environmental conditions of social movement actors and their relations with other groups determine what kind of social organisation source is accessible to them. Moreover, it can be alleged that groups that access such resources more efficiently would mobilise more easily. Infrastructures such as communicative tools or urban architecture cannot be assigned only to social movements. However, the control of social networks and

organisations can be taken over by them. Such resources can be dominated by a social movement, and their use by other movements and actors can be restricted. Social-organisational resources also determine what resources a movement can access. Inequality in mobilization performances is also due to the uneven distribution of resources in the society. Therefore, mobilisation capabilities of movements are also unequal.

Human resources are labour, experience, skills, expertise and leadership. Compared to other sources, they are more tangible because they are gained through the direct approval of individual actors and members. A social movement's capacity of human resources depends on its actors' cooperation level in social movement organisations. Using human resources is affected by individuals' social relationships, moral commitments, obligations, life-course constraints, economic and spatial factors. They should be aggregated per the needs of a social movement organisation. Therefore, they differ from cultural resources. For example, the contribution of an ordinary individual to a social movement mobilised for a better judicial system would differ from that of a lawyer. Finally, material resources include both financial and physical capital. Money, properties, equipment and other supplies are material resources. According to the theory, money is a resource that must be obtained by every social movement organisation because the mobilisation of all other resources should be financed (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, pp. 125-128).

The perspective in which the aforementioned access and resource types are in constant interaction and competition delineates the social world of the resource mobilisation theory in terms of social movements. According to this, organisational manoeuvrability is crucial for the demands of social change to be spoken. The manoeuvrability of social movement organisations and the usefulness and the value of resources they offer to social movements are transformational, and they vary in different contexts in unique ways. These relational processes affect the exchange values of the resources that under the control of various social

movements (Gamson, 1975; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Zald & McCarthy, 2001). A social movement fails when the organisations working for it fail. However, it may also have difficulties in accessing resources because of the constraining efforts of external organisations. In terms of social movement organisations, all types of accesses and resources that I have examined so far can be used to produce demobilisation. The theory emphasises rational actors, strategy and organisation, and makes determinations and predictions about how social groups can achieve the social change they desire, outside of established political systems.

Besides the effects of resource exchange on the formation of mobilisation, the resource mobilisation theory focuses on networks. According to this perspective, individuals live as members of groups and communities as a natural necessity of social life. Therefore, they establish strongly or weakly tied networks, and these networks are based on specific amounts of interdependency and solidarity. According to the network perspective, interdependency and solidarity among network members can generate powerful organisations and provide abundant resources for struggles that demand social change. In this context, it is claimed that the networks are suitable for the formation of movements. Because they contain close-knit relationships, in which the impacts of selective incentives and sanctions are strongly felt.

Furthermore, interdependency reduces free-riding as much as possible. Networks can quickly transform into more administrative and organisational structures thanks to their leaders, spatial assembly habits, and pre-established communication channels. Therefore, it is possible to argue that some social movements emerge as extensions and variations of these networks established in the flow of everyday life. Personal ties, such as neighbourhood, friendship or family membership, facilitate mobilisation (Oberschall, 1973; McAdam, 1982). Oberschall (1973) claimed that there is a connection between the abundance of resources that

networks can use and social segmentation. Networks that are significantly disconnected from elite groups and other networks are more suitable for social movement formation because these networks do not have rich and sufficient sources of interaction to draw the attention of the elite to their demands and grievances. Similarly, elite groups are not close enough to these networks to draw them back into social control and produce consensus.

Decreased interaction between aggrieved groups and elite groups increases the likelihood of protests. Besides, the lack of inter-group transitivity ensures that prominent members of the aggrieved groups remain in the network. Aggrieved groups can protect their human resources. Individuals turn into actors more easily if the networks that they are already members produce social movements. However, new external networks taking part in the movement may be restrictive for participation because these networks mean new commitments and extra material or emotional costs for actors (Snow et al., 1980).

In terms of resource mobilisation theory, the relationship between networks and social movements involves networks' transformation into movements. Networks mostly become social movements' organisational centres. As movements expand, their networks expand. They supply rich resources to social movements, and movements produce new networks to access new resources. In a social movement formation, many types of networks and subnetworks interact, and these interactions consist of amalgam of complex and multi-faceted processes. Social movement organisations have internal networks, and they establish networks with other organisations. Also, movement actors can have multiple organisational or movement memberships through different networks (Tilly, 1978; Diani, 1992).

A Brief Assessment of Resource Mobilization Theory. Resource mobilisation theory is essential with its emphasis on the existence of stable movement activism and the role of political elites in the formation of a social movement, compared to most perspectives that

focus solely on the emergence of social movements. Besides, social movements are not seen as unusual phenomena that suddenly appear, do not belong to the political sphere and disappear again is an important contribution of the theory to the social movements scholarship. In this way, the acceptance of the existence of an ongoing social movement area has completed, and the transformation of demands for social change into collective action has stopped to be seen as a breakdown that needs to be eliminated (Crossley, 2002, p. 103).

The resource mobilisation theory, as I mentioned earlier, agrees with the basic assumption of the rational actor theory; actors always act in line with their interests, and their motivations for collective action are generated to protect or to maximise them. For the same reason it is criticised because some of its concepts are inconsistent with the perspective of actors' rationality. One of these concepts is conscience constituents. This concept refers to actors who mobilise resources for a social movement and expect no benefit. At this point, solidary and purposive incentives come into play. Incentives or punishments that perceived by the actors, under the effects of various cultural forms, ideas/ideologies, or emotions that govern the behavioural preferences within a group, are seen as softeners of the rigid self-interest assumption. However, resource mobilisation theory, like rational actor theory, argues that its predictive value and its analytical capabilities stem from the actors' rationality that constantly works for the protection and maximisation of self-interests. Although it is appropriate to include conscience constituents to theory, their presence conflicts with the theory's basic argument.

Another of the shortcomings of the theory arising from the rational actor approach is the argument that social movement organisations generate and offer benefits or rewards for the social movement actors and their members. On the contrary, many contemporary social movement organisations do not emerge to gain benefits and to provide rewards for their actors that would be obtained in case of participation in collective action. As Crossley (2002)

emphasised, distribution of incentives, rewards or punishments is carried out by group networks, and internal network dynamics are more relevant to the symbolic processes that cause these mechanisms to appear. In this context, it can be stated that the rational actor's disjointed model of agency cannot be explanatory. Agency should be evaluated with the group and network dynamics. Also, McCarthy and Zald's (1977) resource mobilisation model seems inadequate to describe how demands for social change arise. A social world in which all actors are utilitarian cannot explain the all demands for social change. Some actors' preferences regarding collective action may include altruistic features. Moreover, it is seen that the tendency to support or join a social movement differs even if the demands or interests remain the same. For example, it can be said that every actor and social group participating in the Gezi movement were opposed to the government at certain levels. However, it cannot be alleged that every anti-government/oppositional actor or group in Turkey have taken part in the movement. The resource mobilisation cannot explain why such preference differences arise regarding the action.

Another criticism of the theory is that it assumes formal social movement organisations are a prerequisite to struggle effectively for social change. However, formal organisations can sometimes become very bureaucratic and lose their critical mechanisms because of an oligarchical constancy. In such cases, demands for sweeping social change cannot be adequately pursued by social organisations. Besides, this approach ignores the effectiveness of organisations that appear in loose and less formal forms in the name of social change (Crossley, 2002, pp. 89-92).

Besides, the theory can be criticised for placing all forms of collective action in a social world dominated by normative collective interests or for being insufficient in explaining non-normative collective action. Some social movements rise against the basic norms of their social worlds from which they come out. They may choose the fundament

organisational structures of their social world as rivals and demand that all social norms be reconsidered. Moreover, there are social movements that oppose the very idea of capitalist rationality, which is very distinct from the theory's perspective of the rational actor that says the base dynamic of the collective action formation is the self-interest. Recently, many social movements refuse the traditional ways of organisation and use loose, horizontal and connective novel ways of rhizomatic diffusion and action. Occupy movements; for instance, feature such organisational criticisms, and their organisational preferences become embodied by bodily participation, connective ways of cyber networking and demonstrative actions (Maeckelbergh, 2012). The assumption that these kinds of movements will structure their organisations according to established norms that determine social organisations is inconsistent, and implicitly suggest that social movements that demand the change of organisational ways of movements cannot be formed. A certain level of organisation is indispensable for a social movement to be formed, sustained and successful. However, addressing established and apparent forms of organisation as the only remedy for organisational necessities means overlooking both the creative potential and fluidity of group and network interactions.

In addition, resource mobilisation theory assumes social movement organisations and networks as constants. However, the existence of networks is not a requirement for every social movement formation, and networks can sometimes play reconciling roles to prevent their interactions with other networks, and the intensity of their social segmentation. Therefore, they should not be seen as constants, just like movement organisations (Piven & Cloward, 1992).

Finally, the theory contains ontological assumptions that conflict with each other about the agency. It is impossible to define the agency consistently, using in unison the individualism of rational actor and the collectivism of networks created by interdependence

and solidarity (Crossley, 2002, p. 101). In short, resource mobilisation theory' emphasis on actors who make rational choices and organisational ecologies is remarkable. However, it does not address specific cases and structural sources of social conflicts that determine which actors will act. It is criticised for overstating the political entrepreneurship and ignoring the self-organising potential of victim groups (Melucci, 1989; Piven & Cloward, 1992).

Opportunity Structures and Political Process Theory. Political process theory has emerged as an alternative to classical strain models and the resource mobilisation theory. It has also offered an alternative set of explanatory factors to the factors, which became widespread among the models that appeared through the synthesis of these two antecedent approaches. It emphasises the importance of expanding political opportunities, established organisations and cognitive liberation. Many notions of the theory, especially its approach to social networks and cost-benefit calculations, have resemblances with the resource mobilisation theory. However, theory becomes distinct from its systemic analyses concerning the political and institutional environment and the formation of social movements. The focus of the political process theory is the relations between the actors of institutional politics and protests. Social movements struggling with the established political order have to interact with established actors of this order. The theory in this context produces arguments about the impact of environmental factors and governments on the formation of social movements. These effects are called as political opportunity structures. Political opportunities refer to "dramatic events and/or cumulative change processes that cause established political systems to become more vulnerable or receptive towards the challenge" (McAdam, 2013, p. 484).

Peter Eisinger (1973) was the first scholar to draw attention to the concept of political opportunity structures. After his comprehensive study of race riots of the 1960s and urban-based protests in the United States, he separated protest from collective violence and argued that it is a form of instrumental activity involving the cost and benefit calculations of actors.

For him, violence was an expressionist act in which actors no longer calculate costs (1973, pp. 13-14). Eisinger (1973) has also emphasised relations between protest forms and political opportunity structures and argued that protests are related to the political environment of the cities, and political opportunity structures can facilitate or constrain institutional political participation. He believed that to understand the relationships regulating the opportunities for actors to gain access to a political system, one should study the political environment of that system. "By measuring these environmental factors, the analyst develops a means to judge the nature of the biases which groups in a political system must confront" (Eisinger, 1973, p. 12). Eisinger (1973) identified political opportunities as openings in which actors could influence policy formation and political decision-making mechanisms. In this context, he tried to reveal the relationship between the numbers of openings in political systems and the mobilisation frequency of urban social movements. According to him, political systems can be relatively open or closed. Openness or closeness are determined by how a given political system responds to the actors who want to have a say in decision-making mechanisms and to achieve their representation. In closed political systems, opportunities for aggrieved groups to participate in formal political institutions or to generate social change are limited. Therefore, protests are more likely to occur. If these opportunities and constraints coexist in a political system, protests will reach the highest level (Eisinger, 1973, pp. 25-28). Eisinger (1973, p. 28) also argued that in repressive political systems and in political environments that provide abundant opportunities for actors to take part in policymaking, the possibility of protest formation decreases.

In repressive closed systems, the cost of protesting is very high, and the capacity to enrich political opportunities is low. Such systems cannot tolerate protests. On the other hand, in open systems, the need for protest is minimal because actors already can access to decision-making processes. In mixed political systems in which the features of closed and

open systems coexist, and in closed systems that are becoming open systems, protests are likely to occur because the pace of systemic political change cannot meet the rate of rising expectations.

As a political system becomes open, the aggrieved groups of the previous structure expand their effectiveness within the system. However, institutional political tools are not yet practical enough to meet the needs of these groups. In a political system that is opening up, it is inevitable for aggrieved groups to realise that the system became vulnerable to political influences. Furthermore, the existence of continuing inequalities becomes intolerable for these groups, and this leads to the rise of protests (Eisinger, 1973, p. 15).

Eisinger (1973) has also alleged that the presence of protests can be considered as a sign of a system's opening because the emergence and spread of protests are related to the political system's response to them. If a political system responds to protests openly, that constitutes the primal resource needed by the actors to sustain their campaign, to form public opinion and to reach their goal. Unresponsive political systems are likely to diminish protests' success because elites' recruiting capabilities cannot prevail against the systems' coercive capabilities as long as protests are unsuccessful. Therefore, protests are more likely to be successful in responsive systems (p. 27). Another critical point here is that Eisinger developed a process perspective while he associates the change of systems with protests. In this way, changing opportunity processes offer more than the limitations of various constants to understand and define the agency.

Additionally, it is also essential how actors perceive the opportunities for the political process theory. An additional perceptual layer plays a role here. Social movements are influenced not only by political opportunity structures but also by how their actors perceive these structures. Actors' awareness about the level of openness of a given system is formed

by the feedback received from the actors of the ongoing protests, and the success of the antecedent protests facilitates the emergence of the new ones. In this context, an argument is put forward that actors' perception of change in political opportunity structures is not effective in collective action formation unless it is supported by experience (Crossley, 2002, p. 109; Tarrow, 2012, p. 77). Eisinger's emphasis on relations between the changes in political opportunity structures, how actors perceive them, and social movement formation have led many scholars to new studies, analyses and arguments (e.g. Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; Kriesi, 1989; Diani, 1996).

Political scientist Sidney Tarrow (2012) has suggested that political opportunity structures encompass both opportunities and constraints. He defined them as "a set of clues for when contentious politics will emerge and will set in motion a chain of causation that may ultimately lead to sustained interaction with authorities and thence to social movements" (2012, p. 33). According to Tarrow (2012), political opportunity structures include the manoeuvres and interventions of political systems to prevent or weaken social movements, and all the elements that encourage or steer the actors to take part in movements and protests. They do not always have to be formal. They can be local or impermanent. For Tarrow (2012) political opportunity structures are one of the essential factors that affect social movements and the formation of protests, along with networks, resources and frames. He agrees with Eisinger's conclusion that protests and social movements emerge and rise when political systems open. The increase and opening of opportunities can be manifested in various political systems variously. Opening opportunities can be observed when an aggrieved group gain new rights, a political power's paradigm is shifted, the weaknesses of a repressive system become apparent, or the transformative effects of a new political actor are felt in the political environment.

Tarrow (2012) also deepened the explanations of the political process theory on the role of feedback in the protest formation. He argued that the feedback created by the movements and protests in a given political environment could affect protest formation in three distinct ways. First, social movements and protests can change political opportunity structures in favour of themselves and their allies. Second, movements and protests can lead to the formation of counter-movements or transform the counter-movements. Third, if movements and protests are deemed as sources of a political survival problem, they can cause repressive regimes to take measures that are even more repressive and change the political environment in this direction. According to Tarrow (2012), the strength, centralisation, and capacity to use repressive policies of states are the constant factors that influence the political opportunity structures. States can respond to various movements differently depending on how the centralisation and the strength are clustered within a given political system or that states develop original strategies for distinct movements. Therefore, different social movements in the same political environment may implement a variety of forms differently and achieve different levels of successes. Centralised and powerful states can weaken protests and movements by repressive methods and make the opposition invisible. However, repressive state control may lead the opposition to radicalisation, or enable radical groups to take over the area of opposition. Because in such cases, the cost of consent exceeds the cost of protest. Additionally, repressive political systems can become very vulnerable to oppositional movements. Because in these systems, the power is centralised and merged, thusly it can be an open, easier target to be seized. In the states where the power is distributed, it is much more challenging to seize power. The only solution for the repressive states is to intervene in the opposition by force. More democratic systems have flexible structures to absorb the oppositional movements or protests, and they can allow the counter-movements to emerge by utilising the same structures (pp. 157-180). Besides, there is a

possibility of emerging underground resistance cultures in repressive political systems. These cultures cannot openly stage protests, but they pursue their resistance in everyday life (Scott, 1985). In such systems, movements may sustain themselves, while political opportunities are being restricted. When opportunities are open again, they re-engage in the political system (Crossley, 2002, p. 113).

Sociologist Doug McAdam (1982) is one of the scholars who developed the political process theory with his original model. In his movement analysis model, McAdam (1982) argued that social movements should be examined in longer terms and emphasised the importance of movements' authentic processes. He also suggested that the courses and transformations of social movements should be analysed like ongoing careers. For McAdam, focusing only on the emergence and mobilisation stages is not enough to understand movements because the factors that facilitate or constrain them may change. By considering these structural and processual transformations, it would be possible to trace social movements together with their trajectories. Over time, movements can lose their access to political opportunities or the opportunities can become re-distributed. Therefore, it is necessary to examine movements as a processual series of phases including pre-mobilisation, mobilisation and disintegration processes.

Other significant contributions of McAdam to the political process theory are the notions of *cognitive liberation* and *insurgent consciousness* (1982, p. 48). For McAdam, people rarely rebel against the status quo. For the formation of insurrection, people should think they are the victims of illegitimate or unjust policies and have the power to change their destiny. McAdam named this process as cognitive liberation. Cognitive liberation refers to a process in which people become realise their collective strength and advantage of political opportunities. In the early stages of most social movements and protests, actors are not sure whether their efforts will change anything. Cognitive liberation is a stage in which such

doubts disappear or are minimised. In this context, it may be the initiator or the processual outcome of protests and movements (McAdam, 2015, p. 69). Mobilisation occurs when actors think their grievances can be resolved and the demanded social change is possible. For this to happen, a group's grievance must be collectively recognised, and collective action should take place. At this stage, cognitive liberation generates insurgent consciousness (McAdam, 1982, p. 51). With cognitive liberation and insurgent consciousness, McAdam added a new dimension regarding subjectivity and perceptions to political opportunity processes (Crossley, 2002, p. 114). In this perspective, it can be concluded that political opportunities can transform depending on collective psychological processes.

McAdam (1994, pp. 37; 46) has also examined the interactions between opportunities and networks of solidarity. For him, these interactions create movement cultures, which generate the conditions to social movements emerge, and these cultures thrive in homogeneous and highly integrated networks. Opportunities, networks and insurgent consciousness are the constantly interacting factors that build a career of a movement. According to McAdam (1994), there is another factor that shapes the career of a movement; *social control agencies*. Social control agencies can create effects that stop, facilitate, or expand social movement mobilisation. Therefore, they can direct movements to develop new tactics, to preserve some strategies or to be innovative. Between social control agencies and movements, there is an ongoing strategic wrestle, particularly if agents aim to fail a social movement. Outcomes of social control agents' interventions directly affect the subjective and perceptual processes. Thus, perceived political opportunities become changeable, and this is a significant factor for a social movement's career.

McAdam (1986) has also argued that there is a clear connection between the expectations of movement actors and the reality they experience. If actors cannot explain the events they encounter with usual definitions and patterns, a shock effect occurs, and this

causes anxiety. However, anxiety may turn into an intoxicating feeling if agents react to these unusual unexplainable events with an unusual collective response. With this feeling, actors who go beyond their usual explanations and enter a new world. This world presents a movement and resistance culture. In this new world, actors perceive and interpret the events in unusual ways, and they acquire new identities. Through these new identities gathered from collective networks, they see themselves as new members of a newly formed homogenous group or a community. This new identification process may enable actors to see themselves as efficient actors of a new, alternative political area that does not use the usual ways of opportunity structures. Biographies of actors and features of their socialisation determine their tendencies of appropriation, thusly the recruitment processes. Social networks are central factors in actors' participation. If people with whom an individual has a close relationship (such as familial or friendship ties) join a social movement, it becomes easier for this person to join that particular movement. However, if the costs of participation are too high, this process may lose its function. Under such circumstances, participation requires strong ideological ties and proximity. Besides, people who are experienced about being an actor of a movement are keen to take part in other collective actions. Participation in the collectivity allows actors to consolidate and adapt their beliefs and identities. Thus, they can join with more risky and costly collective actions at the next stages (Crossley, 2002, pp. 116-119).

Political process theory has been used to explain the formation of many diverse social movements, such as the US women's movement (Costain, 1992), the nuclear freeze movement (Meyer, 1993) and the new social movements that emerged in France and West Germany (Koopmans & Duyvendak, 1995). In the literature, it is seen that most of the studies using the theory place more emphasis on political opportunity structures than established organisations and cognitive liberation factors. However, there are a variety of studies seeing

political opportunity structures in distinct ways. The differentiation between the studies focusing on the effects of stable differences between political opportunity structures on movement formation and the studies related to the variable expansion and contraction processes of political opportunity structures reveals the first of these distinctions. Another distinction that emerges when the studies within the theory are examined becomes clear between the approach that sees political opportunities as the objective features of institutional power and the approach that sees them as subjective and structured factors. Besides, culture-based approaches have added discursive opportunity structures to political opportunity structures and emphasised that these structures are vital for the formation and development of social movements (Ferree, 2003; Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Discursive opportunity structures express how institutions outside the political arena, such as the media or courts, can narrow and expand perceived opportunities through framing (McAdam, 2013, p. 485).

A Brief Assessment of Political Process Theory. The political process theory has provided favourable expansions for the analysis of interactions between established actors and emerging actors in the political field. Besides, it has eliminated the necessity to view the socio-political world as two poles; the conventional systems of interest representation and the actions that force political systems to change. It has been observed that not all social movements are anti-systemic or focused on the failures of systems. In this sense, the role of social movements in politics can be evaluated more efficiently (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 17). However, the theory is being criticised for its arguments regarding political opportunity structures are not sufficiently explanatory. As noted, the theory argues that political opportunity structures emerge in processes where a political system opens and the possibilities of change become obvious in the eyes of aggrieved ones, and this facilitates the formation of social movements. According to criticisms, it cannot explain the timing of the emergence of social movements.

The theory suggests that there are political opportunity structures that vary from society to society. However, it is also criticized for failing to provide any mechanism for explaining what types of social movements arose in different types of society. Concordantly, for the actors, to discern the political opportunity structures can be relatively easy if they live in a repressive regime that opens up and it would make sense to claim that their awareness or newly obtained perception can lead to the formation of protests and social movements. However, in democratic or democratising systems, it will be harder for ordinary actors to spot the changes in the level of openness because these alterations would not create dramatic and drastic effects. Also, it is stated that the theory has lost its specificity because many studies that focus on political opportunity structures reveal constantly new variables, and this is claimed to cause a perspective that says a lot but expresses little. That problem becomes more evident, especially in comprehensive and comparative studies. Overemphasising on structural variables leads to less attention to other relevant factors influencing social movements such as norms, values, discourses or goals (Crossley, 2002, p. 120, Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 17).

Moreover, it is claimed that the argument that social movements and protests occur when political systems open, ignores the formations that take place in societies where the political system and hence political opportunity structures remain stable. According to criticisms of political process theory, the importance of the accumulation of growing social grievances should come into prominence again because the emergence and diffusion of movements and protests in societies whose political systems closing or not opening up can be only explained through victimisation and the outrage caused by victimisation. In this respect, it would be appropriate to consider the opportunities and social grievances as two different and essential variables of the social movement and protest formation. The explanations on such incidents that argue that the cost of not participating exceeds the cost of taking action

are also criticised. It has been alleged that this is nothing more than a re-articulation of the rise of grievances in aggrieved groups, which is formulated to preserve the analytical capabilities of the theory (Crossley, 2002, pp. 120-122). Besides, the theory is criticised for transcending the cultural contexts such as sexual orientations, minorities or identities that cause most of the contemporary social movements and reducing all these processes to a structural political plane (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 18).

Contentious Politics. Contentious politics that emerged out from the political process theory tries to bring a more inclusive perspective to social struggle than the field of social movements. Sociologist Charles Tilly coined the concept during the 1970s and argued that social contention is not only limited to the field of social movements and protests. He argued that analysing all popular forms of mobilisation under the heading of social movements led scholars to methodological inadequacies. He claimed that rather than analysing the objects or cases, scholars should focus on the relational mechanisms in contention to understand the interaction between movements and institutional politics, the dynamics between movements and other actors, and the relations between different contentions (Tilly, 1978; 1986; 1995; Tarrow, 2015). The approach also examines less sustained and extensive forms of contention, such as riots, strikes, civil wars, revolutions, or episodes of anti-democratisation. Contentious politics are

"episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants" (McAdam et al., 2004, p. 5).

Contentious politics proposes a systematic approach explanatory for all forms of social opposition. For this, it tries to identify and analyse common mechanisms of different

instances of contention and instead of identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for mobilisation or collective action; it aims to identify the causal and recurrent mechanisms that occur in their concatenation (McAdam et al., 2004, p. 13).

The approach offers three analytical terms for the analysis of contentious politics; *mechanisms*, *processes* and *episodes*. Mechanisms are "delimited changes that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations", processes are "regular sequences of mechanisms that produce similar, complex and contingent transformations" and episodes are "contentious flows including collective claims-making that have relevance to other actors' interests" (McAdam et al., 2004, p. 24).

Briefly, contentious politics approach examines these episodes and the mechanisms and processes that constitute them (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015).

Tilly and Tarrow (2015, p. 87) argued that episodes are always around us. They cover all the relations and interactions among claim makers, their allies, their opponents, governments, the media and the public. Contentious politics use the differences among certain episodes to explain the processes of mobilisation or demobilisation. Briefly, all these interactions are seen by the approach as the cumulative efforts of the claimants, third parties and governments. Contentious episodes do not include regular and planned political cycles, such as voting or elections. In this perspective, the notion of the public does not mean the actors who organise and make claims through established organisations such as churches or companies. Contention emerges in these areas; however, the political contention that the approach focuses on takes policies of governments and interventions of their coercive agents under consideration (Tarrow, 2013, p. 145).

Contentious politics examines dynamic political processes and analyses the processes and mechanisms that make up those processes. However, the concept of the process for

contentious politics means something different from what it expresses for political process theory. It is more about the political process of intersecting mechanisms. In contentious politics, processes are the combinations or the sequences of various mechanisms.

Mechanisms come together, work together and lead to more complex and contingent transformations. Therefore, contentious processes can be dismantled into the mechanisms that form them, and their working principles can be understood in this way. Besides, these various processes can be compared to understand how specific mechanisms work. The differences observed in the absence or presence of a mechanism would reveal the transformation of processes in unique environments. Moreover, it can be decided which mechanisms strengthen which certain processes by examining how frequently they emerge. Finally, processes that are large enough to transform a country or a national issue can also be analysed with this mechanism-process approach (Tilly, 2004).

According to the contentious politics approach, performances and repertoires can be transferred to the next episodes of contention. They are not free from innovation and evaluation. Mechanisms that do not succeed will fade away, and the ones that bring success continue to live.

In contentious politics, the most common mechanisms are *brokerage*, *diffusion* and *coordinated action* (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). Brokerage is the establishment of a new connection between two disconnected sites. Diffusion is the spread of contention, an issue or framing from one site to another. Finally, coordinated action refers to signalling and claim-making of two or more actors for the same issue (p. 31). When brokerage, diffusion and coordination come together, the coordinated action occurs. Tilly and Tarrow (2015) called this process the new coordination (p. 35).

Also, some mechanisms expand contentious episodes. These are *social appropriation*, *boundary activation*, *certification*, *identity shift*, *competition* and *escalation/ radicalisation*. Social appropriation is the transformation of non-political groups into political actors using their organisational and institutional capabilities to produce movement campaigns. Boundary activation is the creation of new boundaries or distinctions between challenging groups and their targets. Certification is a mechanism by which an external authority states that it is ready to support the demands and existence of a political actor. Identity shift is the emergence of new identities among challenging groups. Competition is the competition mechanism between different groups and organisations that make up a social movement. Escalation/radicalisation mechanism describes the situations in which social movements face with violence and radicalise their tactics and demands (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, pp. 36-37). Besides these aforementioned mechanisms, for the approach, *repression* is also a mechanism to be underscored. It can be defined as attempts of states or government agents to end movements. Repression is one form of social control, and it does not always manifest itself as a physical force. It may also occur in nonviolent forms, such as legal investigations or employment discrimination (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 37).

Tilly and Tarrow (2015) have divided the processes into which the mechanisms are shaped into two main groups; *mobilisation* and *demobilisation*. Mobilisation is the process by which people make contentious demands. On the other hand, demobilisation starts when people stop making these demands. The mobilisation process increases the resources required for collective demand, while demobilisation reduces these resources. The former plays a central role in all episodes of contention (McAdam et al., 2004). For contentious politics, the concept of mobilisation should be considered as a sequence of clustering mechanisms. According to McAdam et al., (2009), whenever mobilisation appears, some linked mechanisms work, such as analysis of opportunities and threats, appropriation of existing

organisational resources, framing of collective claims making or selection of specific forms of collective action (p. 17). However, mobilisation processes are not permanent. Ultimately, they surrender to the demobilisation process, which involves three primary mechanisms; *co-optation*, *defection* and *repression* (McAdam et al., 2009, p. 276).

Contentious politics emerges when the contention intersects collective action and politics (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, pp. 8-10). As Tilly and Tarrow (2015, pp. 10-11) have emphasised, for contentious politics, the presence or absence of governments within contention and mobilisation/demobilisation processes is a critical issue. Governments are more or less affected by contention. Because the advantages of those who have the power to govern would be at some risk, all governments make rules to control claimants. In this way, they try to protect themselves and to suppress these new merging power centres.

Governments' responses to contention determine the course of contention processes. Finally, governments use controlling coercive forces such as the army, police, prisons or courts. However, such interventions may provide reinforcing effects and advantages for political contention emerging outside the political sphere.

Tarrow (2015) has summarised the assertions of contentious politics in five points. First, all forms of contention, such as social movements, civil wars, cycles, stem from the same causes. Because of various combinations of specific conditions and historicities, their embodiments differ. Second, causes of contention can be analysed through recurrent processes and mechanisms. Third, in all forms of governance, there are traditional relations between governments and other political actors, which affect which forms of contention will occur and these relations determine which political opportunities will emerge and how various claimants will initiate their actions. Fourth, the interactions between governments and popular contention shape the repertoires of contention. Repertoires are ways to make

collective demands. Fifth, all sides of the contention are in the process of constant innovation and negotiation. They try to persuade, block, defeat, punish, or collaborate. Hence, contentious politics refers to a dynamic sequence of interaction processes (pp. 87-88).

The contentious politics approach is built paradoxically, claiming that contention includes the constant variations and the recurrent regularities simultaneously. It aims to map the regularities of contention in a framework in which issues, actors, interactions, demands, sequences and outcomes always change time to time and place to place. Accordingly, the approach transcends this paradox with three main historical recurrent characteristics of contentious politics; *contentious performances*, *contentious repertoires* and *contentious campaigns* (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 14).

Contentious performances are standardised methods in which political actors make collective claims about other political actors. They arise from the interactions of at least two political actors. One of them is the claimant, and the other is the object of the claim. The innovation of performances is continuous at small scales, and the effectiveness of a claim depends on its meaningfulness in terms of structures, the pre-existing forms of claim-making and the nature of the relations between parties (Tarrow & Tilly, 2015, p. 14). Performances such as demonstrations, petitions, and calls to action in cyberspace are modular performances. Modular performances, despite their constant features, can adapt to local practices, conditions and cultural structures. They can feature both generality and specificity and gain characteristics that make sense for a variety of participants and audiences under various conditions. People practice the same forms of performances for different issues in very different parts of the world, such as petitions or demonstrations. However, these forms also vary per environmental and local differences. These differences can be detected in symbols, languages or some other specific practices (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 17).

Contentious repertoires are clusters of performance sequences that are known and accessible such as strikes, lockouts and slowdowns. They include the incessant interactions and improvisations of the claimants and targets. Repertoires are influenced by cultural patterns that determine what is acceptable and appropriable, but at the transnational level, they exhibit continuity according to contentious politics. Because modular forms of protests spreading around the world via protest cycles form modern repertoires and determine the tactics and strategies of contentious politics, and the characteristics of social control methods faced by repertoires lead them to renewal. Therefore, modular forms of protest are in the process of constant innovation and changing repertoires (Johnston, 2014, p. 66). Actors can innovate the repertoires, depending on time and space. However, the repertoires that are generated through these innovations cannot exceed the limits of the variations in the given collective repertoire accumulation as long as collective demands are in question. Besides, the instrumental efficiency of contentious repertoires is variable because they are affected by the changes that they create in the political field. If there is a rapid political change, contentious repertoires can also transform. However, when the authority regains the control, they can be quickly normalised or repressed. If there is an incremental structural change, this alters the repertoires less dramatically and more slowly, but they can generate more permanent effects. In massive contentious cycles resulting from rapid political changes, claim-making routines undergo innovations and these innovations can explain the ebbs and flows in the movement activity (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, pp. 19-20).

Contentious cycles mean that the movements and protests erupt and fade temporarily in time. Movements that initiate cycles are *early risers* (Tarrow, 2012). They make up the core of cycles and induce *latecomer* movements. Early risers lead to the emergence of latecomers because they show that the authority is vulnerable to contention and announce to all claimants that it is time to turn social demands into action. Besides, they threaten the

interests of the groups in which they engage in contention or create effects that change the distribution balance of benefits and suggest the formation of new oppositional fronts. In contentious cycles, political activity, communication, interest increases, and interaction among political actors intensifies. Besides, the cycles are periods in which groups that were previously politically silent entered the political arena, or new groups, organisations and cases emerged. In this context, it is the processes in which cognitive liberation takes place and diffuse. Cycles can end over time because of increased weariness or disillusionment. They may come to an end due to the institutionalisation of movements and the lowering of tension because of the actors finding their place in the institutional political field. Besides, factions occurring within movements can consume the cyclic momentum.

Finally, control mechanisms and states rewarding movements or punishing them with harsh methods can also eliminate the cycles (Tarrow, 2012). In times of rapid political changes, there are both actions and reactions because every new episode of claim-making threatens some political actors' interests and lead them to be contentious. Under these conditions, both the allies of claim-makers and governments react and reposition themselves. These reactions can sometimes lead to the implementation of repressive policies (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 19). The causes of incremental changes in the contentious repertoire can be categorised into three main groups, "connections between claim-making and everyday social organisation, cumulative creation of a signalling system by contention itself and operation of the regime as such" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 20). Contentious campaigns are the combinations of performances that focus on a particular political issue or a policy. Campaigns end when the issue they focus on disappears or when they are stopped. The difference between campaigns and other contentious episodes is that they usually include movements, interest groups, political parties, the media, audiences, and state agents (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 15).

A Brief Assessment of Repertoires. The concept of repertoires, which constitutes the core of the contentious politics approach, is essential because it allows the evaluation of social movements from a broad and historical perspective and is useful in determining the relations between the social forms of the movements. In this context, it is possible to consider the movements, which may be considered temporary or unusual at first glance, within a more stable social structurality. However, the approach, as an expansion of the political process theory, has been criticised for being incompatible with the rational actors' notions and utilitarianism. Contentious politics describes contentious repertoires as external elements for the individual actor. They are the social forms, which are the outcomes of social struggles, transformations and historical accumulations, beyond the rational choices of actors. Repertoires are transferred from generation to generation, from actor to actor, through cultural processes. For this reason, it cannot be claimed that they are determined by the actors choosing the most effective forms of struggle. On the contrary, it should be accepted that contentious repertoires emerge because of the selection of struggle forms believed to be the most effective among a cultural repertoire. The concept of contentious repertoires is incompatible with the perspective of rational actor theory that assumes the choices of rational disconnected individuals as the central dynamic of collective action. If, as the approach suggests, the contentious repertoires can be collectively learned, internalised, transmitted and utilised during contentious episodes, and they are interactive and transformative series, it should be acknowledged that they belong to an area where social realities are more effective than rational individuals' choices.

Another criticism of contentious repertoires is that the concept is not sufficiently explanatory in explaining why the movement actors chose only certain forms of protest from the repertoire of the given society. Some social movements and actors insist on certain forms of protest and create their unique repertoires. On the other hand, the differentiation of

contentious repertoires is not only due to the choices of the actors. Different forms of struggle, resources, political generations and perceptions also cause differentiation of repertoires or different choices regarding repertoires (Crossley, 2002, pp. 130-133).

Frame Analysis. Frame analysis is developed by American sociologist Erving Goffman (1974) and British social anthropologist Gregory Bateson (1973). It examines how the meaning is attributed to events. Attribution of meanings results from a combination of observations, experiences, and established cognitive categories. Individuals give meaning to social events, interactions, and processes through them and these meanings serve as references for social processes in which discussions on the formation of collectively shared frames occur (Chesters & Welsh, 2011, p. 81). Frame analysis in terms of social movements is about how individual interpretive schemata are transformed into collective frames through social movement organisations. Frame analysis is utilised by resource mobilisation theory as a method of examining ideational resources produced by social movements. It also provides analysts with explanatory opportunities on how social movement organisations build and process issues they focus on under the influence of current political opportunity structures. The transformation of collective frames into sustainable action frames produced by large-scale social movement organisations falls within the scope of frame analysis. Moreover, frame analysis is used to examine how social movements introduce and align new demands and grievances into the field of politics under prevailing political opportunity structures and established representations of interests (Chesters & Welsh, 2011, p. 81). Frame analysis is used by the approaches, which focus intensely on structural areas and accept the arguments of rational actor theory to gain the ability to analyse the effects of culture (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995).

Frames are interpretation schemes that allow people to locate, perceive, identify and label what is happening in the world and their living spaces (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). On

this basis, framing analysis assumes that the meanings emerge through "interpretative processes mediated by culture" (Snow et al., 2019, p. 393). Frames contribute interpretive processes with specific functions. Similar to photo frames, they steer people's attention on specific points and determine what will be in-frame and what will be out-of-frame for them (Snow, 2004). Besides, frames connect several points to form a meaningful whole and function as articulation mechanisms. They have transformative effects on actors' minds on how the objects of attention are understood or relate to each other.

In this sense, our definitions, inferences, and actions regarding many objects' meanings that fill our daily lives depend on how they are framed. Again, in terms of social movements, the framing expresses that meanings of events, activities, places, and actors can be interpreted in distinct ways. Meanings are things that can be discussed and negotiated. Therefore, the grievances that create mobilisation are not only caused by natural emotional processes but also material circumstances. They result from interactive interpretations and signifying processes, and movement actors, leaders, opponents and the media play roles in these processes (Snow et al., 2019, p. 393).

Frame analysis enables scholars to examine the interpretation processes that play roles in the emergence of social conflicts because symbolic productions function to facilitate the emergence of mobilisation by attributing meanings to events and behaviours. Successful social movements should define the social problems, determine the solutions of these problems, and finally generate motivations for the actions needed to be implemented (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 74). Briefly, social movements' collective action frames are "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organisation" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). Snow and Benford

1988, p. 200) argued that successful social movements use three types of frames to further their goals: *diagnostic framing*, *prognostic framing* and *motivational framing*.

Diagnostic framing involves identifying a social problem by finding a target to blame or by revealing its causality. For movements, providing an attributional consensus is more complicated than generating a consensus constituted about identity for a given social problem because members of a social movement can identify different causalities related to the emergence of a social problem. Different groups that form a social movement can give different levels of importance to different causations that are related to the given social problem and identify different causations as primary. Problem diagnosis is the process of determining which actors of a social movement will be entitled to have and express opinions about the given social problem. Various actors try to impose their interpretations of the meanings and representations proposed by social movements. Therefore, social movements have to acquire their areas of legitimacy per the scope of their trajectories to cope with these inner conflicts (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 75). Some actors gain the power to speak for specific interests and orientations because of such symbolic conflicts. Another problem encountered in the collective problem diagnosis for social movements is the identification of those responsible for the emergence of social problems. In this highly selective process, engaging intensely one problem can eliminate the possibilities of other potential mobilisations incompatible with the selected interpretation. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 76), argued that when actors choose a specific source of a problem and direct all their energies to it, social complexity becomes reduced. Nevertheless, a mature frame of interpretation not only leads to a shift from other possible conflicting meanings but also reduces the diversity of representations that proposed for the identified problems. The processes of interpretations and signifying that lead to mobilisation of social movements cannot be analysed separately from the uneven power-sharing processes.

Prognostic framing offers solutions to problems, identify targets, and develop strategies and tactics. It "involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). Offered solutions do not have to follow a causal interpretation made by any of the constituents of a movement. There are often no direct connections between the diagnostic and prognostic framing processes (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 201). Prognostic framing is not about rational choices or following the existing cultural and social patterns. It can be regarded as a stochastic process that involves the reconstructing social conditions and intergroup relations in new ways, the emergence of new consensuses, and the redefinition of power practices. From this perspective, it can be said that social movements have a function that transmits new notions outside the boundaries of the dominant culture to society (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 77). Benford and Snow (2000) showed that prognostic framing is a process in which social movements try to refute or minimise the framing of their opponents. That is called *counter-framing*. Through counter-framing, movements try to cope with adverse framing effects trying to cease their existence (p. 617).

Motivational framing invites people to mobilise and for that generates motives and incentives. It also enables the production of appropriate motivational vocabularies and gives potential actors of a movement a sense of agency by creating causalities for participation. Vocabularies of motivational framing include the severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety. Severity indicates the perceived level of danger about a problem. Urgency describes how quickly the problem should be solved. Efficacy refers to the power of the given movement that defines and targets the problem. Finally, propriety expresses the feeling of duty regarding collective action (Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000). Motivational vocabularies may embody unevenly according to the given social movement's strategy. Some of them can be highlighted; others can be thrown out of focus. Motivational framing has a secure connection

with identity building. Before identity-building begins, potential actors need to be convinced intuitively and rationally that the collective action is legitimate and workable. In this context, framing needs to be in a structure that can carry the actor from individual or group stages to broader collective stages. This collective interpretation should also be useful for attributions about other groups or events. Motivational framing needs to have different levels of persuasiveness from the individual level to the level of interaction between social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). Therefore, frames should create new foundations for common causes of solidarity and transform the identities of actors to facilitate collective action (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 79).

Gamson (1992) also suggested that three different components shape the collective action frames; *injustice*, *agency* and *identity*. The component of injustice can be explained with moral connotations. It concerns the consciousness of actors who feel responsible for social injustice and harm, and it refers to the transformation of interpretive frames with such sensitivities. The agency component is a component that allows people to envisage that social order is changeable, support social action, and recognise themselves as potential agents. The identity component is a provider of self-recognition created by social movements. It is a component that allows 'us and them' separation to be established via values and interests (pp. 7-8).

Also, there are two fundamental mechanisms for the formation and modification of collective action frames; *frame articulation* and *frame elaboration*. Frame articulation involves connecting ideologies, events, issues, experiences with each other in meaningful ways. It interconnects the realities, and in this way, a semantic collective selection is created. Thus, all the concrete or abstract subjects and events that a social movement wants to mention can be framed. The accuracy of these issues or events may sometimes be insignificant. Frame elaboration is a mechanism by which social movements emphasise

certain events, issues or ideals more than other topics. It creates changes in the importance hierarchy of events, problems or ideas on the agenda of a social movement (Snow et al., 2019, pp. 398-399). Framing arises from the communicative areas involving both leaders and actors within social movements. These areas, covering cultural and structural contexts, are called discursive fields (Steinberg, 1999) or discursive opportunity structures (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). These areas may facilitate or constrain framing efforts. Discursive fields transform dynamically during the ongoing debates about contentious events or issues and include cultural elements and different social actors with interests concerning specific issues or events. Discursive opportunity structures are shaped by the prevailing ideas and values of cultural/political realms in which social movements arise. Cultural/political environments can make collective action frames easier or harder to be perceived. Frames are contingent upon the dominant effects of the cultural/political environment in which they are articulated. Snow (2004) asserted that the relationship between collective action frames and the determinant cultural/political environment produces innovative results. Besides, articulation and elaboration processes of these innovative frames can be the extensions or remedies of existing ideologies, belief systems, or set of ideas (p. 401). In this context, framing has a continually developing and evolving, productive and dynamic structure (Snow et al., 2019, pp. 398-399).

Alignment, Resonance, Disputes and Hazards. At this point, mentioning four main concepts related to framing would help to understand this analytical approach even better. Frame alignment involves the strategic efforts of social movements to achieve the support of potential participating actors and resource providers. When individual frames become linked congruously and integratively, frame alignment occurs (Snow & Benford, 1988). There are four types of frame alignment; *frame bridging*, *frame amplification*, *frame extension* and *frame transformation*.

Frame bridging includes re-linking multiple ideologically compatible frames that are structurally disconnected. It can occur among individual actors, in a movement or between different social movements. Frame bridging can also take place through the relations of groups or movements that have not been already mobilised. Briefly, this type of frame alignment strives to increase the social resonance for a frame. Frame amplification involves the efforts to make selected ideas, values or beliefs dominant through the framing process. According to Snow et al. (2019, p. 400), frame amplification is a frame alignment strategy, which is very convenient to produce the highest frame resonance because it rises on the established values and beliefs, and it does not change or transform them. Frame extension is to expand the movement frames to include the values, beliefs and ideas of the actors and coalition partners that have recently joined the movement. Finally, frame transformation refers to the processes of abandoning the former ways of framing and adopting new perspectives at both individual and collective levels (Snow et al., 2019, pp. 400-401).

Frame resonance refers to the capability of collective action frames to resonate with the targeted audience. It depends on the peculiarities of the frames and the circumstances of the given cultural environment. As sociologist William Gamson (1992) has assessed, when people find given frames convincing, natural and familiar, they resonate better. The role played by dominant values and beliefs is essential for frame resonance. Snow and Benford (1988) argued that successfully resonating frames use central and shared values and ideals. Besides, frames constructed through broader beliefs and values create higher responses and can be continually extended to new issues, aims or agendas (McCammon, 2013, p. 552). Frames do not merely re-present the dominant values and ideas. They manage, change and redirect them. They try to access dissident information to create wider repercussions (Maney et al., 2005, p. 376). Frame disputes refer to differences of opinions or preferences that arise concerning the frames produced by social movement actors. Disputes are one of the most

common discursive dynamics of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000). They may rise within one organisation that form a movement or among multiple organisations (Benford, 2013, p. 268). When disputes extend to a level that encompasses interactions of movements, counter-movements or the media, they become framing contests (Ryan 1991 as cited; in Benford, 2013, p. 268). When frame disputes emerge, a re-negotiation process must take place about the reality that is created by a social movement. Frame disputes emerge on three different levels. First, most of the disputes are about the conflicts that appear during the diagnostic framing process. In this case, disagreements on detecting and identifying the targets or/and causes of the mobilisation come into question. Second, disputes may arise from the conflicts that arise during the strategy development phase, and they affect the prognostic processes. Third, frame disputes may also arise in processes in which grievances are identified, and solutions are discussed. This dispute results from a movement's efforts to agree on how framing can provide more resonance (Benford, 2013, pp. 268-269). Framing hazards refers to situations that affect the reliability and salience of frames, reducing the capacity of resonance and/or disrupting frame alignment processes. Framing hazards usually occur in four ways: Ambiguous aligning of frames, misframing, frame disputes and frameshifts (Snow et al., 2019, pp. 403-404).

Another concept that needs to be addressed concerning frame analysis is *the master frames*. The concept of the master frames was initially developed for the analysis of protests and movements that arise in the absence of facilitative political opportunity structures.

According to this alternative model, which is used to explain the widespread mobilisation of protest cycles when structural conditions are not favourable, master frames resonate with a much higher scope than ordinary collective action frameworks. They are also much more flexible and inclusive. When a social movement generates a successful action frame, other movements within the same protests cycle also change and adopt it. Thus, the frame spreads

gradually and becomes a master frame. Master frames can also be considered as a rhetorical analytic tool applied when it is difficult to evaluate the heterogeneity and multiplicity of widespread movements for structural analysis. In this way, it has become possible to relate specific cultural forms and historicities in the perspective of protest and movement cycles (Benford, 2013, p. 366-367).

A Brief Assessment of Frame Analysis. Frame analysis can be considered as a useful analysis method for linking political opportunity structures and social movement organisations with individual cultural contexts. It is underlined that there is a dynamic relationship between cultural forms and structural forms in a given social formation in this way. However, it is observed that the frame analysis examines cultural contexts from a structural perspective through this dynamic relationship and emphasises that mostly institutionalised versions of individual cultures affect the frame building processes of social movements. In this context, even the frames claimed to be entirely new, are manipulative or reinterpreted variations of established cultural contexts. The distance of the frames to the established cultural and structural contexts is a sensitive and decisive factor in such analyses. When the distance is too short or too broad, the planned contribution of the frames to the movements is at risk, because the frame analysis continually takes into account the legitimacy production (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 82-85).

One point that frame analysis is criticised is based on the fact that all social movements that have achieved success at a certain level, naturally, already have convenient frames associated with cultural contexts. That makes it difficult to reveal the mechanisms of instrumentalisation of symbolic production used for framing by the social movement organisations. For the sound analysis of these mechanisms, after determining the frames, each social movement's characteristics must be addressed. Also, the frame analysis does not adequately make sense of the needs that vary from movement to movement or society to

society. Some movements' use of interpretive frames in some societies may be essential for the success of the movement. However, it has been observed that in some cases, political conditions are much more useful than frames. Besides, frame analysis is also criticised for assuming the frames as fixed cognitive structures and not being sufficiently explanatory about how the relations between different actors transform frames.

The validity of the congruence between the critical outputs of dynamic cultural production processes and the strategies produced under political entrepreneurship and structuralism is open to debate. Because it is argued that the role played by emotions for a social movement, for example, exceed the cognitive and strategic processes. Accordingly, social movements include not only symbolic processes in which the generated frames direct collective action. People can come together spontaneously through emotions and direct a movement with their experience (Goodwin et al., 2001; Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 85-87).

It is seen that political process theory and contentious politics and frame analysis approaches distinguish and the culture and structures contextually, and benefit from this contrast. However, political structures as opportunities or constraints in terms of social movements and change is generated by culture. As Polletta has noted (1999a), political processes cannot emerge without being affected by traditions, ideologies, taboos or other cultural formations. Therefore, separating political opportunities from subjective and cultural contexts to ensure the objectivity of analyses causes structure and culture to be separated in a way that conceals the genuine objective conditions.

For political process theory, contentious politics and frame analysis, culture is meshed with action and leads us to conclude that activists have an extremely limited agency that arises solely in the form of exploiting existing opportunities or avoiding constraints. Because

these structures were not produced by the actors, they were given to them. Also, this perspective causes an erroneous mapping in which political opportunity structures are seen as fixed and invariable conditions imposed by power and the culture as a transformative space of opposition. Moreover, political process theory ignores that culture is the symbolic dimension of the structure. However, through symbolic dimensions, the cultural patterns that formed the political structures and institutions can be analysed. In other words, the objective conditions of processes and structures do not arise independently of the subjectivity of culture that is continuing in different dimensions (Polletta, 1999a). In this context, it is necessary to think of culture as a dimension in which political opportunity structures can be created, rather than being a contextless area where the perceptions of people or activists are framed. For example, the existence and functioning of a parliament cannot be assessed independently of the cultural processes that are attributed to the social contract associated with it. Culture is not just a fluid and volatile generator of perceptions. It also provides meanings that play a role in the structuring of social institutions. One of the major criticisms of the new social movements paradigm is that theories focusing on political processes and rational actors confine culture in this way.

New Social Movements

The concept of new social movements refers to social movements in which the issues they point to are different from those that occur due to the contradictions between the working class and the capitalist system. Such movements mobilise on issues related to themes such as gender, race, ethnicity, environmentalism, animal rights and human rights (Buechler, 2013, p. 420). There are various approaches to new social movements. Buechler (2013) has put forward some themes that come to the fore for most of these different approaches. First, for new social movement theories, social formations are the determinants in the emergence of collective action. They affect how social movements emerge. Therefore, social movements

cannot be analysed separately from their historical roles and relations within the society in which they emerge. Societies are the source of the contradictions and conflicts that lead to the emergence of social movements. Second, new social movements are responses to post-industrial society. New features and conditions of the post-industrial society summon new social movements. Third, the social bases and causalities for the spread of new social movements are too complex to be explained by pre-existing class-based conflicts, mobilisations and dichotomies. Therefore, some approaches centre the new middle classes, social statuses, values and beliefs as the prime actors of the emergence of the movements. Fourth, for new social movements, collective identities are essential, decisive and indispensable. The detachment of class-based activism requires people to produce collective identities for generating collective action (Melucci, 1989; 1996). Fifth, new social movements emerge from everyday life. Private life, lifestyles and individual spaces politicise in new social formations. That is again about the impositions of the post-material world in which social movements are born. Sixth, new social movements are distinct also with the issues they advocate and their claims. These issues are reinforced by orientations focused on producing qualitative results rather than quantitative ones. Rather than the struggles for the power and aspirations for economic and administrative gains, demands of autonomy and democratisation gain importance. Seventh, new social movements are movements in which cultural and symbolic resistances rise. These movements reject the instrumental rationality of advanced capitalist society. Therefore, instead of conventional achievements, tactics and strategies, they turn to new identities, symbols, meanings and other cultural notions. Symbolic messages are more favourable than rational calculations for new social movements. They are the fields of cultural experimentation that emerge and then disappear. When they emerge, they make use of political subcultures to organise according to the themes (Buechler,

2013, pp. 420-422). Finally, new social movements approve decentralised, participatory, egalitarian, prefigurative and improvisational forms of organisation (Melucci, 1989).

Buechler (2013, p. 425) also argued that new social movement theories divide into two primary parts: cultural and political new social movement theories. Cultural theories distinguish between the forms and actors of the past and the actors and structures of the new social movements. For these approaches, there is no continuity between old social movements and new social movements. Social integrity is associated with semiotic or cultural conditions. The power and social opposition emerge in a decentralised manner. Therefore, new social movements consider civil society, everyday life and the creation and expansion of areas, which would be far from established political institutions and they consider values and ideologies. On the other hand, political new social movement theories explain the society that is formed under the conditions of advanced capitalism through the neo-Marxist perspective. In this context, class-based social movements maintain their validity and also the movements cluster around cultural contexts are taken into account. These theories argue that class-based movements and non-class-based movements can generate progressive changes if they form appropriate alliances. State, identities, grievances and interests maintain their importance for these theories, and instrumental actions and strategies are the leading causes of the movements. Political new social movement theories do not adopt the arguments of cultural theories disconnected from the political sphere and claim that more complex class contradictions have replaced early class contradictions. Therefore, the analysis of new and more sophisticated class contradictions and conflicts is essential to analyse new social movements properly.

Programmed Society. In the scholarship of the new social movement paradigm that encapsulates many differentiated theories or approaches, the works of French sociologist Alain Touraine is one of the most distinctive and controversial ones. He put not only the

concept of the social movement at the heart of his actionalist sociology but also he repudiated most of the pre-existing approaches and concepts of structuralism, functionalism, symbolic interactionism and orthodox Marxism. Touraine argued that the socialist struggle has ended and the era of the movement against technocracy began. He has also claimed that contemporary/ postindustrial society is a set of hierarchical systems of action that creates itself in conflict processes (Rucht, 1991, pp. 361-362).

Accordingly, Touraine's (1977) society comprises the social relations of the actors whose interests are conflicting and share specific cultural orientations because they belong to the same social sphere. It has two key components, historicity and class relations. Historicity is the capacity of the society to produce mechanisms in which it functions, and class relations are cultural tendencies becoming social practices (1977, pp. 4-5). For Touraine (1977), these actions and social relations are hierarchised. There is an organisational system related to differentiation at the lowest level of this hierarchy (p. 240). Above this, there is the institutional system, which becomes evident with influence and where the institutional politics and the state are also positioned (Touraine, 1977, p. 175). At the top of the hierarchy is the system of historicity, which includes the class system and the system of historical action, and it relates to dominance (Touraine, 1977, p. 138). According to Touraine (1985), social movements refer to the struggles of actors against the dominance belonging to this level of the hierarchy, and they produce the society. Unlike many social movements' theorists, Touraine does not include the struggles of political actors in the field of social movements since they cannot affect the level of historicity. There are three levels of hierarchy in Touraine's society having their autonomy, but they are also controlled at a certain level by higher-level systems (Rucht, 1991, p. 363). Besides, these action systems may deviate from the logic of the upper systems because the behaviours produced by the upper systems cannot be absorbed entirely by the lower systems. These action systems also

produce behaviours of social change and opposition. Such behaviours can lead to resistance and denial of control within the organisational system, while in the institutional system; they may generate opposing or innovative actions that can trigger the change of the dominant modes of historicity. However, the social movement that will change the dominant cultural modes only emerges within the system of historicity. For Touraine (1985), identity, opposition and cultural totality are the elements that create class-consciousness and cause social movements (p. 760). Identity is an actor's conscious self-definition that takes place through conflict. When the identity is formed, the actor realises his opponents, and thus opposition occurs. When the opposition turns into a struggle for domination within the system of historical action, cultural totality can be mentioned. Therefore, a social movement is "the direct or indirect expression of class conflict", and it involves "central forces fighting one against the other to control the production of society by itself and the action of classes for the shaping of historicity" (Touraine, 1977, p. 368; 1981, p. 29). As Rucht (1991, p. 365) noted, for Touraine, the social movement is an analytical category. because it comprises both the integrity of the behaviours arising from the systems of action and can be considered as an organisation. Institutionalised political formations that emerge in action systems, on the other hand, cannot be described as social movements only because they are related to institutional system crises (1977, pp. 369-370). Touraine (1977, p. 155) has also argued that throughout history, societies have gradually expanded self-control and self-production, and that has reached its total capacity in the post-industrial society. What is meant here is the production and control of information. Social conflict arises from struggles to access information or struggles related to the distribution of information. It is no longer within the boundaries of specific social subsystems, as the post-industrial society totalizes self-production and self-control (Rucht, 1991). Social conflict in the post-industrial society is omnipresent, so culture is the domain of social conflict.

Touraine (1995, p. 272) named the post-industrial society also as the programmed society. For him, in the programmed society, cultural goods are produced and distributed by mass mechanisms, therefore individuals, goods and ideas are much more in circulation than the industrial society (Touraine, 1988, pp. 105-107). Thus, private life and cultural areas intersect much more with politics, and they are decisive and essential in the emergence of social conflict (Touraine, 1988, p. 14). Since actors are more concerned with individual issues than collective structures, society or the state is no longer the significant determinants, and struggles cluster around the desires for personal freedoms. Touraine (1995, pp. 274-282) alleged that social movement does not have a linear trajectory and regular continuity in the programmed society. It is characterised by intense communicative processes, irregular vicissitudes, conflicts and contradictions (Touraine, 1999). As noted, historicity plays an essential role in the recognition of cultural models that determine the practices and processes of the social movement. The struggle between the owners of cultural modes (technocracy) and those who seek to hijack these modes (self-management) produce society. The social movement does not refer to the struggle against power; it is the struggle with/for the cultural modes of established political/social understandings and systems, to create or to capture a cultural totality. In the post-industrial society, the production mode covers everyday life because of the totalisation of self-control and self-production. For this reason, for Touraine, the trajectory of historicity and cultural modes are not related to the transformation of the society, but the interpreting of the productions in the cultural field. Therefore, the social movement is not related to the modes of development, including the state and politics, but the modes of production (Touraine, 1988, p. 41). Briefly, for Touraine, the social movement is the meaning of action, and it is not about the collective responses to different social events or conditions. It is the dimension of concrete struggles that are determined under ever-changing circumstances and whose meanings changed. The essential difference that Touraine

represents is his argument that sees social movement as a dimension that produces, constructs and transforms society. The social movement is the analytical subject and actor of understanding society and is positioned against domination.

Dispersed, Fragmented and Submerged Networks. Sociologist Alberto Melucci (1996) argued that the categories and concepts used for industrial society analysis and their adaptations do not capture the substance of the transformations in the contemporary global society. According to him, conceptual tools in the hands of sociology are unable to capture the spirit of the time. Melucci (1989) mainly named the contemporary societies, which produce new social movements, as complex systems. According to him, these complex systems, as Touraine argued, continually increase the individual's autonomy of action, but they try to ensure that these autonomous areas are tightly integrated and that motives of individual actions are kept under control. These highly differentiated complex systems, market and state, intervene in everyday life to ensure integration and control. In this context, the domination of complex systems is omnipresent and comprehensive. Therefore, contemporary movements emerge because of the efforts of individuals who resist this intervention to determine their own identities and to realise their own autonomous lives against the manipulation of the complex systems (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 9). Increased access to education in complex systems has resulted in individuals accessing more symbolic resources to identify themselves and their goals and define their *raison d'être*. Individuals have more symbolic resources to be more individualised, autonomous, and to perform self-realisation. These widening autonomies and the individuals' spaces of human action are reinforced by increased political participation, citizenship rights, and escalating importance of communicative and organisational networks. However, these complex systems need to control these differentiated individual symbolic actions, meanings, and motives. Since this control is related to the individualisation and autonomy of symbolic resources, it cannot be

provided by external mechanisms that determine the production and appropriation of resources only. To achieve control, individuals need to take part in social and organisational networks and build their identities in a way that does not conflict with the functioning of the dominant social life. Complex systems provide individuals with resources to achieve the expertise they need. However, they demand that individuals use these resources only in processes that realise the systems, and for this purpose, they have to find suitable ways to eliminate the symbolic and motivational individual resources they cause. In this context, inequality in contemporary complex systems emerges as cultural deprivation. Self-identification, other than forms approved by domination, is stopped through the dependent consumption and imposed lifestyles (Melucci, 1996, pp. 91-94). According to Melucci (1996), new social movements cannot be understood as long as they are considered as reactions to social crises, as social deviations or as behaviours of deprived groups. These movements that occur in complex systems are antagonists, and their antagonist demands are related to social relations, individual needs, identities and production of symbols under the conditions of the high level of information flows. The designs of social progress, identities and individual needs form the core of this antagonism because contemporary social production is about the control of knowledge, symbols and social relations. Economic production and technological apparatuses are subject to the determination of relational forms that produce culture. Complex systems are the systems where symbols are exchanged, not goods. Therefore, to be a part of consumption and production processes, actors have to establish meaningful connections between themselves and symbols and social relations. That is accomplished by identity production. The system continually imposes identities to individuals and tries to ensure that individuals find the meaning of their actions through them. However, in complex systems, there are ever-changing multiple identities. Therefore, individuals invariably try to find identities and meanings for themselves. Antagonist demands

arise from the struggles for the right of being an individual again and reappropriation of the identities, and they stand against the 'heteronomous definition of identity' that spreads to all cultural fields (Melucci, 1996, p. 101). For Melucci (1996), actors of social movements that occur in complex systems may use the old symbols, discourses, categories and definitions while expressing their actions. Because there is a transition period, and the expressions of the phenomena may not express their original context. In essence, in this analysis, movements have little in common with these old categories, symbols and discourses.

Melucci (1996) also drew attention to six distinct features of the new social movements. First, the demands these movements try to meet are mostly heterogeneous and often non-negotiable. These demands arise in very different areas of social life, and the negotiating instruments of institutions and politics can not satisfy some of them. Since these demands go beyond the borders of political representation and participation, they remain unanswered and continue to exist in social life to reappear in new waves of action. Second, new social movements ignore political systems and targets for seizing power. Instead, the desires for disengagement from the system and rapid transformation come to the fore. Third, the infiltration of systems across all cultural areas and impregnation of identities through communicative processes have led to the boundaries between private and public spaces becoming ambiguous, and the private lives becoming the sites of all identity protestations and struggles for re-appropriation that lead to the generation of collective action. New movements confront the modern separation of public and private spaces. Fourth, instruments that will distinguish between social movements and deviance have become dysfunctional. Since complex systems challenged by movements link individual autonomy with allegedly life-sustaining cultural symbols, antagonisms become easier to characterise as antidemocratic or invalid deviances. Thus, it is easier to characterise movements as problems that need to be rectified. The fifth feature of movements occurring in complex systems is that solidarity

emerges as an object of the action. The communal identities oppose the changes that are imposed by the systems, and they stem from symbolic and emotional exchange among groups. Sixth, these new movements confirm spontaneity, anti-authoritarianism and anti-hierarchism. They are fragmented, less organised and incoherent, as they avoid using the control and mediation mechanisms approved by the systems they struggle with (pp. 102-104).

For Melucci (1996, pp. 104-106), the movements that show the characteristics mentioned above are becoming less and less political. Instead of being defined as processes or outcomes of political struggle, they articulate their emergences in a manner that resembles religions and myths against instrumental rationality of systems using the advantages of secularisation. The totalising mythical and religious symbolism refers to the transcendence from the social order and cultural resistance against the apparatuses of dominant systems. In other words, movements try to invent a cultural site that would be not captured by the cultural occupation of systems and would enable the realisation of re-appropriation of identities. However, systems simultaneously try to re-identify these new symbolic and linguistic productions within their dominant logic, and when they succeed, they also show movements as marginal or temporary trends. Similar to preference to express their emergences with mythical symbolism, new movements also reconstruct the social world to save it from the logic of the dominant systems. This construction is based on the social/non-social distinction and is realised by re-summoning nature so that the needs can be expressed in an unconfined cultural area. Nature is used both as an external and essential form in expressing different cultural needs, an alternative to the cultural needs of the dominant social everywhere. Thus, cultural antagonism against the systems is provided to flow back into the social. Also, the collective demands of new social movements have been expressed through individual subjectivities, demands and needs, as power manipulates individual identities and the cultural representation of needs takes place on the individual plane. Therefore, the place where the

actions of movements are produced and where social conflict arises is the individual dimension where daily life, individual behaviours and emotional bonds are experienced. Melucci (1996), similar to Touraine, argued that the emergent production and distribution modes of information had transformed the societal and the dominance, and thusly new movements arise from different mechanisms and areas of struggle in comparison with previous periods. The essence of this transformation is the control of the sovereignty over the identities, which is ensured by seizing cultural areas, and the antagonism forms through individuals' antagonist self-identification processes that generate the collective actions opposing this dominance. In this context, it can be assessed that both the power and the antagonism instrumentalise the individual cultural spaces for identity production. Since social control has become omnipresent, movements are engaged continuously in symbolic productions that try to escape from the boundaries of domination's cultural comprehensiveness.

In this context, for Melucci (1989, p. 34), a collective identity is an "interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place" and plays a critical role in the emergence and shaping of collective action (Melucci, 1996). From this viewpoint, social movements are networks of relationships in which collective identities are built through dialogues or struggles among various groups, and individuals use collective movements as the reference membranes in which they are allowed to reconstruct their identities, which are fragmented into various group memberships, roles and experiences by the dominance (Melucci, 1991; as cited in Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992).

Another important contribution made by Melucci (1989) to the field of new social movements is the conceptualisation of the latency. With this concept, it is referred to the processes that the movements go through between the obvious mobilisation periods. Latency

allows movements to create new cultural codes and to practise these codes when the opposition cannot be expressed and turned into action against the logic of the system. With this conceptualisation, movements have been freed from the boundaries of analytical perspectives related only to their mobilisation and become more complex as systems of action. They are the networks of meanings and signs submerged into everyday life requiring personal participation and produce or reproduce alternative meaning frames (Melucci, 1989, p. 58; 70). In this context, movements continue to exist as forms and reflect the contradictions in society in complexity beyond politics. Therefore, they cannot be resolved through political decisions (Melucci, 1989, p. 60; 222). Contemporary social movements work with signs and are not interested in the distribution or exchange of material goods and resources. Through signs, they reveal the power that maintains the system and the difference that opposes it, and they spread the awareness of the difference to society (Melucci, 1988; as cited in Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992). These invisible meaning and collectivity creation of contemporary social movements can only be analysed by developing and applying appropriate research methods.

Post-materialism. Another approach that differentiates contemporary social movements based on a paradigm shift from old movements is post-materialism, substantially developed by political scientist Ronald Inglehart. Post-materialism provides a framework concerning a value change and argues that individual and social priorities related to material needs such as economic growth, survival, improvement of material living standards, are replaced by priorities on issues beyond materialist worldviews, such as life quality, needs for self-expression or environmental concerns (Miller, 2013, p. 504). The theory suggests that there is a hierarchy of needs, and the individual's values given to certain supplies shape the priorities that would echo within a socio-economic or political-cultural context. Highly valued needs shape individuals' worldviews. At this point, two distinct hypotheses come into

the forefront, scarcity hypothesis and socialisation hypothesis. The scarcity hypothesis suggests that people can only start thinking for more intellectual needs only if their needs for survival are fulfilled. Also, the socialisation hypothesis argues that the transformations in the value priorities of individuals and the socio-economic context do not occur at the same pace because people tend to keep the priorities that they learned in their youth (Inglehart, 1990). Nevertheless, post-materialism claims that people who feel safe about accessing material goods would steer their priorities to post-material values.

The arguments of post-materialism are based on the determination that generations born in the post-World War II era had access to welfare and education at a level never experienced by previous generations. Thus, people turned to more expressive needs. These post-material values (e.g., freedom of expression, individual prosperity, widespread participation in decision-making mechanisms) resonate more with social demands that can be traced in cultural contexts and sometimes even with altruism. According to Inglehart, the number of people with such priorities in the post-material world rises among students and young people, but especially among technocrats with expertise. That marks the emergence of a new class (Inglehart, 1990). The new class more focuses on issues like individual autonomy, civil activism and subjective well-being, and does not take into account deeply matters such as authority and social consent. Individuals who prioritise post-materialist values are more prone to voice their grievances via social movements since they have sufficient qualifications for a cognitive mobilisation to take place. Cognitive mobilisation refers to the "development of the political skills that are needed to cope with the politics of a large-scale society" (Inglehart, 1990, p. 372). Skills gained from formal education, the level of political awareness, cognitive and communicative abilities enable cognitive mobilisation (Inglehart, 1997), and the cognitive elites of contemporary societies utilise their expertise to produce social movements and to ensure social and political changes according to post-

material values. Inglehart claimed that cognitive mobilisation turns into action for three reasons. First, post-materialist actors have the energy to spend on fighting for post-materialist values. Second, post-materialists believe that their priorities differ from the majority's priorities in a given society, and they see themselves as emerging minorities. Third, post-materialists do not view protests as dangerous acts, as the dominant logic sees, because these dangers are often related to material priorities (Inglehart, 1990; 1997).

Radical Democracy. Political theorists Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) arguments about new social movements, like many other approaches on new social movements, see social transformational developments as the fundamental dynamics of the emergence of these movements. However, they assess social movements in a broader perspective, in which they criticise Marxist essentialism and discuss the theoretical and strategic crises of the Left. Developments such as the emergence of identity-based movements (e.g., feminist movement, environmentalist movement, civil rights movement or LGBTQIA movement), the rise of racist and ethnic antagonisms in Europe, the decline in the people's welfare because of the policies required by economic globalisation, organisational changes in politics and many other contemporary transformations in the political field cannot be caught and explained by classical perspectives of leftist politics. Leftist politics should be redefined in the light of these developments (pp. 1-5). For Laclau and Mouffe (1985), the new social movements indicate a social surplus vis-à-vis the rational and organised structures of the social order and outmode the conventional frameworks of the Left that explain "agents of social change, the structuring of social spaces, and the privileged points for the unleashing of historical transformations" (p. 2). Scholars have attempted to generate a theory that does not depend on an ultimate reference point to define and explain new social movements. Thus, they aimed the liberation from the metaphysic stances imposed by almost all explanations about movements. They theorised the identity concerning hegemony in a non-essentialist way,

based on the determination that the antagonist power of the proletariat, which Marxism considers being the maker of history, has waned. In other words, they have built a theory that eliminates the boundaries of the ultimate referentiality and enables the ontologically rethinking of the society, and of social movements (Vahabzadeh, 2003, p. 42). Accordingly, new social movements signify a flow of social opposition that extends beyond class-based explanations. These flows shape a social world in which the resistance of new antagonisms rise against commodification, bureaucratisation and the homogenisation of social life, and social movements mobilise for autonomy, and identity is not a concept independent of hegemony and articulation. Therefore, identity does not refer to the fixed reference or function of a historical or ontological agent. On the contrary, it is about the internal accumulation of external effects in which structures are pushed for transformation. Identities are not things that were acquired or given. They are decentralised systems of difference that make sense to discourses and structures. When a system determines its limits, identities emerge as external threats, and the relations contained by the system are positioned. The fact that a system embodies itself and the field of power enables hegemony to emerge through the evaluation or recognition of identities accordingly. When identities appear, they also emerge as differences that hegemony cannot cover (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). These external relations also reveal a constitutive lack that permeates every identity and opens gaps in the rational objectivity of hegemony (Laclau, 1990; 1995; Vahabzadeh, 2003). For example, an identity related to sexual orientations exists by positioning it according to the dominant culture of sexual orientations. Therefore, identities are not independent of externality, and this may produce antagonism. The differences arising from the relations of identities with the systems are transformational and can be linked by relations of equivalence. For instance, an identity related to sexual orientation can be merged with an ethnic identity. However, these links result from sophisticated discursive practices and are never fixed or pure. "The undecidability

between difference and equivalence renders each identity a symbolic representation of the entire system — and this is the moment of a hegemonic formation" (Vahabzadeh, 2003, p. 44). Identities are never fully constituted because they are symbolic representations that cover both the difference and equivalence. Also, hegemony is a relational concept that marks the end of essentialism. The inconstancy of social relations has become the condition for the emergence of social identities, and therefore social agency cannot be homogeneous. Social agents are created in ideological discourses. The relationality of social identities stem from this formational and constitutive dimension and cannot be explained by essentialist conceptualizations. The determination of social identity is completed by finding a fixation in the infinity of differences, by creating a discourse (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In this context, the concept of hegemony expresses that there are no fixated agent positions or distinctive agents with historical transformative duties in social relations. New social movements are new agents with pluralistic demands and organised within the framework of various identity issues that constitute the material basis of postmodernist arguments developed against the homogenising theses of modernism.

Laclau and Mouffe (1992) have also assumed their theory as the basis of a new political perspective that emerged for the realisation of radical democracy because of social transformations. For them, transformations and changes in fields of production, consumption, communication, culture, art and information can no longer be explained by meta-narratives that describe social reality as a whole of identicalness. In this respect, it can be said that scholars associated new social movements with post-Marxist or postmodern assumptions. They instrumentalised postmodernism to argue a radical understanding of democracy that would explain new social movements and meet their demands. Besides the redefinition of identity that I mentioned above, Laclau and Mouffe examine new social movements from a perspective in which the modern subject/agent is dead. In their theory of radical democracy,

non-reductionist interpretations of Gramsci's (1992) concept of *hegemony*, and new theoretical tools such as discourse, difference, hegemony, contingency and articulation are significant (Townshend, 2004). The new social movements are the history makers that replace the working class for Laclau and Mouffe's post-Marxist theory of radical democracy since they theoretically advocate a new pluralistic category of agency, based on the variety of social demands (Bulut, 2003). 'A new leftist alternative' is only possible with the establishment of a system of equivalences that places social division on a new foundation. In this sense, it is necessary to develop chains of equivalence among various struggles against oppression. Therefore, the left needs to deepen and expand the liberal democracy toward a radical and pluralist democracy by developing a left strategy that includes the demands of new social movements at theoretical and practical levels. The significance of the new social movements arises from the new roles they play in the diffusion of social conflicts into more on more relations, in the articulation of these conflicts and in carrying antagonism from class politics to identity politics (Laclau, 2000). New political agents are primarily established through antagonist relations, with novel forms of dependency and subjection derived from the increasing intervention of the state and the establishment and spread of capitalist relations of production. In this context, social movements are an internal part of the radical democracy proposed by scholars, and they are meaningless outside this framework. In this respect, for Laclau and Mouffe (1985) the development of the working class and its engagement in the anti-capitalist struggle is a crucial milestone in the process of democratic revolution, but this not the last frontier. The new movements, struggles, resistances and identities that advocate the principles of freedom and equality in unexpected areas and forms, are diversified antagonisms. To create solidarity among these antagonisms is needed for social change, and this depends on political struggles (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe; 1992).

Colonization of the Lifeworld. The philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1981) argued that new social movements are far from the political axes that produce old social movements and are concerned with issues covered by a new policy related to themes such as culture, identity and lifestyle. In this context, issues related to peace, environment, youth and education are at the forefront. Dynamics based on class contradictions and class categories developed based on these dynamics, are not suitable for handling these movements. Because new movements can cover many different classes and groups, mainly aggrieved and marginalized ones. He also emphasized the difference in how new social movements are organized. These movements produce and use forms of organization that are non-hierarchical, decentralized, emphasizing participation, inclusiveness, and intra-group democracy. For these reasons, new social movements require a new sociological explanation. The framework in which Habermas examined new social movements includes concepts such as public space, public opinion, system, life world, negotiator democracy and communicative action (Habermas, 1986).

Accordingly, public space is part of social life. It is the area defined by the means, processes and spaces where individuals freely discuss and identify societal problems, carry out rational discussions, and because of these discussions, if possible, create a common sense and public opinion that will influence political action (Habermas, 1997, p. 155). The public space, which is open to all citizens, is produced by public bodies created by private individuals by communicating with each other. In the public sphere, individuals can act neither as members of the private sphere nor as members of the state bureaucracy. This area is an area where private people discuss their shared issues, and hosts “a virtual or imaginary community which does not necessarily exist in any identifiable space” (Habermas, 1997, p. 176). The public sphere constitutes its own public opinion. The state authority, which is accepted as a public authority and does not exist in the public sphere, must ensure the welfare

of the citizens, because of the actions imposed by the public sphere. At this point, Habermas' concept of public opinion comes into play. The public sphere influences the legal organs and government through its institutions. The government's control and criticism of the government are carried out formally or informally by public bodies created by citizens through a sovereign structure organised in the form of a state. The public within the state is organised as a carrier of the public, allowing the public sphere to mediate between the society and the state. Thus, democratic control and criticism of the activities of the state can be made possible (Habermas, 1995, pp. 62-66).

According to Habermas (1986), the same model cannot be applied to mass democracies organised as a social welfare state. Because, within the social welfare state model, the self-regulated free-market order has brought the conflicts of interest from the private sphere into the public sphere, and the group needs are controlled by the state, as they cannot benefit from the self-regulating market. The public space, which mediates the demands expressed in line with the group's interests, becomes the scene of conflicts of interest and competition based on violence in such an environment. Legal rules of this transformed public space correspond to private interests that conflict. In other words, the private and public spheres are intertwined, so that the political authorities have authority over the free market, while the social organisations and groups enter the political public sphere and obtain new political functions. Habermas (1997) has conceptualised that as the re-feudalisation of the public sphere. In this context, the important functions of the social welfare state were weakened because of the political public sphere. The public sphere has undergone a structural transformation in the social welfare state (Habermas, 1995, pp. 63-64). The distinction between the state and the society has diminished, and the public sphere and the public have become unable to fulfil their functions between civil society and the state, as they have lost their critical and deliberative characteristics. The private individual is no

longer autonomous and free, like the bourgeois individual in the liberal model. For this reason, critical publicity fades, and manufactured publicity becomes dominant. The process of public debate in the public sphere is a basic element of democracy. This process is the basis of the formation of the political public sphere. The presence of communicative possibilities and conditions in a deliberative democratic structure, which is a source of legitimacy, has an important place and allows rational debating. The public debate enables the rationalisation of democratic public opinion and the formation of common sense. Within this perspective, collective decision-making is central, and a deliberative democracy requires wide public participation, public debates and awareness of public issues, negotiations to reach a consensus and equal conditions for each individual regardless of the power and power relations in the negotiations. Individuals take part in the formation of the discursive will and this process also constructs its own normative public space structure on the same basis (Habermas, 2002, p. 162).

On the other hand, the system is a kind of imperative field. In the system, individuals are means and individual consciousnesses are insignificant. Systemic consciousness creates economic and power mechanisms, and the system is managed by them. The life-world is outside the system area and shaped in communicative action. For Habermas, social action takes place communicatively or strategically. Strategic action is the action by which the individual and/or groups of individuals are utilitarian and pursue their interests.

Communicative action, on the other hand, aims at reaching a consensus and perception through negotiation (Habermas, 2001, pp. 122-124). Communicative action takes place in the space, which is called the life-world. Life-world, built on the interest and curiosity of liberation, is an area where individuals act to overcome their problems through communicative action (Habermas, 2001, p. 559). Habermas's public sphere is directly related to the communicative rationality that constitutes the norms. The public sphere reproduces

itself through communicative rationality, and it is assumed that the people in the public sphere can conduct rational thinking and debate (Habermas, 1996, p. 347). The life-world, communicative action and communicative rationality influence the social system.

New social movements emerge because the system of state and market interactions has been expanded into the life-world, interfere with the life-world, and these interventions eroded the communicative rationality. Habermas (1981; 2001b) has termed this phenomenon as the colonisation of the life-world. The colonisation of the life-world occurs with the entrance of instrumental and strategic rationality, and the logic of the market and state bureaucracy heavily reduces the capacity of communicative rationality to produce consensus (Habermas, 2001). This reduced capacity creates social problems revolving around identities and lifestyles since the rationality of communicative action is the provider of social reproduction, symbolic interaction, socialisation and identity formation processes (Edwards, 2009, p. 382). Interventions in these processes caused an anti-systemic social opposition and reaction towards the colonisation of the life-world appearing through juridification and commodification. Juridification refers to the expansion of the state into the life-world and intensification of legal interventions (Habermas, 2001). Under the conditions of welfare state capitalism, private spaces and private individuals have become the clients of the state bureaucracy. Besides, the welfare state radically changed the grounds for the capital-working-class struggle. With the increase in unionisation, the struggle has been institutionalised and the working class has gained many rights, but this development also caused the workers' movement to lose its ability to produce criticism and social change (Habermas, 1981). Habermas established the typology of social movements with the distinction of offensive or emancipation and defensive or resistance (Strydom, 1990). Every citizen can be an agent for new social movements, and with communicative action and discursive consensus, organisational integrity can be achieved with individuals coming from

distinct segments. However, this causes them to show a high level of confusion and a weak understanding of communicative rationality (Habermas, 2001). Nevertheless, new social movements have the power to create and transform the public space, and they are significant as long as they bear this transformative power, and generate the new conflict potential (Habermas, 2001). Besides, the fact that the class conflict is institutionalised does not mean that the protest potential is diminished. They emerge from the colonised life-world because of the other directions of conflict (Habermas, 2001, p. 849). New social movements may propose several methods and solutions for problems in accepting universal morality and legal principles. Thus, they can create a driving force by causing a change in public and public opinion. Defensive and resistance movements create subcultural counter-publicities and counter-institutions that aim to gain new spaces with extended rights. In counter-publics, movements reshape the public space both with their resistance to the system and opposition to other public spaces. Subordinated groups can establish counter-publics in which they can make themselves advantageous. These subaltern counter-publics led to the recognition of subordinated social groups and the emergence of counter-discourses (Fraser, 1990, p. 67), allow these groups to build their identities, articulate their interests and generate counter formations. That is why new social movements revolve around identity and culture and transform the public sphere in this way.

Collective Identity

Collective identity is a concept that replaces the concept of class-consciousness for the new social movement theories (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 437). In this context, the base element used by new social movement theories in analysing movements is the formation process of the collective identity (Johnston et al., 1994, p. 10; Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 437). Resources and possibilities that an individual can inject into the process of identity building determine the likelihood of being a social actor. Circumferential resources are also

determinants for participation; however, their selective usage is dependent on actors' perceptions (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 437).

Identity building encompasses how social actors define themselves and how other actors define them. It begins when actors become part of larger groups and establish emotional ties (Melucci 1989, 1996; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Goodwin et al., 2001). Collective identities do not have to be shaped by certain identificatory social characteristics such as genders or sexual orientations. They can be generated through the shared values, views, choices, experiences or lifestyles. They can ostracise other identities or may sometimes embrace them. Besides, a single social actor may belong to more than one collective identity. Building collective identities take place under the conditions of the complex relations between individual and collective dimensions. Conditions at the individual level affect the processes of building, maintaining or revitalization the identity. On the other hand, social processes influence the emergence of collective identities (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, pp. 194-195).

Identity building is one of the crucial components of collective action. During the participation of actors in social movements, the intensity of the relations among actors and the perceived continuity of various historical events are determined through identifications. Identity is a process in which individuals and/or actors interact with other individuals and/or actors and attribute meanings to events, social relations and behaviours. However, the concept of identity brings with it some paradoxes. As Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 92) pointed out, the first paradox is that identities have both variable and constant dynamics of formation. They are built with the identities of previous periods. This implies a process that makes use of the meaningful power of historical continuity and solidarity. Identity building constantly changes its forms according to the course of social movements or other collective actions. In this context, they can have a structure that is both stable and recurrently

transforming (Calhoun, 1994; Melucci, 1996). The second paradox arises from the fact that actors can have multiple identities. An actor may feel simultaneously belonging to different collective identities, or actors that are likeminded in certain contexts may have different attitudes, experiences and behaviours (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 93).

Building identity strongly and collectively makes it easier to feel belonging to that identity (Klandermans, 2004, p. 364). However, a linear perspective cannot adequately explain the relationship between collective identity and participation. Therefore, to overcome this insipidity, Hunt & Benford (2004, p. 438) examined the relationship between different dimensions of participation and collective identity in four concepts; *micro mobilisation*, *solidarity*, *commitment* and *collective identity*.

Micro mobilisation is all the collaborative work that social actors put forward for the realisation of a movement. It is the production of the material resources, labour and ideas of a movement to achieve collective action. Therefore, collective identity building is a process that is shaped both by micro mobilisation and that shapes micro mobilisation (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 438). Solidarity is how the members of a group are connected (Fireman & Gamson, 1979, p. 21). It requires actors to define a collectivity and to define themselves as an element of this collective formation. It occurs when the individual is linked to a collectivity with shared goals and fates (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 439). Commitment is an individual's sense of collectivity. It is an instrumental and moral attachment (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 440).

Collective identity fosters the cognitive, moral, and emotional connections that individuals establish with communities, categories, practices, or institutions (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 284). They can only be produced through perceptual processes and are associated with individual identities. However, individual identities and collective identities

are distinctive. Collective identities express themselves through cultural products, but not all cultural products are indicators of collective identities. They cannot be explained through the rational choices and calculations of actors. Sometimes collective identities can be imposed externally to movements, but actors must accept these identities (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 284).

"Collective identity is an interactive, shared definition of the field of opportunities and constraints offered to collective action produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to groups" (Melucci, 1989, p. 793).

Identity emerges in a process where meaning plays a leading role. The processes in which meaning takes place always involve interactions such as "agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, communication and negotiation" (Jenkins, 2008, p. 17). Three different mechanisms play a role in the construction of collective identities; *boundaries*, *consciousness* and *negotiation* (Taylor & Whittier, 1992). Boundaries refer to the social, psychological and physical structures that create the differences between a group that constitutes collective action and the dominant group with which it struggles. Boundaries are critical to collective identity building because actors create an '*us and a them*' simultaneously (Taylor & Whittier, 1992; Hunt et al., 1994).

Consciousness is the interpretative framing used to define the interests of the movement. It is a process that emphasises collectivity after positional explanations of boundaries. Collective consciousness "emerges through many mechanisms, such as speech, narratives, frames, emotions, and interactions of actors with others" (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 445). Collective identities are multidimensional and therefore the elements that play a role in the formation of collective consciousness have multidimensional and complex relations.

Despite this complex structure, social movements need a coherent and organised collective identity. "Collective identities shape and shaped by collective action and the subsequent identity talk... Collective identities are talked into existence" (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 445). These talks take place in a cyclical process between four dynamics; becoming aware, active, committed and weary (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 445). Consciousness is a mechanism by which a group increases awareness of group membership and determines its position relative to society and relative to other groups. Group membership becomes politicised when this position is perceived as illegitimate and unjust (Van Stekelenburg, 2013, p. 114).

The negotiation mechanism refers to the symbols and everyday actions that a movement network negotiates to challenge and reconstruct existing systems. Hence, it is a mechanism that is used to end the different attitudes of others against the opposing groups (Taylor & Whittier, 1992, p. 111). Boundaries, consciousness and negotiation intermingle, interact, and sometimes can create unexpected outcomes (Hunt & Benford, 2004, p. 442).

Identities and practices are in mutual interaction and can facilitate or constrain each other. Collective identities are in a continuous state of transformation, and transformation and collective action shape them (Van Stekelenburg, 2013, p. 114). Social movements are discursive communities that establish relationships among collective actions, solidarity ties, identities, symbols, shared identity discourses, and everyday life practices, participants' experiences and forms of social injustice. If a social movement rises through an issue of identity, the link between individual identity and collective identity is more powerful and decisive for this movement. Therefore, identity strategies are aimed to change the definition of identities of individuals or groups in society and to re-define them as individuals and groups (Taylor, 2013; as cited in Van Stekelenburg, 2013, p. 114).

Collective identities are important indicators or tools derived from shared emotions, experiences and practices and used for the analysis of contemporary social movements. However, the roles they play for social movements may vary. Some movements may develop strategies through the mobilisation or articulation of existing collective identities. In this context, it can be assumed that existing, sharp and strong collective identities can also create conflicts, causing intra-movement disputes, and even the dispersal of movements. Every collective identity may not facilitate social movements. However, every social movement need not use existing collective identities to achieve its goal. At the time of their occurrence, they may generate novel, emerging collective identities that echo existing collective identities and do not pursue matters that may cause conflicts. The life span of these collective identities may be limited to the life of the given movement. The balance that a movement that generates collective identities must follow is about the adequacy of efforts to introduce a production around cultural contexts that do not contrast with the pre-existing identities of the actors. In any case, through collective identities, movements become defined by and for the actors. Moreover, the formation and transformation of collective identities are not limited to the emergence, spread and end of movements, because everyday life and culture in which power interferes, contains omnioptic nuclei that the collective identities can be derived or reproduced.

Emotions

Assessing social movements through emotions aims to analyse thoroughly various interactive contexts such as recruitment, intra-movement dynamics, external relations, collective identities. The ability to analyse political actions and social movements outside the limitations of the rational actor has revealed the necessity of new, subjective, and more exacting analytical tools. Emotions are considered as one of the providers of these tools in the social movements' literature. In this way, they appear as factors affecting interpersonal

relationships, interpretations of symbols and claims, and mediated rhetorical settings (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006). Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2004) assigned emotions into different categories; "reflex emotions, longer-term affective commitments, moods, and emotions based on complex morale and cognitive understandings" (p. 413). Contrary to the usual belief that strong emotions cause irrational behaviour, many categories of emotions do not produce such a result. Reflex feelings can be considered as feelings most likely to produce irrational behaviour, but they do not always produce such behaviour. According to Goodwin et al., (2004, p. 413), the share of cognitive errors and lack of knowledge in strategy errors made by social movements is greater than emotions. Jasper (1997) claimed that emotions can be analysed with similar theoretical and methodological tools used in the analysis of cognitive beliefs and moral visions. Individual and public expression of emotions differ. Besides, detachments from dominant emotions may arise from different reasons, both individual and public. The point that should be underlined here is the relationship between emotions and culture. Initially, emotions are closely related to psychological mechanisms. However, it can be argued that these mechanisms are shaped by cultural structures.

In terms of social movements and collective action, emotions are the signalling used by actors. Movements express themselves with emotions to their components and those outside of the movement and emphasise their grievances they associated with these emotions. These processes involve strategic reasoning. Certain emotions functioning for a social movement depends on cultural codes and the reality of this social formation (Hochschild, 1979; 2003). Emotions assume different functions at various levels of collective action and are used differently. Movements can use emotions to transform audiences into actors, to produce legitimacy by establishing emotional ties, or to change society's feelings about any movement, event, or problem (Vood, 2001; Haskell, 1985a; Haskell, 1985b; Taylor, 1995).

Goodwin et al. (2004, p. 416) argued that emotions are cultural accomplishments rather than reflexive psychological responses, and discussed them as mechanisms for social movements. Accordingly, to better analyse the relationship between emotions and social movements, the above-mentioned categories need to be examined.

Reflex Emotions. Some emotions emerge as reflexes, but most of them are more complex and coordinated. Fear, surprise, anger, disgust, joy and sadness are reflex emotions. How reflex emotions are expressed by humans do not vary from culture to culture, but the reasons for their appearance may differ for each culture (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 416). Reflex emotions may induce irrational behaviour. However, they can also invoke complex evaluation processes and cause people to contemplate the problems that cause these emotions more carefully and make rational choices (De Sousa, 1987; Frank, 1993; Barbalet, 2004). Reflex feelings can be approached in a strategic context for social movements. Fear, for example, is used to demobilise social movements' actors and potential participants. Actors or potential actors of a social movement can be afraid of governments' threats to worsen their economic social conditions or be frightened by the violence that coercive powers inflict. Especially in repressive systems and strict social formations, these intimidation tactics are often used against antagonist movements. However, informal network relations, solidarity-improving performances or strong collective identities, in which people would generate strong and positive feelings, can enable actors to conquer fear and allow the movements to be sustained (Goodwin & Pfaff, 2001). Anger can sabotage the strategic mind of the opposing side in social contention. Angry decisions taken by governments or movements can limit their political manoeuvrability and inclusiveness. Because they can cause strategic mistakes. Besides, organizational actors of the conflict develop strategies to ensure the public disgust from the opponent. It is possible to influence the attitudes and behaviours of society about political actors, political ideas, institutions and governments through emotions. The struggle

around negative emotions usually comprise strategies to match those emotions with opponents. (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 417). Joy, when it appears as a reflex emotion, can cause social movement actors and potential actors to believe that they can change things, especially if it springs because of an unexpected moment of success. This can lead to the beginning of a cognitive liberation process. Perceptual and behavioural contexts of emotions depend on emotion's temporality. That changes their functionality in terms of social movements. A collectivity that is emerged from sudden outbursts of anger and a collectivity generated from the momentum of anger accumulated over the years would lead people to create different organisational forms (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 418).

Affective Bonds. Affective bonds are not feelings that appear and disappear in a brief time, unlike reflex feelings. They express persistent emotional ties to people, ideas, places or things. They are significant in people's commitment to groups and participation in social movements. When people feel affective bonds such as hate, love, respect or trust, the cost of joining a movement decreases for them (Zurcher & Snow 1981; as cited in Goodwin et al., 2004). People do not take part in social movements only to protect their material interests or to voice their material grievances and claims. They also participate in movements to help their loved ones or to punish those whom they hate. Affective bonds can be igniters of social movements. Besides, they may affect the course of movements. Love and honour are the emotions upon which collective identities emerge, and actors' feelings for each other in a movement can determine the emotional stance of the movement (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 419). Positive affective bonds, such as respect and trust, are important for social movements. People often rely on political figures they agree with (Jasper, 1997, p. 112). Such affective bonds also determine what type of leadership social movements will have. Leaders are the peacemakers and embodied icons of movements' moral ideals. They are both the members and superiors of movements. Leadership within movements cannot be explained solely by

cost-benefit relationships. The essence of leadership should be grasped through affective bonds (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 419). Positive affective bonds such as trust and respect are necessary for social movements to cooperate and to improve their organisational capabilities (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). Affective bonds can strengthen or weaken social movements. For example, deference for a traditional institution can weaken the mobilisation of a movement (Polletta, 1999b; Wood, 1999). Besides, affective bonds can be attributed only to certain subgroups within a social movement, and prevent movements from producing higher levels of solidarity and cooperation (Goodwin, et al., 2004, p. 420).

Moods. Moods are modular emotions that can be transferred, unlike affective bonds. People can transfer their moods to different situations and targets. For this reason, a mood caused by one situation can affect how people will act in another situation (Goodwin, et al., 2004, p. 421). Moods are effective in people having positive or negative feelings about others. For this reason, organizations and leaders directing social movements endeavour to keep the actors in a positive mood. Hope facilitates collective action because it allows people to see themselves and their movement as efficient actors of the political arena. Not only the moods that emerging from positive social contextual fabric can enable mobilisation of social movements. For instance, in repressive systems, actors can pursue their actions by clinging to feelings such as courage and dignity, even though they know that their movement cannot easily achieve tangible results. They may continue to strive for the next generations, or by seeing themselves as part of a long-term movement, which will be eventually successful (Wood, 2001; Jasper, 1997; Polletta, 2000). The capacity of social movements to use moods is directly proportional to the capacity of their cultural toolkits. Movements can revive and use the old moods from old narratives and memories of old movements coherent with their framing (Polletta, 1998; Voss, 1998). Briefly, moods are effective in recruiting and how movements will operate (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 421).

Moral Emotions. Moral emotions are closely related to cultural formations and structures. Unlike other categories of emotions, they arise from more complex cognitive processes and moral awareness (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 422). People perceive the world and their place in the world through moral emotions. They are the indicators of people's judgements about the world, about themselves, their actions, others and actions of others. This connection between judgments and moral emotions also shows how these emotions relate to social movements or collective actions. Because people make certain judgments about certain issues is an essential element that enables people to come together and social movements to emerge. Embarrassment, pride, outrage, compassion and jealousy can be counted as moral emotions (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 423). Compassion is a moral emotion, which passes beyond cost/benefit calculations and it is crucial for altruistic social movements (Jasper & Nelkin 1992; as cited in Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 422). Moral shocks that invigorate moral emotions facilitate protests to spread because recruitment becomes easier. Moral shocks are not only emotional but also moral and cognitive processes (Jasper, 1997), so they are appropriate for the strategic stages of the movements. Moral shocks about ethics, beliefs, community alliances, economic or physical security and ideologies can lead to an outrage (Jasper, 1997, p. 140). Since moral emotions significantly influence the recruitment process of social movements, those who organise social movements try to create a framing in this context. For this reason, narratives and discourses are effective in creating and strengthening moral emotions. The creation, dissemination or reproduction of moral emotions is one of the strategic fields of social movement organisations, because they are the reflections of cultural judgements of actors, and they can be shaped and re-shaped by cultural structures. (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 423). Emotions find themselves in the literature of social movements as factors affecting actors' actions and decisions. As a result of these efforts, emotional risks, costs and benefits were added to the rational actor's cost-benefit-risk

calculations (Jasper, 2011). This conceptual expansion does not reduce the importance of rational choices and decisions, but rather enables analysts to understand and interpret them more efficiently.

Narratives

Narratives are important resources for social movements because they play critical roles in supporting claims with their emotion-related functions. If people find a story credible and are affected by it, they can also accept the legitimacy of the social claims to which these stories are associated. They are strategic means for social movements and actors and used to mobilising participants, recruit new participants, and appeal to outsider influential actors.

Newly created narratives interact with old narratives familiar to the given social formation. Because the credibility and success of new stories are determined by whether they are meaningful, important or coherent, how they relate to broader stories and how they use the power of moral shocks. These broader background stories also determine to some extent how policy is made or which social groups are advantageous in a certain social formation. Social movements aim to achieve their goals by changing these big stories (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, pp. 534-535).

"A narrative or story is an account of a sequence of events" (Polletta, 2013, p. 409). Narratives first produce an orientation. This orientation depicts the scene of the story. Later, many actions emerge in this scene and the narrative becomes complicated. Finally, one of these actions sets the final of the narrative and the complexity becomes resolved. After that, an evaluation of the events expressed by the narrative is made and these events are ranked hierarchically according to the importance attributed to them. At this point, evaluations and inferences are made about the narrative (Labov & Waletzky, 1967; Polletta, 2013, p. 409).

Characters experience the events in the narratives and the audience needs to establish emotional ties with them for the stories to work. In narratives, causality between events is established not with logic, but with the plot of the story. The plot determines how narratives develop and connect the events that make stories meaningful and understandable. Often, they are simple structures that can be easily understood by the audience, and different narratives can have similar plots. Also, the events or the plots that a narrative tells to its audience provide a perspective and a projection about the future. The aim here is to give the audience a moral lesson; thusly these projections can be positive or negative (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 536).

Narratives are also elements of collective action frames. Collective action frames announce the ideologies and discourses to audiences, but they are easily identifiable because of their formal characteristics (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 536). Narratives, unlike ideologies, discourses and frames, go down to the depths of societies' cultural fabric. Mostly, ordinary people know how to tell and make sense of stories because knowledge of building narratives comes from history and folk culture. Some narratives and the ways these narratives are narrated have been institutionalised. Social movements endeavour to produce and present new narratives and patterns that compel these institutionalised rules of narration. However, actors of movements may have problems adopting these new rules or may abstain to pay political costs for these new themes and patterns. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the institutionalised narrative norms to understand the policy-making and governing logic of the established political systems (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 536).

The emergence of mobilized collective identities usually occurs as a result of the alteration of generalized dominant stories. Narratives revive emotions and combine distinct events in meaningful integrity. They relate the events of the past and the present to the perspectives of the future by increasing their moral importance and emotional strength

(Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 537). There are researches stating that narratives are more effective than interests in enabling people to take part in collective action (Somers, 1992; Plummer, 1995; Gerteis, 2002). Protests emerge when the established narratives regarding specific institutions are replaced by new ones. This emergence can be caused also by the revitalisation of an institution. Institutionalised narratives are the sources in which institutions generate their practices and legitimacy. If a story about an institution loses its credibility, necessity, consent, approval or support, the mechanisms associated with that narrative of that institution become ineffective (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 537). Through narratives, relations between the particularity and the universality in a social formation can be understood. They explain how the rules adjusting the balance between the individual and institutions established (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 537).

Social movements use narratives strategically. They can be used to recruit participants, to maintain commitment among the actors, to provide support, to justify violent repertoire of action and to make political claims. The difference of narratives from the arguments and logical explanations is their power to change people into political actors by changing their identities (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 538). Besides, the configurational capabilities of stories that can connect movements to present, past and future make are effective in social movements' decision-making mechanisms. Narratives give people information about movements, and they can change their minds and have them adopt the stories of movements like their own. In this way, agents abandon their critical understanding of the movement. Changes in attitudes, depending on the stories, can be long-lasting. For this reason, it can be argued that stories change people's ideas more effectively than other forms of messages (Jones, 2013; Green & Brock, 2000).

Narratives must be persuasive, relevant, and credible to perform these functions. Collective mobilization stories that people are familiar with are more successful in getting

support. However, too familiar stories may also limit the recruitment and the supporting (Voss, 1998; Jansen, 2007). Successful narratives need to be fine-meshed with ideological perspectives, but well-structured stories with a high level of persuasiveness can also lead to the generation of new ideological perspectives (Haltom & McCann, 2004; Somers & Block, 2005). Narratives with ambiguity attract people more because they allow listeners or readers to make interpretations and to experience the binding of loose ends. This allows listeners or readers to internalise the narrative and complete it by themselves (Polletta, 2006, p. viii).

Political actors with rich resources and broad political networks use stories more effectively (Fine, 1995; Esacove, 2010). For social movements, telling their stories both effectively and in compliance with the norms of institutionalised areas is a tough task to achieve. Because following the rules of a narrative of institutionalised areas may cause unusual narratives produced by movements to become tamed and lose their power.

Storytellers try to solve these problems by increasing strategic costs.

Through the narratives, determinations about the influences of social movements can be made. They can be messengers of the emergences of new political actors or can be seen as novel ways of understanding social discontent (Polletta & Gardner, 2015, p. 541). Some scholars have argued that stories directly affect the policy practices (Stone, 1989), some others claimed that narratives do not affect policymaking (Baumgartner et al., 2009), and other scholars stated that they influence the political authorities indirectly (Jones & McBeth, 2010). When the narratives of social movements are recognised and approved by the authority, it can be said that the movements have successfully achieved their goals in this context. However, the narratives of disadvantaged opposition groups are mostly considered subjective, unbelievable or insignificant. One of the ways to overcome this problem for social movements is to redistribute the dominant narrative. Sometimes, social movements can also lead to the emergence of new narrator classes through narratives (Polletta, 2006; Polletta &

Gardner, 2015, p. 542). Narratives are not used to draw the boundaries of a cultural site that defines the limits agencies of movements and actors, unlike frames. In terms of social movements, they are materials culturally depicting the aspirations for social changes and their importance and urgency. They steer the flow of events by generating stories that steer the meanings and relations of events. Also, they can be considered as indicators for the impositions and possible transformations of existing cultural formations. In this context, narratives are subjective initiatives that aim to achieve collective meanings and objective changes by reformulating the decisiveness of cultural formations on social and political structures and offer generated interpretative possibilities that may include the usage of collective identities and emotions.

Network Society

The concept of network society offers a different general perspective on the social transformations that the new social movements paradigm emphasizes and tries to reveal the semantic and perceptual outputs of structural transformations that can be functional in the analysis of contemporary movements. In this context, it depicts the conditions under which networked social movements and urban social movements emerged. Network society has emerged through advances in network communication and new connections that have arisen thanks to telecommunication and computer technologies. (Castells, 2013a, p. 56). The internet can be defined as a network of networks and refers to a transformation in which communication processes exceed the limits of time and space (Timisi, 2003, p. 26). This transformation has led to the emergence of novel spaces, realities, communities and identities in the cyber dimension (Timisi, 2003, p. 121). This virtual environment has its idiosyncratic architecture, structure, nature, places and geography and has transformed social relations in terms of its conditions. Virtual communities are the political communities and imagined nations with their sovereignty and limitations (Anderson, 1995, p. 20). Castells (2013a)

described the network society as the new society that emerges with the disappearance of the known distinctions between space and time. Under the circumstances of globalisation, new technological developments and the spread of means of communication, the network society has transformative effects on the economy, politics, culture and social relations and it has led to the emergence of new perceptual patterns. Because, in the network society, individuals experience economic, cultural and social events inter-connectedly and that change how they perceive the world, how they think and act. The emerging new forms of capitalist production and the globalised information society determine the conditions of this change. Networks organise all functions and processes of life and therefore the social structure is a very dynamic, open system and the effects of social changes are global (pp. 89 -92).

In the network society, all institutions are organised in forms of networks and they interact with each other through networks, which has led to a fundamental change. According to Castells (2013a, pp. 88-96), this change can be understood with four key features. First, the basic material of the network society is information. Second, it is shaped by the diffusion of new technologies. Third, its components act with the logic of continuous networking. Fourth, the network society is a society focused on innovation (Castells, 2013a, pp. 88-96).

Castells' concepts of network society and informational capitalism do not express the same phenomenon. The concept of the network refers to the organisation of production, society and social relations. Informational capitalism is evaluated together with its capabilities that create technological developments and regulations (Castells, 2004a, p. 114).

In this sense, it is how informational capitalism is structured, not capitalism itself. The network society is a social pattern composed of various information networks and the network is the decentralised structure of this social pattern, which composed of nodes.

In the network society, global markets, labour, production, media, communication and social movements are organised into networks (Çımrın, 2011, p. 70). However, Castells' emphasis on networks does not point out that networks are the novel ways of organising. Networks existed before the network society. The new phenomenon to be emphasised here is the emergence of the network society. In that society, networks can make snap decisions and be coordinated rapidly. This new paradigm emphasises the efficiency of the individual in performing collective tasks. Networks can decide and receive feedback in real-time; they are versatile and interactive. Besides, network society represents a qualitative change in the structure of human experience and organisation. Global society is organised through networks taking its material basis from the internet (Castells, 2004a, pp. 141-142). The common feature of the social movements that emerge in different parts of the world today is that autonomous communication networks generate them. These movements occur on the network through mobile communication technologies and the Internet and spread to real urban spaces, squares and streets (Castells, 2013b). Internet-based communication networks allow the formation of a new public space by eliminating the necessity of physical proximity, which was a necessity for the formation of public space for previous periods. This new public space not only eliminates spatial and temporal limitations but also changes people's perceptions of time and space. Its main innovation is that communities, whose core constituents are individuals, can discuss public issues and exchange ideas on common interests (Habermas, 2003). That facilitates the organisation of people around certain social events and problems. When the communicative process of action leads to collective action, anger and hope also arise, leading to a social mobilization towards a goal or target. Individuals who create networks overcome fear through outrage and hope and become collective actors. Thus, social change can be achieved through communicative action requiring connectedness between networks. These networks are established from the neural

networks of human brains, activated by the signals coming from the mediums of communication. Organisational transformation of communication through new technologies, interactive, versatile and horizontal networks is the new context that forms the essence of the network society. This essence plays a genuine role in the formation of the social movements of the twenty-first century (Castells, 2013a, p. 473).

Networked Social Movements. Networked social movements emerged as people share their outrage, hopes and struggles in the network society. At the social base, the culture of autonomy has started both internet networks and networked social movements (Castells, 2013b, pp. 200-201). According to Castells, the main issues of new social movements such as freedom, individualism, identity and values originate from the social networks, which are spaces of autonomy. Because there is a fundamental relationship between the internet and networked social movements. In social networks, individuals share the culture of autonomy, their longing for the ownership of autonomy and their ideas about what are the basic cultural structures of modern societies. The goals of the new social movements are to meet all these new demands. The main axes of this new cultural structure are individualisation and autonomy. In this context, individualisation should be understood as an individualism prone to collective action and suitable for the production of common ideals. Autonomy is the process by which actors become subjects for their values and interests, independent of institutionalised structures. Transitions between individualisation and autonomy are ensured through the actors' communicative practices and their networking with the like-minded actors.

Networked social movements add autonomy practices to the movement culture and produce new organisational communicative platforms. They aim to turn people into subjects of their lives by approving the individualism-based autonomy against the established institutions of society (Castells, 2013b, pp. 198-199). Also, they emerge from their genuine

circumstances and grievances, establish their networks in urban spaces. Afterwards, they connect to the social virtual networks, learn new experiences and are become inspired (Castells, 2013b, p. 192). This creates a hybrid public space (Castells, 2013b, pp. 34-35). Networked social movements provide spaces of autonomy that are flexible and they can generate different outcomes according to the conditions imposed by the social formation in which they emerge (Castells, 2013b, pp. 92 - 99).

Internet and virtual social networking platforms are where young people from middle classes discover or build collective identities, and create an awareness of common problems such as bad economic conditions, corrupted political systems, police violence or the narrowing of the public spaces. They constitute the choreography of collective action (Gerbaudo, 2014, pp. 242; 6-12). Despite the media controlled by governments and media organisations, networks provide important opportunities for communicative autonomy in the determination and coordination of collective action (Castells, 2013b, pp. 17-19). Besides, social networks have become areas of emotional energy accumulation in which people's frustrations, anger and hopes for a better future accumulate. Networks are the starting points for initiating and directing collective action. Protest preparations, exchange of information about actions and calls for action are made through the networks. They serve as springboards for social movements (Garbeudo, 2014, p. xiv). Garbeduo (2014) stated that networked social movements mobilise on nationwide scales, but, they share many similar cultural characteristics despite their geographical differences. Therefore, it would not be right to evaluate these movements as disconnected (p. 17). These movements differ from the anti-globalisation movements with their structures that embrace pluralism. Networked social movements are popular movements; they involve many segments of society. Therefore, it can be said that they attach importance to diversity and autonomy.

Castells has determined the common and significant features of networked social movements (Castells, 2013b, pp. 191-205). Accordingly, networked social movements can be described as networks in a variety of forms. They include the pre-existing social networks, the social networks formed by the movement, and the other online or offline forms of networks. The network comprises practices that form constantly evolving and expanding networks. they are present both in urban areas and in the autonomous cyber areas of the Internet.

Since networked social movements are organised in multiple forms of networks, having not a single central structure is not a cost accelerant for them. They maintain their coordination and the exchange of ideas by using their multiple centres. Besides, this decentralised structure gives the networked movements a chance to evolve and to facilitate new participation. The multi-centre structure of networked movements also increases their resistance against interventions of the system or the power. Because they do not have easily identifiable centres as long as they do not manifest themselves in urban spaces, thus they cannot be easily targeted. These movements can renew themselves if they have enough connected participants across their loose structures (Castells, 2013b, p. 192).

Networked social movements start their lives as social networks in cyberspace, and they grow by occupying urban spaces. In this process, urban space and cyberspace hybridise and form a space that Castells (2013b) names as the space of autonomy. Networked movements gain abilities to become autonomous and to establish free, communicative networks from cyberspace. In the urban spaces, they oppose the institutional order by claim-making and try to play transformative roles. "The space of the movement is always formed by the interaction between the space of flows on the Internet, wireless communication networks and the space of places..." (Castells, 2013b, p. 192).

These movements are both local and global. They are local because they appear in specific contexts because of their sui generis reasons. They establish their networks in cyberspace and their material nodes in urban space. However, they are also global. Because they utilise global experiences through global networks. They take part in ongoing global discussions on the Internet and make calls for global demonstrations in local networks. Networked social movements' culture is global and cosmopolite. Nevertheless, they also depend on their own identity. Therefore, they make sharp claims that global problems are caused by local issues. Networked social movements create their form of time. They exhibit their existence through the practices of the alternative society they desire, during their occupation in urban spaces. This mobilisation process is independent of the daily life practices to which they are bound and the time constraints of their episodes, which may end at any moment by the intervention of opposing forces. In this sense, their ability to experience an alternative society is independent of time. "They live in the moment in terms of their experience, and they project their time in the future of history-making in terms of their anticipation" (Castells, 2013b, p. 193).

A spark of indignation about a particular event or political actor may trigger the networked social movements. Because of the indignation, calls for action for the spatial space are made from the space of flows. Numerous unspecified recipients become emotionally attached to the content and the forms of the messages. Visuals posted on social media strengthen and speed up these connections. Networked social movements spread virally, and erupt in many places at once.

Networks help people around the world to see other people who protest, and that perception facilitates mobilisation because it spreads hope of change. Actors of networked social movements avoid delegation processes and leaders. They do not trust such roles. This distrust comes from the same source as the indignation that triggered the emergence of

movements in the first place; representatives' rejection of the people they represent. The efficiency of those who spend relatively more effort and time on these movements stays out of the established decision-making mechanisms. Because networked movements lead themselves through their participants. This effort is also the performance of the new, alternative social representation proposed by these movements.

Outrage and indignation transform into hope by exchanging ideas in the space of autonomy for these movements. Networked social movement produces togetherness in urban and cyberspaces. Togetherness allows people to overcome fear and discover hope. However, togetherness does not refer to communities. Networked movements are not multiplicities constructed around shared values and beliefs, like communities. Togetherness is a linkage that enables people to come together and start discovering partnerships. Such social movements support cooperation and solidarity. On the other hand, they undermine the needs for institutional, organisational leadership. Because these movements see the organisational processes brought by leadership as ineffective and problematic processes. Leaderlessness is the element of inner trust for these movements. Therefore, as both a goal and a collective practice pointing to that goal, these movements shun leadership. These movements are highly self-reflective (Castells, 2013b, p. 195). The processes of self-identification, target revision, innovation, self-criticism and strategy formulation are constantly ongoing. These processes are carried out both in forums on the urban spaces and in the cyberspace of autonomy. An important part of self-criticism and discussions is related to the violence faced by the movements. Networked social movements are nonviolent, civil disobedient movements. However, because they believe in the dysfunctionality of established political participation mechanisms, they try to suppress the capitalist market and the power by resorting to acts of occupation. Having such an action repertoire often pushes them into violent events. This leads to a question of legitimacy for these movements, which aim to make claims peacefully

on behalf of the people. Because violence-prone social movements are likely to lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

Networked social movements rarely have pre-determined programs. They cannot form unions or other organisations because they encompass multiple demands of the multiplicities and these demands stem from a multiplicity of reasons. Their collectivity is based on the protest culture and politics of the issues. These features make them successful in terms of participation and attractiveness, but also prevent them from setting concrete goals to be achieved. Their influence in the political sphere may make it easier for political organisations to implement some of their alternative programs. They aim to change the values of societies, and their goals do not require revolutionary results, but transformational results. However, it can be said that they are political because of their extraordinary suggestions on policymaking, representation and social re-formation (Castells, 2013b, pp. 191-197). According to Castells (2013), these movements propose a utopia of autonomy in the name of subjectivity against the established institutions of society.

Urban Social Movements. Urban social movements are social movements in which the actors try to gain some control over the urban environment (Prujit, 2007). They are "collective mobilizations around demands for collective consumption, cultural identity, and political self-determination that influence structural social change and transform the urban meaning" (Castells, 1983, p. 305; Andretta, et al., 2015, p. 202). Urban movements become urban social movements when they interact with other social movement actors such as the media, professionals and political parties, and create networks of solidarity (Castells, 1983, p. 322). They are related to the built environments, the social fabric of the cities and local political processes, and often arise from three main groups of issues; collective consumption, urban planning and specific urban issues that cause specific groups to take action. Collective

urban consumption refers to issues stemming from the conditions that determine the quality of urban life such as infrastructural problems and economic fluctuations in urban spaces.

Urban planning, on the other hand, relates to issues such as the displacements or demolitions of spaces and buildings, which urban dwellers know, love, protect or claim. The third group refers to the issues in which urban groups struggle for economic or socio-political reasons (Prujit, 2007, p. 5115). Prujit (2007) argued that there is no need for large narratives, goals or organisations to classify urban movements as social movements. If an urban movement desires a new urban identity, a new way of urban life or an urban improvement, it can be described as an urban social movement. Besides, as Andretta et al., noted, (2015, p. 202) defining every urban mobilisation with the above-mentioned characteristics as a social movement can be misleading. This is an empirical problematic and each case needs to be analysed separately. Urban social movements, which have extensive protest repertoires, are related to urban problems, and these problems result from conflicts of urban networks. Urban networks include individuals and groups with common identities and beliefs and in solidarity (Diani, 1992).

Urban conflicts that induce urban social movements are related to social and political processes, institutional arrangements and specific socio-economic structures (Andretta, et al., 2015, p. 203). Urban mobilisation occurs when the effects of shocking economic transformations are felt on the urban landscape. In this context, urban residents living in cities that host economic development and restructuring projects are more likely to mobilize. The increasing importance of urban spaces for the global economy, the increase of urban population and the effects of neoliberal urban policies aiming to increase urban profit are the leading causes of contemporary urban mobilisation (Harvey, 1992; Salet & Gualini, 2007). This new municipal and administrative approach to urban areas is called new urbanism. The concept expresses the understanding that causes reshaping the urban landscape and its

surroundings to ensure urban economic development and attract investors and special economic actors to a city. New urbanism refers to a global phenomenon involving serious processes such as the privatisation of urban resources, the commodification of urban spaces and the built environment, the execution of gentrification projects, the design of cities as tourism areas and the redistribution of the urban population (Andretta, et al., 2015, p. 203), and leads to the emergence of conflict and competition among cities. The conflict between urban actors who refuse this new way of urbanism and demand more environmentally friendly and social rights-oriented policies for cities and those trying to implement the policies required by the new urbanism has matured to enough to produce social movements (La Gales, 1995; as cited in Andretta, et al., 2015, p. 204). The conflicts between those who live in cities and those who manage cities to reap more profit are one of the fundamental reasons for urban mobilisation. Urban mobilizations emerge in various forms according to various municipal structures and contention-resolution models (Trudelle, 2003). How and by which segments the production of urban space is provided in a city and the frequency and forms of agreements/disagreements between these segments and the political opportunity structures that urban residents can use determine how urban mobilisation will form (Andretta, et al., 2015, p. 204). The emergence of urban social movements develops depending on the nature of the relationship between local political power and civil society in a particular city (Nicholls, 2008, p. 841). Urban social movements involve debates and claims about representation and participation, and this process takes place with the contribution of non-institutional political dynamics (Della Porta, 2013, p. 183). Networked and urban social movements can be considered as two contextual categories that overlap under the conditions of the network society. Many of the contemporary social movements arise due to urban issues or from urban spaces, and they utilise the possibilities of cyberspace that facilitate networking. From this point of view, it becomes important how these opportunities affect

individualised participation, agency and the way social movements are organised. In other words, it becomes necessary to analyse how transformations caused by the network society change the logic of action for actors and movements. Therefore, before I assess the existing literature of the Gezi movement, I will examine the concept of connective action.

Connective Action

The transformations and changes brought by the network society lead to the transformation of collective mobilizations in the world. Today, social movements that exclude unions, political parties and other institutional political organisations or state that the relations with them should be rearranged are frequently encountered. A significant amount of today's social movements rejects certain forms of organisation and structuring which are known as essential for the formation, diffuse and success of a social movement. They try to get rid of the constraints embedded in established organisational structures and regard these formal structures as constraints or as established negative opportunity structures that transform them into movements, which are linked to disapproved established political arena. However, the successful spread of these social movements without the instrumentalisation of well-known, essential resources and opportunities and without exhibiting inclusionary attitudes in their interactions with them, is being met with curiosity and surprise. These movements have leaderless collective identities, communicate via the internet, and spread their ideas or messages using a cyber architecture that supports virality (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, pp. 741-742). Organisational orientations of these movements point to the increasing importance and effectiveness of digitally enabled action networks. These networks organise themselves in two patterns. First, they avoid embed themselves in the networks of conventional collective action and aim to increase the number of their participants by using the themes of personalised action through the interactive possibilities of digital media. Second, they replace the established politics and its organisations with technological

platforms and digital applications and share their demands and grievances in personalised digital environments (p. 742). According to Bennet and Segerberg (2012), these personalised and digitally mediated collective forms of action grow faster, spread more rapidly among places, and can perform dynamic manoeuvres that are required by ever-changing different political objectives. The development of the digital capabilities of social movements is fundamentally related to the global impact of developed industrial societies. The influence of personalised tendencies has increased because of the change in the social and political perspectives of the younger generations (Inglehart, 1997). When this transformation meets new communication technologies, digitally networked action has gained importance. Because it is possible to turn the grievances felt at the individual level into collectivity in the digital environment. The actors can form collective identities based on inclusive, diverse forms of large-scale personal expression. At this dimension, social belonging and ideological identities do not contribute to identity formation (Howard & Hussain, 2011; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 744).

Such movements include not only the sharing and collectivisation of personalised grievances and discontent but also the personalisation of organisational mechanisms. The basis of this form of organisation is the increasing importance of flexible weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and social networks in late modern societies. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) argued that the two elements of individualised communication are important for large-scale connective actions. First, political content is presented in a form that can be easily personalised. Thus, it is possible to bring together people who do not think the same way about a particular debate. Because the need for the resolution of a certain problem can be attributed to different personal reasons. Second, themes to create a personalised awareness of political content are shared through social media platforms and other digital platforms. This enables people to share themes with people whom they trust, such as friends or relatives, and

thusly trust and familiarity are reached regarding any political issue through digital ties. In connective action, the network becomes the organisational form of political action (pp. 744-745). Communication technologies and their contribution to the dissemination of personal action frames, encompass re-reinforced and enhanced effects of aforementioned themes. It depends on how people appropriate, reshape and share these themes. Personalized action frames do not force potential political actors to join various groups or be ideologically identical. Therefore, the need to adopt common ideas and behaviours and the costs and commitments associated with shared ideas and attitudes lose their significance. The participants can express themselves with their voice.

The distinction between personal and collective action frames is not about being online or not. Today, all the networks of action in contentious politics are established by the people that act in material spaces and almost every social movement organisation enjoy the advantages of being online. The difference of the connective action frames is that they change the dynamics of processes such as collective identity building or organisation. The logic of collective action endeavours to persuade people that the costs and risks of participation are worth the benefits to be gained in case of participation take place. The logic should also be persuasive in the claim that the free driver problem will be overcome. The logic of collective action requires that individuals need to leave behind their subjectivity to build a collective identity. Formal organisations with specific resources are essential to enable individuals to take part in collective action and to coordinate participants (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, pp. 750-752). Besides, when it becomes difficult to obtain the resources required for mobilisation and the political opportunity structures shrink, it becomes difficult to take part in collective action for potential actors because their perception that the gains that are thought to be achieved will be limited enough emerges. It should be emphasised that established collective action processes require individuals to move to a dimension, which is

away from their daily routines by taking certain risks, costs and labour into consideration. The required existence of organisations for the formation of collective action, collective identities, frameworks and or shared ideologies prevents individual preferences or interpretations from coming to the forefront of (Bennet & Segerberg, 2012, pp. 750-752).

The logic of connective action has different principles and is free from the unwieldy mechanisms of collective action. Personalised networks of action refer to a range of technological processes that can be organised with no collective identity frames and the mobilisation of organisational resources. People can transform the networks in the cyberspace they already use in everyday life into organised networks around political problems without paying enormous costs. This convenience eliminates the problem of free riders because the cost calculation process has altered completely. For free riders, it is easier to join political networks that have ambiguous boundaries between public and private (Bimber et al., 2005). In digitally mediated networks, participants provide their motivations. The main dynamics of generating this motivation is sharing on the Internet, recognising and becoming recognised through sharing, and re-sharing what others have shared. There is a continuous multiple networked sharing activity, and cyberspaces like social media platforms that bring these activities together can lead to processes resembling collective action. The mediation and content production of organisations, which are required by the logic of collective action, is hierarchical. However, in the logic of connective action, content is co-produced and co-distributed (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 752).

Co-production and co-distribution processes involve trust, exchange of views, and personalised expression and recognition because it is done through networks, which people use in everyday life. Within this architecture of networks, it is possible to take actions related to public issues or to act for collective aims. However, because of the transformation of space and time by cyberspace, the limitations of collective action on these notions are also

eliminated by connective action. "The essence of the connective action is the self-motivated (though not necessarily self-centred) sharing of already internalised or personalised ideas, plans, images, and resources with networks of others" (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 753). Briefly, these networks form an organisational structure that transcends temporal and spatial boundaries, enabling sudden actions and coordinated manoeuvres. Collective and connective actions are not equivalent to each other. They can coexist or even have mutualism between them. Bennett and Segerberg (2012, p. 756) have examined contemporary action networks into three types; *connective action with self-organising networks*, *connective action with organisationally enabled networks* and *collective action with organisationally brokered networks*.

Collective action with organisationally brokered networks refers to the networks of brokering organisations that enable cooperation to happen and the elimination of the heterogeneity. Such large-scaled collective action needs exclusionary collective action frames when it aims to diffuse. This action uses cyberspace and social media to provide participation, strengthen coordination and mobilise the masses. On the other hand, connective action with self-organising networks does not require leadership or organisations, and it is the multitude of connected action networks that use cyberspace and social media platforms to become organised on their own. Communicative processes, information, ideas and discussions are shared and communicated through personal action frames. These networks do not allow formal organisations to play central roles in their movements, even if they address them. Connective action with organisationally enabled networks is the hybridisation of these two types of networks. In these networks, formal organisational actors use personalised frameworks of action. They avoid asserting powerful ideologies, identities or agendas. If such action networks need formal organisations seriously, their attractiveness for individuals decreases. Organisations, which want to establish loose ties with other formal organisations

can also use this type of networks. They are functional to eliminate the unwieldiness that organisations incur because of the appropriation of the issues or claims that lead to mobilisation. Their use of such networks does not imply that they are moving away from their organisational goals. It only shows that such organisations can switch between different organisational structures based on time, location and form (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, pp. 756-759). This approach, which explains the hybridisation of connective action with collective action, is one of the most refined conceptualizations put forward to evaluate the conditions of the network society in terms of social movements. Since cyberspace encompasses all particularities in its universality, which is independent of the old limitations of time and space, universal categories and tools can be developed to facilitate the structural analysis of contemporary social movements. However, at the same time, the diversification, individualisation, recombination of connective and collective action logics, and their fragmentable and re-integrable relations, show that all the concepts produced and discussed throughout the literature of social movements should be re-contextualised according to given case studies.

Evaluation of the Concept of Movement for Theory Generation

During my literature review on social movement scholarship, I have learned and found many fertile perspectives and notions that would enrich my interpretations and assessments of the conceptual categories arouse from data. In general, it can be said that social movement's scholarship begins with huge attention on subjectivities and social psychology. Nevertheless, these early approaches to collective behaviour and action have managed to generate some ever-valid concepts about movements. Blumer's (1969) five steps and Smelser's (1962) six social determinants still provide a firm base for movement analysis. In terms of the Gezi movement and Gezi graffiti, these steps and determinants are also explanatory. In this context, the first concepts that my attention drew are social strain and

structural conduciveness. Both scholars emphasise on social strain can be easily associated with the Turkish government's policies and other transformations that I explain in the next section. The concept is meaningful since it refers to the accumulation of grievances and the presence of social and political climate that cause them. Easily, for Gezi, it can be used to explain the sudden boom of the events since the social strain was too much and diversified as branches of a tree. Also, steps or determinants referring to agitators, precipitating factors, beliefs and ideologies, for the Gezi movement can be analysed through the Gezi graffiti. In other words, Gezi graffiti is an area in which these phases or constituents of the movement are reflected. Besides, through Gezi graffiti the movement can be taken under consideration in terms of emergent norm theory since it encapsulates many signs about Gezi's socio-cultural facades and novelty. On the other hand, if Gezi graffiti and the Gezi movement would be scrutinized via relative deprivation theory, the discrepancy would emerge most likely from the cultural field. Because, Gezi movement has appeared during economic progress, however the cultural demands and government's mentality were like from two different ages. I believe to study this discrepancy thoroughly new social movements paradigm and its concepts would be more convenient and elaborative than relative deprivation theory. However, these approaches are keen to regard collective behaviour as an accident on the course of the society and therefore to combine and re-phrase the graffiti interpretations and patterns only with these paradigm's notions would diminish the chances to recognise the political and systemic structure's effects on Gezi.

From the perspectives of rational actor and resource mobilization theory, to studying the Gezi movement would be not very fruitful. For sure, these approaches provide some useful analytic tools to understand the emergence and development of social movements. However, these approaches can be too reductive for the Gezi movement and not compatible with analysing graffiti. Gezi is highly spontaneous, altruistic, fluid and multifaceted for these

approaches. Thus, such an effort could lead researchers to overlook some crucial and unique characteristics of the movement. Moreover, I believe, the rationality of the rational actor and resource mobilization theories and Gezi's altruistic and anti-systemic ideal social world are poles apart in this manner. The movement did not emerge from a social system that contains stable social movement organizations, nor was it interested in creating such a system. Also, Turkey's conditions were not suitable for such organizational accumulations since political polarisation was also embodied in structural ways. AKP as a form of state-party, and Erdoğan as a sultanist populist leader, did not negotiate with opposition or respond to demands until there was nothing else left to do for them. Therefore, Turkey did not have a social infrastructure to build its social movement industry or sector.

On the other hand, within the theories that rational actor is the main axis, political opportunity structures and the political process theory can be useful to analyse Gezi movement, since Turkey has a political system that closes more and more, and political power is hyper centralised. In this perspective, it can be argued that because Turkey's political system has been constraining opposition intensely and trying to silence all contentious intentions, a movement independent from the established ways has emerged, and made the power vulnerable easily. The government had no other method but to use force. Also, contentious politics can be used to analyse the Gezi movement from a historical and mechanism-based point of view. Even though these approaches underline processes and elements like repertoires, cycles, cognitive liberation and insurgent consciousness (they can be re-evaluated together with emergent norm theory), they are not highly useful to analyse a data corpus that involves graffiti.

At this point, frame analysis comes to the fore. However, for Gezi graffiti I believe, arguing there has been tactical and organizational thinking that created, steered or adjusted interpretative schemata to draw individuals or groups into the movement or to keep them in

the movement would be not accurate. Gezi movement did not have such organizational structures, work sharing, leadership or a centre, and the movement actors were silenced or ignored by the conventional politics and mainstream media so they did not possess any discursive expertise to utilise. Therefore, I believe, the concept of narrative is more helpful to discuss Gezi graffiti.

During the literature review on the concept of movement, I have found the new social movements paradigm more facilitating in evaluating Gezi graffiti. The emphasis on culture as a field of social conflict amplifies the significance of the graffiti for the movement. Also, Erdoğan's and his government's policies in the pre-Gezi period match with the paradigm's recurrent designations of power's omnipresent interventions and the colonization of the lifeworld. Furthermore, networked movements, emotions, collective identities, possibilities of cyberspace, urban spaces and new emergent and digitalised action and organization logics have been very useful for me to improve my interpretations of patterns of Gezi graffiti. Because their contents are mostly related to these concepts. Nevertheless, I have kept in my mind the importance of the structures' and political system's effect on these cultural contexts, because culture refers to structures, for the new social movements paradigm. Lastly, after the comprehensive review of movement literature, for the grounded theory on Gezi graffiti, the concept of movement appears as follows; a movement detached from previous organizational ways, highly affected by the constraints of the political system, strongly related to interactions, symbols and emotions and articulates itself with cultural contexts to struggle.

Gezi Movement

This section contains an array of various analyses of the Gezi movement, and it attempts to create a conceptual mapping about how it has been approached in scholarship. For that purpose, it collocates dissimilar determinations and conceptualizations used for

sociological and political analyses and examines the recurrent scholarly intentions and patterns. Thus, it is aimed both to recognise the Gezi movement's literature and to reveal its relation with the social movements' scholarship discussed in the first section of the chapter. Identifying how analysts in the literature use these patterns will also show how they used the Gezi movement to prove the validity of their social world designs and sociological allegations. The mapping I have tried to produce following these patterns reveals the most recurrent, debated and remarkable concepts and contexts in the literature on behalf of the movement, and explains to some extent the relationship between sociology and the movement. Following that the section assesses the Gezi movement literature and concludes with the outline of the Gezi multiplicity.

Analyses for a Supra-political Gezi. One of the noticeable patterns in the Gezi literature contains efforts to define the movement outside of political and economic contexts. These analyses link the causes and propagation of the Gezi movement to emotional and cultural reasons and do not take a critical approach to the political system. Besides, within this pattern, to characterise the Gezi movement concerning any given political agenda means to ignore the essential causality of the movement, its significance and magnitude. According to the pattern's analyses, the educated youth was the supreme actor of the movement, and it played a role as the social commentator of growing social demands. The excessive use of force by the police, and the rhetoric of the government are condemned and criticised; however, the movement is not accepted as revolutionary or politically evident with a firm agenda.

A Creative Public Youth Movement. Sociologist Nilüfer Göle (2013) regarded the Gezi movement as a diffused, expanded and transformed series of protests, which started as an action against an urban project. For her, the movement's transformation depended on the enormous support coming from the enraged middle class in Turkey because of the aggressive

and violent police interventions. Gezi movement is a youth-initiated urban movement. The abuse of power and the legal culpability faced by this youth movement infuriated ordinary citizens and led the middle classes to support the movement. Besides, Göle (2013) has considered the Gezi movement as a gateway to a new social period containing a strong presence of women, new emergent actors and a repertoire of action. Gezi movement has similarities with movements like May 1968, Occupy Wall Street, Indignados Movement and Arab Spring (p. 8). It is a public movement that occurred in the streets, showed resistance and occupied urban spaces. Its first sparks belong to the youth; however, it embraced previous generations as well. Although the movement resembles all these movements, it is also unique.

Gezi movement can be confused with the Arab Spring revolts and may also be assumed as a rebellion against an authoritarian regime. However, unlike the Arab Spring revolts, it did not stem from the democratic aspirations and efforts for making the majority's voice heard. Differently, it criticised the given democratic system and defended the rights of minorities and individuals. Gezi was against capitalism and hyper-development, like its counterparts in Europe. Those who took part in the movement were not victims of an economic crisis or recession. They rejected the policies that transformed the city and life into commodities. Göle (2013, p. 9) pointed out that the Gezi movement symbolises a new urban space understanding, and argued that the grievances of the secularists, who are concerned about the government's policies, have also articulated into collective action in Gezi Park. In this sense, it is a public space struggle. Göle utilised the correlation between the movement and spaces, which she tested in two axes, in the persona of Gezi Park, and thus tried to reveal the movement's uniqueness. For Göle, the Gezi movement has grown and became itself through the articulation of accumulated grievances for a more democratic, efficient and extended public space, in the form of an urban space protest.

Under these conditions, (Göle, 2013, p. 10) , the movement has united different social groups and unique identities. The government's policies and Erdoğan's polarising political rhetoric functioned as the catalysts for the aggregation of segregated ones. The actors of the movement practised a new social understanding, respectful to all differences and refuted the tradition of discriminatory political rhetoric. Göle also highlighted the movement's ability to interact and deliver performativity. She drew attention to the improvisational, creative, humorous and communicative abilities of the generation that leads the movement and movement's repertoire of action. Göle suggested that the movement should not be scrutinised only from a political perspective since it is a public protest, and if the movement had been steered to a specific political agenda, it would have lost its strength and spirit (2013, p. 12). Briefly, Göle argued that the movement has contributed to building a new critical paradigm in which different identities can come together and expand the public space, and that was demonstrated through a bodily resistance for an urban space.

An Uprising for Dignity. Political scientist and economist Ahmet İnsel (2013) described the Gezi movement as an uprising for dignity. He stated that the resistance in Gezi Park arose because a segment of the public was outraged in consequence of the reckless and disproportionate use of the police force. İnsel likened the Gezi movement to anti-austerity movements (Indignados), which started in Spain and subsequently spread to the world. For him, the Gezi movement cannot be adequately explained by seeing it merely as a dissent movement against government policies. Gezi is a reaction against the culture of obedience and the blustering power that continuously targets criticism and opposition. İnsel argued that people took action in Gezi Park because they wanted to protect their dignity as citizens, against the derogatory policies of the government. Therefore, for him, Gezi is not an anti-regime uprising. What happened in Gezi Park was the combination of the grievances stemming from the government's interferences in lifestyles, and the struggles for reclaiming

dignity that is based on democratic rights (İnsel, 2013). Insel placed on that ground the concept of the new Turkey and evaluated the movement within this framework. According to him, the first feature of new Turkey is to experience the economic problems of a developed and normalised capitalist country, and the youth in Taksim Square and Gezi Park was not deeply worried about their economic prospects. The second feature of the new Turkey is that the dominance of the military-bureaucratic guardianship regime has ended. During the Gezi movement slogans did not call the military for duty to protect democracy. Insel (2013) also underlined that this uprising for dignity occurred in a very peaceful, libertarian and festive environment, and it manifested emphasised solidarity amongst various social groups in the Gezi movement. Insel, in his Gezi analysis, claimed the youth as the dominant power of the movement. Besides, he described actors of this youth as libertarians who have minimal organic relations with established political institutions, use social media intensively and efficiently, is reactive against moralism, is respectful to differences and demands their differences to be respected. The Gezi youth has a powerful sense of humour and does not use violence or is not intimidated by violence. Therefore, it has rendered the government helpless and incapacitated. According to Insel (2013), the Gezi movement has mobilised to demand more freedom and recognition from the government.

Analyses for a Class-based Gezi. Another significant pattern of the Gezi literature comprises analyses, examining the movement from a class-based perspective. These analyses can be roughly divided into two main groups. The ones that see the movement as a middle-class movement and the ones argue that it was a working-class movement. The first group evaluates the Gezi movement's class as a new middle class trying to maintain its gains and advantageous position against the neoliberal global order. Analyses in the second group allege that the above-mentioned emergent middle class is a part of the working class by extending the frame of the working class. The essence of that reframing stems from the

contemporary economic transformations such as altered production relations, the rise of the service sector, increased presence of white-collar employees. In some analyses, even those who do not regard themselves as workers are considered the members of the working class, and the relationality of production relations accepted as a sufficient determinant for the categorisation. Within the borders of these efforts that build a new class or explain the transformation of an old class cultural dimensions of the distance, the proximity, and the relations among the newcomers, the working class and the precariat, is just a theoretical problem to overcome.

A New Middle-class Movement. Sociologist Çağlar Keyder (2013) examined the Gezi movement in the light of Marxism's historical approach and modernisation theory, and he defined it as Turkey's emergent middle-class movement. For Keyder, (2013) the bourgeoisie has lost its transformative power in Turkey, and this new middle classes' demands cannot be met within the existing system. Members of these classes work in jobs that require education, knowledge and skills in modern society. They are not employers, but they have essential positions. There are two distinctive characteristics of the members of these new classes. First, they are highly educated and second; they have a certain level of power to take initiatives in working life. Therefore, unlike the working class, they are more sensitive about individual freedoms and democratisation. Keyder (2013) argued that new middle classes have appeared in Turkey after 1980, with the modernisation of economic life. Turkish economy had been modernised, and the new system needed experts. Therefore, the norms of professional working life were settled, and free-market rules became dominant. Under these conditions, a large young population, which has a fruitful social capital and familiar with global cultural codes, has emerged.

Consequently, students and employees, comprising these new middle classes, had been carrying the potential to object to old-fashioned political structures for a long time

(Keyder, 2013). The Gezi movement took place under conditions where a meta-nation-state gradually turned into a one-man authoritarian regime combining with a form of Islamic conservatism, and this transformation increasingly outraged the new middle classes. Besides, the nation-state, which was becoming more and more reactionary, had been responding to the individualisation demands of new middle classes with uncompromising repressive policies and discourses.

New social spaces and life modes demanded by these classes were exceeding the borders of the spaces that established and controlled by the nation-state. The contention that emerged from this gap, has led the middle classes to an opposition. In Turkey, the increasing significance of the new middle classes in the social life that worried about the decline in citizenship rights and the closure of the political system resulted in the mobilisation of the Gezi movement.

For Keyder (2012), the Gezi movement articulated three primary demands; the democratisation of the state, the improved recognition of civic rights and freedoms, and the changing of some related policies. Therefore, the Gezi movement differs from previous social movements in Turkey since it did not aim to seize the state or the power (p. 3). Keyder argued that that the ultimate aim of the movement was to reach the conditions in which a new social contract that would facilitate the democratisation and debilitate the patriarchal domination of the state can be made. In this sense, for him, the Gezi movement does not differ from the movements that emerged in various societies with the rise of the new middle class.

Status Middle Class versus Market Middle Class. Political scientist Soli Özel (2014) described the Gezi movement as a moment of reckoning in Turkish politics. The movement included communicative conditions in which both social consent and opposition were created

because the manipulative journalism of partisan mainstream media and dominant discourse has reproduced and dismantled to some extent the minds of those affected by the flow of the Gezi. Actors of the movement could not utilise well enough the advantages of social media to share information, to build networks and to re-frame the reality and to create spheres of influence. No one has adopted these frames but who has taken part in the Gezi or sympathised with the movement. According to Özel (2014), Gezi was not a democratic protest for many people that their actors were victims of police violence because the government has successfully presented police violence to the public as a legitimate and legal response to violent protesters. According to this narrative, protesters were rebelling against a legitimate government elected democratically and harming public property.

Özel (2014) argued that Gezi movement emerged as an outburst of anger against the rising authoritarianism, power's interventions in private lives and reification of urban areas along with their social, historical and cultural meanings. Also, the movement rose against decisions, which perceived as an "attack on the cultural stronghold of westernised elite", and it "staged an experiment in Arendtian understanding of power and politics" (Özel, 2014, p. 9). Özel (2014) alleged that the spirit of Gezi will not fade away and will continue to influence the politics of Turkey. In this context, he explained the spirit of the Gezi by associating it with other contemporary social movements. He positioned neoliberalism against the ongoing wave of insurgency in the world, both as a source and as an opponent. Even in developing countries, systems can no longer offer a future to people, and even educated segments have ceased to trust hope. These changing conditions create insurgencies that demand more responsible, careful and egalitarian economic systems. Besides, the spaces of this global uprising are global cities, and their leading actors are youth, slum dwellers and the working class (Özel, 2014, p. 12).

Özel (2014) emphasised that it is not possible to establish a democracy without the middle classes. However, the decisions of the middle classes do not always bring democratic consequences. Many of the social movements in the world today are organised without leaders and hierarchies. They refuse to organise in conventional ways and stay away from political parties. According to Özel, this phenomenon will shape 21st-century politics. These movements occur all over the world under various conditions. They may appear both in countries that experience economic growth (such as Turkey or Brazil) and also in countries the middle classes have waned and impoverished (like Greece and Spain). Özel agrees with Žižek's argument that proposes that these movements mobilise against globalisation and neoliberalism. Besides this determination, Özel drew attention to two different typologies of the middle classes in relation to the global wave of social movements, status middle classes and market middle classes. For him, status middle classes refer to middle classes that benefited from the economic structure of the pre-neoliberalism period, and market middle classes are the emergent classes that exploit the commodification policies of the new economic paradigm (2014, p. 14). Özel claimed that contemporary insurgencies, including the Gezi movement, are the manifestations of conflicts between these two middle classes. Under the conditions of neoliberalism, market middle classes have displaced status middle classes, and the former is now in conflict with the latter to protect its advantages and interests. Özel added a decisive political factor to this point of view, which played a role in the emergence of contemporary social movements, especially in countries like Turkey and Thailand. Elections in these countries have been instrumentalised in using populism to strengthen the power and legitimise the autocratic policies of governments. In this context, three primary factors affected the social conditions that facilitate the materialisation of the Gezi movement; repressive policies of the government, rising struggles for the right to the

city, and concerns about increasingly restricted individual freedoms. Özel (2014) underlined that the reasons for the movement are challenging to describe precisely. He also stated that the Gezi spirit had changed permanently Turkish society and politics in many respects. It has become a symbol of urban resistances against the "unresponsive, intrusive or brutal rulers" of the world, and during the Gezi movement "Turkey became truly a contemporary of its times" (p. 19).

A Petty-bourgeois Aristocracy Movement. Sociologist Cihan Tuğal (2013) criticised liberal thinkers who described the Gezi movement as an uprising of dignity, for reproducing hegemony with their analysis. According to him, the main objective of these liberal analyses popular amongst some scholars is to emphasise the differences of Gezi Park from Tahrir Square. Thus, it is aimed to make forgotten the possibility that the experience and ties acquired in Gezi would be included in institutional politics. These analyses are the products of efforts to overlook the relations between the Gezi movement, the Arab Spring and the occupying movements rising in the West. The liberal thinking calls for the movement not to be politicised. In this way, the messages like "do not turn anger against capitalism and oligarchy, do not build organisations that would destroy them" are given. They are the attempts of breaking the Gezi out of the context of the rising revolutionary wave in the world (Tuğal, 2013, p. 8). Tuğal (2013) also criticised the reduction of the causality of the Gezi movement to the regime crisis in Turkey. For him, even if liberalism success, it has destructive effects, and the Gezi movement has rebelled against the democratic police state and the neoliberalism that make urban life unbearable for the people. Tuğal (2013) argued that the movement started and continued around the negative themes that unite people such as Erdoğan's policies, destruction of trees in the park and police violence.

Along with being against these developments, actors of the movement have expressed their desires for reclaiming urban spaces and a better democracy. Tuğal (2013) described the Gezi movement as a middle-class youth movement. For him, Gezi also differs from its counterparts in the world, but this difference is mainly class-based. As a movement of the petty-bourgeois aristocracy, Gezi took its base from the anti-commodification struggle, rather than demands of equal distribution of wealth. The opposition of the Gezi to commodification is not just about urban spaces. For engineers, doctors and plaza employees who participated in Gezi, its effects are in the middle of their everyday lives and leisure time. For Tuğal, the movement is a reaction to these circumstances. Tuğal (2013) also claimed that some leftist circles claiming that the movement has revolutionary consequences are wrong. According to him, the Gezi movement is unsuccessful in this sense because its existence stems from contradictions that will continue as long as hegemony continues. Gezi movement appeared against the conservative-liberal hegemony, and it broke the identicalness of democracy, conservatism and capital by emphasising the right to the city and mobilising the reaction against police violence. However, the movement could not express clearly its target. It is anarchistic and autonomist for its prefigurative and performative characteristics. However, paradoxically, Gezi also used official political channels to convey demands. In this respect, it differs from the anarchist movements because it does not entirely reject the state mechanisms. According to Tuğal, another crucial political preference given by the movement is to accept the established/organised left wing to the movement covertly. For him, Gezi was organisationally directed by established/organised left because of *Taksim Dayanışması* (The Taksim Solidarity); the most significant organisation of the movement has embraced some workers' unions and other leftist organisations. When the organisation made a strategic mistake, the Çarşı fandom group and the scattered youth brought the movement to the Gezi line again (Tuğal, 2013).

Tuğal (2015) placed the Gezi movement into the post-2009 global wave of revolts and claimed that the middle strata are the most decisive actor of these revolts. He named the middle strata as the new petty bourgeoisie, and he argued that it is not the sole creator, but the greatest player of these social movements. Accordingly, the occupation movements like Gezi emerging in urban centres are not anti-capitalist movements, but they carry loud and clear anti-commodification messages. Besides, they are poorly linked to lower strata and the poor. The fact that these movements demand and practice direct democracy stems from the well-educated middle classes that dominate the movements. However, the reasons for the middle-class revolts in the world are varied. Revolts in America and Southern Europe have been caused by financial crises. On the other hand, they appeared in North Africa because Western-supported dictatorships and neoliberal development programs were paralyzed. According to Tuğal, the Gezi movement resulted from the discontent caused by the success of neoliberal development programs. Also, that social discontent turned into outrage along with the rise of conservatism, and that made the elite secularists take part in the Gezi movement. The presence of the elite in the movement triggered the dilution of anti-neoliberal demands. Tuğal emphasised that movements like Gezi contain demographic and ideological diversity. They mostly act on leftist or liberal political themes; however, some movements, as in Ukraine, Egypt and Venezuela, have rightist tendencies. Tuğal (2015) assessed that the centrality of the new middle classes creates an ambivalence in this wave of movements (p. 77) as the new petty bourgeoisie mobilise only to protect its privileges. In this sense, it is unclear that the effectiveness of middle classes whether serving for a post-capitalistic future. The new petty bourgeoisie has shown elitist, authoritarian and even fascistic tendencies in some countries. Besides, some movements completely excluded the working class, and in some, the anti-commodification struggle was irrelevant to the revolts.

According to Tuğal, liberal analyses ignore the dynamics of this movement wave against capitalism, and radical analyses exaggerate the transformative potential of the new middle classes who are concerned about the future. The new petty bourgeoisie is in cooperation with collectivist ideologies and democracy contradictorily, to protect its interests. Contrary to popular opinion, tolerance and horizontalism are not among the dispositions of this class. Moreover, because of its protective reflexes, it has not a real revolutionary notion and stays away from proletarianisation. It opposes authoritarianism, centralism and hierarchical structures, but also aims to preserve its authority and hierarchical position. "It is an individualist class. It worships power, even though it does not understand political power" (Tuğal, 2015, p. 83).

Tuğal (2015) acknowledged that while mapping the new petty bourgeoisie in the class context, its productive and social relations with other classes should be taken into consideration. The characteristics of a class can be understood from the classification struggles of their actors. Therefore, this class should be defined not only by an extended class definition but also by the political and historical context of class politics. The new petty-bourgeois is a class with relative control in production, consumption and exchange processes. This control is not only on products and services but also on meanings and aesthetics. Another distinguishing feature of this class is expertise. This feature separates the new petty bourgeoisie from the traditional petty bourgeoisie. However, efforts to define the new petty-bourgeois class via occupations are imperfect. Because in the neoliberal world, professions wobble continuously around privileges and differences. In short, the definition of this class, in which modern and rational skills are monopolised, depends on struggles that determine what constitutes the rational practices of deciding fractions or individuals that are in the ranks of the proletariat or the traditional petty bourgeoisie. Many fractions of these classes are always at risk of losing their privileges. Therefore, it is in constant competition with the

precariat. Level of education and income or occupations cannot describe who belongs to this class. Class articulations should be continuously analysed according to local and historical contexts. Tuğal claimed that the new petty-bourgeoisie developed inter-class partnerships and anti-hierarchical methods through social movements, but this acquisition alone is not enough to provide a transition to a post-capitalist society. This transition can only be achieved with a bloc to be formed, along with other classes of this global wave of revolts. This bloc should include some fractions of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and its sub- elements. It is possible for the new petty bourgeoisie to reconcile with capitalism due to its interests or to be thrown to more socialist stages. It can contribute to the transition to the post-capitalist society, or it can turn into an element that prevents it. The proto-communard experiences of the Gezi movement and some other revolts have shown that the middle strata carry an anti-capitalist potential, despite its members highly commodified lives (Tuğal, 2015, p. 79). Because of the organisational erosion of the proletariat, this class can be regarded as the key actor of the social struggle. However, the new petty bourgeoisie is reluctant to organise strictly. It is intensely consumerist, and it is not programmatic since its potentials contain contradictions and spontaneities. For Tuğal, these are shortcomings and to overcome them, and new petty bourgeoisie should form blocks in cooperation with lower strata. According to Tuğal, the Gezi movement has defended a common urban space and brought together proto-communard tendencies and excluded classes. However, it did not attempt to organise the collectivist production. Gezi was a movement of the privileged middle strata of Turkish society. It caused a series of multi-class protests, but its organisational forms have been seen only in the middle-class districts of cities (2015, p. 80). The neighbourhoods, where the proletariat and its sub-proletarian elements are clustered, followed the leadership of these middle-class districts. The prefigurative style of the Gezi movement continued to live among the privileged fractions after the evacuation of the park. After the occupation, socialist

organisations tried to direct the protests in the park forums; however, an exclusionary discourse targeting the poor has been dominated in debates. In these forums, professional organisations were highly effective, and workers' organisations were almost invisible. Tuğal claimed that this aspect of the Gezi movement is an example of how a particular type of participatory democracy can exclude less privileged segments. Because of the carnivalesque nature of the movement, the tolerance that states that all sounds should be heard were in the park, however, that has created a series of long, not programmatic and aimless discussions and finally, it reduced the popularity of the movement. Tuğal (2015) argued that the aestheticised protest repertoire of the movement also caused disintegration within the movement.

An Alliance of Working Classes against the Political-cultural Fix. Efe Can Gürcan and Efe Peker (2015), analysed the Gezi movement with the class-based theoretical perspective of social movements, coined by Marxist theorists Poulantzas and Wright. They criticised analyses of the movement that focused only on culturalist points, identity-related discontents and civil society centred views. Gürcan and Peker (2015) described the catalyst of the Gezi movement with a political economy approach, instead of frequently mentioned middle-class category in some analysis. According to them, the categorical core of the Gezi movement consisted of the alliance of different segments of the working class. Educated youth and service sector employees guided this alliance, and the movement contained both white and blue-collar workers (p. 36). They also stated that neoliberalism is a phenomenon that reveals the inadequacy of evaluations that assumed the middle class as the decisive category about the Gezi movement (2015, p. 37). For them, the movement emerged because of the amalgam of economic, political, cultural and ideological discontents. Therefore, it cannot be explained through categories such as middle classes, the seculars or the youth (Gürcan & Peker, 2015, pp. 37-38).

Because of neoliberalism, the economic conditions of the working class are worsened, labour safety diminished, unionisation narrowed, and the unemployment rates are increased. Farther than that, Islamist characteristics of Turkish neoliberalism, which arose from Turkey's unique conditions, created deep discontent in secular and educated sections of this class. Because conservative / Islamist power's working-class relations and networks began to take initiatives instead of these segments as they grow with neoliberalism.

Besides, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's repressive policies, restrictive interventions in social life, and its ostracism aimed at those who do not comply with the cultural-ideological standards imposed have increased social discontent. Gürcan and Peker suggested a new conceptualisation of a political-cultural fix that is built on Harvey's (2003) spatial-temporal fix (2015, pp. 70-84). The political-cultural fix is concerned with the political and cultural reorganisation of the society by capitalist political regimes to keep up with local cultural and hegemonic conflicts and struggles. According to this conceptualisation, the political-cultural fix is not only functions for the transformation of urban spaces and the accumulation of the capital but also relates to efforts for generation social consent for the economic system through the transformation of the cultural-historical symbolic spaces (Gürcan & Peker, 2015, p. 67). The scholars argued that AKP has interfered with everyday life at every opportunity, excluded the social segments that were not obedient enough, and transformed urban spaces for profit under its Islamist-neoliberal policies, and the Gezi movement has emerged as a response. Gürcan and Peker (2015) also argued that with the Gezi movement, processes of spontaneity and collective leadership were not independent of each other. They coexisted coherently to expand the political capacity of the movement. The leadership that guided the movement was neither the plurality of various leaders nor was meaningful in a conventional hierarchical sense. It was a product of oppositional counter-hegemonic collectivism composed of various social/political groups such as political parties,

other movements, professional organisations, fan clubs and trade unions (pp. 111-112). According to the scholars, various action repertoires became available because of this collective leadership, and that enabled the rising of a unique political/social subjectivity. Violent interventions of the police, accusatory discourses of Erdoğan and the government have created a grotesque perception of reality for the protesters. Together with a common perception of being intimidated, the movement turned into a carnival in the Bakhtinian sense. The carnivalesque allowed the unification of this heterogeneous mass that includes some inconsistencies. Gürcan and Peker claimed that the discursive praxis, which has been named sometimes as the disproportionate use of intelligence, results from that new, transformative political consciousness which was only possible in case of such unification. Disproportionate use of intelligence was woven with humour, irony, sarcasm and ridicule, and it worked to overturn the discourse of power. In this way, the movement seized the power's moral superiority and kept its participatory structure alive. Gezi movement could thus develop robust counterhegemonic responsiveness in both cyber and urban spaces (Gürcan & Peker, 2015, pp. 138–139).

A Matured Class Revolt against the Plundering Capitalism. Marxist economist Korkut Boratav (2013) disagreed with the evaluations that describe the Gezi movement as a middle-class rebellion. According to him, these evaluations spring from insufficient determinations about some features of the movement. The first one is the argument of the working class was not involved in the movement. Boratav (2013) recognised that the working class was not involved in the Gezi movement and did not steer the movement with its organisations and programs. However, he also noted that it would not be factual to say that workers are not involved in the movement. Alternatively, he argued that people from suburbs, blue-collar workers of industrial sectors, wageworkers without university degrees and students from such families participated in the movement. Secular, leftist, progressive and

democratic fractions of the traditional working class in Turkey, could not remain indifferent to the Gezi movement.

Boratav (2013) described without using the term middle class some common social characteristics shared by most of the Gezi protesters/activists. First, a significant portion of people who took part in the movement includes university and high school students. According to him, it should be noted that the practical social positions of these students are in the broadest sense the potential membership of the working class. Schools educate them to be well-trained white-collar units of labour supply, however, capitalism cannot promise them anything but unemployment. For this reason, they would enter the ranks of the reserve army of labour in the first step after they graduate and would become the elements of the working class in the most general sense with their practical positions. Second, Boratav (2013, p. 8) pointed out that most of the Gezi protesters were university graduates (undergraduate and post-graduate). According to him, this group is a derivative of the above-mentioned group. They are what previous group members will become. These qualified workers labour in a multifaceted sectoral structure called the service sector and the unemployed members of this sector protect their social position of being wageworkers. Third, some workers can be categorised as unskilled labour in the service sector, although it is known that the numbers of university graduates are increasing among the members of this sector in Turkey. According to Boratav (2013), it does not matter whether these people's job involves concrete production processes in the context of the Gezi movement. They are practically members of the working class in today's conditions, and they constitute a significant part of this class quantitatively.

For Boratav (2013), the fourth social group participated in the Gezi movement as the independent professionals who earn their lives by selling their acquired skills to customers rather than employers, such as doctors, lawyers, consultants, architects, engineers, financial advisers. This layer has similarities with the working class in terms of quality, ideology,

value systems and lifestyles, but is different in terms of production relations. This class can be qualified as petty-bourgeois because its members do not employ workers in significant numbers even if they incorporate their own companies. However, independent professionals are qualitatively different from the productive petty bourgeoisie because their immediate position in the social division of labour does not stem from thoroughly capitalist relations or simple commodity production processes. Sources of their income are their education, real expertise acquired by practice, skills or scarcity rents. The only category of middle classes that can be included within the traditional Marxist class framework is the independent professionals. Boratav underlined that independent professionals, especially doctors and lawyers, crowdedly joined the Gezi movement, and their actions and political stance, were coherent with the worker class (2013, p. 12).

Korkut Boratav (2013) defined the Gezi movement as a matured class revolt against plundering capitalism. According to him, it was a class movement because it was against the bourgeoisie and its state. Besides, Gezi was a joint movement of people who do not share a common fate with the bourgeoisie and the state. It was a movement of contention and discrepant fates. Opening of the centre of Istanbul to the unearned income did not endanger protesters' salary, wages and working conditions, however, the problem was that the collective assets inherited from the past generations had been made benefit tools by political power for the purse-snatcher bourgeoisie. Protesters opposed the transformation of the shared assets inherited from the past generations into bourgeois property (2013, p. 18). The maturity of this class reaction roots in its rapid and spontaneous transformation into a particular political attitude. Therefore, Gezi was a movement targeting unlimited direct democracy, and it articulated the historical aspiration of the working class.

A New Middle-class Movement Rising in the Hedonist World. Economist Ergin Yıldızoğlu (2013) analysed the Gezi movement as the movement of a new class comprising

people who live by selling their labour, the unemployed and the young people waiting to take part in employment. In his evaluations that partly overlap with Boratav's ideas, Yıldızoğlu tried to draw a map for the Gezi movement by making an economic-political evaluation of this class on a macro scale. He took the Gezi movement in the same category as the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and the occupy movements. For him, the primary catalyst for the emergence of such movements is the rapid collapse of the neoliberal governing models after 2007. This model was created to manage the structural crises and to resolve the accumulated problems of Fordism. For Yıldızoğlu, (2013) in these movements the youth have come forward because in many countries today, capitalism became unable to offer new jobs and prospects for them since its focus has been on making a profit as quickly as possible.

Neoliberalism deepened pleasure-oriented consumption's dominance. He asserted that the youth sank into a sea of passive nihilism and became a ticking bomb ready to explode because pleasure-oriented consumption and lack of employment cannot give them a principle to guide their lives.

Yıldızoğlu stated that the youth is a hollow category for these debates and continued his analysis utilising the concept of the middle class. The economist showed that in the symbolic world of capitalist reality, which is based on consumption and neoliberalism, the working class is ignored. Therefore, for him, all employees are middle-class members and potentially bourgeois (2013, p. 65). He added the property owners who have their own business, but who require capital and information networks, and the employees of education, health, media and advertising sectors -immaterial labour- to this new class. According to him, it is wrong to pay attention to income levels or consumption patterns to understand the emergence of this class. Instead, their position in the material and symbolic production processes should be taken into account in the context of the economic conditions that involve and identify these two elements (2013, p. 66).

This new class can use the most up-to-date production techniques, is open to interaction with the world and uses communication technologies effectively. Whilst the pleasure-oriented consumption model was developing, and this class has reached a higher level of prosperity than the working class. Besides, in this world of hedonism, it grew a notion of freedom and originality focused on maximising individual pleasures (Yıldızoğlu, 2013, p. 69). However, the deepening crisis of capitalism has overwhelmed these balances. Effects of the crisis infiltrated into this relatively prosperous and pleasant world and the new class quickly lost its confidence in future and society. Besides, this class has the power that can affect the processes in which the hegemony is reproduced and may cause problems in the symbolic field of these processes. Social movements surrounding the world, global hacker groups and digital actions like WikiLeaks are examples where this potential turns into practices. According to Yıldızoğlu, this class also produced mass forms that express universal demands such as freedom, equality and solidarity (2013, p. 70), and they were all the subjects of the Gezi movement.

Analyses for a Democratising Gezi. Another notable pattern in the Gezi literature involves the analyses defining the movement as the amalgam of bodily practices and experiences for direct democracy. In this perspective, performativity embodies and expresses the longing for a change in systems of representation both in terms of sociality and politics. Substantially these analyses argue that the Gezi movement has tried to produce alternatives to the problems of parliamentary democracy and the traditional ways of representation and suggested direct democracy as a better alternative. It is also claimed that that suggestion embraced all segments of the society and made those who were excluded by the established democratic processes representable. Briefly, the pattern considers that the Gezi movement has redefined democratic aspirations and proposed a new concept of the people within a new democratic framework.

An Example of Direct Democracy. Post-structuralist scholar Judith Butler (2014) mentioned that it is necessary to concentrate on the Gezi movement with an emphasis on neoliberalism and its inherent securitarian states; still, the historical and political dimensions that differentiate the movement from its counterparts should not be overlooked (p. vii). For her, to examine movements such as the Gezi movement, structural analyses of the privatisation and global sovereign system are useful. However, with that approach, it would be possible for the analyst to be stuck by the cultural, geopolitical and economic differentiations of movements because it is not possible to reach to same contextual explanations with same logical patterns. Neoliberalism produces solutions, revives and survives to depend on the fluency, variability and ability to disguise of the context. Therefore, while examining neoliberalism, the theory should not follow this path and should not separate movements from their historical roots. She stated, "if we consider the array of groups gathered in the park.... we find perhaps another idea of democracy at work" (2014, p. xi). Butler held the view that the Gezi movement was an example of direct democracy. People went out on the streets to make their voices heard, to create change, to cancel policies and to re-claim to the title of the people. Butler also drew attention to the central issue of ongoing debate during and after the Gezi Park occupation: "Who represents the people?" Groups gathered in the park connected for such a purpose and under these conditions for the first time. Environmentalists, anti-capitalists, anti-capitalist Muslims, gay, lesbian and transgender community, women, feminists and Kurdish mothers joined each other in waves.

All these groups freely announced that they had rights, with the awareness that something unusual happened. For Butler, in Gezi Park, "the idea of public space has been transfigured" (2014, p. xii), and that new space embraced all who were excluded and ignored. Many groups and individuals expressed their demands for justice, equality and freedom, this time knowing their voices were heard. Under police violence and intensive pepper gas, these

groups taught themselves, and each other, how to survive. They supported each other, and to do that, they invented alternative ways. According to Butler, "another sense of democracy was being articulated" (2014, p. xii) by these deeds of protesters. This unfamiliar sense has displaced the strong claims of the status quo that alleges that it represents the public.

In this way, some groups could think of themselves as part of the public for the first time without having to hide their identity and claims. They knew that their cases were legitimate and supported, even for a brief time.

These groups expanded by the participation of groups such as Çarşı that dismayed Erdoğan. According to Butler, the Gezi movement wiped out the usual social distinctions and enabled separated groups' recognition for each other. Finally, a political will was born from this amalgam. Thanks to this new way of understanding the people, protesters reminded the problems about the official definition of the people in Turkey. The movement that opposed the commodification of urban spaces by protecting trees in the Gezi Park tried to re-add rooted historical and political issues, such as the Saturday Mothers or the Armenian Issue, which had been ignored for a long time, into political ecology. Gezi was a phenomenon that is performed for "the preservation of natural, cultural and political history against the destructive effects of state censorship and privatisation" (Butler, 2014, p. xiii). Butler, in her Gezi movement evaluation, also emphasised that to scrutinise the cooperation between authoritarian regimes and neoliberalism and their securitarian policies against democratic freedoms is a critical endeavour to understand the phenomenon. Also, she summarised the relations of these securitarian policies to urban spaces. The control of resistance against the commodification of urban and public spaces depends on determining who have access to these spaces. Public space is defined by the distribution of this right to access. When the public space is taken over by opposition and resistance, not only the commodification of spaces is stopped, but also the political power that makes this transformation possible is

shaken. That is why the police force is always present in parks and on streets whenever public rights are demanded. The blindness of the media or stigmatisation of protesters as terrorists or marauders serves the same purpose. Threats or practices of imprisonment, detention or being subjected to police violence try to remove resistances and oppositions from public space. According to Butler, neoliberalism (commodification of public goods) and the use of police power (attacking public demonstrations) acted together in Gezi and other such movements (2014, p. xv). The police force is a tool to ensure that the state may convert urban spaces into goods and to make needs of capital superior against values of democratic life. Neoliberalism tries to control public people's reach to public spaces and forces them to be dispersed into concrete or abstract prisons. Butler suggested that after the Gezi, it would be wise to have expectations about the next prison break and to keep slow and crucial work of analysing of these movements.

A Democratic Retroaction. Jurist Yasemin Özdek (2013) discussed the Gezi movement in terms of the relations between direct democracy and representative democracy. She assumed that the Gezi movement initially was a democratic retroaction, and it questioned parliamentarianism on its course. According to Özdek, Gezi is the first movement in Turkey that criticised representative democracy deeply and validated direct democracy in the eyes of society (2013, p. 117). The movement enabled Turkish society to experience direct democracy and left behind a legacy to be discussed. Özdek divided the Gezi movement into two periods in terms of direct democracy practices. These are the phase of the occupation of Gezi Park and the phase of park forums. Özdek also noted that in both phases, decision-making mechanisms reached the substratum. During the occupation of the park, protesters took decisions about the processes of agency in public meetings with the participation of everyone who wanted to take part (2013, p. 118). Besides, the park forums phase started with the speaker's corner acts. In a scant time, they transformed into planned meetings with

particular agendas and finally, a shared decision-making process was commenced. Forums became neighbourhood assemblies. In June 2013, there were eighty park forums in thirteen different cities of Turkey because the communal life experiments that began in Gezi Park spread across Turkey through park forums. Swap markets, park libraries, solidarity tables and free food sharing were among popular direct democracy practices (Özdek, 2013, p. 119; 122).

Özdek (2013) unsurprisingly argued that the Gezi movement takes its place in the global wave of social movements that emerged as uprisings against neoliberal policies. According to her, these policies brought along the largest proletarianisation in the history of capitalism. The social state shrank, unemployment increased, job security decreased, and repressive policies intensified. These revolts against neoliberal conditions make demands of direct democracy rather than socialist political progression. People of the world began to realise that democracy is just a name. In most of the countries, under neoliberal conditions, regimes are not associated with people's power. Parallel to this, the power of states is at the capital's service, and capital-government cooperations make political decisions.

The aggressive capital strategy of neoliberalism led to the emergence of repressive regimes and unnecessarily powerful governments. Governments can decide almost automatically, thanks to their majority in parliaments, and sometimes they resorted to statutory decrees and other forms of executive decision-making. In Turkey and many other countries, the tyranny of the majority prevailed over pluralism and representation (Özdek, 2013, p. 123). Briefly, Özdek associates the Gezi movement with neoliberalism that took away political regimes from democracy and enabled authoritarianism. The world is filled with oligarchic regimes, which name themselves democracies and have periodic parliamentary elections. Contemporary democracy movements fight these false democracies and call for direct democracy and the return of power to the people. For Özdek, the Gezi movement is one of these movements.

A Re-nationalization in a Political Oasis. Political scientist Güneş Koç (2015) examined the Gezi movement with the concepts of radical-democratic hegemonic movements (Laclau & Mouffe, 1992) and subaltern contra-publicities (Fraser, 1990), and argued that the movement included many political sub-tendencies such as radical socialist systemic criticism, ecologism, anti-capitalism, anti-authoritarianism, and advocacy for pluralistic democracy (especially in the Gezi Park area). Correspondingly, for her, Gezi has managed to be protected from the state/police interventions and to open a fresh field for a novel way of doing politics. Koç named this novel way as an oasis by referring to Hannah Arendt's (1963/1990) conceptualisation. The oasis means not only the rescue of the park from police forces. It also tells us that a new space was built, which allowed the practices inherent in radical democracy to keep the antagonistic struggle against hegemonic ways of building political spaces (Koç, 2015, pp. 164-166). Koç extended her analysis by listing the practices experienced during the Gezi movement as follows; emerging coexistence, the coalescence of differences in a shared space, elimination of the possibility of inner conflicts by consensus, the liberation of spaces in which different identities and political views expressed based on this consensus, production of pluralist discourses, organising horizontally, and spread of organisational forms to other areas of movement (Koç, 2015, pp. 168-169).

Koç (2015) has alleged that by these practices, the movement has overcome the neoliberal impositions of the sovereign power, and reclaimed urban spaces and spaces of politics. According to Koç, the Gezi movement did not remain under the influence of radical political approaches. Instead, the actors of the movement were those who best described themselves: "Those who have no connection with any political group and who participate in political action for the first time". Koç claimed that this description was the cement integrating different groups of the movement, and these groups have produced a mass that demanded democracy. More precisely, a very different concept of democracy from the

government's conception was proposed. Koç has also underlined that the movement was a struggle to create a counter-hegemony and could not change power relations; however, it exposed the political short-sightedness of the government (2015, p. 183). Besides, it started a process of re-nationalisation of spaces. This process is a reproduction of the public and political spheres in which the differences and singularities would not be overlooked (2015, p. 184). The re-nationalisation was made by an alliance that opposed the government's interventionist, oppressive, populist democracy and profit-oriented economic policies. In this context, Koç (2015) argued that the Gezi movement generated new political subjectivities strongly connected with the notions of liberty and equality in the counter-hegemonic space through radical democracy practices. It re-appropriated the political spaces and re-opened the path to democratic progress.

A Reclaiming the Dignity of Individuals for a New Democracy. Farro and Demirhisar (2014), based on the data obtained from their field study, argued that Taksim Pedestrianisation Project was the last straw that broke the camel's back for the emergence of the Gezi movement. Urban projects that the government was trying to implement through authoritarian means has created a sense of threat for the protesters regarding their everyday life and their subjective integrity. This indignation has caused new ways of being oppressed and consequently created new ways of resistance (Farro & Demirhisar, 2014, pp. 177-178). According to the scholars, the protesters perceived the project as a step towards increasing social inequalities and urban problems, and "the subjective affirmation against the dominations affecting all these dimensions was underlying all the protesters' actions" (2014, p. 178).

This affirmation was integrated with collective mobilisation to control, reverse, and eliminate uncertainties and derives from emotional and relational states of subjective existence (Farro & Demirhisar, 2014, p. 178). One reason for the mobilisation of protesters,

most of whom are educated employees or students, was a control attempt against the problems of unemployment and precariousness that they face (or will face) in their work lives. However, the problems of protesters related to their working life are not only limited to economic resources or job security. The fact that business life does not involve enough creative processes is also a cause of discontent. In this sense, it is possible to claim that the protesters have taken part in the movement because of their needs to keep their creativity alive. According to Farro and Demirhisar (2014), the mobilisation processes of Gezi protesters indicated a very personal approach. Individuals have taken collective action since they try to re-control the flow of their lives and avoid processes that interfere with their existence. They sought new subjective interactions against the actions of the government and the systemic structures that objectified and dishonoured them. Therefore, there were political, social and cultural echoes of individual participations. These echoes reached all the places where the system reaches (p. 180).

For scholars, the protesters have mobilised to find unique perspectives that cannot be found before the movement. In this sense, there were severe differences in individual perspectives between the pre-Gezi and after-Gezi periods. Besides, Gezi protesters were on the streets to fight against authoritarianism and the precariousness of social life, to reclaim the initiative of their lives, to decide about urban spaces and to influence the government's economic policies. Farro & Demirhisar (2014) stated that a variety of communicative paths were critical and constituent for the Gezi movement. Individual agents made their decisions and joined collective action under the conditions of multi-faceted communicative processes, and they shuttled between cyber and physical spaces. Contacts and interactions established in both spaces have extended co-ordinately. Gezi movement's initiatives were formed by the relations among its actors, and this inter-relatedness was built with the choices made to experience the alternative cultural areas that are outside the pre-drawn cultural orientations.

Throughout the movement, these actors attempted to generate liberation that would be enough to invent new ways of life, avoiding unequal social perceptions and cultural/social dominance. That is why organisations that contribute to the spread of the movement had no hierarchical impact on the movement.

According to Farro and Demirhisar (2014, p. 185), the Gezi movement was not just a movement against the neoliberal policies of the government; instead, it offered a universal critique of the neoliberal systems and proposed a new understanding of democracy. The movement resulted from the individuals' opposition to domination in almost all areas of social life aiming the subjective affirmation, and that opposition wanted to regain control. Gezi movement proclaimed the emergence of new collective movements resisting the precariousness and fragmentation of individuals' lives, and it aimed at reclaiming the dignity of citizens for a new democracy.

Analyses for a Transnational Gezi. A considerable amount of Gezi analyses examines the movement as a part of the rising wave of global social movements since the 2000s. In this pattern, the movement is approached at a transnational scale and described as Turkey's stage of the struggle with the global neoliberal order with a recurrent emphasis on the government's religious and authoritarian policies and the decisiveness of local conditions. Some analyses of the pattern examine the movement more specifically; for example, in comparison with its counterparts in the world such as the Arab Spring, nevertheless, almost all determinations of the pattern, position the movement against neoliberalism. For the pattern, the movement is a meaningful part of the global wave; however, in comparison with other social movements, it is seen that the distinctiveness of the movement in economic, social and cultural aspects is clearer than its similarities.

An Aimless Part of a Global Wave against the Global Order. Philosopher and sociologist Slavoj Žižek (2013) affirmed that the Gezi movement was more than an issue about the destruction of Gezi Park for commercial purposes. For him, the reason for the anger gathered in Gezi Park, and its surroundings were the wild neoliberal economy and religious-nationalist authoritarianism, and the Gezi movement is a part of the global wave that shook the global order (2013, p. 8). He contextualised the movement with the sense of civil society, social solidarity and cultural tolerance and claimed that the problems that created the Gezi movement were the fact that free-market conditions are associated with authoritarian policies rather than freedoms. Žižek (2013) also emphasised the anticapitalistic stance of the Gezi movement and argued that it would be insufficient to consider it, as an uprising of secular groups against the authoritarian Islamist regime.

Also, for Žižek, Gezi protesters do not have a specific agenda or an aim. The only thing protesters were aware of was "the existence of a fluid feeling of discontent that holds together various specific demands" (Zizek, 2013, p. 7). Žižek also identified the protests taking place all around the world as reactions to capitalist globalisation; and he correlated the Gezi with the movements from Brazil, Egypt, and Greece, and so on. Global capitalism affects different countries differently, but its aims do not change. It aims to expand markets as much as possible, and by doing this, it creates different effects such as shrinking public spaces, reduction of public services or rising authority. Again, responses to these transformative effects have been formed as demands for the reinvention of democracy by the occupy movements. In Greece, people protested the domination of international finance capital and their ineffective government. As another part of the same picture, the response of Turkish society embodied as a protest against the commercialisation of public space and religious authoritarianism (2013, p. 16).

An Immediate Uprising. The French philosopher Alain Badiou (2013) summarised the Gezi movement as an immediate uprising, *soulèvement immédiat*, of educated youth and the wage-earner petty bourgeoisie against the reactionary state. He argued that the Gezi rebellion should unite with the masses of people, and that can only happen by inventing new ways of political organisation. Badiou (2013) also asserted that it would be inaccurate to argue that the movement stemmed from the conflict between secular freedom of thought and conservative Islam. According to him, the main issue was the fundamental conflict between the liberation of the people and the oligarchic development of Turkish capitalism. Badiou (2013) stated that the movement should not evolve as a demand for a Western democracy because that would create a compromise that can be benefited only by the middle classes. For him, the Gezi movement should have touched the fundamental mechanisms such as economic issues, imperialism and the destruction of the world.

The Turkish Spring. Sociologist James Petras (2013) identified the Gezi movement as the Turkish Spring and compared it to the Egyptian revolution of 2011. However, according to him, the movement in Turkey differs from the movement in Egypt. He explained the difference in three points. First, the Gezi movement was a secular movement composed of leftists, democrats, progressivists and environmentalists. Second, the movement did not request the re-establishment or modification of the regime in the country. Third, the Gezi movement was a pluralistic and democratic coalition including trade unions, peasant movements and the middle classes. On the contrary, the Egyptian revolution of 2011 was led by Islamic groups, and it involved both right and left wings, called for a military coup and did not articulate democratic demands. Besides, in Tahrir Square, religion-based problems were dominant, and any progressive Islamist opposition was absent (Petras, 2013, p. 148). Petras also explained the similarities between Gezi Park and Tahrir Square, again through three points. First, both movements became rapidly massive while parliamentary systems were

paralyzed. Second, they were both revolutionary and harsh reactions against governments. Finally, the oppressive policies of the far-right in both countries were increasing.

For Petras (2013), the Gezi movement passed the phases; initiation, explosion and revolutionary character acquisition. Ecologists, students and the youth generated the heart of the movement, but as it was spreading, the working class, unions and many other different actors also joined the process. Petras also stressed that to describe the movement merely as an ecological movement of the middle-class youth would be deficient, because, for him, revolution may also stem from non-revolutionary classes with immediate demands. In Turkey, the authoritarianism of the government, urban projects and everyday existential problems of people have created a broad mobilisation through the fluidity of the working class and the middle class. Petras (2013) has put public employees, skilled workers and teachers into the working class and highlighted the Kurdish movement as an essential copartner of the Gezi. He claimed that the components of the Gezi movement have complemented each other and performed a multidimensional struggle. For Petras, Gezi was not a pure rehearsal of a socialist transformation, but it contained the necessary elements for a political leadership with such an agenda.

A movement that differs from the Arab Spring. Bülent Gökay and Farzana Shain (2013) examined the Gezi movement by comparing it with other social movements that took place in Europe, the Americas and Arabian countries. They argued that the economic and political background of the movement differs greatly from the so-called Arab Spring and that it is wrong to describe the Gezi as the Turkish Spring. For scholars, the Gezi movement is also different from the social uprisings and movements in Greece and Spain. In these countries, increased unemployment due to collapsing economies caused discontent; however, Gezi has emerged in a period of economic growth. Besides, Gökay and Shain (2013) claimed that disproportionate use of force and the violence of the police is not enough to categorise

the movement as the Turkish Spring because policing was not any different from the implemented tactics of the police in European countries under similar periods. However, none of them considered Greek, Spanish or British springs (p. 62). Scholars also stated that to describe the Gezi as a movement of secular groups revolted against an Islamist authoritarian government, is the sign of a shallow point of view. On the contrary, for them, the movement is multi-layered and much more sophisticated, and these shallow deductions based on a dichotomy that encapsulates many clichés and ethnocentric ways of thinking. For Gökay and Shain (2013), to compare the Gezi movement with the Confederations Cup riots from Brazil that took place almost in the same days, can provide meaningful clues for a better understanding of Gezi. Both countries were economically booming, were influencing their regions predominately, and they have been governing by elected governments. Besides, both movements were urban movements, although the triggering elements were different (p. 63). A conservative/Islamist party was ruling Turkey, which was in power for a long time.

Brazil's government was new and belonged to a popular leftist political movement. Both countries were resilient from economic and military perspectives with their democratically elected governments. Contrary to this, most of the dictators in countries, where the Arab Spring occurred, regimes were shifted by military interventions. In this context, movements in Brazil and Turkey differ from the Arab Spring in both causes and outcomes (Gökay & Shain, 2013, p. 64). Scholars elaborated their argument as follows: In Brazil and Turkey, many segments of society were deprived of participation in politics. Moreover, the leaders, who think they know what is good for a society better than the society, have tried to enlarge their imagery of power by carrying out giant projects compatible with neoliberal policies. The effects of these projects on the lives of these segments were the primary sources of social discontent. According to Gökay and Shain (2013), a developing economy in both countries increased the expectations of the people, and they demanded

better living conditions. Both movements belong to groups that demand better democracies and living conditions both at local and national levels, and they have emerged in rapidly changing countries. Gökay and Shain (2013) also emphasised the importance of urban youth for these movements. The urban youth, which is described by many analysts as overly individualistic and apolitical, opposed their governments, and the neoliberalism, which had been attacking their lives, and transformation and gentrification projects that disregarded democratic rights and demands. Thusly, both the Gezi protests and the Confederations Cup riots can be described as the "articulations of those involved of what a fair and just world might be" (pp. 66 - 67).

Analyses for an Emergent and Novel Gezi. Another significant pattern of Gezi literature involves analyses that claim that the movement is the incarnation of significant social and political transformations taking place in Turkey. These analyses underscore the emergence of a new social phenomenon with the movement. Within the pattern, the newness of Gezi is examined with a trajectory that starts with individual subjective processes and concludes with inferences, which argue these processes transformed the collective notions of the movement. Throughout the model, it is possible to follow continually the reasoning that recognises that singularities change universality, and the movement was something more than its amalgam. Besides, these determinations are expressed or associated with various concepts such as composition, multitude or union. However, analyses that constitute the pattern do not assume that actors of the movement in a firmly integrated structure, therefore, they frequently discuss factors such as changing or abandoned identities, disengagement from traditional and established opposition, the emergence and formation of new agencies. Briefly, the pattern covers attempts to rediscover the processes between particle and wholeness in terms of the Gezi movement, and thus the need for new sociological conceptualizations is emphasised. Since the newness of the Gezi requires the newness in sociology, most of the analyses

included in this pattern endeavour to explain the newness of the Gezi movement through unprecedented terms and concepts.

A Movement of Issues, Instead of Identities. Sociologist Nil Mutluer has (2017) evaluated the Gezi movement through the transitions, balances and contrasts between concepts of identity politics and issue politics. According to her analysis, issue politics transcends beyond identity politics in which aggrieved groups generate their social demands through their identities and victimhood to mobilise because the struggle against hegemony is confined to the political sphere whose borders are drawn by the hegemon itself. According to Mutluer (2017), identity politics have amplified in Turkey because the authoritarian determining power of the state has been drawing the borders of political participation. Identity politics builds itself through the discourse of the difference, demands of equality and power/interest relations (Jenkins, 2008; Mutluer, 2017, p. 231). It uses discourses and methods that homogenise its elements to revive this triad, and correspondingly, it must ignore the singularities that constitute itself and its potential political creativity. That leads to the separation of identity politics from the demands of freedom and a dead-end of continual cost/benefit calculations. Mutluer (2017) asserted that identity politics disappears when the politics of the issues arise, and the Gezi movement had such an actuality. During the movement, individual actors came together concerning issues rather than identities, and practices of pluralism and alternative languages became apparent (p. 231). For Mutluer, the movement created an antagonist political front that has sprung from the aspiration for freedom, and the volunteerism of actors who have different political tendencies moulded the plurality in Gezi. She has associated that plurality with the phenomenon of Gezi spirit, and (2017, pp. 235-236) assessed that the issue politics born in Gezi Park materialised on two foci, commonality and libertarian plurality. The movement has sent its messages to all people

of Turkey, not to the government, and in Gezi Park was practically shown that a free common life could be established.

Regarding libertarian majority, Mutluer (2017) argued that a secular space, in which people respects beliefs, disbeliefs and plurality was created. According to her, the Gezi movement is one of the rare episodes that politics of the issues that were prominent in the history of social movements of Turkey. This form of politics allowed previously diverged collective identities to recognise each other and to act together by evading polarising and exclusionary discourses. For Mutluer, on June 15, 2013, after the police evacuated the Gezi Park identity politics displaced the politics of the issues in Turkey again.

A Profound Break from the Traditional Social Opposition. Ertuğrul Kürkçü (2017) claimed that the Gezi movement was an event that points to one of the most dramatic political transformations in the modern history of Turkey. According to him, the movement indicated a profound break from the usual tradition of social opposition in Turkey, and the primary reason for this break is urbanisation. Kürkçü associated Gezi with the other revolts from the world that emerged in urban spaces against the transformation of urban spaces and argued that the urban transformation in Turkey has extended into cultural and political fields and dominated them. Kürkçü (2017, p. 205) also asserted that the movement did not rebel only against the marketisation of the urban spaces, it also opposed urban incarnations of efforts to reshape Turkey in an Islamic way. For Kürkçü, the Gezi movement is not homogeneous or monolithic; it has different manifestations according to the local needs, historicities and political heritages.

Kürkçü also mentioned that the Kurdish movement did not play an active role in Gezi, because in its core regions, social processes work differently. Urban conflicts, the driving force of Gezi, are not present in these regions, and there is no direct hostility between local

governments and the people. For Kürkçü, the secondary reason the Kurdish movement did not openly support the Gezi movement was the possibility that such a move could jeopardise the solution process carrying out with the government. Besides, he also criticised the Turkish opposition for claiming unfounded cooperation between the government and the Kurdish movement (2017, pp. 210-211). Also, for Kürkçü, the Gezi movement included not only groups that rebelled against the urban policies, and the inequality but also elements that tried to seize the hegemonic spaces of power. Also, Kürkçü asserted that the Kurdish movement was late to comprehend Gezi, but it could take a central role in the movement. At this point, it would be useful to remind that Kürkçü is the honorary president of HDP. According to him, the Kurdish movement's political traditions are distant from the newness of the Gezi however, this distance is shorter than the distance between the traditional working class and Gezi because demands of the Kurdish movement for a democratic republic and democratic autonomy correspond with the demands of the movement, which wanted urban areas to be managed by those living in cities. Briefly, both movements want to have a voice in urban politics. For Kürkçü, all aggrieved groups that wanted Turkey to change experienced their alterations, which would become the key to this change thanks to the Gezi movement. In this sense, the movement was a revolutionary fair that embraced everyone, and it was an uprising that explored the future of Turkey and created a significant opportunity for change (2017, pp. 217-218).

A Pendulum of Identities. Özden Melis Uluğ and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar (2015) examined the Gezi movement from a social psychological point of view. To this end, they asked actors of the movement why they took part in the movement and how they perceived the relations among the groups that formed the movement. Uluğ and Acar (2015) ranked the groups clustered in Gezi Park according to their specific gravity in the movement and did in-depth interviews with individuals from these groups (p. 126). According to the study, almost

all groups that have passed through a variety of mobilisation processes, have a certain level of congruity and resemblance. Also, the actors of the Gezi expressed that they participated in the movement to articulate their discontent with the government's policies, to protect values such as democracy, freedom and equality, and to protest the use of disproportionate physical force by the police. Uluğ and Acar observed that prime minister Erdoğan's uncompromising rhetoric, his anti-democratic and reactionary policies, and the protesters' will to fight against injustice, were among the prime reasons for the mobilisation (2015, p. 132).

In the research, it is stated that the participants have united around a collectivity rather than their own activist identities because they have repeatedly used words such as us, all of us or none of us while they mention themselves or other protesters (Uluğ & Acar, 2015, p. 132). According to the study, some groups within the movement aroused more sympathy or antipathy among the other groups. Moreover, the identity-related schism among the groups varied regionally, and it was more salient around the park since protesters could interact more easily with their fellow activists. However, in other cities, group separations were less significant, and throughout the movement, identities were enabled to be muted according to the context (Uluğ & Acar, 2015, p. 133). Uluğ & Acar (2015) argued that Gezi protesters preserved their own activist identity within the movement, but they positioned themselves against external factors according to collective identities. In this way, they could take the essential steps per collective identities in the movement, and, their original activist identities were not shunned. In essence, the ways of protesting were shaped by actors' original activist identities, and these identities determined the convergence or the divergence among distinct groups. However, during the police interventions or against the government's accusatory, aggressive rhetoric, these identities were immediately replaced by collective identities (p. 134).

A Re-composition of the People. Karakayalı and Yaka (2014) have discussed the phenomenon of the Gezi spirit and presented the concepts of re-composition of the people and commoning as necessary conceptual tools to examine the new political subjectivities, values, protest language and forms that have appeared during the movement (p. 119). Scholars argued that these forms carry new potentialities for the liberation from the conditions of hegemonic established conditions of collective political action. Karakayalı and Yaka (2014) also used Hardt and Negri's (2004) concept of the multitude to describe the mass of the movement and discussed the heterogeneity and the resonance differently from the perspectives that concentrate on inter-group balances and relations systematic. Contrary to the arguments, which state that the heterogeneity of the movements hindered opportunities would enable creating shared goals and clear messages, scholars claimed that heterogeneity and resonance provided the emergence of new virtual political subjectivities in the Gezi movement. For them, the re-composition of the people applies to identities. In this context, it is preferable to focus on the emergence rather than the outcome of the movement. Thus, the movement is not reduced to the attributes of the constituents that formed it, and it reveals an entity that is different or more inclusionary than the sum of the sociological strata represented. That, the becoming, expresses a modal change in the transformation of the collective actor (Karakayalı & Yaka, 2014, p. 123). According to the researchers, without becoming ignored, the movement should be analysed with empirical data obtained from its practices. For example, an environmental activist who takes part in a movement acts not only with the motives of this identity. Every other identity that is met changes the activist and repositions relevant practices. For Karakayalı and Yaka, this perspective was valid for every constituent of the Gezi movement; hence, there was a continuous exchange and repositioning through empirical practices. This process was different from the preexisting organisational processes and resulted in the formation of a unique composition; the re-composition. The

concept of re-composition brings a new ontological view to the processes of producing collective identities and social movements. This view arises from the assumption that groups and individuals gathered in and around the Gezi Park had particular antecedent collective ties, and they re-identified themselves through practices and interactions during the becoming of the movement. For scholars, understanding the Gezi spirit is possible with the analysis of this process. Besides, the participation of groups and individuals in a common struggle against the government, and their joint resistance against the police violence facilitated by these practices and interactions. Karakayalı and Yaka (2014) explained these practices and interactions with the concept of *commoning*. Accordingly, Gezi protesters have recreated the spaces and relations in the park they occupied, and they generated an anticapitalistic culture that affirmed solidarity and removed conventional daily practices such use of money. For scholars, these practices and relations show us that the Gezi movement exemplified how the sociality should be by experiencing it, along with its opposition against the government.

In this framework, Karakayalı and Yaka (2014) claimed that Gezi is a movement, in which identities of disparate groups came together and redefined themselves in a broader political context rather than dissolving into a collective identity. For them, various ethnic, religious and political identities in Turkey have traditionally interconnected under the title of Turkishness by the ruling secular and nationalist power, and they took positions in the socioeconomic hierarchy. However, the AKP government has externally reorganised the hierarchy of identities, and that re-composition has turned the society upside-down at the symbolic level, and this process revealed that identities interact in relational terms. Collective identities are permeable, and even conflicting ones can overlap in Turkish society. For example, “one can be a Sunni Kurdish entrepreneur or an Alevi Kemalist worker” (Karakayalı & Yaka, 2014, p. 127). For scholars, these collective identities are utilised by the hegemonic conditions imposed by state-run projects to ensure hegemonic social

transformations because they can affect each other. However, in times of crisis that state-imposed projects are interrupted, these collective identities grasp the chance to escape from hegemonic conditions and to cluster in a site of sociality that lies far from power's will. Karakayalı and Yaka argued that Gezi's re-composition was ideational and about the society, and its actors' message was "we want to live together" (2014, p. 127). The movement problematised the structuring of the political body. Scholars have identified the movement as an episode of the missing people (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) who resisted to be objects of the hegemony in an ever-negotiating society (Balibar, 2014) with the trans-individual urge (Balibar, 2008) to antagonise injustice.

In this context, for scholars, the Gezi spirit refers to the emergence of the re-composition. Re-composition of the people has transformed the protesters in a way that would not be possible under any other circumstances. Besides, the Gezi spirit resonated with practices that reject othering and alienation. Therefore, it does not have enemies, does not apart from society; however, it is not a social category that can be easily identified. Gezi spirit has started the re-composition of the people in Turkey and revived the dialogic processes that were previously paralysed. Gezi spirit has changed the culture of opposition in Turkey by trying to embrace all. However, it could not reach every strata or segment of the society because of the deep roots of polarisation in Turkey. Briefly, for Karakayalı and Yaka (2014), the Gezi movement is another link to the chain of movements that practice direct democracy and experience various forms of horizontal organising opposing monolithic majoritarian tendencies in the world.

A Movement of Oppressed Bodies and Physical Thereness. Political scientist Zeynep Gambetti (2014) analysed the Gezi in terms of the politics of the body and argued that it would be much more appropriate to evaluate the movement with this perspective rather than the macro-level political discourses (p. 100) because the modernist perspectives reduce the

agent to an abstract individual who desires and reasons. Gambetti (2014) claimed that the Gezi movement has occurred because of the kinesis of thousands of bodies (p. 90). For her, the kinesis did not include any strategy or political caution, and it transformed the movement into an empty signifier in which many various discontents were allowed to find their places to fill them with their meanings. According to Gambetti (2014), two important realities allow making understandable sociological and political evaluations about the Gezi movement. First, people joined the movement to protect urban spaces, to protest the destructive effects of neoliberalism and to express the strain accumulated due to increased authoritarianism. Second, many social groups, identities and ideologies joined and cooperated, and that caused the redefinition of the people. Gambetti (2014) underscored that “organised groups were not only the occupants of Gezi” (p. 91), and most of the actors of the movement has joined the movement, occupied the park and resisted the police violence with their own will, individually. Gambetti criticised space-related analyses of the Gezi movement for overlooking the unique fluidity of Gezi. According to her occupation of the park and persistent resistance was shown to keep it were significant dimensions of the movement; however, movement’s constant moving among urban spaces thanks to the fluidity of substantial participation was also crucial.

The appropriation or occupation was about not only the Gezi Park or barricades; it was about seizing spaces. Through the spaces, the movement liberated itself from the spaces of immobility (Gambetti, 2014, p. 91). For instance, during the movement, the actors of the movement transformed the hotel lobbies into shelters or infirmaries, crossed the Bosphorus Bridge on foot illegally, made themselves heard in subway stations or on ferries. They established continuous and variable relationships between other spaces and the Gezi Park/the movement per their needs and preferences. Another dimension of the mobility of the Gezi movement was the continuous process of the new positioning and shaping in the face of the

violent interventions of the police and pro-government groups. According to Gambetti, this does not mean that Gezi remained passive against the state's apparatuses (2014, p. 92). These conditions also determined the movement's tactics, practices and mobility.

Gambetti (2014) also asserted that the mobility of the movement generated an alternative to ordinary life in Gezi Park and that alternativeness created a site that is not reachable for the government's tactics (p. 93). For Gambetti, the Gezi movement was the movement of ecological and anticapitalistic sensitivities. It also opposed the exclusion of differences and desires to ensure that direct participatory democracy could be experienced. The alternative life of the Gezi occupation was based on volunteerism and was money-free, leaderless, free from institutions and control mechanisms. Decisions were not taken without the consent of those who are related to them. According to Gambetti, these characteristics of the Gezi movement are irrelevant to required tactical decisions. They stemmed from actions of bodies' and desire, for solidarity and cooperation. Gezi movement was a carnivalesque and communal experience, and everyone was a de facto labourer. Works and values belonged to everyone, and, they did not belong to anyone (2014, p. 94). The Gezi movement was the movement of all bodies felt oppressed under the practices of the government and outrage at the excessive use of force by the police. It was a matter of politics of the body. According to Gambetti (2014), the politics of the body is the most explanatory concept for the Gezi movement because it belongs to people who have nothing to set forth but their bodies. Since AKP has prevented the public from getting genuine news about reality, the movement had to announce itself as a significant force before being able to voice its demands. Efforts to announce the movement have been successful, and thusly Gezi Park gained the features of an empty signifier and became a space where various grievances were expressed and announced. That emergent circumstance initially was broader than the depth of the movement, but eventually, it changed and spread across all of Turkey. Gambetti (2014) argued that

movement belonged to those who cannot announce their ideas within institutional politics and wholly separated from the decision-making mechanisms. Therefore, bodies did not leave squares and streets despite the state's effectiveness in silencing and palliation, and their persistent presence performatively articulated the demands that could not be made.

Moreover, bodies were not affected by the calculative logic of the government concerning the majority-minority discrepancies and continued to influence the process. Gambetti, at this point, referred to Ernst Bloch and argued that the bodies of the Gezi movement evoked the upright man to amplify the collective action against the efforts of power to separate the movement from society. According to her, the bodies resisted as “a corporeal assemblage that acts as a living multiplicity” (Hardt & Negri, 2004; Gambetti, 2014, p. 98). The multiplicity of the Gezi enabled the movement to respond successfully to each new manoeuvre of the government and allowed different resistances, protests or rhetorics to coexist. By this means, the movement has gained a superiority nurtured by creativity, humour, ridicule and social media that the power could not cope with. Gezi movement avoided the central structures built over dichotomies while it was emphasising the concept of being the public and discourse of unity for its Deleuzian rhizomatic structure. In Gezi, bodies that practised the politics of the body have embedded Turkey's rooted social and political issues into the movement, and the act of bodily resistance and the physical thereness of protesters have put ideological prejudices and disputes aside (Gambetti, 2014, p. 99).

A Request for a New Existence. Ertan Kardeş (2015) defined Gezi as a movement that “attempted to protect public social sphere, rather than a demand to change political actors on behalf of other ones” (p. 210). He argued that the movement should be analysed in the light of a new sociological semiology because Gezi is a unique event with unique features

and cannot be explained by the theoretical efforts of conventional macro analyses. Instead, its reasons, intentions and sources should be examined by *theoria*¹ (Kardeş, 2015, p. 209).

Kardeş claimed that the Gezi movement caused the emergence of new social imagery stemming from new social dynamics, and named it the new sociological semiology (2015, p. 210). He examined this new semiology by looking at the practices of the movement and associated them with 21st-century values. In this way, he tried to reveal the movement's characteristics by perusing types of resistance, notions of space, conceptions regarding violence and politics. Kardeş (2015) also argued that each assessment would be made about the movement within the boundaries of the terminology of classical modernism would fail. For him, the movement contained elements of class struggles; however, to apply outmoded and imported West-centred concepts frustrate the efforts of Turkish scholars to analyse the movement.

The movement used a repertoire that belongs to the protest culture of the 21st century, such as the occupation of public spaces, and resistance against the police force. According to Kardeş, the Gezi movement rejected the grammar of institutional politics entirely, and it was born out of sociality. It has been successful because it did not communicate with the centre of established politics. It did not even try to seize the area of power. On the contrary, the movement ignored the hegemony and created a new paradigm in which "... protesters manifested their existence as a non-massificated social subject" (Kardeş, 2015, p. 211). Gezi movement has taken an anti-politics path, and by doing that, it created a strong opposition gaining strength from its disruptive effects on the grammar of power. It was an example of the process of the emergence and participation of new actors in 21st-century politics.

¹ As an analytical tool to discover what beings are in themselves, not what they are for us.

Kardeş (2015) also alleged that the Gezi movement is a new revolution in the context of space, and therefore, it cannot be explained in comparison with previous movements. The Gezi movement is the new reference point because the movement has created an alternative model of public space in which everyday life has become a political area, and it has disproved the claim that it is impossible to separate between social revolution and political revolution (Kardeş, 2015, p. 214). Bio-politics cannot explain the beginning of the movement because there is a discrepancy between the biotic and the political. “The genuine politics starts from the point where the oppressive state device and sociological subjects’ productions made their positions possible” (Kardeş, 2015, p. 214). The semiologic break that emerged from Gezi has transformed actual being in the ontological sense. However, the structural existence and weight of the state was still present, and it took a new position due to this new semiology. According to the scholar, Gezi imagery redefined relations between different groups taking part in the movement and allowed them to unite. The movement organised itself based on this imagery that the subject is an individual, but not just an individual (Kardeş, 2015, p. 215).

Ertan Kardeş (2015) also considered that there was an existential will stemming from the fear of social/political exclusion and ineffectiveness at the basis of that semiological break and uprising because many social groups living in urban areas in Turkey had been left out from every step of decision-making processes. The new semiology of Gezi prognosticated the end of conventional politics in Turkey and invented a new paradigm of representation for the entire world. This semiology, based on the perceptions of life arose with solidarity, used cyberspace as the other side of the streets and solved the organisational problems with its communicative abilities. Kardeş (2015) evaluated the movement from many points. First, it was a nonviolent violence praxis. The violence it inflicted was a response to the violence, which it was subjected to, and its resistance made the violence of

the power visible. Second, Gezi was a movement in which a new understanding of citizenship has emerged and strived to find its place; therefore, the stability of power was the calamity and stopping the calamity meant ending the exclusion. Third, Gezi was not a political movement; instead, it was the social/political phenomenon of the request for a new existence that refuses to be excluded. Kardeş alleged that the Gezi phenomenon had left its seeds into everyday life, and its new semiology will continue to reproduce itself in novel forms (pp. 218-221).

An Experiment for the New Ways of Political and Social Being. Asu Aksoy, who is well known for her studies in the fields of cultural policy and urban transformation, examined (2017) how the Gezi movement ruptured the government's attempts to strengthen its dominance by transforming the Taksim Square. In essence, the Gezi movement was related to the conflict between authoritarianism, inequality and democratic aspirations of the people (Aksoy, 2017, pp. 31-32). According to her (2017), dissident social movements and states are space-making practices. She grounded the concept of the state on Ranciere's *la police* concept that describes the state as the regulations and practices deciding how human life sustain. From this perspective, the state decides who will reach better resources, and who may voice her demands, and *la police* refer to the rules that regulate the appearance of bodies, the order of activities and the places where these activities happen. After that, in her Gezi analysis, Aksoy referred to Erik Swyngedouw (2012; 2014) and mentioned the impossibility of conceived spaces for providing perfect saturation in spaces as Lefebvre has mentioned many times. Aksoy (2017) has claimed that urban spaces are machines that have the potential to destroy the saturation created by *la police*. Those who are not reached and swallowed by the rules struggling to create a space for everyone are closer to this potential. The urban has the highest potential among the all-social spaces to escape from this total domination's grasp and is the place where many subjects coexist (Aksoy, 2017, pp. 18-19). During the

movement, Gezi Park has been transformed from an urban space into a political space, and new political subjectivities have appeared for the first time in this very space. These new actors established a relationship with the space outside the spatial logic of power and questioned the existence of the entire city. Thus, the space characterised by power has become contentious, and the subjects opposed the urban of neoliberal logic. The convergence of ordinary subjects in Gezi has brought with it the divisions imposed by the spatial logic of power in the movement. However, these differences turned into a process of mutual cognisance with solidarity practices, and the embedded identities of dominant logic became disrupted (Aksoy, 2017, p. 20). Aksoy also claimed that groups that formed the movement were not represented in the political realm and could not voice their demands. These ignored groups, along with the movement, have suddenly become political actors; however, they did existing oppositional organisations. They have created new protest organisations and repertoires. Gezi Park has been a loud bullhorn for those who cannot make their voices heard, and was not only a stage of dissent but also was an experiment for new ways of political and social being was imagined and realised (Aksoy, 2017, pp. 22-23). Aksoy took part in the discussions of the Gezi spirit and stated that the spirit of Gezi was queer and the movement contained queer solidarity. Through this spirit, the limits and positions that determine identities were questioned and therefore, the othering ended. Istanbul's symbolic centre has turned into a radical queering of every notion of la police by the movement.

Analyses for a Gezi caused by Structural Causes. One of the prominent patterns of the Gezi movement literature includes analyses that focus on Turkey's authentic socio-political conditions, together with the dynamics of the movement's emergence and mobilisation. In this pattern, subjects such as urban spaces, urban policies, the transformation of the modernity, government-opposition relations and the movements' organisational deeds are discussed. It has been seen that the number of empirically backed comprehensive studies

about the movement are very few; some analyses also emphasise that it is too early for a comprehensive analysis of the Gezi movement. Also, some analyses covered by this pattern highlight the connective action that occurs through cyber social networks, as a critical concept in understanding the movement. Besides, it is noted that the Gezi benefited from simultaneously interacting networks that function per particular logic and mechanisms both in cyber and urban spaces. Briefly, the pattern includes discussions about the possibilities and capacities of the new forms of social movements that emerged because of the hybridisation of cyber and analogue networks through the Gezi movement.

A Movement for Reclaiming the Urban Space. Archaeologist and an architectural historian, Ömür Harmanşah (2014) examined the Gezi movement from the perspective of political ecology. Harmanşah (2014) described political ecology as an area that enables activists, intellectuals and civil rights activists to come together for emancipation and human rights on a global scale, and emphasised that social movements are essential for political-ecological thinking because they contain ecological conflicts and spatial struggles (p. 122). Within this perspective, he identified the movement as a mass movement of youth aiming for reclaiming the public spaces. By reclaiming urban public spaces, urban historicity and socio-political symbols embedded in spaces, the movement tried to defend the sense of belonging and collective memory. “The defence was against the threat of neoliberal development, utopias and capital intervention” (Harmanşah, 2014, p. 123). According to Harmanşah, the genuine issue of the Gezi movement was that the modernisation project of the republic was interrupted by a combination of authoritarian neoliberalism and neo-Ottoman imperialism during the AKP rule (2014, p. 123). He underlined the reconstruction or reproduction of the buildings that were destroyed years ago could create dangerous social problems by referring to Lefebvre’s theory of space, which defines space as a social product. Such actions that interfere with historicity aim to recreate and revitalise the historicity that is affirmed by the

power. Besides, they annihilate the urban heritage and its resonances that the power wants them to be forgotten. Erdoğan tried to achieve that at Taksim Square and Gezi Park; however, the Gezi movement has disrupted his urban policies that followed the authoritarian and neoliberal utopias and enabled urban spaces to be reclaimed by people and to be liberated from political power's utopian, profit-oriented projects. The urban space that the Gezi movement defended was not conceived, but a lived space. In this lived space, direct democracy and freedom of expression were practised (Harmanşah, 2014, p. 130).

An Indefinite and Fluid Episode of Contentious Politics. Syoros Sofos (2014) claimed that the Gezi movement had become a centre of contentious politics across Turkey, and it created a fluid space where many demands, aspirations and complaints could be expressed and connected for a brief time (p. 135). For Sofos, the movement has successfully used social media activism and developed peculiar ways of communication, cogitation and collaboration. The decisive factor of the emergent practical and semantic struggle was the unexpectedness of the movement because the power did not know how to deal with these unique methods. Sofos named this union of actors that never appeared before in Turkish history as co-presence, thanks to these methods. According to him, co-presence and simultaneity have enabled many protests, individuals and groups to produce shared meanings (2014, p. 136). Also, the Gezi movement made urban spaces available for contentious politics, and in cyberspace, designed a space to keep the movement alive, to share information and to renew its activity continually. It grasped and embraced public discontent in the management of urban spaces by repeating the rhetoric of collective ownership (Sofos, 2014, p. 137). The source of this discontent was a crisis that affects public life concerning urban spaces, and it emerged from subjectivities at individual and collective levels that had been longing for the realisation of their agency and sovereignty. The Gezi movement did not appear as an alternative for the pre-existing opposition. It was embodied as an inclusive

phenomenon embracing indefiniteness and fluidity (Sofos, 2014, p. 138), and a massive movement forming during its actualisation. It has connected different social aggrievements, and thus, these grievances found their ways to express themselves and announced the people's discontent.

Authentic Modernity versus Reflexive Modernity. Political scientist Hikmet Kırık (2017) examined the Gezi movement through the conflict between two unique visions of modernity, the authentic vision and the reflexive vision. The proto-vision of the Turkish modernity has begun with the founding of Turkish republic. It was presented as a vision to be fulfilled, aiming to reach the level of contemporary civilization and proposed the collective identity of the secular Turkish nationality. However, it could not encapsulate Turkish society because it was intolerant against ethnic, religious or social differences and contentions. Today, the authentic vision and the reflexive vision are two alternatives for the proto-vision of republican modernity. The authentic vision has emerged as a compelling alternative to the proto-vision and traced a lost collective identity that can be found through re-traditionalisation. The authentic vision underlines the necessity of partial re-traditionalization of modernisation by discarding secularisation.

The reflexive vision emphasises on the re-modernisation of modernisation. For Kırık, the AKP is the representative of this vision. On the other hand, the reflexive vision has been closer to the proto-vision since it has been defending contemporary values and norms. The Gezi movement was the first significant materialisation of the reflexive vision, and criticised values and norms and demanded more individuality, participation and freedom (Kırık, 2017, pp. 88-89). According to Kırık (2017), "Gezi had been a testing ground for two conflicting modernities in Turkey" (pp. 90-91). Kırık argued that the Gezi movement has tried to transform expert systems into a democratic, dialogical political public sphere, but it has failed. This failure was partly the result of government's majoritarian understanding of

democracy and the de facto efficiency of the expert systems as public spaces that form rational democratic will. Ordinary citizens of the Gezi movement with their disobedient creative act turned Turkey's most significant public sphere into a political sphere, believing that democracy is not limited by voting (Kırık, 2017, p. 96). In this way, publicness was revived, and Gezi emerged as a counter-public sphere.

Modern Turkey's political public sphere is inherently authoritarian, and unlike Western modernity, what cannot be tolerated is not democratic deficiencies, but deficiencies in national security (Kırık, 2017, p. 100). Since Western modernity is built on the individual and its rationality, it can be structurally differentiated and rationalised. For this reason, legitimacy can be re-established based on the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals when politics lose it. However, Turkish modernisation is built on the notion of nationhood. The Republic of Turkey was established after a war of national liberation, and the principle of national sovereignty has always been the dominant principle. Therefore, political groups or movements who seized power in Turkey always try to redefine the concept of a nation and to adjust their policies per the authoritarian modernity. Ultimately, social segments, who have more rights and freer, are determined by the definition of the nation. Kemalism was a project for the creation of a new civilised individual and a society based on national sovereignty. However, Turkey still has a society in which the individual does not have individual agency. Because of the semi-publicness of communitarian tradition, legitimacy produced by individual rationality cannot shape social/political values and norms (Kırık, 2017). Therefore, the uncompromising modernisation and secularisation program of Kemalism could not be adopted entirely by the society, and in time to be progressive, it became more centralised, made the state authoritarian and implemented monist cultural policies. These policies culturally transformed society into a single fictive nation. However, constituents of that

nation are practically interrelated in a realm in which ethnic or religious differences are both embraced and conflictual.

Kemalism has predicted that commonalities and the fictive nation would cover the ongoing conflicts in society. However, with the emergence of autonomous public spheres (political Islam or Kurdish movement), it struggled to maintain its legitimacy and became unstable. The AKP government was the embodiment of the majority fear of this former dominant republican program. Erdoğan and his government have engaged in political interventions in the fields of culture, identity and lifestyle to expand their power. That new power also has generated its fictive nation and tried to fulfil this mission with top-down centralism and pressure. The centralist traditionalism of Kemalism, which is not very different in method, still maintains its existence. Briefly, the modern history of Turkey's political sociology is roughly shaped around a series of rivalries between these two original visions of modernity. Gezi movement has emerged as a response to the AKP's program of the re-traditionalization of modernity, and it was an uncompromising rejection (Kırık, 2017, pp. 97-101).

The AKP's authentic nation is similar to the Kemalist vision about the nation; both are discursive collectivities waiting to happen. Besides, the AKP government has successfully used this authentic fictional nation to consolidate the majority that supports it, albeit partially. Growing stronger more and more with electoral victories declared all oppositional efforts as rebellious and antidemocratic. Thus, it became the party of authoritarian politics and social engineering, and the new transformative actor of the dominant public sphere. Kırık assessed that the Gezi movement symbolised another newness that challenges this power. Majoritarian repression of the AKP re-awakened the fear of the majority and disturbed those who adopted the Western-like values of reflexive vision. Actors that formed the movement tried to prevent their shared values that are relatively congruent

with the values of the proto-vision from being entirely wiped out of the public spheres and produced counter-public spheres. With the Gezi movement, the conflict between modernity and tradition has been replaced by the conflict between the visions of authentic and reflexive modernity. Kırık (2017) argued that before Gezi, the political was praetorian, and only basic democracy was allowed. National security had always been the top priority prevailing over individual rights and freedoms, on behalf of political stability and authoritarian development. AKP governments have tampered with the DNA of this praetorian structure, and these changes led to the polarisation of political identities and the emergence of counter-public spheres (pp. 102–103).

A Cacophony of Multivocality of Demands and Claims. Sociologist Kumru Toktamış (2015) criticised the analyses that only focused on the dynamics of the Gezi movement's emergence and overlooked the preconditions that facilitate it. Because there was an organised and strategic struggle to go on before the movement appeared and spread across the country, and various professional and local organisations have contributed to this campaign. According to Toktamış (2015), mobilisation of the movement resulted from determined and organised actions carried out by the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) and other local constituents. Afterwards, these efforts have made up an umbrella organisation under the title of Taksim Solidarity (p. 15). Gezi movement has used tactics such as occupation and humour instead of traditional protest methods and claimed that it was not a protest to watch, contrarily, it was a Bakhtinian carnival that everyone can be part of it (Toktamış, 2015, p. 38). The Gezi movement was a movement in which the new partnerships take place and the social demands creatively and productively expressed. Marxists, anarchists, Kemalists and secularists have come together to demand the government's resignation. The movement was reactive against religious and neoliberal interventions that have been becoming increasingly dominant in urban spaces, and the participation of

LGBTQIA groups, the Kurdish movement and the Anti-capitalist Muslims transformed it into an extraordinary inclusive public movement. Toktamış (2015) has described Gezi as a “cacophony of multivocality of demands and claims” (p. 40). However, for her movement’s tendency to snub the authority has reduced the Gezi to a level of struggles ongoing injustices.

Toktamış (2015, p. 42) has also indicated that the Gezi movement contained some groups affirming the reawakening of the former notion of nationhood in line with status quoist Kemalists. However, as a movement, it has tried to establish a coalition with segments who have remained outside of this view. The movement expressed the demands for reclaiming urban spaces by the people and reforming political decision-making mechanisms based on individualism and human rights. It emphasised individual creativity and collective solidarity without the need for hierarchical and elitist understandings, even under the harsh conditions of police violence. This newly emerged individualism and mobilisation showed a firm stance against the anti-democratic political tendencies of the government. Unlike the elitist or Islamist monist political views, the movement exhibited a new understanding of nationhood embracing diversity and pluralism.

A Public Stage. Della Porta and KıvançAtak (2017) examined the Gezi with an approach that relates the context and the agency and sees the movement as an eventful structure. Within the framework of contentious politics, they defined the Gezi with its transformative effects on political subjectivities, taking into account the antecedent accumulations that caused the emergence of the movement. Efforts to detect the determinant groups that created the Gezi movement are generally clustered around the middle-class based explanations. Some of these analyses argue that privileged, educated and young people from that class were the key actors of the movement. Some analysts claim that the middle strata is under the conditions of proletarianisation or precarisation, and acted during the movement in the name of an anti-capitalist, pro-revolutionary struggle as an active working class. On the

other hand, some analyses consider the movement as a multi-class movement. According to Della Porta and Atak (2017), these conceptualizations give superabundant attention to the demographic and occupational categories and tell meta-stories and break their empirical connections with the movement. Scholars argued that there were elements of class politics within the Gezi, but the movement cannot be considered as a class movement. Again, it may have begun under the leadership of an educated and privileged young middle class, but it has spread to other class fractions rapidly. The leading fraction of the Gezi did not make precise class demands, and in a traditional sense, intellectuals were transferring their abilities and opportunities into the movement. Gezi movement has grown rapidly into a more widespread social phenomenon by going beyond the limits of a compact class movement or an urban space resistance unexpectedly, even for its igniters. It became a public arena where disparate groups, organisations and unaffiliated individuals who were discontented with political order and the government in various degrees and for various reasons, came together (Della Porta & Atak, 2017, p. 40). Scholars also underlined that before the Gezi movement, Turkey had been experienced a very different and separated series of protests. These conditions enabled the movement to bring together groups, organisations and individuals with different political stances. In this way, “the usual suspects of contentious politics in Turkey brought in their claims, repertoires, and resources, enriching the collective agency of the Gezi Park protests” (Della Porta & Atak, 2017, p. 42). According to the scholars, another reason for the rapid diffusing of the movement was the authoritarian attitude and policies of the government, especially of Erdoğan. That public resentment was not a cause for the movement, but an essential structural factor. The movement comprised extraordinary moments that protesters put their lives in danger, deliberately or incidentally. With these experiences, the wall of fear was destroyed, and the movement became a historic moment for protesters. The first and unprecedented gathering of various actors had transformative effects on political

subjectivities, and that paved the way for decentralised, horizontal ways of organisation and innovative practices of democracy. However, these new political subjectivities and practices were not the only determinants of the movement. Traditional and established patterns have sometimes outweighed innovative practices and new political language (Della Porta & Atak, 2017, p. 53). For Della Porta and Atak, time is needed to identify the Gezi spirit thoroughly (2017, p. 54) because the emerging subjectivities continue to occur, and the movement is still alive with an evolving potential.

A Movement of Connective action. Jakob Lindgaard (2017) examined the Gezi movement through the social networks that guided it and proposed that both the failure and the success of the movement were inevitable because of these networks. Gezi movement could not find any area of representation in mainstream media and established opposition, so it has spread through connective action. As a movement with connective action it had fought against traditional entrenched networks in which powerful, patriarchal leaders are the guarantors of security, prosperity and identities because when the contention manifested itself, the fear of social chaos immanent in these networks arose (p. 110). Lindgaard (2017) explained the traditional networks in Turkish politics with a dichotomy. At one end of the dichotomy, there is a socially incoherent, eclectic, hierarchical and monist Islamist reactionary traditional network that survived the Turkish war of liberation. At the other end is the network of Turkish nationalism that imposed upon society by the top-down oppression of Kemalism during the foundation of the republic.

Lindgaard (2017) also explained the social and political climate in which the Gezi movement emerged. First, individualism was relatively strengthened with the country's integration into the global market economy during the post-1980 military coup period. The European Union harmonisation process has made issues such as equality, justice, human rights and freedom highly debatable. The demands of the Kurdish movement and the

headscarf issue are examples of these processes. Besides, AKP's policies that resemble liberal democratic approaches but also invest in the discontent of conservative groups has increased the social frustrations. According to him, the Gezi movement was the scene of the struggle of the social networks that acted connectively against the traditional networks, and it has emerged under the conditions as mentioned earlier (2017, pp. 112-114).

Lindgaard (2017) has defined the Gezi movement as the first liberal act in the history of modern Turkey that disabled traditional networks (different social groups and individuals) transiently. For him, the accumulation of all similar struggles united in this individualist search for freedom, pluralism, tolerance, and decentralisation of power. The source of this convergence was the belief in the necessity to go beyond the societal dynamics that determine the political area. Thus, individualism would be reached and freed to liberate Turkish democracy from the decisiveness of traditional networks. Within this balance-changing effort of the movement, connective action was not merely essential because of its instrumentality; further, it became a praxis of this effort. Connective action was the cyberspace that shaped the fundamental dynamics of movement, and it did that by evolving into distinct ways of sharing and mobilisation. It was not only a limited digital extension of the material dimension of the movement (p. 118). Connective action produces individualised contents in integration and interaction, excludes established political institutions and ideological categories, and is often the act of youth. It is leaderless and organizes its leadership through social media thanks to its high communicative abilities. It is spontaneous, rapid and more flexible than collective action and spreads faster. It enables widespread recognition of the individual's agency as a resource for the production of shared contents and their distribution. Lindgaard (2017) noted that the "Gezi movement manifested most of the traits of connective action", and comprised all displays, suggested by Tilly; *worthiness, unity, numbers* and *commitment* (WUNC) (pp. 119-120). Reasons for the inadequacy of the Gezi movement to achieve its goals were

organisational, socio-economic, re-cognitional and political difficulties. It was leaderless, unsaturated, and inexperienced in the organisational point of view. Furthermore, it lacked funding. On the other hand, traditional networks that were accustomed to influential leaders organised efficiently, able to find financial support, approved and directed (Lindgaard, 2017, p. 122). Gezi movement did not comprise groups that provide financial support and power to each other.

Traditional networks could do so thanks to the dominance of the state in the Turkish economy. Participants of the movement also faced sanctions implemented by AKP limiting or blocking their careers. From the socio-economic point of view, the movement had faced a major systemic obstructiveness (Lindgaard, 2017, p. 123). Besides, re-cognitional challenges that the Gezi movement encountered were related to trust and social capital. Lindgaard (2017) also stressed that the Gezi movement had a strong shared Erdoğan opposition and a loose multitude of abstract ideas. However, there was no straight, transparent and easily recognisable sense of identity in the movement. Therefore, the movement lost power against the high recognitionality of the ancient cultural, religious and social identities of traditional networks (pp. 124-125). The Gezi movement also faced obstacles in terms of the political opportunity structures because Erdoğan's popularity and loyalty of law enforcement officials to the government diminished the Gezi movement's manoeuvrability to open new structural opportunities to take further steps. Lindgaard (2017) indicated that society's fear of chaos played a crucial role here, and that fear pushed people to trust and support traditional networks (pp. 125-126). Briefly, the Gezi movement was a connective action in which frustrations of unmet liberal demands came together, and it can be considered as part of the global wave of anti-establishment. However, it had a few supporters in Turkey and gravitated to the anti-establishment left.

A massive social justice action against the authoritarian government. Another academic study examining the Gezi movement as a connective action is Chrona and Bee's (2017) analysis on the discourse of social media posts from the Gezi movement. Scholars argued that the Gezi movement has eluded from the decisiveness of collective identities and ideological tendencies and did contentious politics with individualised actions using organisational, communicative opportunities of cyberspace. The movement was not related to political organisations, and it has used the social networks of cyberspace as mobilisation tools. Besides, it brought together individuals from different oppositional nodes. For these reasons, it had a collective action structure. In the Gezi movement, ecological demands expanded into individual demands for freedoms and rights. The movement conveyed two coherent messages on the national and transnational scale; first, the opposition in Turkey is ready to demand its rights, to protect public spaces and freedoms by force of its democratic will. Second, the government is determined to suppress this will (Chrona & Bee, 2017, p. 178).

In the Gezi movement, online networks of cyberspace played vital and varied roles. The dissemination of information about protests and the communication between protesters and supporters are among these roles. Also, a new cyber community has emerged around the Gezi movement, thanks to cyber social networks. Cyberspace catalysed the creation of individualised perspectives and the articulation of these views. The heterogeneity of the mobilisation process and the possibilities of cyberspace enabled individuals to identify their areas in the movement and to spread their unique messages. These messages came together and created a massive action for social justice against the authoritarian government, emerging from the amalgam of shared grievances. According to Chrona and Bee (2017, p. 179), Gezi movement's ability and flexibility to include individual personalised actions, ensured its liberation from the borders of traditional mobilisation processes, necessities of collective

identity and established ideological patterns. Gezi reached beyond the traditional polarisation that characterised social and political fields in Turkey, and thus it has opened up novel ways to enter these fields for citizens. The movement has voiced demands for democratisation, individual rights and freedoms, and also practised and proposed an alternative form of citizenship.

Gezi Analyses for the Necessity of a New Sociology. Another notable pattern of the analyses on the Gezi movement includes debates that seek an answer to the question of Gezi sociologically and criticise the sociological analyses of the movement, which can be described as conventional. The common ground of these debates is that sociology should also be reformed to understand the newness of the emergent movements, including the Gezi movement. Traditional sociological methods, categories and inferences are regarded as insufficient, and it is claimed that it would be not possible to examine the movement thoroughly by existing conceptualizations. Since Gezi pointed out the emergence of a new sociality or the desire for it, new analytical tools are needed.

Against the Sociological Analyses which Accept the State's Action as Normative.

Sociologist Sinan Tankut Gülhan (2014) alleged that most of the analyses that claim to be sociological about the Gezi movement are the product of minds focusing on the social movements from the perspective of the Turkish state. For him, this perspective involves an abstraction that accepts the actions of the state as normative, and that abstraction is reproduced by the state's threat to social movements. Thus, the demands expressed or problems raised during the movement are removed from their potential to cause social changes. The state emerges as the ultimate interlocutor and solver of every problem, and every step was taken in Gezi Park. In Turkey, those who try to form opinions about social movements have this tendency, albeit they are from different wings (Gülhan, 2014, p. 22). Gülhan (2014) primarily underlined the concept of the middle class in his analysis. Because

of the urbanisation of production, this class can enter its struggle for discourse, politics and domination. In this process, the perspective, as mentioned earlier, is keen to re-integrate the aggrieved ones into structures of commodification.

Gezi was a movement in which others could move away from these structures and become self-reproducing. Gülhan (2014) mentioned the ideas of C. Wright Mills (1960; 2008), who acknowledges the potential of youth movements to create social change. He suggested examining the Gezi movement by looking at the others, lumpens, minorities, and students and those who cannot be perfectly distributed to social strata according to the previous perspectives, per Mills's view. According to Gülhan (2014), the only contribution of the bourgeoisie to the Gezi movement was its silent acceptance, and those who constituted the core of the movement did not identify themselves as members of the worker class. In Gezi, a mass whose interests depended on urban life and whose access to the urban areas is becoming more and more difficult has been manifested itself through different but successive organisations and with limited opportunities and spread rapidly (p. 51). These groups, who were voiceless in established political mechanisms, gained the initiative on urban space for the first time. The transformation of urban spaces harms the interests and expectations of the youth, whose cultural and social capital is higher than the groups that enjoy this transformation. Besides, this transformation prevents the mobilisation of this creative class under the roof of left-wing organisations because venues of these organisations are also transformed. In this context, Gülhan (2014) noted that there is a novel form of organisation, which is described by Negri's concept of the multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2004). It is a social relation that manifests itself through discourse emerging with low gravity and weak relationships. The multitude of Gezi did not understand left politics and its forms, and it has met with the first time during the movement. This encounter carried the potential of new and creative solutions. Gülhan (2014) continued his analysis with a parallel emphasis on the

liminal experiences that were debated by McAdam, et al. (2004). For him, liminal experiences, a step beyond the predictions of structurality and relationality, have been experienced in the Gezi movement. The rapid development of mobilisation, the dominance of improvisation and spontaneous actions, the invention of the new discourses and language, the continuous form-change ability of movement are examples of these experiences.

A Social Movement that Requires a New sociology. Sociologist Sanem Güvenç Salgırlı (2014) pointed out that there are methodologically different but attitudinally similar two types of sociology trying to explain the Gezi movement. The first one is a sociology that is positivist, and responsible for inventing the truth about the movement, and with its hierarchical and commanding language, announces that it is necessary to return to the social order that Gezi has interrupted. For example, this hierarchical understanding describes Gezi as a youth movement, and by doing so it became able to refer to the established patterns of politics belong to the old generations, and the movement can be discarded. The second type describes the movement through its participants. Although it claims that it does not instrumentalise sociology for the power, essentially it has the same function as the first type because it tries to reshape Gezi by its own set of values, and it tries to explain and understand Gezi (Güvenç Salgırlı, 2014, p. 85).

The widespread effort among Gezi analyses is to profile the protesters and to refer to the concepts of bio-politics. However, these deeds of profiling usually reach generalising conclusions. Referenced concepts lose their significance since they become victims of shallow and non-creative acts of thinking. Consequently, the Gezi literature is filled with categorically meaningless concepts that are continuously used, such as youth, middle class, civil society or generation y, arises. This problem also creates a noise that mutes the systematic criticism done by Gezi. Güvenç Salgırlı (2014) made evaluations about the analyses of the Gezi movement adverting time, object, and language (p. 93). According to

her, there are two types of deeds on the time axis. One of them is to propose that the conditions of the present age caused the mobilisation of the movement and the participants of the movement can be explained by a typology, which is inherent in this era, such as generation y. Scholar named that as the time that transformed into a cause (2014, p. 88). The second deed related to the time is to place Gezi in a chronology of social movements as a successor of the Egyptian revolution and occupy movements. Güvenç Salgırlı (2014) argued that these efforts are understandable but indicate a problem: If a chronology of social movements will be created, this must be done by considering the authentic temporality and historicity of each movement. For example, Gezi can be regarded as an up-to-the-minute movement in terms of technology use. However, it can be seen as a rather backward movement compared to the urban bourgeois movements that shape Western democracy. Accordingly, Güvenç Salgırlı emphasised that the genuine problem to be resolved is the oscillation of sociology between the present and the today (2014, p. 89). Referring to Alain Badiou's *The Century* (2007), the scholar suggested that the movement should be examined by its authentic temporality because it cannot be understood through familiar times or existing concepts.

According to Güvenç Salgırlı, (2014) the society that emerged in the park and its semantic peripheries is incompatible with the stereotyped definitions of Turkish society because it has occurred in a space where various individuals and groups came together for the first time. They have contacted outside of the established hierarchies and balances of power and organised through volunteerism. Therefore, they were ignored by sociologies that see the society as an organisation of sanctions within the boundaries of familiarity of vertical hierarchies (p. 91). The scholar also pointed out some problems regarding sociological explanations of the movement based on language. The first one is the inadequacy of the language for the explanatory efforts based on representation. Gezi is a brand-new movement

that cannot be explained through representation since the current language of sociology is not yet suitable to understand or explain it. On the other hand, all related quantitative or qualitative sociological methodologies operate through representation. Instead of two primary methodologies that add, gather, sample, or advocate the representation, Güvenç Salgırlı (2014, pp. 93-94) proposed a third form of representation. This suggestion is inspired by Foucault's article, *Subject and Power* (1982). The function of representation in the production of knowledge navigates between individualisation (deduction) and amalgamation (induction), and this may be useful to generate sociological knowledge about the Gezi movement.

Fallacies of Sociological Categorizations. Sociologist Vefa Saygın Öğütle (2014) argued that Gezi is a new phenomenon, but its components are familiar. Thus, the composition of the movement did not just appear out of anything in terms of activist typologies and positional class analysis. For Öğütle, “a social science does not allow any social phenomena to be explained through individual inclinations” (2014, p. 138). This expression is a critique of the efforts, which try to describe the movement, by political attitudes of Gezi participants in other stages of their lives. Öğütle has also noted that “a social science does not have an analytic category as the youth and it should not allow a positive or negative youth fetishism” (2014, p. 139). Here, he draws attention to the inaccuracy of the youth category used in many sociological analyses. Another assessment of Öğütle concerning sociological studies explaining the Gezi movement was as follows; “A social science does not see any identity as a substance. It does not transform what needs to be explained into an explainer and does not fetishise neither the explained nor the explainer” (2014, p. 139). In this way, the scholar criticised the analyses evaluations about the Gezi humour that allege protesters used humour as a power-balance destabilising element against the police's disproportionate use of force and the government's ideological manoeuvres. Because Gezi humour, the disproportionate use of intelligence, referred to the humiliation of intelligence

against those who were out of the movement or on its peripheries. Öğütler (2014) also criticised the debates about if the movement was political since it was spontaneous. According to him, the movement was political, and it is impossible to claim the opposite because social discontent has made resistance possible by itself. From now on, the debate should be about what kind of political speciation will take place. Established paradigms exclude spontaneity from the political area as a form of political unconsciousness or separate civil society from the political society. However, “spontaneity is not a criterion of being, or not being political” (p. 140).

Accordingly, the Gezi movement has created a new composition with familiar components such as distinct typologies; nongovernmental organisations, the revolutionary left, flagless ones, participants from the Kurdish movement, Kemalists, traditional human typology of the park and its surroundings and Anti-capitalist Muslims. For the class analysis of the composition, Öğütler agreed with Boratav (2013) that these components come together around a class struggle. However, differently, he analysed this struggle through the relationship between body and space. Bodies were instruments of human consciousness and sociality that occur in the space, and, because of neoliberal urban policies, this relationship between the body and space has been disabled. In Gezi Park, the composition has come together not to protect lifestyles, but to protect life itself (2014, p.145). At this stage, there was a new class emerging against the class, which breaks the body - space relation, and it is hard to describe it because of its newness. Efforts to define the Gezi movement will only be fertile through the relations between the city and its deprived residents. Movement should be analysed with a relational class conceptualisation, not a positional one.

An Embodiment of the Desire for a New Sociality. Sociologist Ali Akay (2017) suggested that the Gezi movement should be evaluated as a movement that criticised the established way of life and proposed an alternative. Beyond its political aspects, the

movement was about the construction of that alternative life. The mobilisation of Gezi belongs to a new era in which individualisation and singularisation are prominent, and homogeneous concepts such as the people or the proletariat are no longer sufficient for sociological analyses. Akay (2017) also noted that it is necessary to recognise the aggregation of different *modus vivendi*, the rhizomatic occurrences of consensus and equality, to evaluate the movement. For him, political-archaeological excavation in the name of Gezi should be in and around that new form of living because these life forms pointed out to the emerging of a new sociality, and actors desired accordingly to find new ways of doing politics as they invented these authentic forms.

Akay described the movement as “a heterogeneous subjectivity emerged during Gezi” (2017, p. 19). It was an attempt to create a living space where young people came together in a horizontal form. There were no political centres, and no one was focused on differences such as class, religion or ethnicity. The heterogeneous subjectivity of Gezi experienced the affection of sharing and doing together around an ecological moment, at the beginning of the movement. However, because of the violent interventions of government, this subjectivity moved away from its ecological focus and became anti-governmental. The heterogeneity was preserved during the movement’s politicisation, and that enabled different political and ideological groups such as nationalists, Muslims, Kurds and secularists to act together with the youth who could not be put into any political category. According to Akay (2017), the Gezi movement was an embodiment of the desire for a new sociality, and old dichotomisations such as secular-pious or labour-bourgeois are no longer sufficient to examine this new sociological field.

A Brief Assessment on the Gezi Movement Literature. Supra-political analyses, which emphasise that examining the Gezi movement in a framework dominated by solely political or economic-political determinants would be reductive and prevent the

understanding of the essence of the movement, explain it also within cultural and emotional contexts. However, these cultural contexts are not considered as the areas where hegemony and counter-hegemony occur, instead, they are conceptualised by the aligning of the individualisation with the demands for human/civil rights that are the subjects of an anti-neoliberal but non-anti-systemic cultural transformation. Similar to other patterns of the Gezi movement literature, some argue the movement was associated deeply with the youth and middle classes. These analyses claim that the movement emerged because of the growing demands of a more integrated part of society to the West (the youth), for social change and democratisation, and it has diffused by the government's reluctance to meet these demands and the police violence generating recurrently emotional causes for movement's actors and those who joined the movement afterwards (middle classes).

Besides the central role of the youth, these analyses point out that the Gezi movement brought together different social segments which have not collaborated on common social goals before. Since this new union does not correspond to the divisions in the political field, they suggest that the movement should be examined from a supra-political perspective. This rationale can be criticised for overlooking the possibilities in which the movement has emerged as an alternative, oppositional political field or as a manifestation of such an already formed one.

Moreover, supra-political analyses do not claim that the actors of the Gezi had revolutionary intentions. For them, the movement, in its roughest form, was formed by those who opposed the repressive policies of a reactionary government. It was not a movement that pursued fundamental democratic freedoms and rights, rather it has emerged as an amalgam of demands for a better democracy and more freedom, and that resulted from Turkey's democratic and economic development. However, established political institutions, including the government, could not meet these growing demands. Supra-political analyses emphasise

the movement's actors' success in generating a series of efficient and embracing discursive or bodily performances utilising their social capital and cultural accumulation. All the features of the Gezi that positively differ for the opposition as an emerging movement are associated with this capital and accumulation. Besides, that difference is shown as the crucial reason for the inadequacy of the government's response to the movement. The analyses included in the pattern can also be criticised for evaluating the movement, disconnected from economic and political conditions and reasons. Although they have emphasised that the dominant actors' cultural and social capital have enabled the emergence of a difference enriching the performativity of the movement, they remain incapable of explaining the dynamics that caused the emergence of this difference, the historical position of the movement and its impact on established norms.

Briefly, according to supra-political analyses, the Gezi movement is a libertarian uprising of freedom and civil rights that utilised humour, creativity, supreme emotions and inclusiveness successfully, and therefore became a public movement. However, they do not address the structural processes and cultural causalities that facilitate the mobilisation, or the social transformations that led to the emergence of the Gezi's allegedly new cultural contexts.

The class-based analyses of the Gezi movement make similar explanations about its actors' position in production relations, their conflicts with other classes and their struggles against neoliberal policies. However, the class they relationally depict in similar ways differs when the nomenclature starts; such as the middle class, the new middle class, or the new petty bourgeoisie. In all these analyses, it is claimed that prominent members of these class are young, well-educated, neither poor nor rich. Nonetheless, these people have the potential to become poor, rich, entrepreneurs or members of the precariat. Class-based analyses of the Gezi movement are made in the context of the pre-existing categories together with the series of prospective economic-political predictions, and according to them, the class recurrently

appears somewhere among social strata. In this sense, they are distinctly different from those that claim that an efficient analysis of the Gezi movement is only possible with a new sociological approach.

Besides, class-based analyses of the movement do not conflict with those that refrain from economic-political evaluations when they explain the cultural characteristics of the actors who formed Gezi. Class members are considered to be culturally well integrated into the global world and disconnected from the working class. In this respect, class-based structural analyses may be considered insufficient since they send the Gezi protesters to a culturally distinct dimension, and they do not explain what global cultural integration means, unlike non-Marxian analyses. Also, some class-based analyses consider the class to be the (new) petty-bourgeois that rationally struggles only for its interests. Since most of such analyses evaluate the movement from a Marxian point of view, they also assess the possible socio-political effects or changes that the movement would cause in comparison with the agenda that this perspective affirms. However, the significance of these determinations that the movement was not as progressive as it seems, did not have revolutionary qualities or that the class that drags the movement was focused only on its interests are overstated.

These arguments are concentrated on understanding the instrumentality of the movement within an ideologically predetermined trajectory rather than understanding it as a social phenomenon. Also, a Marxist analysis should be based on the relational analysis of classes, and suggest that classes can be historical actors only if they act for their interests and oppose other classes. In this sense, even if Gezi was a new petty-bourgeois movement, that is not relevant to its being focused on its interests since that is an immanent feature for every class. Also, the fact that the movement did not have revolutionary notions in the Marxian sense (if this is a fact) does not indicate that it was not a progressive movement and belonged

to the global movement wave generated by petty bourgeois-like classes (even if this wave could be described as such).

Also, some class-based analyses include efforts to revise the definition of the working class to identify all the actors of the Gezi movement within a single class. As long as their claims regarding the transformations of the production relations are valid, perhaps these new definitions are consistent. Nevertheless, in the pattern of class-based analyses, it has been continually emphasised that the class of Gezi differed from the working class, the middle class and the petty bourgeoisie in a conventional sense. The class of Gezi (if there is such a thing) is considered as a class that has some characteristics of above-stated classes, but positionally variable, culturally and content-wise unconventional or unknowable. I argue that such meta-analytical efforts cause analysts to define the Gezi with the derivatives and combinations of pre-defined class-based definitions and categories, and to highlight the clues of the inadequacy in envisagement of a homogeneous class; even if there is an analysis in front of us in which birth of an utterly new class is allegedly detected as a stable determinant or a history maker. These analyses can be criticised for overlooking the fact that the Gezi class, which they claim to exist, corresponded to a social occurrence that initially exceeded the amalgam or combination of the classes that formed it. The appearance of a whole can refer to more than its sum. To examine a multi-layered and hyper-dimensional social occurrence in which diversity is collectively exalted and performed, utilising the fixated categories is insufficient and irrelevant, even if they are well-thought enough to capture some notions of the temporary whole. The need for class-based analyses that would not freeze flexibility, variability and transformability, which enables the formation of social movements such as Gezi to generate explanatory and concrete frameworks, remains valid.

Analyses that account for the Gezi as a new stage of democracy or democratisation process in Turkey are comparable to class-based analyses in terms of how they position the

movement against neoliberal urban policies. Besides, these analyses are freed from the categorical constraints of class-based analyses since they identify the movement with a mobilisation revolved around the demands for better democracy, greater participation in decision-making mechanisms and right to the city. Moreover, for them, the movement was not an occurrence appearing from the explicit dynamics of class struggle in the conventional sense, and on the contrary, it laid weight on multiplicity, plurality and heterogeneity. From this point of view, it can be claimed that according to such analyses, the recurrent detection of asunder social groups united during the movement for the first time, becomes explainable through a more fruitful causality that stems from democratic demands.

In this pattern, since the groups that made up the movement are related to such a shared issue, two significant differences appear. First, it became possible for these various groups to open different issues up for discussion in the name of a better democracy. Second, embracing differences enabled the nascence of spontaneity and the building of a new public. Thus, all conceptions of affirmed citizenship typologies became reproachable or suspended, and a new individualist democracy understanding was proposed.

Besides, these analyses classify the movement based on its actors' performances and practices. In other words, the action repertoire put forward by Gezi protesters especially during the occupation of the park, the attitudes and behaviours they exhibited are considered as indicators and constituents of an alternative, oppositional and proponent way of thinking to the neoliberal/authoritarian logic. Actors of the movement practised and experienced the social change they demanded. These practices, performances and preferences are been the expressions of the same logic that poses problems of representation of the established system and strongly recommends a more direct democracy. Thus, the venues of the movement, especially Gezi Park, become the nodes of a public space where the actors express their demands both by language and action. For such analyses, the movement opposed neoliberal

urban policies by transforming urban areas to serve its own social and spatial desires. In this context, it can be argued that they do not ignore the political and economic conditions, unlike supra-political analyses, and they do not fit the movement into pre-agreed categories.

According to these analyses, the movement gave its spatial and performative struggle and realised itself through the actions of different actors involved. Thus, it is possible to grasp the movement in terms of emerging subjectivities, acts and demands. Also, some analyses in this pattern claim that questions and suggestions articulated by the Gezi movement made contribute to the democratisation process in a global sense when the Gezi movement is accepted as a movement that upheld direct democracy, pluralism and the right to the city, as these analyses claim, the trueness of this contribution becomes acceptable.

Analyses concern the Gezi movement from a transnational perspective within the framework of global social movements are diverse. Some consider the movement an episode of contentious global politics and rediscover the common features and dilemmas of this process in Gezi. Another part tries to describe the movement through its similarities or differences between movements occurring in other parts of the world. In this pattern, as observed in most of the previous patterns, the pronounced effect of neoliberalism on the formation of social movements is robustly expressed, and the narrative of social movements rising against the global economic system comes to the fore.

Besides, it is seen that the arguments put forward to define the movement frequently mention concepts and concepts such as multitude, urban processes, youth, authoritarian orientations of the government and the need for democratisation. It can be said that the arguments of these analyses should have been put forward as a result of much more in-depth and detailed studies. The pattern does not contain data-driven, comprehensive and comparative researches that would generate satisfactory persuasiveness in terms of transnational mapping of the movement. The pattern which analyses Gezi as an innovative

and emerging movement sees the movement because of the transformation occurring in Turkish society or as the first concrete manifestation of that. According to these analyses, the established narratives and assumptions that regulate the relations between individuals and socio-political structures have been displaced by the realisation and outcomes of the movement.

That displacement is regarded as a traumatic shock for the system and some argue it requires the generation of new answers, definitions and policies. The notion that is constantly underlined across the pattern, is that a newness profoundly breaking out from established political and social structures has been embodied. This newness is affirmed just as the analyses dealing with movement as a democratising event do because it is often associated with the abandonment of identity politics, which has polarising effects. It may be appropriate to link what is meant with this newness, which is constantly underlined in the pattern, to the concept of cognitive liberation. In this context, for these analyses, a segment of Turkish society has abandoned the identity politics that ensures the continuous reproduction of polarisation enjoyed by both power and institutional opposition, and this was what led to cognitive liberation. Thus, the imposed differences of the conceived public and the barriers separating aggrieved groups disappeared temporarily, and interactions answered the question of what kind of public should be, based on similar structures and circumstances causing various discontents.

The Multiplicity of the Gezi Movement. This section tries to present and compile the demographic profile, educational level, employment rates of the activists/protesters who participated in the Gezi movement, statistically based on surveys, which are conducted by various institutions. It also includes some findings from the work of Yörük and Yüksel (2015), in which class analysis of the multiplicity of the Gezi movement was carried out. Moreover, rates of participation in political and non-political organisations of the Gezi

multiplicity and their motivations for mobilisation are compiled based on the surveys. By using the data about the profile of the multiplicity that has produced the Gezi graffiti, an indirect attempt is made to create an instructive assessment. In this section, data from the surveys of Political and Social Research Centre (SAMER, 2013), KONDA (2014) Research and Consultancy and GENAR (2013) Research, Consulting, Training are used. SAMER's survey is based on interviews with 3944 people selected by stratified random sampling. KONDA's survey was conducted by interviewing 4441 individuals who were randomly selected in Gezi Park. The research of GENAR was carried out with the same sampling method and with 498 protesters.

Gender Distribution. According to the survey of KONDA (2014), the gender distribution of Gezi Park protesters is not much different from the gender distribution of the population in Turkey. The distribution among Gezi protesters is 50.8% women, and 49.2% men. KONDA's survey shows that the gender distribution of Turkey composes of 48.8% of women and 51.2% of men. Additionally, the same distribution, for Istanbul is 51.5% women and 48.5% men. Therefore, it is possible to say that the gender distribution of Gezi protesters is consistent with the population structure of Turkey and Istanbul (KONDA, 2014, p. 5).

Age Distribution. The average age of Gezi Park protesters is 28 (KONDA, 2014). According to the same research, the average age in Turkey is 30.3 and in Istanbul is 30. In comparison with the average age of Turkey's population, it can be seen that protesters of Gezi reflect Turkish society in terms of age (KONDA, 2014, p. 6). Additionally, the study of SAMER shows that 16.28% of the adults, aged 18 and older in Istanbul, participated in the Gezi movement. The number of adults aged 18 and older in Istanbul is 9.5 million. Accordingly, the number of adults aged 18 and older in Istanbul who participated in the Gezi movement is 1.5 million (SAMER, 2013, p. 39). Furthermore, 9.53% of the participants of SAMER's research say they were in Gezi Park. According to this information, the number of

adults aged 18 and older who visited Gezi Park during the movement is around 900 thousand. Besides, SAMER's survey presents that 15.25% of Kurds living in Istanbul participated in the Gezi movement and most of these Kurds are middle-class members and have socialist views (SAMER, 2013, p. 43). The same survey was also conducted in Izmir. Results are proportionally similar to the data from Istanbul. 18% of the aged 18 and older people in Izmir reported that they participated in the Gezi movement. This information shows that 500 thousand people over 18 years of age participated in Gezi because the population above the age of 18 is 2.8 million in Izmir.

Level of Education and Employment Rates. According to the KONDA (2014), educational and employment-related features of Gezi Park protesters are different compared to the average of Turkey, and the average of Istanbul. The proportion of people who continue their education in high schools or higher level is 12% for Turkey, and 13.9% for Istanbul. However, 42.8% of protesters of the Gezi movement are graduated from a university and 12.9% of protesters are Master's Degree / PhD students or graduates. This is for Turkey is under 1%. From the employment point of view, students are represented in Gezi profile much more than general Turkey. Additionally, pensioners and homemakers are much less represented. Students in Turkey constitute 7.4% of society. However, 36.6% of Gezi protesters are students. On the other hand, pensioners cover 13.8% of the population in Turkey. However, for the Gezi movement, this is only 3.5%. Similarly, homemakers present 32.2% of the population, but only 2% of protesters were homemakers. Also, the proportion of employees in Turkey is 40.8% and in Istanbul 40.3%. 51.8% of the Gezi protesters are employees. Again, the proportion of private-sector employees in Turkey is 4.8%, and in Istanbul is 7.8%. The same distribution among the Gezi protesters is 15.4%. Like doctors or engineers, self-employed people's distribution in the Gezi movement is 5.5%. This rate for Turkey is only 1.3% (KONDA, 2014, p. 9).

Classes. Yörük and Yüksel (2015) evaluate data from SAMER survey by conceptualising Portes and Hoffman's social class categories for the Gezi movement (p. 145). These classes are capitalists, executives, elite workers, petty bourgeoisie, the non-manual formal proletariat, manual formal proletariat and informal proletariat (Portes & Hofman, 2003, pp. 47-48). In this context, capitalists are owners and managing partners of large/medium-sized companies. Executives include the managers and administrators of these companies. Elite workers refer to educated fee-earners working in these companies or public institutions. The petty bourgeoisie is the class of self-employed technicians and very small business owners. Non-manual proletariat refers to white-collars and salaried employees with professional training. The manual formal proletariat is the class of contract labour. Last, the informal proletariat class includes non-contractual and informal labour. The new middle class, which is frequently mentioned in the analysis of the Gezi movement, is composed of the non-manual proletariat, elite workers, executives and capitalists (Yörük & Yüksel, 2015, p. 148). The distribution of those participating in the Gezi movement according to these classes is as follows; capitalists 4.1%, executives 4.59%, elite workers 6.23%, petty-bourgeoisie 11.48%, non-manual proletariat 20%, manual formal proletariat 35.57% and informal proletariat 18.03%. Turkey's population distribution according to the same classes are as follows; capitalists 2.17%, executives 1.63%, elite workers 2.95%, petty-bourgeoisie 16.48%, non-manual proletariat 15.25%, manual formal proletariat 37.17% and informal proletariat 24.38% (Yörük & Yüksel, 2015, p. 146). Considering this information, it is possible to say that the upper classes are represented in the movement above Turkey's average. However, most of the participants appear to be members of the proletariat.

Organizations. As stated in KONDA's report, 21% of protesters are members of a political party, association, fraction, platform or civil society organisation (2014). According to another KONDA' research about lifestyles (2008), 15% of Turkish society are members of

an organisation with a political agenda in Turkey and 7.5% of the people in Turkey are members of various associations that are outside of professional life (KONDA, 2008, p. 25). In light of this information, it is possible to say that the political organisational membership ratio among Gezi protesters and the population of Turkey are different. However, this data is not enough to understand how political parties or various associations were represented during the Gezi movement by its participants. In other words, the KONDA survey (2014), interviewees were asked about their participation in political organisations. 93% of protesters said that they joined the movement as simple citizens. Besides, four out of every five protesters stated that they are not members of any political party, association or organisation. However, half of these people also said that they have previous experiences of collective action (p. 14).

Mobilization, motivations and Gezi multiplicity. According to the GENAR's survey, the reasons for participating in the Gezi movement and their percentages are as follows; Erdoğan 57%, government 13.7%, police violence 8.2%, cutting of trees 3.4%, restriction of freedoms 2%, turning Gezi Park into Shopping Centre 2%, discrimination 2%, unearned incomes 1.8%, wrong rhetoric 1.6%, spite 1.2%, fascist policies 1.2%, other reasons 2.8% and no idea 2% (GENAR, 2013). In the same research, it is stated that 70.7% of protesters joined the Gezi movement because of Erdoğan, AKP or government. In KONDA's study (2014), nine out of every ten protesters thought that they faced human rights violations during the movement. Additionally, 87% of protesters defined themselves as members of a social group which is a victim of injustice and violation of human rights. Consequently, we can say that majority of protesters saw themselves as excluded or disadvantaged, and thus took part in the movement. Briefly, they were on the streets because of their grievances, not on behalf of any political organisation's representation (KONDA, 2014, p. 14).

KONDA's report (2014) also shows that 49.1% of protesters joined the movement after they noticed the police violence. Additionally, 73% of those who identify themselves as simple citizens said that they participated in movement because they were enraged because of police violence. This means that the police's use of excessive force was an important turning point for many protesters. Reasons for participating in Gezi movement for protesters who took part in KONDA survey are as follows: Restricting of freedoms 58.1%, to protest against AKP and the research does not explain whether these protesters participated in the movement through any political organisation. For this reason, in its policies 37.2%, respond to Erdoğan's rhetoric and attitude 30.3%. Each protester had over one reason to protest. For example, 20.5% of protesters indicated that they were on the streets both to protest the restriction of freedom and to respond to Erdoğan's statements and attitude (KONDA, 2014, p. 17). Moreover, 34.1% of protesters said that they participated in the Gezi movement for freedom, 18.4% of the protesters stated that their cause was to stand against the violations of human rights. It appears that demands for rights were the main issue for one out of every three people in the Gezi movement. Also, for one out of every five people's human rights was the main reason for participation. For that matter, in case we put aside people who came to park for standing against tree cutting and demolition of the park, we see that nine out of every ten protesters participated in the movement for a reason, which is directly related to government policies. Demands for rights were echoing with words of freedom, oppression, democracy, police violence and calls for resigning. The striking point is the positive correlation between these two kernels: For protesters (nine out of ten people) rights and freedoms were under serious threat, and they demanded (again, nine out of ten people) their rights from the government (KONDA, 2014, p. 19).

As a result, it is possible to say that the age and gender distribution of Gezi multiplicity correspond to Turkey's population. In terms of participation intensity, it is seen

that the number of young people is significantly higher. Also, the education level of the Gezi multiplicity is well above the average of Turkey. In parallel, it can be concluded that those who have relatively more qualified professions in terms of employment are more represented in the Gezi movement. However, when a class-based evaluation is made, it is seen that most of the Gezi protesters are people who sell their labour to earn a living.

Besides, it can be said that the multiplicity of Gezi consists of more organised individuals and groups. However, Gezi protesters do not mention that political or non-political organisations' leadership regarding their reasons for participation. Most of the reasons and motivations of participation indicate emotional and individual decision-making processes and grievances about rights and freedoms.

Space

Although the literature review on social movements provides a rich and horizontal background that I benefited from while interpreting the data, to examine the emergent codes, memo and categories only from this standpoint, would cause the authentic contexts of the Gezi movement to be overlooked. The need to eliminate this problem stemmed from three basic facts. First, the Gezi movement has taken place in an urban space and has been related to urban space. Second, the data of the analysis that I tried to carry out consists of cultural products produced in and within that urban space. Third, space, where the Gezi graffiti practised, has special meanings, connotation and significance for Turkish society. For these reasons, I continued my literature review per spatial contexts.

Accordingly, this section first addresses the concept of space and spatiality, from a historical and sociological perspective, and bases its theoretical foundation mainly on the works of Lefebvre. Then it examines the social movements and cyberspace from a spatial perspective. Following that, the section describes the spatiality of the node of Gezi graffiti

(Gezi Park and Taksim Square socially, politically and historically. Finally, it concludes with an assessment of the node where the Gezi graffiti came into view.

History of the Space

Before mentioning the history of the spatial production of the node, it is inevitable to mention seminal concepts of French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre, regarding the history and production of space. I will discuss the spatialities of the node through these concepts in the following sections. Lefebvre (1991) argued it is impossible to understand society without understanding the space. Because space is a social product and “each mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one to another must entail the production of a new space” (p. 46). The analysis of changes and transitions between the modes of production allows the discovery of newly planned spaces, which are produced during these changes. Lefebvre proposed and described the periodisation of the space encompassing the specific and the general phenomena. Specific phenomena refer to the formations of a specific code of a space such as the dawn, the collapse and the fragmentation of this code. General phenomena refer to the production modes, the institutionalisation of these modes, and their impact on societies (Ghulyan, 2017). The periodisation describes six different spaces: *Absolute space*, *sacred space*, *historical space*, *abstract space*, *contradictory space* and *differential space*.

Absolute space is an agro-pastoral space where history was originated. It was a set of spaces named and exploited by peasants, nomads or half-nomads. By the primitive practices of peasants, nomads or half-nomadic shepherds, the social space rose above nature. This space was unshaped by humans, and its boundaries were determined by external, natural forces. The basic feature of absolute space is that human life was in close relation with nature and its rhythms, hence the harmony with space was not broken down yet. In societies where

the absolute space was produced, although human activity was trying to transform this space and to assign a distinct quality and character to it, space was not a designed place, it was the place of living. The space of representation was the issue, rather than representations of space (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 234-236).

The emergence of the sacred space corresponds to the establishment of the first city-states, the Asian type of production and feudalism. One of the paradoxical features of this space was that its removal from the natural context by the political power, and still it was perceived as nature. In societies where the sacred space dominated, the central government appeared on specific sites with spatial forms, and there was a distinction between the centre and the periphery, between the city and the town in the social space (Ghulyan, 2017). With the emergence of these forms, the sacred space has expanded materially.

Lefebvre (1991) argued that the barbarian invasions laicised the semi-holy and absolute nature of the Roman Empire's private property: the religious and political space of Rome. That broke the absoluteness of the old socio-spatial order and allowed the emergence of historical and abstract spaces (p. 253). In this fragmented space, accumulation, richness and wealth (information, techniques, money, valuable objects, artworks and symbols) formed. "One subject dominated this period: the historical town of the West, along with the countryside under its control" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 49). With the organisation of cities as markets and the development of trade, the value of exchange gained prevalence. Small-scale manufacturers came together and organised guilds and associations. Accordingly, collective labour, who could be produced socially, has emerged in the city. In parallel with the abstraction and spread of value of exchange, there was also the abstraction of labour (Ghulyan, 2017, p. 10). The gathering of the productive activity in certain centres separated labour processes from the maintaining space within the historical space. The family area and labour have diverged. This led to the emergence of public and private spaces as related spatial

practices. "... in becoming independent of that process, labour fell prey to abstraction, whence abstract social labour — and abstract space" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 49).

According to Lefebvre (1991), the abstract space, which is the space of the bourgeoisie and capitalism, emerged in the physical plane, and in this space, the value of exchange substituted the value of use. It is political, because it is a product of violence and war, and it is institutional because the state establishes it. As a superstructure, it is produced by urbanism, which is separate from practice, social relations and society. It acts by the logic of the state; it divides and distributes spaces and creates vast gaps. Abstract space brings out the wide motorways against walkers, and numbered streets against the freedom of being anonymous in the city (Bektaş, 2017). It flattens and rasps all differences that resist its rationality. Homogeneity is not the structure of this space, but its target. In this planned space, all places are homologous and their relations are determined over distances. Abstract space is objective and measurable. It appears as large straight lines, broad empty streets shaped by state rationalism. In this way, it attempts to position, classify and encode people and things in spaces. The illusory transparency of the abstract space is the transparency of the power, which it makes invisible and hidden. It is the curtain of institutional ideology, hidden behind the lines, it is the space of isotopy and precision that we encounter through maps and city plans. The concept of abstract space brings to minds Baron Haussmann and the wide streets he has opened in Paris in the 19th century. He aimed to establish a state rationalisation to stop the oppositional struggles in the city and the political contentions of the period. To clear the city centre from the poor and bestow it to the monopoly of the bourgeois, he has rebuilt Paris (Lefebvre, 2016).

The structure of the abstract space is based on the Euclidean space isotopy. Its geometricity enables establishing homogeneity, clarity and transparency. That geometricity eliminates all differences and degrades the space to the level of forms, from three-

dimensionality to two-dimensionality. Abstract space is phallic and optical. It represents male violence. It extends beyond the abstract and becomes the rudeness of political power and its coercion/oppression tools (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 50). Opticalisation of space de-contrasts tastes, touching, smelling and hearing in the face of lines, lights and colours. The dominance of the visible causes a set of substitutions and replacements. What becomes visible through them subrogates the entire body and eliminate its deficiency. While the optical settles into the centre, other meanings and those that may be discovered by other senses become waived and ignored (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 287). In the space of power where it is built with strategies, there is no room for tactics, novel ways and escape lines for the individual (de Certeau, 2008). However, images, which abstract the space such as signifiers, regarding a neighbourhood or a street, cannot represent meanings and functions (signified) that are re-constructed in everyday life. Everyday life has a transformative potential despite all the routines, habits, and movements of motor level. It is lived in the space (Lefebvre, 2007). The space interconnects cognitive and cultural, social and historical. It creates a complex process that involves the discovery of brand-new spaces, new continents, the production of spatial organisations and landscapes specific to the structure of society and the structurality, which contain monumentalism (Lefebvre, 1991). The social space that Lefebvre positioned against the abstract space uses its relationality against the abstracted homogenised ones (Bektaş, 2017).

Social space results from perceptions and experiences of distinct practical and conceptual ways. It brings together, collects and intensifies crowds, symbols, performances. It is a production and work of art enabling the realisation of social existence. In a certain sense, it involves actual and potential convergences and in this respect; it is significant. Social space is a convergence and spontaneousness that comprises everything produced by the cooperation or the conflict, in nature and in society, such as living beings, things, objects, artefacts, signs and symbols. Abstract space adjoins to things, but social space combines

things. What abstract space consists of is constituted by everyday practices of social fractions (Şentürk, 2014). There are many units in abstract space. This space is multi-layered, conflicting and plural, it is a combination of oppositions. Despite its emergence, which depends on the social and political reconciliation between aristocrats and the bourgeoisie, it is contradictory. It reflects the fundamental contradiction between the capitalist mode of production and the working class and its effects on that contradiction. It can be said that when it is evaluated in terms of logic and unequal development of accumulation processes, it can never be homogeneous. Because, even though capital flows have a homogenising effect, they base on difference and inequality. The tendencies of dividedness and homogenisation, and the hierarchical organisation of space, lay at the foundation of another important feature of abstract space. In this hierarchical arrangement, the role of the state and the power becomes evident. Therefore, the question is not only the relationship between the centre and the periphery based on the economic hierarchy.

The state sees the space as a political tool and an apparatus to provide social order and constantly takes part in the production of space. It provides infrastructure, manages resources, and it wields the power to plan. It is responsible for the hierarchical organisation of the abstract space. Moreover, the state provides the foundations of the social order, by putting places, spaces, function and features in a hierarchical order. However, this hierarchical arrangement is not evolutionary and random as it is considered, as a whole; it results from the strategic logic of the organisation of peripherals by the centre (Ghulyan, 2017). It should be noted that political power is not only a space-generating one, given the particular characteristics of the abstract space. The production of space is not a spontaneous purpose; political power reproduces space as the place and environment of reproduction of social relations (Lefebvre, 1991).

“Through their manipulation of abstract space, the bourgeoisie's enlightened despotism and the capitalist system have successfully established partial control over the commodity market. They have found it harder -witness their monetary problems - to establish control over the capital market itself. The combined result of strong political hegemony, surge in the forces of production, and inadequate control of markets, a spatial chaos experienced at the most parochial level on worldwide scale. The bourgeoisie and the capitalist system thus experienced great difficulty in mastering what was once their products and tools of their mastery; space. They find themselves unable to reduce practice (the practico-sensory realm, the body, social-spatial practice) to their abstract space, and hence new, spatial, contradictions arise and make themselves felt. Might not the spatial chaos engendered by capitalism, despite the power and rationality of the state, turn out to be the system's Achilles' heel?” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 63).

Contemporarily, the abstract space still the dominant space, but advanced capitalism gave distinct characteristics to the production processes of the space and spatial contradictions. Therefore, the fundamental feature of today's abstract space is a contradiction. Abstract space, qualitatively and quantitatively, is seen today as a stiff and clear contradictory space. In addition, the contradictions between labour and capital prevailing in the previous stage (industrial capitalism) still exist in metamorphosed forms. Capitalist social relations spread to every area of daily life and cause new contradictions. Thus, today the contradiction between labour and capital is overlapped by contradictions of the spatial relations of production. Some of these new and deepening contradictions, directly and indirectly, related to the production of space.

The first contradiction of abstract space is the contradiction between quantitative and qualitative. The basis of this contradiction lies between the value of use and the value of

exchange and takes forms among spatial dimensions of this contradiction. The geometric representation of the space serves only to the quantification process and cannot explain actual contradictions. This geometric representation allows nature and space to be fragmented and parcelled. Thus, space becomes a commodity that can be bought, sold and become included in the exchange processes. Since capitalist relations of production are omnipresent, the quantification of space has reached extreme dimensions. Particularly, the rapid sprawl and global developments in urban areas divided the pre-defined places of nature into the processes of exchange. Correspondingly, these spaces are subject to quantitative manipulation, and the result is the disappearance of qualitative. However, the qualitative never disappears; the need for it always makes itself felt. Lefebvre (1991) defined this as the movement towards consumption of space from the space of consumption (p. 352).

“This moment is the moment of departure — the moment of people's holidays, formerly a contingent but now a necessary moment. When this moment arrives, 'people' demand a qualitative space. The qualities they seek have names: sun, snow, sea. Whether these are natural or simulated matters little. Neither spectacle nor mere signs are acceptable. What is wanted is materiality and naturalness as such, rediscovered in their (apparent or real) immediacy” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 353).

In this way, the qualitative re-appears spatially. However, the nature and the value of use remain in their pure state while they move from the space of consumption to consumption of space and the quality becomes dominant. Sectors with high-profit rates develop; industry and production penetrate here. Consequently, in this process, which represents the contradiction between quantitative and qualitative, there is not a double contradiction but a three-term movement (Lefebvre, 1991). The first movement is the movement towards the consumption of space within leisure time. It is the movement from everyday life to the non-daily. In this context, the contradiction between the place of production -that provides social

reproduction- and the consumption of the space can be specified. Because the consumption of the space needs productive consumption. The second movement occurs at this stage. The third movement happens between the space of consumption and the space of production, during the consumption that enables reproduction of labour and things. Although this contradiction between use and exchange, between quality and quantity, is solved by the victory of the latter, the living space always reappears. What maximises the value of use gives ground to the political use of the space. The basis of this political use is the designed space and its oppressive, abstractive, alienating structure. This contradictory situation, which penetrates politics, causes the palliative solutions with the production of things in the best case. In the worst case, it causes the production of a space, which is the simulacrum of nature and destroys the last remaining parts of nature and natural. According to Lefebvre, the solution lies in the differential space, his utopia (Ghulyan, 2017). Abstract space tries to eliminate differences, oddities and reach homogeneity. However, it is impossible to produce a new space without underlining the differences. Every time space is reproduced, the elements disintegrated by the abstract space reunite. This reuniting puts an end to the localizations that shatter the integrity of the individual body, the social body, human needs and knowledge. what the abstract space defines needs to be distinguished (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 392).

Differential space privileges the inclusivity and the value of use, not the value of exchange of abstract space (Leary-Owhin, 2012, p. 69). According to Lefebvre (1991), differential space is associated with a worldwide space that will emerge after capitalism. This place will emerge with social revolution and will make everyday life open to endless possibilities (pp. 422-423). The teleological nature of the historical dialectic of Lefebvre in which an inevitable transition unfolds, from the absolute space of nature to the abstract capitalist space, finally reaches the utopian differential space. In this space, capital interests and state abandon the land and property periodically, under the conditions of neo-capitalism.

That makes differential space possible. Disengagement of interests and state from space takes place continuously in urban areas. This absence allows the users of the abstract space to create and appropriate new spaces. They carry the potential of axioms to gain new rights for the urban spaces (Leary-Owhin, 2012).

“Appropriation should not be confused with a practice which is closely related to it but still distinct, namely ‘diversion’ (détournement). An existing space may outlive its original purpose and the *raison d’être* which determines its forms, functions, and structures; it may thus in a sense become vacant, and susceptible of being diverted, re-appropriated and put to a use quite different from its initial one. (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 167).

The space that arises in such moments is a space of play rather than a space of work. Moreover, counter spaces can arise from the clutches of the established order in this space of play. This space is a product of the commodification process of neo-capitalism with its ludic structure. It brings the space of work and space of joy closer, and thus hosts a space of contradiction with efficient potentials (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 385 - 383). The differential space and its potentials are not be given as an opportunity to create counter spaces to obtain rights to the city by the power, they have to be earned.

Spatial Triad

The concept of spatial triad developed by Henri Lefebvre (1991) provides a unique perspective in relation to space production as a conceptual framework having epistemological, ontological and methodological integrity. Lefebvre approached to space as a multi-dimensional whole and scrutinised all discourses and distinctions related to it (Aslan & Yavan, 2018). According to Lefebvre (1991), space is trilateral and related to the three dimensions of space production. The spatial triad includes three distinct spaces: the perceived


space, the conceived space and the lived space (Lefebvre, 1991). These spaces with their own unique natures coincide with a positive eclecticism. Routes and networks that interconnect spaces where we do our daily routines and spend our time (work, home and spaces of leisure), come together in the perceived space and generate spatial practices that make up urban realities. Because of the spatial practices that arise from the production/reproduction of the routines and experiences, which are constantly repeated in everyday life, each society creates its own unique perceived space. It is the physical, concrete, material and real space. The conceived space corresponds to mental production processes and the representations of space. It is designed abstractly through cognitive and imaginary forms and is the way of planning and organising spatiality. In conceived space, the fundamental production activities are planning and designing the space. Technocrats, urban planners and community engineers control these activities. The conceived space is digitised with a neutral field emphasis; hence, it is loaded with representations under the conditions of capitalism. The lived space, which is the third element of Lefebvre's theory of space, is the realisation area of human actions, emotions and contradictions. In other words, it is the social space. Lived space contains images, meanings and symbols that are lived, produced, experienced and changed over time by those who use it. This space of representations can provide a place in everyday life for people, except for dominant relations of production and established representations of space. It differs from perceived and conceived spaces but also contains both (Aslan & Yavan, 2018).

The totality and existence of trilateral dialectic relations among spatial practices (perceived space), representations of space (conceived space) and the space of representations (lived space) transform the space into a product/an entity produced by both the agents and the power (Harvey, 2010). Therefore, the production of space is the manifestation of the trilateral dialectical controversies and frameworks, among the physical space, mental representations of physical space and the social life that is occurring in physical space. According to

Lefebvre, these structures cannot be decomposed or isolated. They are intertwined, isochronous and interacting (Lefebvre, 1991). The space created by these overlapping spaces is the urban space. Urban spaces crystallise in cities. The spatial praxis of the urban space is not free from the hegemony, social contradictions and the struggle of the productive forces. Spaces carry the trails of spatial practices into urban space or spatial practices establish the social space. Therefore, the purpose of all productive acts is to exist in the perceived space.

Figure 1

Spatial Triad



Note. A Graphic representation of the spatial triad (Lefebvre, 1991).

The spatial triad deliberately does not explain capitalist spatiality. According to Lefebvre (1991), it is an abstract shell that needs to be filled when it is necessary. If the process of concretisation is ignored, it loses its meaning and power. In this context, spatial practices, space representations and representative spaces contribute to the production of

space that change from society to society or moment to moment such as qualities, modes of production, socialities and historicity (pp. 40-46; Merrifield, 1993, p. 524).

Lefebvre has established the dialectics of abstract, social and differential spaces with the spatial triad. The urban space in which urban social movements emerge is in the physical space in which the city exists. In this sense, it is dependent on the embodiment and concrete structure of urbanisation. Urban space also includes the space designed by power and capitalism to survive. This is the space where the meanings gain consent for the existing production modes. It is aimed to produce a living that is designed with spatial arrangements. However, for the realisation of the space as a social product, life must continue under the logic of conceived space and on the perceived space. However, for the emergence of the space as a social product, life must continue in the space that is conceived, which unfolds in the space that is perceived. Urban space does not occur unless lived space, spatial practices and conceived space coincide. The social production of the space cannot exist without this relation. Urban space is a social space, and the contradictions that emerge within the lived space accumulate the seeds of social transformation in this space. This accumulation may pave the way for the formation of social movements. Urban space is unique for each society with its production modes, historicity and sociality. It can be argued that this nonresemblance is related to the process in which the conceived space is hijacked by technocrats or planners when urban social movements or collective conflicts emerge. As a reflection of the contention among the subjectivities in the social space, the contentious movements may try to change the course of the social production of the space by producing their own meaning and thought systems in the urban space. They may try to dismantle the conceived space, the urbanisation of capitalist relations of production, and substitute it with a revolutionary conceived space. The symbolic or physical remnants of the historical contentious episodes that have taken place in urban spaces can nest in the conceived space. For example, after the

suppression of an uprising in an urban space, even though the conceived space stills exactly the same as it was in the past, the meanings, narratives or experiences that created by subjectivities during the uprising, can infiltrate again from the lived space into this conceived space and become indelible. Statues, large buildings or shopping malls symbolising the dominance of neoliberal capitalism may still stand there. However, whenever space is mentioned, the remnants of the periods in which the conceived space was hijacked, would be there. The conceived space can be rearranged to repair this dismantlement. However, the newly conceived space must also take into account the effects of the transforming power of the uprising. The cycle between perceived space, conceived space and lived space can be interpreted in this way in terms of social movements or contentious politics. Briefly, the conceived space applied to the perceived space causes contradictions, which are rooted in the lived space, and the sociality in urban space can produce transformative movements. When these contradictions lead to transformations or movements that can dismantle the conceived space, a newly conceived space is created for the continuation of capitalist productions modes. This starts the emergence of new contradictions that flourish in the living space and accumulate in the urban space.

Spatiality of Social Movements

Lefebvre's concepts are inspiring for the spatial analyses of social movements. The concepts that he coined and discussed are the sources for the examination of the spatialities affecting social movements. While evaluating Gezi Park and Taksim Square in terms of spatial triad and production of the space, to analyse the Gezi movement in terms of spatialities and the relations of these spatialities that affecting the social movements, is essential. Thus, spatial relations and possibilities between the node and Gezi movement will be met in a meaningful body. "All social relationships are fundamentally, inextricably spatial and all spatialities are relational" (Nicholls, Miller & Beaumont, 2013, pp. 7-8). Relational

spatialities such as places, scales, territories, networks are critical determinants for social movements. Structures, strategies, dynamics and power of social movements intertwiningly and distinctively are shaped by these spatialities. Spatialities also have implications for the incarnation of social movements. They can identify or influence internal dynamics, internal relations, manoeuvring, diffusion capacities and framing abilities of social movements (Nicholls et al., 2013).

Places. Merrifield (1993) enriched Lefebvre's space approach by arguing about places. He described places as nodes in which the flows of the capitalist system are stalled. Places arise from the material flows of capitalism, and class and social struggles also position within them. The place is always conceived, depending on the dominant relations of production and sexuality in which unbiased objects are set by hegemonic logic. Because the knowledge and power of capitalism infiltrate sensual and sexual experiences and become actions in daily life. These actions may transform into a struggle between the representation of the conceived space and the experience of the lived space. Places are everyday life practices that are embedded in certain sites. According to Merrifield (1993), social practices, political organisations, and life itself depend on places, and the struggle that will change life in a Lefebvrian sense rises from these places, which conceived, perceived and lived to collide in an order. The thought attached to the conceived space refers to a representation of space. However, this representation materialises only in places. For this reason, the place, and its actuality, should be the starting point of spatial analysis. In places there is antagonism, and it is always ready to take action to control a larger domain. Merrifield emphasised the necessity of using this antagonism to explain the political practices that arise from everyday life with the understanding of place. Spatial practices take place in both conceived and lived spaces, and they differ according to the locality. Imagery linked to locality can be shaped around symbolic representations of dominant spatial practices, and these forms gain meanings in

everyday life. Therefore, spatial practices may blur the distinction between conceived and lived spaces (Merrifield, 1993, pp. 525-526).

Martin and Miller (2003) argued that Lefebvre's approach to social life and spatiality, which states the production of space is the production of social, and social production cannot be understood without considering spatiality, can be supported by the concept of place. "Lefebvre's spatial production triad implies that socio-spatial processes in different spatial and temporal contexts constitute a fixity in space" (Martin & Miller, 2003, p. 147). Space becomes the conceived space by the circulation of capital, its networks and its motion. That enables the emergence of places where interactions, disturbances or emplacements occur. Places appear where lived space embodies, (Merrifield 1993, Martin & Miller, 2003) and they witness the intermingling of signs and meanings with space. They include the processes in which social identities are emerged, reproduced and differentiate (Smith, 1999). Martin and Miller (2003) also proposed that Agnew's three-dimensional conceptualisation of place may be useful to understand the spatial constitution and situatedness (p. 148). Agnew (1987; as cited in Martin & Miller, 2003) claimed that the idea of place contains a social framework, a structural feeling and a juncture of interaction. In this sense, the place can be divided into three components; local, location and the sense of place. Local means daily life, and location refers to geographic, social, economic, political relations, connections between places. The sense of place implies the meaning that enables people's bonding with the order of life. Places are complex because daily life experiences, opinions about social processes and meanings related to social life become combined in them. In places, these spatial flows collide due to the overlapping meanings, conflicts, control processes, and economic fluctuations; they are the sites of social and political discontent (Cresswell, 1996). For the same reason, in places conflicts and grievances emerge and they become announced. If these grievances would not be heard, the vibration generated in places would increase. Contentious

politics do not occur in places. However, depending on opportunities, vibrations from places can also be directed to different spaces, in which contentious politics occur. Social groups, religious institutions, capitalists, planners, communities and media shape different meanings and concepts (security, belonging, fear, etc.) related to places (Martin & Miller, 2003, p.148). In that way, inappropriate and appropriate social behaviours become installed in places. In places, political subjectivities may emerge and they may decide whether contention is necessary. Through these possibilities, people assemble to produce information as epistemic communities (Nicholls, Miller & Beaumont, 2013, p. 9). Places help to build strong relationships between activists within social movements through networks. These strong relationships enable participation to take place despite mobilisation conditions, even though they have major risks. In other words, places play an important role in achieving even hazardous actualities of some mobilizations by strengthening the relationships among people. David Harvey (2001) distinguished places by two different concepts; the *place in itself* and the *place for itself*. The place in itself emphasises the role of place-based relationships in facilitating the convergence of people for social and political change. The place for itself refers to the conditions that undermine the assemblage of people. In place of itself, facades are established against the others; those who are outside of the place, and interaction with other places becomes difficult (Nicholls et al., 2013, pp. 11-12).

Territories and Regions. Territory and region are the spatialities that affect social and political processes in terms of areal structures. Even though it is not possible to differentiate and define these two concepts precisely and easily, it can be said that the region is a spatiality experienced through a geographical manner. The constitution of geographical areas and demanding or claim-making through them can be seen as processes of this spatiality (Nicholls et al., 2013, p. 12). The territory is a space bounded by the constitution of the modern state, and it refers to the sovereignty of the state over a confined area. Moreover,

the state dominates the population and resources within this spatiality. In this way, it can apply exclusionary policies in both contexts. Even though the ambiguous effects of globalisation influence borders of territorial spatialities, they keep their role in the accumulation of flows in places (Agnew, 2009). Territorial identities can be decisive in the formation of identity and solidarity, which are critical for collective action to happen. These identities have the potential to legitimise the spatial/territorial policies of the state. However, when this legitimisation fails, contentions and conflicts can arise; interests related to territorial identities can lead to mobilisation (Nicholls et al., 2013). Castells (2013a) examined these processes under the conditions of advanced globalisation and argued that localisation interventions of the state towards spatialities make difficult the unification of global elites and local activists. Castells (2013a) also claimed that the two basic spatial logic is in opposition under the conditions of the network society; *space of places* and *spaces of flows*. “The space of flows, organizes the simultaneity of social practices at a distance, through telecommunications and information systems. The space of places, privileges, social interaction and institutional organisation based on physical contiguity” (Castells, 2013a, p. 181). The intransitivity between these two different spatial rationalities also makes domination possible. Because in this way economic, symbolic and political processes can be kept away from the area in which social meaning occurs and political balancing elements for the power can be produced.

Scales. Scales express the extension of places and the social/political relations that vary depending on them. Hierarchies established within these relations generate a variety of possibilities for contentious politics because they use compelling and regulatory methods. Scales can also be re-adjusted with contentious politics or other political processes. “Scale is an element of the production of perceived, conceived, and lived space” (Martin & Miller, 2003, p. 148). Spaces, places and scales describe the spatiality of social relations and their

ways of organisation. Territorial power is articulated unequally across various relational geographic scales (Nicholls et al., 2013, p. 14). The opportunities and constraints that social movements may face vary from country to country at national and transnational scales. In this process, approaches of international institutions and the nature of the political contentions are also effective. International institutions can block the paths of nationwide empowered social movements. Alternatively, a social movement that has the support of many institutions on an international scale, may not find a channel to flow on a national scale (Sikkink, 2005).

Brenner (2001) associated the concept of the place with things and the concept of scale with processes. The emergence of the place depends on the creation of certain boundaries. Internal and external distinctions are significant. Scale emerges while the relations between spatialities are transforming. Therefore, the mobility of social movements in the scalar spatial hierarchy depends on the possession of appropriate claims or arguments. Social movements can diffuse in a scalar hierarchy as much as they can be articulated through it (Brenner, 2001). On the other hand, Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005), pointed out the need of avoiding the conceptualisation of this hierarchical scale. Because considering this analysis as the most valid one, may lead us to ignore the cracks on hierarchical scales and the possible leakages from these cracks into political areas. Economic-political-cultural mediators, institutions and states embed the cultural, economic and social rationalities of neoliberalism on relational and variable scalar loops. Hence, they impose constraints for movements opposing neoliberal conditions and resources, and after the power and opportunities become unequally scaled. Scales are not only inherent in the political structure of the system; also, they are produced. They are the issues of constant reproduction of social movements and their opponents. A movement on a national scale may lose the ability to be represented by its original representatives due to the hierarchy of scales. This results in the halting of the political transformations that have been desired or the taming of their demands to protect the

neoliberal system. However, social movements try to overcome these barriers by constructing their strategies in multi-scalar structures (Nicholls et al., 2013, pp. 14-16).

Spatial Networks. Nicholls (2009, p. 91) described the spaces of social movements as areas wherein activists interact and form networks. Places (geography and mobility) play a vital role in the formation of these spatialities and networks. The strong ties and positive emotions established by places make it possible for activists to take the risks for the formation of social movements. In addition, places provide contact points that keep the actual and potential actors of social movements in constant interaction. For this reason, places are suitable for the formation of networks. By those interactions, new ideas can be produced and circulated. According to Nicholls (2009), the space of social movement turns places' structure, which comprises gathering individual-based spatialities, into space where various places can assemble. Social movement space contains very different dynamics than the places that constitute it. During networking, conflicts can arise between activists with stronger economic, cultural capital and activists with limited mobility. If the networks formed by the assembling of different places are loose, the ability of these conflicts to damage the networks and the space of social movement is reduced. In summary, different spatialities and facilities or constraints imposed by them on social movements vary. These spatialities are in constant interaction with each other and have unique potentials for each specific mobilisation. Spatialities play important and undeniable roles in the analysis of social movements and collective processes. However, their decisiveness differs continuously.

Contentious Politics and Spatiality. Martin and Miller (2003) concentrated on Lefebvre's triad, to examine the spaces, places, and scales from the perspective of contentious politics. Because the spatial triad of Lefebvre, which declares the reflections of material and symbolic meanings of spaces in social life, also explains how hegemony is established through spaces and the role of spaces in the emergence of resistance against

hegemony. Lived space is a space where control and allocations are perceived to make sense of spatial inequalities. It also provides information on the spatial and historical dynamics of elements that would contest these inequalities. The challenging individuals, groups or organisations form new spatial arrangements by re-contextualisation of the space and thus they challenge the established order through space. These contexts manifest themselves in forms of art, graffiti and alternative representations (Martin & Miller, 2003, p. 147). Since Lefebvre's triad recognises simultaneous and contradictory potentials of spaces, it offers opportunities to understand the dynamics of contention better. The disjuncture between spaces creates opportunities for contention by revealing contradictions.

According to Martin and Miller, (2003, pp. 143-144), spatial perspectives allow us to understand why groups make claims on spaces, the impact of spaces on the formation of daily life and identities, the relations of global social movement waves with local-based movements. They help to explain how alliances are built under the conditions of unequal political and economic opportunities. For Martin and Miller (2003), context and contingency have become more important for understanding mechanisms and processes of contentious politics. The scholars emphasised the inextricable nature of the spatial processes from the social processes and stated that the former constitutes the latter. Space is not just an area in which changes and actions take place. Further, it creates and formats identities, relationships, and networks. It encapsulates social processes, conflicts and includes opportunities and threats.

The space is decisive for categorical occurrences and it is efficient for scale shifts of these categories. The actions for change, which imbalance the power, are inherent to spaces (Martin & Miller, 2003, p. 145). Spaces play an important role contextually in understanding how the mechanisms and processes work, which are elaborated by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2004). According to them, spatiality is both the constituent and

context of the dynamics of contention. Tilly (2003, p. 221) has introduced five arguments on the spatiality of contention. First, the arrangement of spaces and time/distance costs may limit or support participants in public claim-making. Second, the spatiality of everyday life, proximities and routines of potential participants of the contention affect the scopes and forms of mobilisation. Third, contention interferes with the spatial jurisdictions of power and therefore invites the intervention of power. Fourth, the spatial patterns of established politics give rise to non-settled (non-routine) contentions. Fifth, contention alters the political decisiveness of spaces and spatial patterns.

According to Tilly (2003), social sites involve a variety of organised human actions in individual, organisational, network and spatial terms. These actions can never be independent of spaces and their manifestations take place in spaces. They are shaped by the conditions of the spaces, places and scales. When they absorb a space, they create meaningful, significant and collective representations.

Social sites blend conceived and perceived spaces in lived spaces and this amalgam generate contention (Tilly, 2003). Tilly examines spatial social sites through two dimensions; *proximity* and *mobility*. Proximity implies time-distance costs. It is about the intersections among social sites and participants, actions, objects, relationships and codes. Mobility refers to changes in connections between social sites and geographic configurations. Tilly also sorted four extreme types produced by these two dimensions: *Local fixed*, *large scale fixed*, *local mobile* and *large-scale mobile*. Local fixed refers to the linkage of claim-making with established structures, repetitive accepted actions and symbolic spaces of the public. Large scale fixed indicates the linkage of claim-making with representations and communication processes within known empires. Local mobile alludes to spatial patterns of public meetings and demonstrations that can rapidly spread and flow. Finally, large scale refers to the

communication and coordination structures in transnational organisations (Tilly, 2003, p. 222).

These forms of connection are spatial, but they differ by relations they have with contentious politics. Low proximity connections need coordination and organisation on large geographical scales. High proximity fixed connections produce articulations between contentious repertoires, non-contentious social interactions and meaningful local data. In addition, large-scale mobile connections shape the unique incarnations of contentious politics. They refer to claim to make sequences that can rapidly translocate under the conditions of different spaces, hierarchies, geographies, populations and places. These connections also mean independent political identities.

Collective identities vary between the two poles that can be called *embedded* and *detached* (Tilly, 2003, p. 222). At the embedded pole, collective claim-making established social interactions (related relationships), representations and meanings are clustered. At the detached pole, routine social interactions (its relationships), representations and meanings are generally not found. However, at this pole, the relations that constitute identities in contentious claim-making are clustered. Tilly (2003, p. 223) explained the positive correlation between detachment, modularisation, mobility and spatial scale with four mechanisms: *Category formation*, *brokerage*, *object shift* and *certification*. Category formation is a reshaping of established social boundaries. With this new combination, the mechanism expresses the relations, which passing through boundaries and are on both sides of the boundaries. Brokerage means the interaction of previously unrelated social sites, thanks to the mediation of a unit. Object shifting refers to the changing relations between claimers and objects of their claims. Last, certification shows the approval of claimers, their claims and actions by external authorities.

William H. Sewell (2001, pp. 55-56) attached importance to the question of how spatial constraints can be transformed for the sake of contentious politics. How the contention would reshape spatial meanings and strategic capacities have various potentials for the spatial agency. Beyond the limitation and shaping effects of space, contentious politics can produce new spatial relations and structures. Participants create new spatialities by changing the meanings and strategies of spaces. The space contains many dimensions that affect collective action. Location, processes, time-distance costs, designed environmental conditions and repetitive monotonous practices of daily life can be counted among these dimensions. These dimensions can constraint or facilitate the unification of participants around collective struggles. There are socially constructed meanings placed within the spaces by power and by previous contentious episodes. Sacredness is the most important of these. The struggle and contention in places with sacred social meanings are momentous. The administrative apparatuses of states, control spaces and their embedded meanings serve the continuation of the order by the policing. Contentious politics is a complex phenomenon that encompasses many processes such as generating political strategies, mobilising resources, eliminating barriers for collective action and identifying definitions/methods for collective action. It is also a deed of spatial agency, producing new spatial structures, meanings and routines from established spatial structures.

The places are formed because of the fixing of the flows that experienced in lived space. These places formed in the flow can produce themselves in a way that is protected from the values and logic of the conceived space. In this sense, it can be said that there is a contradiction or opposition between places and territories, where power tries to arrange the identities and practices connected to these identities. Places are also the building blocks of spatial networks. They come together through networks and create new spatial networks. This relation also plays a critical role in the emergence of social movements and the determination

of their scales. The transformation of the scales of places through networks and their interaction with other places can increase the proximity of spatial connections. This provides efficient conditions for mobility. Local fixed spatial connections are inherent to places. They may establish large scale fixed spatial connections because of their conflict with territories. Networking can convert the local fixed spatialities to local mobile or large scale spatial connections. As relational proximity and mobility increase, the spatial scope of contentious politics, its communication capabilities, coordination capacities and scales grow. In addition, large scale mobile spatial connections lay the foundations of collective claim-making through identities at the embedded pole within places. The formation of contentious collective identities in the detached pole can be considered as an indicator of the transition from places to urban space. This transition may lead to the formation of new categories that redefine established social boundaries. Concurrently, new scales arising from the relations of distinct places and their contradiction with territories can change the objects of claim-making. Because of this change, episodic identification of contentious politics can be made.

A Spatial Right: Right to the City

The initial protests and demonstrations, which would later spread across the country and grow into the Gezi movement, were formed around the demands for city rights related to Gezi Park. The government's decision to transform Gezi Park as space was strictly objected to, and these objections swiftly turned into an organised right to the city struggle. Therefore, the significance of the concept of the right to the city cannot be denied in the study of the Gezi movement and graffiti in a spatial context. The right to the city has remained crucial throughout the movement as an ongoing oppositional argument for protecting the park from demolition. Also, it served as a door opener as the first of the causations that allowed the movement to expand both semantically and spatially. Therefore, the Gezi movement cannot be considered separately from the concept of the right to the city. The right to the city places

the right of participation and appropriation and the value of use against the value of exchange. It is both a singular and collective right. It requires thinking of the city not as a goal, but as a frequent part of the practice of changing the world. As capital has taken as a great path in internationalisation, the city has undertaken new functions for capitalism as required by its heritage. In line with neoliberal policies, the capital has become more fluid. The rise of the finance capital has broken the intensive bureaucratic structure of nation-states and technocrats and required a dynamic infrastructure. Correspondingly cities became the providers of this infrastructure. Production, consumption and circulation flow in cities have made them the ultimate areas of capitalist accumulation (Lefebvre, 2016). According to Lefebvre (2016), society is urbanised as a whole because of these flows, however, urbanisation can only work by destroying the city. The city existed before the industrialisation, but to speak about the urban became possible only after industrialisation. The city is an artefact related to the value of use. On the other hand, urban is a product, and it is about the value of exchange (Lefebvre, 2016). Urbanisation is a procession that break down the city. It is the manifestation of a transition from the value of use to the value of exchange, from art to the product. Urban space is not natural, but a produced place and this production is directly related to the capitalist mode of production. Costes (2009; as cited in Öner & Osmanoğulları, 2017) has stated that the epistemological basis of the production of information related to the city constitutes the axiom, which is a form of political, cultural and spatial dimensions to organise collective life.

It is possible to describe the right to the city as the political program proposed by Lefebvre against the urbanisation of the society (Öner & Osmanoğulları, 2017). Urbanisation refers to the capitalist processes that operate in the city, transforming capital into everyday life. Right to the city concept creates chances to fight against these processes. Streets are both the places and the aspirations of this quest. Therefore, the right to the city is not a legal right,

but a vehement opposition making claims against the claims of power. It is a right to re-share the blessings of the city (Mayer, 2014). From the perspective of the right to the city, the city is not only a place in which commodities are produced and consumed. It has become a commodity absorbing the inert capital that emerged in the periodic crises of capitalism because of the production of urban spaces (Öner & Osmanogulları, 2017). For capitalism, the value of exchange matters, and the concrete value of the use of the space not. Therefore, the historical production, the use of space and social values that represented by space are significant only when they contribute to the value of exchange of the space (Şengül, 2009). The right to the city, unlike capitalism, gives prominence to the value of use. It questions critically the commoditization by concentrating more on the reproduction areas, rather than production areas. Consequently, the concept of the right to the city is based on the labour-capital conflict and points to a class situation (Öner & Osmanogulları, 2017).

Relations of production are reproduced in the name of the continuity of capitalism by the accumulation of capital, product, labour and consumption (Gottdiener, 1989). With such an approach to the city, urban rights, which do not have a critical stance on capitalism, cannot go beyond being a claim to the city. In another saying, it is a subject of capitalist development. Differently, the right to the city goes beyond this threshold and proposes a systemic change. Lefebvre (2016) argued that the purpose of the struggle to extend from the production area to the reproduction area is the creation of the socialist space, and this cannot be accomplished without transforming the property relations and ending the private ownership. To do this, the value of use and the concrete space must substitute the value of exchange and the abstract space (Şengül, 2009). Accordingly, the concept of the right to the city covers the access to economic, cultural and political urban services laid down by urban rights (Öner & Osmanogulları, 2017). The right to the city proposes the participation in all decisions that contribute to the production of urban space, rather than democratic negotiations

limited by the decisions of the power. It refers to the need for a radical restructuring of the power relations that underlie the production of urban space. This emphasis on the production of urban space differs from the forms of urban participation defined in liberal democracy (Şen, 2015). Legal rights are obtained by political struggles and collective claim-making of citizens. The right to the city is a struggle for stopping the alienation of urban areas and starting the generation of social networks. From this point of view, participation means that urban residents manage the production of urban areas. The city should belong to those who want to live in it. (Purcell, 2013). Right to the city is the right to determine and control urban and urbanisation processes.

Besides these, David Harvey (2012) also argued that the right to the city is more than an individual demand for freedom. It is access to urban resources. “It is the right to change ourselves by changing the city” (Harvey, 2012, p. 4). Concordantly, it is one of the indispensable rights for people. However, that necessary transformation requires the existence of a collective power to reshape the processes of urbanisation. Urban processes created drastic changes in urban lifestyles. Urban life has become a commodity by industries based on consumerism, tourism, culture and knowledge. That change has also constituted significant dimensions in the urban political economy. Right to the city now is in the hands of private interests, and cities are shaped according to the desires of the political and economic elite. As Harvey (2012) noted, urban governments are in a process of change towards entrepreneurship. The administrative approach of the 1960s has transformed into entrepreneurial forms of movement in the 1970s and 1980s. This consensus seems to surpass the national borders, even the political parties and ideologies. The rise of urban entrepreneurship played an important role in the transition of the general dynamics of capitalism from a Fordist-Keynesian capital accumulation regime to a flexible accumulation regime. The commodification of cities made the urban processes the active element of

political and economic development. In this process, many actors with original objectives and agendas interact with certain forms of spatial practices connected to each other. In a class-bound system such as capitalism, these spatial practices gain a distinct class content. The power that rearranges urban life lies in a broader coalition of powers, where local governments and the administration only play a coordinating and facilitating role. Urban entrepreneurship is based on class allegiance, and the public-private partnership is the most important element of this new entrepreneurship. This public-private partnership does not focus on developing the conditions in a particular region. It concentrates on the investment and economic development that comes with the speculative construction of the land (Harvey, 2012).

“The right to the city is, therefore, far more than a right of individual or group access to the resources that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts' desire. It is, moreover, a collective rather than an individual right, since reinventing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanization” (Harvey, 2012, p. 4).

The right to the city is now held by a small group of political and economic elites and needs to be reclaimed. It focuses on the production and use of surplus value in processes of urbanisation and questions who has the right to manage that. Right to the city is a slogan and a political ideal to ensure the democratisation of urban rights for the construction of a broad social movement, to re-appropriate and reproduce urban spaces.

Cyber Spatialities of Social Movements

Gezi was an active movement both in cyber and material space. Expectedly, cyberspace was used as a place of communication, organisation, news flow and propaganda. Besides, the logic of action shaped in these cyber-spatial-specific infrastructural and

architectural conditions manifested itself as one of the evident characteristics of the movement. Occupation or hacking of cyberspaces was quite common. Also, Gezi graffiti applied on the material walls had been often posted and shared on the walls of cyberspace. In this context, understanding the possibilities of cyberspace and the transitions and relationships between cyber and urban spaces becomes more of an issue for assessing and interpreting Gezi graffiti. The spatiality of the urban social movements goes beyond the physical urban space. Social networks in cyberspace play various roles in movements. They are used for the dissemination of information and communication among the groups and individuals in a movement. Activists use cyber-social networks to organize, maintain solidarity and legitimacy, and recruit new people. They are effective in scaling social movements continuously. Through cyber social networks, movements can be succeeded in resonating at national and transnational scales (Chrona & Bee, 2017). Castells (2013b) stated, “space is the material support of time-sharing social practices” (p. 441). With the communication technologies of the information age that enable simultaneity, space enables the material articulation of symbolic meanings of these practices. This articulation gives the space a relational sociality. Space is not an extension of society; it is itself and its expression. However, it is under the occupation of the interests of dominant elites and their networks. Therefore, social movements have to create new public spaces covering cyberspace and lived space together. In the network society, social networks often emerge in cyberspace and become urban movements by occupying urban spaces, which bear symbolic meanings. The space of movements arises from the interaction between the cyberspace of flows and the space of places. Castells (2013b) alleged that the result is the emergence of a third space which he calls the space of autonomy (p. 192). The space of autonomy is the hybridisation of cyberspace and urban space. It emerges only when the transformative power of a movement, which is organised through cyber networks where free communication possible, defends right

to the city in urban space and opposes the system at the institutional level, is involved. According to Castells (2013b), the space of autonomy is the new spatial form of social movements that form networks (p. 192). The communicative structure of social movements, organised by cyber social networks and occupying urban spaces, tries to eliminate the distinction between local and global scales. This spatiality allows social movements to connect with the world, to learn and to be inspired by global experiences. This connectedness allows them to spark continuous debates in cyberspace. These ongoing debates at different scales cause movements to develop a cosmopolitan view of issues and problems. It is possible to say that social movements rising from social networks can express their demands at universal scales by protecting their local identity. These waves of debates and scaling are constituted by the virality of cyber networks. Urban social movements appear as multi-dimensional togetherness in both urban space and cyberspace. Togetherness is the origin of these movements. They are critical for the social movements because they help people to overcome fear and reach hope (Castells, 2013b, p. 194).

It would be wrong to see cyberspace as just a digital extension or reflection of urban movements and contextually separate it from the physical space. Urban movements occur also in cyber-urban space. The conceptualisation of the cyber-urban space, which is coined by Lim (2015), does not merely refer to the processes by which social movements absorb or exploit the communicative technological capabilities of digital networks. It relationally reconstructs the spatiality of urban life. Accordingly, the conditions of the network society we live in, blur the boundaries of physical and cyberspaces (Lim, 2015, p. 118). Cyberspace and urban space are entangled, overlapped and embedded. Therefore, cyber-urban space is a social product just as urban space. The experiences of those who are living in urban spaces are diffused in physical and cyberspaces, and the distinction between these two spaces is becoming more and more blurred. Therefore, while examining the spatiality of social

movements, analyses should be made by avoiding dichotomies such as physical-digital or real-virtual spaces. Social movements are various collective interactions between the power and the power relations, which embody spaces. Spaces are not only the locations of these power relations but also the objects of power struggles. “Cyber-urban spaces provide competitions for power (and counter-power) and are themselves part of the contests over access, control, and representation” (Lim, 2015, p. 118). Lim examined the role of cyberspace in urban social movements under three titles; *imaginaries*, *practices* and *trajectories* (2015, p. 118). In this way, she analysed the transformation of imaginaries, that inherent in spaces, into collective practices, and the continuity of the patterns of these practices. Her analysis opens a path to the accurate assessment of the cyber and physical intricacies of the spatiality of the cyber-urban spaces. Accordingly, the emergence of social movements starts with contentious imaginaries. Contentious imaginaries do not occur only through corporeal actions such as the occupation of an urban physical space or by the cognitive actions such as dissemination of information through cyberspaces. Movements lurch between cyber and physical spaces and manipulate the power in the multiplicity of spatialities. Thus, movements find the starting places of their contentious imaginaries, spread to other spaces and constitute their own places (Lim, 2015, p. 120). Social movement practices such as participation, organization, protest and symbolic activities no longer take place solely in physical spaces. Cyber-urban space links these practices in the physical world with other spaces, communicative flows and places through networks. In this way, the space connects distinct places in one node. The interaction between the distinct places in this cluster can be reflected again on the physical dimension of the cyber-urban space, and the groups taking part in movements from these places in cyber-urban space can be clustered in urban space. The cyber-urban space is not only space; it is also a resource (Lim, 2015, p. 122). The practices of social movements and the events covering these practices have a multi-faceted

structure. In cyber-urban space, these events relate to each other through networks.

Information, narratives and emotions flow through hybrid networks of movements.

“Contemporary social movements make use of hybrid spatial networks, linking different sites and localities, involving traditional and new social linkages, and large and small media within the cyber, physical, and interstitial spaces of the cyber-urban milieu” (Lim, 2015, p. 122).

When this flow is blocked, it finds another way. The characteristic of hybrid networks is that the flow cannot be stopped completely in this multilayer structure. Lim (2015) has stated that these hybrid networks in the cyber-urban space circulate the events among different scales.

The connective action taking place on these networks contribute to the social movements for creating collective actions, and the connective structure of the cyber-urban space connects individuals engaged in collective actions through connective actions. The multiple structures of hybrid networks allow social movements to move beyond the control of the power within the cyber-urban space. Social movements diffuse in a multi-layered manner and gain a structure that cannot be targeted as a single centre. They can fade, appear, re-fade and re-appear to create new connective actions.

Gezi Node

This section briefly discusses the historical change of the spatial node, which includes Gezi Park and Taksim Square, in economic, social and political terms. The processes of social production of the node and its changing processes of perceived, conceived and lived spaces will be introduced. Thus, it will be discussed what facilities and constraints a social movement would have while rising on this spatial accumulation. In other words, there will be an effort to elucidate the spatial background and heritage of the Gezi movement and Gezi graffiti. In this way, a contribution can be made to understand its relations with other contentious episodes that have occurred in Turkey.

Gezi Node in the Ottoman Era. Today's Taksim Square and the Gezi Park were a site of settlement with a coffee shop surrounded by nature, which was called the Taksim Garden in the classical Ottoman period. Taksim, on the outskirts of *Galata*, was a district starting where the flourished *Pera* district (Beyoğlu, at the present time) ends, in those years. At first, there were sparse rural settlements and monasteries in the area. After the conquest of Istanbul, a palace named Galata Palace, and some dervish lodges, masjids, baths, fountains were built in the area, and it grew rapidly. After the 16th century, it became a place where Muslims and non-Muslims were living together, and Galata and Pera's large cemeteries were located (Yılmaz, 2013). Taksim is one of the rare districts of Istanbul, whose origin is known. The urban history of the node starts with the construction of a water distribution building (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014). Because the population of the area exploded in the 18th century, Sultan Mahmud I. has built a water reservoir and a fountain here, and water was distributed from here to adjacent areas of the city. After the construction of the reservoir, the area became known as Taksim, which means distribution in Turkish ("Taksim", n.d.). "The modernisation policies of the Ottoman Empire made Taksim one of the most sought-after destinations in Istanbul" (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014, p. 64). Afterwards, Selim III. built the Topçu Kışlası (Artillery Barracks) in 1806, where the Gezi Park is located today, and the node gained a more military character. There was also an Armenian cemetery near the barracks. The government's pedestrianisation project that ignited the first sparks of the Gezi movement, had aimed to destroy the Gezi park and rebuild the artillery barracks in the form of a shopping centre.

One year later, Taksim witnessed its first major contentious movement. It was a revolt under the leadership of a low-ranking soldier named Kabakçı Mustafa against the military reform movement initiated by Selim III, and it resulted in a coup. Sultan was dethroned,

political leaders who supported the new army system, *Nizam-i Cedid*², were killed. During the events, the barracks was also ruined. In the same century, the barracks was repaired and renewed many times. However, the node remained to be the scene of major events.

The second major social/political event witnessed by the node was the 31 March Incident³ and it was a rebellion that arose against the reign of Abdulhamid II. It was a reactionary counter-coup of those who were outraged by the reformation of the constitutional system. That was the second event that took place in this node with reactionary orientations after the Kabakçı Mustafa Revolt. 31 March Incident took three days with heavy gun battles before it ends. During the incident, the artillery barracks was seriously damaged, and it was never again fully restored (Yücel & Sevim, 1990; Yılmaz, 2013).

Also, After World War One, during the armistice period, when Istanbul was under the occupation of Allied Powers, the courtyard of the ruined barracks was turned into a sports field. Following that, the building has lost its military function completely. There were other military buildings like Mecidiye Barracks, Gümüşsuyu Barracks and Gümüşsuyu Military Hospital in Taksim district during the Late Ottoman Period. Therefore, the node would keep its military air for a while. Besides, many other remarkable buildings were also built in the node in the first twenty years of the 20th century, since the area was enjoying the advantages in the transportation of the new electric tram which was built in 1875. Nevertheless, “Taksim district was gaining importance in the urban morphology of Istanbul”, in those days (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014, p. 64).

Gezi Node in the Early Republican Period. Taksim Square was still bearing the traces of imperial past in Istanbul, after the defeat and withdrawal of Allied Powers. It was the central square of the largest city of the new republic, still connecting with the

² The new military establishment of the military reform program.

³ (March 31, 1325 by Rumi calendar, April 13, 1909 by Gregorian calendar.

cosmopolitan structure of Pera district and surrounded by remaining barracks from the dispersed imperial army (Örs, 2014). The establishment of the new and secular republic in 1923 initiated social and political transformations that led to intense spatial changes in the node. Although the origins of Turkish modernisation were based on the 18th century, the program of the new republic was different. The secular values of the West replaced the values of Ottoman society radically and rigorously. The Kemalist elites saw architecture, city planning, and design as key visual indicators of that cultural modernisation (Bozdoğan 2001; Gül 2012). They were pursuing to create an abstract conceived space, by rearranging the perceived space of the node wherein the new republic would consolidate its reign and gain consent. According to Tekeli (2009), a fundamentalist modernity project was tried to be implemented in Turkey from the beginning of the republic until the end of World War Two. A modernist framework of legitimacy was established for urban development.

In the first year of the Republic, the first national football match was played in the old artillery barracks' courtyard and the field was named Taksim Stadium, in those days. In a brief time, Taksim Stadium was the host of international competitions in distinct sport branches. Many entertainment venues and casinos quickly appeared around the square and the area became one of the liveliest spots in the city. In the early years of the Republic, a monument designed by Italian sculptor Pietro Canonica was built at the centre of the square to symbolise the War of Liberation and the republican revolution in 1928. The name of the monument is *Cumhuriyet Anıtı* (The Monument of the Republic). Furthermore, architect Giulio Mongeri landscaped the area, and the square was renamed as the *Cumhuriyet Meydanı* (The Republic Square) (Yılmaz, 2013).

The process of Kemalism's intensive reorganising of Taksim Square accelerated in the 1930s. French architect and urban planner Henri Prost was in charge of the zoning of Istanbul starting from 1936, and he has proposed to build an enormous park in the node.

According to the project, the artillery barracks was demolished and a public promenade which today is called the Gezi Park was built. Shortly after, the park was named as *Inönü Gezisi* (Inönü Promenade) to honour the Second President of the Republic Ismet Inönü. The destruction of the barracks began in 1939. The only purpose of the demolition was not to build a park in the city. Demolition also was symbolising a new era and its values. With its new design, the node would serve as a state of prestige that every section of the society wanted to enjoy its value of use (Yılmaz, 2013).

During the 1940s, Inönü Promenade became the neighbour of the Maçka Park, a football stadium (built in 1946), an open-air theatre (built in 1947), the State Radio Hall (built in 1945), the Sports and Exhibition Centre (built in 1949) and the tree-lined Republic Avenue. All these changes transformed the node into a modern place where the foundations of the secular society were laid (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014, p. 66). Besides these, in Taksim an opera hall construction began in 1946. Construction of the building was completed in 1969 due to financial hardship, however, it suffered severe damage from a fire one year later and then was turned into a multipurpose building. It was reopened in 1978 under the name *Atatürk Kültür Merkezi* (Atatürk Culture Centre), and quickly became an icon of the secular architecture in Istanbul (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014, p. 66). The node became a significant and vibrant urban area during the early republican period and was the symbol of the new state's narrative of success. All structures and artworks in this area were built to symbolise the political power of the period. Also, the regime reinforced its power by using the node as the public space for official parades. The function of the node was to display the dominance of the government in power and the state. That can be said because Turkey was ruled by a one-party regime in those years. As Özyaydın and Yavuz noted, the two foci (government and state) can be considered roughly as same or substantially intertwined (2012; as cited in Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014).

Gezi Node in the Post World War II Period. World War Two caused major changes in Turkey, as it did for the entire world. Values, which indicate that a reputable state should be governed by a democracy that respects human rights and try to realise the functions of a welfare state, came into prominence in Turkey. Turkey adopted the world's nascent institutions and took part in them to get a respectable position in the re-establishing world of that time. In parallel with these, the power executed the transition to a multi-party system. Along with this transition, the nature of the modernity project in Turkey has changed. Henceforth, the radical modernity project had no opportunity to continue its approach of despite the people, for the people. However, this change did not mean abandoning the project of modernity. A new era in which the modernity project would be applied to the populist tendencies was beginning (Tekeli, 2009).

Turkey embraced a multi-party regime in 1946. In the period of the Democrat Party (DP), which took over the nation-state administration from the founder Republican People's Party (CHP) in 1950, no concrete intervention was made around Taksim Square and Gezi Park. The only exception was the construction of the Istanbul Hilton Hotel at the northern end of the İnönü Promenade. "Istanbul Hilton was symbolising the increasing American influence in Turkish politics after World War Two" (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014, p. 66). With the urban solutions that started by the road opening operations marked this period, efforts of the government to realise its power through interventions into the spaces have shifted from Taksim Square to various areas of the city (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014).

At this point, brief information about the DP period would be useful. DP was founded in 1946 and was closed in 1960. The period is brief, but it has been a real turbulent for Turkey (Keskin, 2012). The party has come to power with populist rhetoric just like Erdoğan's AKP. Between 1950 and 1960, it was the sole ruler of the country. In 1952, Turkey has sent troops to the Korean War and became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) (Balçı, 2019). DP also applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) (Karabulut, 2012). The party has worked to re-shape Turkey by the liberal economic approach in the framework of economic programs that prepared based on the reports from the United States and the World Bank. Simultaneously, it has tried to end the statist practices in Turkey. *Köy Enstitüleri* (Village Institutes) in rural Turkey, established under a unique teacher-training program, was closed during this period. DP also ended the *Halkevleri* project (the People's Houses); it was a nationwide network of nongovernmental organisations operating for the protection and extension of the rights of housing, health, education, environment, women and disabled people (Keskin, 2012). Besides harsh economic and administrative transformations, the DP period was also a period of political turmoil. One of these, was the *Istanbul Pogrom* that happened on September 6-7, 1955. The incident is considered one of the breaking points of Turkey's recent history. It was triggered by fabricated news of a bomb attack on Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki, the city he was born. The shops, houses and places of worship of Armenian, Greek and Jewish citizens were looted in Taksim, Pera and many other districts of Istanbul. Approximately five thousand properties were destroyed and 73 churches were set on fire, in Istanbul. According to official figures, eleven people were killed and thirty people were injured. It was later revealed that this incident was related to a provocation, which was designed to influence Turkish-Greek relations related to the problem between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus (Güven, 2005).

Besides, DP has resorted to repressive methods as economic and political problems escalate. The newspapers that supported the CHP, the main opposition party of those days, were closed at intervals. DP tried to prevent the domestic trips of the CHP leader and alleged that CHP was in preparation for an insurrection. Therefore, it established a committee to investigate the main opposition party. Extreme political tension in the assembly mobilised the streets. In Ankara and Istanbul, university students with opposing views have made

demonstrations, and clashes happened (Keskin, 2012). The social strain was increasing continuously. At the end of the process on May 27, 1960, the army staged a coup. The party was closed down and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan and Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu were executed after the Yassıada Trials. In 1990, a law for the restoration of honour was enacted for politicians. DP is still one of the most important symbols of right-wing politics in Turkey. Until AKP and political Islam came to power in Turkey, successors of DP such as Justice Party (AP) and True Path Party (DYP), ruled the country in multiple periods (Kızılarıslan, 2010).

Also, the military coup which happened on May 27, 1960, was an important turning point for the multi-party regime of Turkey. Because of this coup, the 1961 Constitution came into force and caused major changes in the democratic structure and the state. Turkey has passed from a Westminster style democracy into a more balanced and outlined concept of democracy (Tekeli, 2009, p. 121). With the new constitution, the principle of social state and welfare state understanding was adopted. The state began to see itself responsible not only for ensuring the classical freedom of citizens but also for meeting the material needs them. In the constitution, it was stated that the state would take measures to meet the housing needs of poor or low-income families under their health conditions. With the 1961 Constitution, left-wing politics have found their institutional place, the first time in the political life of Turkey. Furthermore, the country has experienced the spirit of 68 hectically, and this enabled the additional contributions to constitutional developments. It has been witnessed that the experience of urbanisation was evaluated and criticised from a socialist point of view. As Tekeli (2009) noted, that was unprecedented.

Gezi Node among Military Coups. In the 1960s and 1970s, an immense immigration wave from Anatolia to Istanbul has started. Urbanisation and squatting rapidly increased, and the population of university students grew. In this period, Istanbul hosted a new generation of

social movements, which led by these students. However, the centre of these movements was the *Beyazıt* Square, the square of Istanbul University, not the Taksim Square (Durmaz, 2017, p. 32). The node, which includes Taksim Square and Gezi Park, also has witnessed some important social and political incidents in this period. Some of them has completely changed their spatiality and social perception.

Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP) held its first mass rally in Taksim Square in 1965. Also, the 6th Fleet Protests took place in the node between 1967 and 1969. Taksim has been the secondary centre of the student upheavals of the 1970s. One of the tragic social incidents that took place in the node was Bloody Sunday in 1969. 30 thousand protesters took part in a rally organised in Taksim Square on 16 February, to protest the 6th Fleet. In those days, the effects of the 1961 Constitution, which facilitated social organisation, were felt deeply in society. Socialist parties and organisations were strong. TİP has found its place in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) for the first time. Anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism were rising. In Istanbul, politics was the most decisive factor among the increasing number of university students. These groups can be described roughly in two major sections; revolutionaries and anti-communists. On February 16, 1969, on the Bloody Sunday, when the crowd reached the Taksim Square, a group of right-wingers attacked the revolutionaries with stones, sticks and knives. Two people lost their lives and hundred people were injured (Güngör, 2016). During the 1970s, conservative circles raised the idea of building a mosque that would represent the traditions and beliefs of the land, in the node. The mosque project, for many Kemalists, was not only about the construction of a temple but also an infiltration into the abstract space. For them, conservatives were aiming to transform the conceived space and to open new areas of representation for the conservative groups against the modernism of the republic. During these days, the node has also become an area of profit. Projects developed in and around the park have now drawn the attention of those who act on

purely economic grounds, as much as of the circles that want to show themselves in the power space of the Republic. These circles borrowed the different projects of other interest groups or attempted to enter the area by cooperating with them. The mosque project was also including private parking lots and many other shops (Yılmaz, 2013). Aside from the discussions on the construction of the mosque, in 1970s Taksim Square was continued to be a dominant urban public space in which socio-cultural aspects of power were displayed. The square has become a ceremony and rally square and hosted national festivals, major political events and tragedies.

Taksim Square Massacre. The most tragic incident that the node had witnessed in its history, happened in 1977, during the May Day demonstrations. To celebrate Labour Day on May 1, 1977, approximately 500 thousand people attended the rally in Taksim Square, together with those who came to Istanbul from various cities. As President of Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) Kemal Türkler came to the end of his speech, gunshots were heard. They were coming from the top of the Directorate of Waters building and from the windows of a hotel in the square. While people were trying to escape in a panic, the police intervened in the crowd with sound bombs and panzers. Simultaneously, a white car entered the square, and unknown attackers in the car shot people. The crowd headed to *Kazancı Yokuşu* (Kazancı Slope) to escape, but another truck was blocking the road. Many people were stuck there. They were run over and smashed by the crowd. Twenty-eight people died because of contusion or suffocation, five people were killed by gunshots, and a person was crushed by a panzer (Mavioğlu, 2007). On the day of *Kanlı 1 Mayıs* (Taksim Square Massacre), at least thirty-four people died and hundred thirty-six people were wounded from worker and leftist groups. Thirty-four of the injured were shot in the head and chest.

The case of the Taksim Square Massacre was never fully enlightened. Many journalists, prosecutors, politicians and left organisations claimed that the police, the Special

War Department, the Special Forces Unit, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and even United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were involved in the massacre. However, all efforts to deepen the investigation have failed. Taksim Square Massacre remained in memories and for the public conscience as an ever-bleeding wound. After the incident, the node has become a symbol and an arena for labour unions, political left and socialist movements in Turkey. In this respect, the node ceased to be an area where the state embodied its economic, political and cultural will. Contrarily, it became the sanctuary of the leftist opposition (Erbey, 2017). The square was closed to Mayday demonstrations until 2010. For thirty years, governments have been rejected the demands for celebrating the Mayday at the node and took extreme precautions such as stopping public transport and blocking road accesses to prevent people from gathering in the square (Mavioğlu 2007; Vardar, 2013). The issue has become a political strain flow.

Gezi Node and the Rise of Neo-liberal Political Islam. The node has been the object of many renovations and gentrification projects, especially in the last years of the 20th century. Following the period of political upheavals and the right wing-left wing conflicts of the 1970s, another military coup took place on September 12, 1980. The coup resulted in the dissolution of all political parties and the drafting of a new constitution by the military junta. Also, Taksim Square and its surroundings were again the centres of hegemonic space design. The junta used spatially the node to reproduce the social imagery and memory. On the coup day, the tanks were deployed to the square. Also, a massive rally was organised by Kenan Evren, the leader of the junta, which was held in Taksim Square, on November 4, 1982 (Karaca, 2011).

During the 1990s, socialist groups, parties and organisations have conducted campaigns for the re-opening of Taksim Square to the civil rallies. The square was named as *1 Mayıs Meydanı* (The Mayday Square) by the political left. The Motherland Party (ANAP),

which came into power with the first democratic elections on November 6, 1983, after the coup, used the node again as a space of urban arrangements to be reproduced according to the new modes of urban production. ANAP was aiming at completing Turkey's integration into the global economic system. For that purpose, it carried out structural transformations in economic terms and adopted neoliberal policies that changed the morphology of Istanbul.

The node was once again the symbol of modernity of the republic (Gül, Dee & Cünük, 2014), but this time it was embracing the market economy. Efforts to transform Istanbul into an internationalised marketplace started to re-weave the spatiality of the city. Istanbul gained a production-oriented structure. The role of the finance sector and tourism for the city economy has come to the fore and the number of foreign investments rapidly increased. On the other hand, the culture, urban heritage and the lived space of the node were resisting this transformation (Erbey, 2017). After the pedestrianisation of İstiklal Avenue and the expansion of Tarlabası Avenue, the Republic Monument was left in an undefined space, while the node becoming a space where foreign capital and consumerism are dominant. However, movie theatres, theatre halls, art galleries, bars, restaurants and cafes were also opening along with the node, and it was revived again to host the social opposition.

The predecessor of today's AKP, the Welfare Party (RP) was the representative of political Islam in Turkey in the 1990s. In 1994, the party's candidate won the Istanbul mayoral election. This was the first important success of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who will be the prime minister and then the president of Turkey. RP opposed the nationalist nation-state identity of Taksim Square. After the administrative change, the debates on the necessity of bringing back the old historical and cultural structure of Taksim Square, Gezi Park and İstiklal Avenue, immediately started. The project of mosque construction in Taksim Square was at the top of the agendas again. For RP, the mosque would symbolise the repressed side of Istanbul and the nation-state itself. With this Islamic architectural touch, Taksim, which

was a square that only military ceremonies were held, would begin to carry the meaning of the spirit that conquered the city five hundred years ago. These debates led to Taksim being the scene of political conflicts based on identities (Erbey, 2017). The first praxis of political Islam in those years in urban areas was to provide food and shelter for the poor in the parks and squares of Istanbul during Ramadan. These public services used as a catalyst for the rise and production of conservative and traditionalist spatialities in the city. Besides, the increasing popularity of nostalgic and pietistic neo-Ottomanism (Sargın, 2004) amplified the process. The program of the RP (Çakır, 2013a), can be summarised as follows, economic development through strong industrialisation, re-regulating the social life according to Islamic principles and the ultimate creation of a just society. This program, not surprisingly, has conflicted with the secular ideology of the state, and redefined the modernisation project based on globalisation, especially after it came to power. Öktem noted that RP tried to transform Istanbul's urban spatialities, by generating new conceived spaces for its Islamic ideology. On the other hand, the party reconsidered its approach to westernisation. It altered the role of the intellectual Muslim's and the Islamic capital's role in Turkey's integration into the globe (2005; as cited in Öktem, 2011). Until the 1994 elections, RP maintained its model that suggested an ideal mix of the Islamic order and classic welfare state administration and kept its anti-globalisation discourse on economic issues. However, shortly after its coming to power, the party abandoned its approach and acknowledged that globalisation strengthened the competition between countries competing against each other in and by urban spaces (Öktem, 2011). The elite of RP had a powerful motivation to make Istanbul an international trade, science and technology centre. However, they emphasised that this process should not overlook the Turkish-Islamic values. Globalisation has been adopted on the condition that these values would prevail (Aksoy & Robins, 1994). The secular groups considered the RP's global city vision as an anti-modernist, anti-western and anti-systemic project and they

argued that the party wanted to Islamicise Istanbul (Öktem, 2011). Because of the increasing tension between the RP and secular groups, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces issued an e-memorandum, which is named afterwards as the postmodern coup. In the e-memorandum, it was stated that the spread of anti-secularist events and exploitation of religion across Turkey has become worrisome and the situation should be evaluated as a defiance to the regime. In the text, it was also mentioned that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) would not hesitate to use its powers, which are enshrined by the laws, against these groups. In 1998, the Constitutional Court closed RP because of its policies against the secular regime. The party was re-established under the name of the Virtue Party (FP) in 1999 and declared that it adopted the free market economy as the party policy (Turhan, 2015). Following that, FP won in Istanbul and Ankara (with many other cities) the mayoral elections in 1999. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the mayor of Istanbul again. However, during his election campaign, he had read a poem with Islamist messages and the reaction was harsh. Because of this poem, he was dismissed from his position just after he won the election, and had to serve four months and ten days in prison (“10 months in prison for Erdoğan”, 1998).

Many of the urban projects wanted to be carried during the period, which could not be realised because of economic problems. The major earthquake that happened on August 17, 1999, and the major consecutive economic crises in 2000 and in 2001 were the key reasons for that financial fragility. The crisis in 2000 was a crisis of the banking system and financial circles. The crisis in 2001 resulted from the political conflict between the leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (“The constitution flew away, 51 billion dollars lost”, 2002) On the other hand, the regime's attempts against the movement of political Islam were ongoing. The Constitutional Court closed FP again in 2001 for the same reasons as the RP (“Virtue Party is closed”, 2001). During the re-establishment of the successor party, a conflict between traditionalists

and reformists appeared. The traditionalist wing established the Felicity Party (SP) and the reformist wing founded the AKP, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Gezi Node in the Period of Political Islamic Rule. In 2002, the AKP took 34,29% (Yükseler, 2011) of the votes in the general elections and came to power alone. The party won all general elections since that year in Turkey. Besides that, it held the management of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality between April 2004 and March 2019 (Öktem, 2011). In this period, neoliberalism, whose beginning dates back to the 1980s, was resurrected by the urban management projects and its deadlock for the impoverished labourers, have been resolved (Doğan, 2010, p. 86). AKP is mainly a product of the process of reconciliation of Islamic capital with neoliberalism. Because of the specific circumstances of Turkey during AKP's foundation, the party managed to receive strong support from the working classes and large capital groups, which have been adversely affected by the crisis of neoliberal policies. In this period, AKP announced its urban principles with these notions; decentralisation, governance, participation, local development, urban and local entrepreneurship, social and modern municipalism (Öktem, 2011). According to Doğan, (2005) the neoliberal municipalism that dominated Istanbul and Taksim Square in the 1990s, has transformed into a new structure in the 2000s that Islamism became very influential. The practice of Islamic municipalism established its hegemonic supremacy and fed the capitalist structure with conservative - Islamist patterns. In this period, public lands were left to the private sector, construction and real estate sectors exploded, shopping centres, luxury housing and urban transformation projects boomed. Around the node and Beyoğlu, historical houses and passages were closed and left their places to shopping centres and international companies. At the same time, debates about the construction of a new mosque behind the historical water distribution building in the node, re-emerged. Before the AKP government, the process of gentrification that was implemented in the old neighbourhood Tarlabaşı, which is only a few

kilometres away from Gezi Park, was the most important urban intervention carried out in Istanbul by the state and capital cooperation. In 2004, the central and local authorities cooperated and collaborated for urban arrangements, interventions and projects. In this period, bureaucrats and technocratic cadres of the local and central administrations made the urban centre the arena of the capital accumulation model, in harmony with the goals of the AKP government. Following this step, Istanbul became the space where the capital and the state work together, make mutually beneficial agreements. The partnership made rules for accessing these spaces according to their interests, and the city turned into a space of mad projects, which were created to reproduce urban space. The state was not only an actor who set the rules and made the processes suitable for the capital, but also the leading actor who prepared the legal grounds and applies policies, especially through the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ). The state was the sole actor who designates the other actors (Arslan, 2013).

That transformation, as Harvey (2012) noted, was caused by the neo-liberal urbanisation that sees urban spaces as centres of capital accumulation. Both the central and local governance was in the hands of AKP, and urban transformation projects were announced for Istanbul one after the other. With the projects announced before the general elections in 2011, it was apparent that the new urban interventions in Istanbul would no longer be realised only through the transformation of urban spaces. The Channel Istanbul Project (WWF-Turkey Report, 2018), which would turn Istanbul into an Island, was announced on 27 April 2011. People in Turkey learned about the project, which was designed for the node of Taksim Square and Gezi Park, on June 1, 2011 (Yazman, 2011). According to the project, the node would be pedestrianised, Gezi Park would be demolished and a shopping centre and a residence in the shape of the old Artillery Barracks would be built (Arslan, 2013; “The reason for the fight in Gezi Park is the shopping mall project”, 2013).

After the Gezi Park protests began, Erdoğan stated that the construction of the shopping centre is not inevitable, and there might be a shopping centre or a city museum (“A statement from Prime Minister”, 2013).

Besides the Taksim Pedestrianisation Project, other mega projects for Istanbul were also on their way. The Third Bosphorus Bridge Project (Kara, 2013) and the Third Airport Project (Ülker, 2013), both are completed by now, were in the beginning phase. Apart from these mad projects, relatively minor urban transformation projects were also continuing. Apart from urban transformation projects, many areas in Istanbul were declared as risk-bearing areas at the time of disaster. However, the declaration of these places as risk-bearing areas was an indication that spatial transformations in these areas would be forcibly completed, not by social and legal consent (Arslan, 2013).

Briefly, it is possible to say that there were a series of offensive interventions to the urban spaces and spatialities of Istanbul, from the beginning of the 2000s until the Gezi movement. These interventions were shaping and reproducing private and public spaces. The real users of the places were excluded from decision-making processes, and the capitalist and technocratic elite were playing an active role. Thus, the displacement of users of the spaces was becoming easier (Arslan, 2013). Against these policies making the urban an asset for capital accumulation, and use the city only for neoliberal policies, various occupational groups and non-governmental organisations showed resistance. This flow of resistance got stronger day by day and highlighted the value of use against the projects carried out for the prominence of the value of exchange in urban spaces.

Gezi Node in the Pre-Gezi Movement Period. Before the Gezi Park movement emerged, one of the most visible deeds of increasing urban discontent has emerged during the demolition of Emek Movie Theatre on İstiklal Avenue on May 20, 2013 (“The story of the

demolition of Emek Movie Theatre”, 2016; Uluç, 2016). Emek Movie Theatre was in the historic Serkildoryan (Cercle d’Orient) building, which was officially a public property. However, it was decided that the building should be demolished and then rebuilt as a shopping mall. According to the project, Emek Movie Theatre will be moved to the upper floor of the new mall. This project of creative destruction (Harvey, 2012) has generated serious resistance and protests in the node, however, they were inconclusive, and the demolition has started. I argue that these relatively minor protests have expanded the awareness of the concept of the right to the city. For example, some activists who gathered in the Gezi Park, to prevent the cutting of trees, were also those who struggled for the Emek Movie Theatre just a few months ago (Arslan, 2013). The demolition of the Emek Movie Theatre was not the only event in Taksim, which led to social discontent related to spatial politics. Inci Patisserie, the iconic and historic bakery of the district, was also in the Serkildoryan building. It was closed on December 8, 2012, and during the eviction, a brawl broke out between the police and activists. An activist detained during the brawl was also a member of the “Emek is our Initiative” (“68-year-old İnci Patisserie closed”, 2012).

Urban spatial conflicts that emerged in the node are intertwined, and cannot be easily categorised and separated. These protests and resistances performed for the right to the city and the protection and re-appropriation of public spaces are associated. Besides, neoliberal accumulation policies and the interventions of the state apparatuses in these collective actions are interrelated. It can be argued that the purpose of the power is to attack the symbols and meanings of this prominent urban node, eliminating its cultural and social historicity.

Taksim Square Pedestrianisation Project was the fundamental reason for the beginning of Gezi Park protests, which will transform into a movement afterwards. For urban activists, there were two original problems with the project. First, the material re-design of the space. Second, the conceiving will emerge through that new design. This emergent

conceived space would take its origin from an amorphous conception ignoring the modernisation, westernisation and reformation efforts continuing for two centuries. Instead of these efforts, the anti-secularist and Islamist neo-Ottoman perspective of AKP would become a toolbox for its contemporary neoliberal political arguments. AKP tried to create a new social identity by building a new perceived space to constitute that newly conceived space (Örs, 2014). In Turkey, the new official interpretation of the imperial past spatially reveals itself in line with neoliberal urban policies. Also, it is possible to detect these efforts not only in the node of Gezi Park and Taksim Square but also in many other projects taking place across the city and country (Öncü, 2007).

The project became a controversial issue immediately after its announcement. From 2011 until the Gezi movement broke out, trade associations, chambers and business owners of the node frequently announced their grievances about the project. At the heart of discussions were lying the concerns about losing the park, the only green area that has survived in the node. The question of how the pedestrianisation project would affect the life in Taksim, the shopping, entertainment and social centre of Istanbul, was also discussed. However, the project was unanimously approved by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality with the majority of votes. Following the official approval, the decision was immediately prosecuted. Also, TMMOB gathered other chambers and non-governmental organisations to discuss the project in February 2012. At the beginning of March, all the organisations and groups who attended a meeting and announced that they opposed the project established an umbrella platform under the name of Taksim Solidarity, to stop the project in legal ways (Özdemir, 2015). Taksim Solidarity consisted of a hundred twenty-eight different groups of professional chambers, political parties, non-governmental organisations, student unions, trade unions, associations and platforms (“Constituents of Taksim Solidarity”, n.d.). The organisation maintained its struggle during the year 2012 with various collective actions.

Before the initial Gezi Park protests started, professional chambers and local non-governmental organisations against urban policies organised at least three major rallies.

In March 2012, DİSK has announced that it will support Taksim Solidarity. In a press statement, the confederation emphasised that the node has historical and symbolic significance for the labour movement in Turkey. It was strongly expressed by DİSK that fighting for the Gezi Park is something deeply required to defend the historical meaning of the space (“Gezi is where the public come to power”, 2012). Besides, Taksim Solidarity stated at the same protest that they would not let a *fait accompli* happen, and announced that the project will destroy the authenticity of the square and it was a work of a mentality giving importance to concrete buildings rather than the living human beings. However, the government and local authorities did not take seriously these objections and the official bidding process for the project has begun. In June 2012, another large rally was held. In parallel, the legal struggle was continuing. As of October 2012, small businesses and shops in Taksim Square received eviction orders. Thereupon, Taksim Solidarity launched a petition to attract public attention and called for a new demonstration on October, 14th. At the beginning of November, members of the platform started to guard the Gezi Park physically. The construction started in January 2013. In the same days, Taksim Solidarity invited the people of Istanbul to organise collective breakfasts every Sunday in Gezi Park. The platform organised another large demonstration on February, 15 with the support of professional chambers. In March, *Taksim-Gezi Parkı Koruma ve İyileştirme Derneği* (Association for the Protection and Improvement Taksim-Gezi Park) was established. Against the project, the association gathered signatures and held a festival on April, 14 to mould public opinion. Some deputies of the main opposition party CHP also attended the festival. Taksim Solidarity continued to organise vigils in Gezi Park, during May 2013, until the Gezi Resistance, the first spark of the Gezi Movement, has started (David & Toktamış, 2015, p. 17).

Social and Political Climate in Turkey in the Pre-Gezi Movement Period. During the pre-Gezi period, AKP's urban policies and their echoes were not the only major social issues. There was a rapid anti-democratisation process going on. Numerous journalists were in prison, and many of them were fired because they criticised the government (Demir, Ağbaba & Özel, 2013). I believe that giving a few examples here will help me depict the rise of oppositional strain in the period before the Gezi movement. For instance, Turkish Airlines (THY) banned wearing red and pink lipsticks for its cabin crew, and SunExpress (flanker brand of THY) forbade wearing skirts ("After red lipsticks, skirts are also banned", 2013). In same days, while a young couple were kissing in a subway station in Ankara, a warning was heard from the speakers: "Dear passengers, please act according to the code of morals." The warning attracted huge reaction and was protested ("Kissing protest at Ankara subway", 2013). Again, in those days, alcohol sale after 10:00 pm banned in liquor stores and markets. Erdoğan, in response to criticisms of the prohibition, said, "The law of two drunkards is valid for you but the law of religion has to be rejected" He was referring to the law that enacted in 1924, which allowed the selling alcohol in Turkey, ("The law made by two drunkards", 2013). The phrase of two drunkards was interpreted as a referment to the founders of the Republic of Turkey; Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü (Gezi Park initially was named after him) by Kemalist opposition. Therefore, Erdoğan's statement drew a big reaction in the secular, republican wing and created a huge discontent. Another injunction that annoyed the same segments and increased the social tension were the removal of the T.C.⁴ signs from signboards of sub-institutions of the Ministry of Health ("TC signs will be removed from health institutions", 2013). Backlashes to this injunction was taking shape under the influence of conditions, which related to another very important, complicated, gangrened issue for Turkey; the Kurdish issue.

⁴ Abbreviation for Türkiye Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic).

A comprehensive examination of the Kurdish problem or evaluations about whether the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is the actual representative of a political movement capable of solving the Kurdish problem is outside the scope of this study. However, the solution process related to the Kurdish problem that started in the pre-Gezi period, and the social atmosphere, which arose around that process, should be not ignored to understand the pre-conditions of the movement. PKK has been in armed conflict with the Turkish state since 1984. The initial aim of the organisation was to establish an independent Kurdish state. Afterwards, this goal has changed to struggle to have equal rights and to achieve Kurdish autonomy (White, 2015). Also, PKK is officially designated as a terrorist organisation by European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United States, Australia, Iraq, Iran, Japan, Canada, Syria and New Zealand, and Turkey.

Back to the solution process; in a television interview on 28 December 2012, Erdoğan announced that the government was negotiating with Abdullah Öcalan, who is the imprisoned leader of PKK to solve the Kurdish problem (Kaya & Ünal, 2013). It can be concluded that hunger strikes initiated by six hundred PKK members who were detained demanding the end of Öcalan's isolation and for the beginning of the use of the Kurdish language in the public sphere were also determinant factors for the start of the process. On March 21, 2013, months after the negotiations, a letter from Öcalan was read in both Turkish and Kurdish, during the Nowruz celebrations in Diyarbakır. With the letter, Öcalan announced that PKK's armed forces will be withdrawn from Turkish lands and armed conflict has ended. Subsequently, later, PKK groups stated that they would comply with the order. Erdoğan has welcomed the letter and announced that concrete steps will be taken after the withdrawal of the groups. On April 25, 2013, PKK officially announced that all armed forces will retreat to northern Iraq. Following that, it was reported that studies on constitutional amendments, which are the second phase of the process, would start. The solution process ended in 2015 with no positive

results. Negotiations went down in history as the first official peace contact between Turkey and PKK, after twenty-nine years of low-density war. CHP and another opposition party in parliament, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) did not approve developments regarding the solution process for different reasons. For these parties, the solution process would jeopardise the regime in Turkey. Nevertheless, the process has enabled debates about the situation of Kurds in Turkey by creating a freer environment for a brief time. The state's strict and uncompromising rhetoric structured on the basis of terrorism and betrayal was suspended because of the solution process. In this way, the Turks living in the West were allowed to discuss publicly the Kurdish issue, free of political taboos (Yörük, 2014). Before the solidarity emerged among them during the Gezi movement, if it may be expressed shallowly, Kurds and Turks experienced this slight relief, and this includes a valuable clue to understanding the social situation at that time. Sirri Süreyya Önder who was a deputy of Istanbul from Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) that was seen as the political extension of the PKK in the parliament, played one of the key roles in the rapid recognition of Gezi protests by the public ("Sirri Süreyya Önder blocked bulldozers", 2013). However, besides Önder's individual stance, the Kurdish political movement initially has put a distance between itself and the Gezi movement. Despite this distance, first, in Istanbul, then in Ankara and other provinces, BDP sympathisers also took part in early demonstrations. Constituents of the Kurdish movement could not understand exactly what was happening at first. Moreover, they could not predict how the Gezi movement would develop. They were worried about what might have happened because their participation in the Gezi movement could have a negative impact on the solution process. Some leaders of the Kurdish movement engaged in the solution process were responsible for that hesitation. Because they regarded the Gezi movement as an organised conspiracy, led by external powers, to sabotage the

solution process (Çakır, 2013b). However, shortly after, Öcalan greeted the Gezi protesters and after that Kurdish movement supported Gezi more actively.

*Evaluation of the Concept of Space for Theory Generation and a Brief Assessment
Concerning the Gezi Node*

It is possible to associate the historical stages of the space put forward by Lefebvre with contemporary urban social movements. Abstract space is where the seeds of the grievances and conflicts that cause the emergence of a social movement are sown by the state and the system. Because this space tries to arrange the identities and subjectivities of individuals and groups living in the city by arranging the urban quantitatively. This arrangement expects is that urbanisation should be homogenised, spread and perfected under the value of exchange needed by capitalism. Abstract space tries to instrumentalise everything that is urban by patterns. However, the patterns of the abstract space are broken by experiences that go beyond quantitative relations, are non-routine and contrary to capitalist logic. Lefebvre (1991) acknowledged that as an integral and inevitable part of life. Individuals and groups adjoined in the abstract space and imprisoned in its patterns, may get beyond these limits by experiencing their own distinct qualitative patterns. Any space in which the capitalist logic of economic relations cannot reach or interrupt may be the substantial site of this space. These sites may be squares, cafes or cyber networks. Groups and individuals practically perceive the difference of daily life from the homogeneity in these sites, which are liberated from the abstract space. Thus, the social space, where grievances and conflicts can flow into, becomes able to re-emerge when the return of the abstract space happens. In this way, grievances and conflicts can accumulate in the abstract space, and the longing for the value of use rises. It is possible to consider the social space as a space where the social movements express their demands or where conflicts occur. This space is where urban social movements occupy urban spaces and try to experience differential space even if

they are surrounded by elements of the logic of the abstract space. For example, the abandonment of the practices of capitalist everyday life during the occupation of Gezi Park can be considered as a sign of the efforts for the differential space. Using swap instead of money during the occupation or the invalidation of the homogeneous hierarchies of the abstract space are the acts, which indicate such aspirations.

During the literature review I have conducted on the concept of space, I benefited deeply from Lefebvre's work. Since the Gezi movement was an urban movement and Gezi graffiti was a spatial practice, evaluating space as a social product and understanding the generation of social space through the relations among perceived, conceived and lived spaces were significant for the study. With this perspective, it became much more meaningful why a movement against power's urban interventions harboured spatial ways to struggle such graffiti. First and foremost, the Gezi movement started as a right to the city struggle. Also, the occupation of Gezi Park and walls by graffitiists can be seen as spaces of counter-representations. Spaces and spatial practices have been transformed by the movement and graffiti and re-produced to mediate the meanings and designs of the movement involving both everyday life and collective action.

The node, the spatial centre of the Gezi movement, contains an urban space in which significant political, economic and social transformations experienced in Turkey. Also, it is possible to say that the node of the Gezi movement was the cradle of abstraction of the space and its conceiving, during the early republican period. Urban and urbanity, which were re-organised by the power of the newly established republic, belong to this node. In other words, the urban incarnation of the republic began here. Until the end of World War Two, the node has continued to adjoin urban life and spaces according to the modernity understanding of the establishment. The design of Gezi Park as a European city park, the construction of the Republic monument in Taksim Square, or the transformation of the node into an urban

entertainment/attraction centre very differently from the Ottoman period city-related life can be considered among the practices of this political will. However, the node was also the centre of lived space that contradicts the peremptory, top-down and uncompromising conceived space of the republic. Despite the intense urban transformations and the radically changing daily routines, the memories embedded in the space have been emphasised the difference with the past. Therefore, it is possible to say that many places opposing the abstract space were formed in various sites and have created detached poles.

The symbolic significance of the node shapes the mobility and proximity of spatial interactions for its historicity. When it becomes a space hosting the emergence of a contentious episode, it appeals to the different places that formed in different areas against the capitalist flows. By the gravitational force of the node, relational affinities between places increase, and they establish novel relationships through networks, and the identities are re-categorised to reach urban space over larger scales, through arrangements. In this way, subjectivities that are not directly connected to the emerging contentious episode in the node seize the chance to strengthen their indirect relationalities. I believe that the Gezi movement has taken place under conditions, which were appropriate to a distinctive spatial relationship where such articulation is highly possible with the support of urban space.

After World War Two, Turkey's economic integration into global capitalism has started. During the Cold War years, Turkey has built its foreign policy by emphasising its geopolitical importance in the West's fight against the Soviet Union and communism, and by affiliating itself with the United States of America (USA). During this period, a liberal party and a peripheral political movement were born. DP has used populism and seized power in a quick time. This political fluctuation, which could be considered as one effort of the periphery to approach the centre (Mardin, 1973), would be deeply shaken by the Istanbul Pogrom, which erupted in and around Pera, one of the cultural carriers of Gezi Park and

Taksim Square. The deterritorialized anger of those who accumulated in Istanbul with the waves of immigration from Anatolia has cracked the multicultural cosmopolitan structure inherited from the imperial era to the node. The perceived space and conceived space in the node were transforming simultaneously. Urbanism in the modern sense has been shaped by the new sociality and the handover of the value of the use in lived space. With the economic integration process, wide roads were opened in Istanbul. Many districts in the city were redesigned in line with more intense capitalist relations. The node was now the host of an international hotel chain. In the node, a new mode of production has emerged that supports the value of exchange and undermines the value of use. The node has lost its old charm and importance partially in this period when it changed its shell. Because the spirit of the republic was fading. However, the logic of the republicans soon returned to the urban space. Due to the military coup of 1960, the spatial practices and representation processes of the node were undone. There was only renewing the abstract space and the urban space disappeared. Afterwards, the renewal was completed, and an updated version of the spatiality of the republican spirit unfolded. This new derivative allowed different subjectivities and places to establish spatial networks and relations in a more flexible way. The striking and transformative multi-layering of the symbolic meaning of the node took form between 1960 and 1980. The rise of the labour movement, intensive politicisation and polarisation in universities, caused the biggest rallies in the node and the emergence of a new urban space. Places across Turkey were merging by networks of labour and revolutionary organisations and flowing into the node. The reflex of the state and power was to facilitate the transfer of nationalist and conservative subjectivities that emerged in territories to the node. Drastic events like Bloody Sunday and Taksim Massacre happened in the node where spatialities collide. After these events, the node has become a holy space for the socialist and worker

movements. On the other hand, it was still the most important centre for the arrangement of urbanity as required by capitalism.

Another military coup happened in 1980, and the urban space was again paralyzed. Tanks, soldiers and junta's rallies reformatted the node starting from the perceived level. Gezi Park and Taksim Square would remain closed to the public rallies until 2010. The elections and democratic regime restarted in 1983. The coup constitution prepared in 1982 was in force. With this new constitution, civil society organisation, unionisation processes were partially restricted. Although the node was isolated from contentious episodes and collective opposition, it continued to play a dominant role in the social production of the city. Because of the deep social trauma caused by the coup and the effects of the 1982 constitution, it was difficult for spatialities to establish networks and to carry identities into collective processes. On the other hand, Turkey's integration and adoption of neoliberalism were accelerated. The numbers of hotels, international restaurant chains and shops increased in and around the node. The value of exchange has returned more strongly. In the 1980s, the Pera district was a pavilion/entertainment area and its regulars were new Istanbulites. The depoliticisation of the area was in parallel with the depoliticisation of the society. Simultaneously, political Islam manifested itself in urban space. The node was a symbolic oasis to be reclaimed for the political left. For political Islam, it was the key to Istanbul's reconquest that would be realised by the construction of the Taksim Mosque.

In 1994, political Islam has obtained Istanbul's mayoralty. In those days, the node was becoming the space of populist policies of political Islam, which were coherent with the neoliberal policies. However, Pera became the culture and art centre of the city again in the late 1990s and early 2000s ("It will rise again from the ashes", 2017). On this ground, the value of use came into prominence in little places. Within the lived space, pocket dimensions opposing the new transformation in the node and the city were unfolding. With the AKP

government, Istanbul has become a centre experiencing urban transformation at an unprecedented pace.

Neoliberal urban policies, in which the conservative emphasis of power was embroidered, continued to gain momentum in Pera and neighbouring districts. These districts were influential on the cultural infrastructure of the node, the centre of the Gezi movement. Transformed places were sent to the new suburban areas together with their residents, and the node was filled with new residences and shopping malls. A new deterritorialization has begun and all spatial dimensions of the urban space were under its influence. The construction of the Taksim Mosque and the demolition of the Atatürk Cultural Centre were among the important topics on the agenda. Besides, during the AKP rule political rhetoric and practices that intervene in lifestyles and individual freedoms have increased. These policies were predicated on the legitimacy obtained by the party through elections. AKP claimed that it took the power away from the republican elites and gave it back to the people with the populist rhetoric it has used. Furthermore, it has promised to end the military domination over the political arena and it has done so at a certain level. Just before the Gezi movement, an opposition against the urban transformation projects in Istanbul began to organise itself. These opposing movements were mostly right to the city acts. The crazy projects announced by Erdoğan and the technocrats in Ankara increased the pressure felt in lived space and created conditions for an expanding, networking contradiction that would crack the narrative of the conceived space. While the Taksim Pedestrianisation Project was announced, this pressure was at its peak because of the government's policies and rhetoric, which judged and limited the individual freedoms, objectivity of the media and lifestyles.

The spatial centre of the Gezi movement is the spatial urban centre, which has been the host of Turkey's historical power struggles, social transformations and contentious episodes. This urban space is a node in which the power forms the urban designs and

rearrangements as required by the capitalist modes of production. From this node, pressures on the determination of the boundaries of territories were flowing into local and national urban processes. Besides, this urban space is multi-layered. It is an area of social production, where the symbolic and material values of different powers and oppositions overlap and coincide. The node gained a very complicated spatial structure by the ever-changing perceived, conceived and lived spaces under the influence of economic and political transformations in Turkey. Because there are remnants and places related to these remnants, which cannot be completely erased from spatial historicity, and encounters that are experienced in lived space end in a continuum. This complex structure allows different spatialities that coincide for different social groups in the node. During the Gezi movement's emergence, the node was still the most meaningful urban square of republican revolutions in the eyes of the republican opposition. The government was seeing the node as an area that its dominance would be perfectly materialised by urban conceiving and its developmental, neoliberal economic program will be crowned. For non-governmental organisations, trade unions and the established political left, it was an ideal tool for manifestation and recruiting. It was also sacred for the political left because it was the space of mass movements of the great ascension of the 1970s.

The node was also at the centre of the right to the city struggles. At the same time, it was the space of contention in a sense of rising global opposition and its values such as identity and freedoms. Identities, still seen as extreme by conservative and established values, embraced this urban space due to the proximity of metropolitan-type entertainment areas next to the node. Their places, networks and experiences were opposing power, just like the republican main opposition and the political left. The Gezi movement began with an opposing flow in this urban space, which includes a series of right to the city demonstrations against the Taksim Pedestrianisation Project. The node was highly sensitive. Because it was

again the core of power struggles and economic transformations. Therefore, its proximity with other distant or indirectly related places increased rapidly. At the same time, the republican and socialist opposition that was sleeping among the old layers of this urban space awakened. During the AKP period, almost all of the political movements with deep roots in this node were demonised by the populist discourses of power.


Additionally, generations born after the military coup have no connection to these demonised movements. They were seeing these movements as old, outdated, failed and boring. These people were closer to the rising values and social movements in the world where they were easily integrated through cyber social networks. Generations who came to the node physically for the Gezi movement passed through cyber social networks and brought along the notions of new social movements.

They occupied the node disconnectedly from the accumulation of interrelated past spatial relations. The node was occupied for the first time and the occupation was not about the creation of a new counter-abstract space that attempted to process an alternative dominance offered by movement in urban space. Instead, a differential space trial was performed. The difference from the political, economic and social struggles that revolved around the power and tried to seize it, was the purpose. The urban space was not occupied to seize power. It was brought under control for the desire for a new understanding of the concept of power. This understanding required the embracing of all groups that have no problems with human rights and solidarity. For this reason, other established oppositions were also able to enter the space. They were able to adapt to new notions of social movements through new networks. The Gezi movement expanded its scale rapidly and managed to keep itself decentralized. In this sense, Gezi Park became all places as a spatial symbol.

Gezi protesters redesigned the park during the occupation. This counter-conceived space was designed to be conducive to the organisation of the movement. Also, it was presented as an alternative urban spatiality for political, social and economic order. Protesters and visitors of the node did not only voice their aspirations of social change but also they experienced and performed their demands spatially.

Figure 2

Gezi Park Encampment Map



Note. A map of the distribution of social groups in Gezi Park (Wikimedia, 2013).

Gezi protesters have taken the spatiality of the node to another dimension by using cyber social networks. They have used the communicative and organisational possibilities of social movements organised through social networks. Moreover, they have changed the spatiality of the node in a way that has never happened before. The node was a space to reach, conquer and keep. It was a socio-political ultimate destination, and it has maintained its spatial significance throughout the Gezi movement.

The Gezi movement hybridised urban space and cyberspace through cyber networks and enabled diffusion on a national scale. The node has transformed many other urban spaces in Turkey into new Gezi Parks and Taksim Squares through its cyber-urban spatiality. In many cities of Turkey, parks or squares were occupied and tents were set up. The symbolic diffusing of the Gezi movement caused other concrete spatial actions in other urban spaces, thanks to the spatiality of the cyber-urban space. The prominent social media platform of the Gezi movement was Twitter. It was the most widely used cyber social network by protesters throughout the movement. Somemto's analysis (2013), which covers 143.795.432 tweets that were posted in Turkish between 29 May - 10 June, provides striking findings on Twitter usage about the Gezi movement. The first striking finding is about the enormous increase in the number of Twitter users in Turkey, along with the start of the Gezi movement. According to Somemto (2013), there were 1.819.403 Twitter users in Turkey on 29 May. By June 10, this number was over 9.5 million.


In this context, it is possible to say that the mobilisation of urban material space sprawled into cyberspace. Another striking finding regarding the use of Twitter by Gezi protesters shows that the rhythm of sharing in the cyberspace was in parallel with the rhythm of the movement in urban space. In the period covered by Somemto's research, the number of tweets that were posted reached their highest number on June 1, the day which Gezi turned into a mass movement. On 1 June, 18.935.909 tweets were posted on Twitter about the Gezi

movement. After June 3, the number of tweets continued at an average of 10 million per day.

It is also observed that the use of Twitter by the protesters reached the highest frequency during the beginning and end of interventions of the police.

Figure 3


Map of Tweeting – Istanbul



Note. Geographical distribution and density of tweets sent via #resistgeziparkı on 2013, May 31 at 16:20 p.m. and on 2013, June 1 at 14:00 p.m. in Istanbul (smappNYU, 2013, 00:01, 00:24).

Figure 4

Map of Tweeting – Turkey



Note. Geographical distribution and density of tweets sent via #resistgeziparkı hashtag on 2013, May 31 at 16:20 p.m. and on 2013, June 1 at 14:00 p.m. in Turkey (smappNYU, 2013,00:01, 00:22).

Another important element of the use of Twitter during the Gezi movement is hashtags. According to the Somemto's study, the 10 most commonly used hashtags on Twitter (expressions in brackets are English translations of hashtags) and their usage are as follows; #direngeziparkı (#resistgezipark) 2.140.709 tweets, #direngeziparki (#resistgezipark) 1.611.029 tweets, #direnankara (#resistankara) 1.114.267 tweets, #occupygezi 846.020 tweets, #direngazipark (#resistveteranpark) 617.384 tweets, #sesvertürkiyebuülkesahipsizdegil (#giveoutasoundturkeythiscountryisnotownerless) 589.118 tweets, #direnİzmir (#resistİzmir) 438.813 tweets, #tayipistifa (#tayipresign) 403.050 tweets, #direnbesiktas (#resistbesiktas) 382.252 tweets, and #takipedenitakipederim (#ifollowwhofollowsme) 372.852 tweets.

Figure 3 and figure 4 show the distribution and frequency of tweets posted on the hashtag #direngeziparkı on May 31 and June 1, 2013, in Istanbul and Turkey. The hashtagging was used by many people in different places in Istanbul, and Turkey. The contention, which emerged first in Gezi Park's physical space, flowed into other places through cyber-urban space and caused the spread of contentious imaginaries. Hashtags used during the Gezi movement can be considered as an example of the practices involved in cyber-urban space. Some tweets were clustered around the #resistgezipark hashtag with environmental concerns, and some of them were about urban policies of the government. Some tweets discussed the power's interventions in lifestyles, and some of them argued about capitalism. In this way, the cyber-urban space connected different oppositional places, in one cyber node. The interactions among these places in this cluster were reflected again on the material node, and the groups and individuals participating in the movement from these places in cyber-urban space, also clustered physically in or around Gezi Park.

The Gezi movement took place in Turkey's most important urban space node. Its historicity, its proximity to places, its multi-layered structure and social meanings have affected and shaped the spatial processes of the movement and its relations with the node. Furthermore, the node has given the movement the power to become an empty signifier of all this spatial social, political and economic accumulation. Its social networks, which were established by an empty signifier through cyber-urban space, also connected the various contentions, grievances, demands and claims of other places and other urban spaces and merged with them as a contentious political episode.

Gezi Park and Taksim Square, in the heart of Istanbul, have been the centres of the Gezi movement throughout all its processes; from the emergence to the dissolution. That is why the movement bears the name of the park. Turkey's largest social movement has begun as a tiny environmentalist demonstration to prevent trees in Gezi Park from being cut off. Soon afterwards, under police violence, the weak voice of that tiny action came to the public's attention and was heard, thanks to social media. However, there were no local or central authorities among the attentive listeners. While the police force and government were continuing their uncompromising attitude towards protesters, the park and the square was becoming once again a unique spatial node in which grievances, discontents and claims city accumulate more and more (Lefebvre, 2016; Harvey, 2012).

Demonstrations in Gezi Park have rapidly spread to the neighbour Taksim Square before turning into a nationwide movement. According to the Ministry of Interior, 3.5 million people participated in a series of acts during the Gezi movement. In total 4.725 events took place in all but one of Turkey's 81 cities ("The Gezi Report from the Ministry of Interior", 2013). The park and the square have been agents, places of these spatial struggles, and the centres of claim-making, all along with the movement. Besides, during the movement also another threshold was passed. The node (Gezi Park and Taksim Square as perceived spaces)

has witnessed and harboured various overlapping conceived spaces, from the imperial period to the commodification era of neoliberalism. Correspondingly, it owns strong curvilinear historicity as a lived space experienced by the everlasting, protracted social and political fluctuations in Turkey. The node has an idiosyncratic structure as a lived space, just like the city of Istanbul. Also, it is a space of high resonance, where a wide range of everyday experiences and social interactions are involved. Taksim Square and Gezi Park form a node because of their geographical, historical, social and political proximity. A node scaling multifariously, which is of the particular centre of concern to almost every social group. Moreover, the node is a folding site wherein distances of this diversity are constantly shifting and changing. It would be explicative to think this node has a huge gravitational force in Turkey's socio-political space.

As noted, the node has been witnessing in the last few centuries major social and political events of the country's history. It is a realm of social occurrences, emergences, transformations, oppositions, deep-rooted contentions and public opinion. Historically and cyclically the spaces that constitute the node become places and following that they grow into spatial symbols of all these various processes. Abstract and material remnants of all these processes are superimposed and accumulated in and on the node. However, it is wrong to explain the accumulation of these remnants with a linear dialectic. Turkish society still harbours the living reciprocations of social and political tides that have left behind these remnants in this node. As long as these reciprocations survive, remnants continue to draw nested circular patterns, try to complete their circles, and sometimes encounter. At this point, relationality is very decisive.

When the political or social groups within the contention change their relative positions, their remnants in the node also revive and reposition themselves. These reappropriations can sometimes be observed simultaneously. Also, their echoes cause

circuitous reappropriations. For example, in the 20th century, when political Islam wanted to build a mosque in the node, the remnants of the reactionary uprising from a century ago, which has opposed modernisation and the granting of rights to minorities, revived. In this way, they have renewed their own narrative. Synchronously, the remnants of the secular-modernist republic were awakened because of the revival of its opponent, and as expected they have also generated their counter-narrative. The node is fluid. Therefore, after an announcement of the yearning for the mosque project, it would not be surprising to see that it simultaneously hosts both a collective Friday prayer and a parade organised to commemorate Atatürk, the founder of the secular republic.

The encounter and intersection of these remnants in these places produce a morphology that would create new remnants. Also, the remnants of those who are at the periphery of the node are become affected by this process and mobilise to get new positions. They try to drag their symbols and meanings to the centre of the node by using contentious episodes as opportunities. For instance, socialists may organise a marching to the node which had been the arena of the golden age of worker's movement. Thus, they may try to re-attach themselves to the node where all eyes are fixed on, by associating the mosque project with their rhetoric of return of the golden age and their presence in the node. This example tries to express simply the relationality of spatialities for the node. The combinations and fluidities of these relations are often much more intricate, sometimes revealing even grotesque socialities. According to the depth of the ongoing contentious episode and the characteristics of the relevant social groups, the scales of spaces and their relations with the places vary.

In the node, we can see the reflections of the socio-political transformations in Turkey. It has been an arena of these transformations for a long time and with every new episode, new layers were added. A contention may arise from elsewhere, but its places would be related to the node. Besides, power legitimises its existence and gains social consent

through its effects on this node. On the other hand, the opposition can shake the absoluteness of power, only if it transposes its claims to this node. The node is an object of incarnation or centralising for the excluded or the newly emerged. Groups that manifest themselves in the node re-declare their existence or announce their aims for the first time. Those that can declare their existence in this node, consolidate their agency in the socio-political field.

Going back to our Astro-metaphor, the node of Gezi Park and Taksim Square is like a star that bends the space re-arranging the distances between places because of its tangible and abstract accumulations, and it shines occasionally more or less depending on relations the different social groups can utilise.

Gezi movement is one of the contentious episodes, in which the node has bent Turkey's socio-political Astro-space gigantically, and shone incandescently. Hence, flowing social debates, grievances, taboos, demands and claims were brought, poked, discussed and voiced here by the repositioned remnants and via shortened distances between places. They were experienced and articulated in the lived space during the movement. The movement embracingly scaled up, as it absorbed all discontents, and became even more communicable.

In this way, different places with their nodes and flows, found opportunities to converge, to touch each other. The experiences of resistance and opposition from everyday life awakened particles of discontent that concentrated in distant places and turned all of them into an ever-changing political body. Within this body's veins, knowledge, ideas, claims, demands, interactions and collectivity they wandered rapidly and spatially. The spatiality of this node mostly shaped the repertoire of contention of Gezi. The node was not only a site of claim-making and resistance but also the constituent of the movement's performances to sustain its rightfulness, legitimacy, regeneration and diffusing. These performances took shape by gaining new spatialities and meanings. Graffiti that I will analyse and interpret has

emerged as a part of that repertoire related to that spatial transformation. Gezi graffiti is a striking part of the repertoire of contention from the movement. Furthermore, it is both the symptom and bearer of spatial relations of the Gezi movement.

Graffiti

The last section of my literature review is inevitably related to graffiti. With this section, the conceptual and theoretical background I needed for my one-sided interpretative effort that I am convicted of whilst analysing and interpreting Gezi graffiti data corpus is completed. Also, I should mention that throughout the section, when the word graffiti is written in the singular form, it refers to the concept of graffiti and when it is written in plural form; it mentions the multiplicity of graffiti.

This section comprises five subsections examining the phenomenon of graffiti. The first sub-section examines ancient graffiti and explains the birth of contemporary graffiti, and shows how graffiti is in the literature and which focal points are decisive in these definitions. The second sub-section tries to examine graffiti from an ontological perspective. It explores the pathway of the graffiti from subjectivity to publicity in different phases. Thus, the meaning of the existence of graffiti is tried to be revealed concerning individuals, multiplicities, urban space and the public. The third sub-section examines the concept of graffiti separately in terms of its functions related to urban, social and political issues. Thus, it will be explained how graffiti is used for these different purposes. The fourth sub-section investigates the phenomenon in terms of Turkey and the Gezi movement. The emergence of contemporary graffiti in Turkey and its social and political significance are described. Also, the determinations of previous scholarship about the Gezi graffiti are reviewed in the section. The last sub-section of the chapter aims to redefine graffiti to create an analytical concept by

trying to get to the essence of the phenomenon and patterning its invariable qualities in accordance with my grounded theory generation efforts.

History and Definition of Graffiti

Graffiti from Antiquity to Modernity. The concept of graffiti (the plural of graffito) comes from the *graffiti* in Italian (plural of graffito) which means scribbling. It is the diminutive of *graffio*; a scratch or scribble that is derived from *graffiare*; to scribble, originating from the Greek word of *graphein*, means to scratch, draw and write (Online Etymology Dictionary, n.d.).

Graffiti is today recognised as a phenomenon of contemporary urban areas. However, its history is ancient almost as the history of humankind. According to Smith, pictorial graffiti had its beginning with cave art (2004; as cited in Baird & Taylor, 2011, p. 1). Many ancient graffiti samples belonging to various literate or pre-literate civilisations and societies have been found (Baird & Taylor, 2011). Most of the studies that examine the history of graffiti focus on the ancient civilizations that lived in and around the Mediterranean Basin between the invention of writing and the end of antiquity.

Graffiti of that period are mostly found in cities, rural areas, places of worship, houses, walls, streets, marketplaces and on various portable objects. They contain texts, pictures, symbols and pictograms. The most impressive graffiti examples of this period have survived until today in ancient cities like Aphrodisias, Smyrna, Ephesus (modern Turkey), Pompeii, Herculaneum (modern Italy) and Dura - Europos (modern Syria) (Baird & Taylor, 2016, p. 18). Besides, ancient graffiti is found also in remote but religiously important places such as Delos (modern Greece) and El Kanais (modern Egypt) (Baird & Taylor, 2011, p. 3).

Ancient graffiti was produced by various techniques and applied on various surfaces. They were carved on plasters, painted on different surfaces, engraved on stone or drawn on

pots. Chisels, hammers, coal, inks and paints were the most common antique graffiti production materials. The identification of ancient graffiti is a complex and sometimes confusing effort as the examples are subjected by studies from many disciplines. These samples are sometimes referred to as graffiti and are sometimes named in specific terms of the related terminology. For example, texts on pots are mostly called *ostraca*. However, similar pieces sometimes are labelled as graffiti (Baird & Taylor, 2016, p. 18). In other words, decisions about the characteristics that distinguish the graffiti from others are related to modern scientific or professional perspectives and are variable.

Like contemporary graffiti, ancient graffiti is very diverse, both spatially and contextually. Some ancient graffiti have many similarities with their contemporary equivalents. They contain messages and slogans that express social or political criticisms and oppose tyranny (Zadorojnyi, 2011). They have successfully used language, word games (Benefiel, 2013) and images, like their contemporary versions (Levin-Richardson, 2011; Langner 2001; as cited in Chaniotis, 2011). Also, they were the instruments some groups and communities declared their existence to the world and renegotiated their social status (Taylor, 2011, p. 104). Graffiti was an integral part of antique cities. They contained both the magical, doxastic and divine symbolism of their era and contexts (Baird, 2011, p. 66; Chaniotis, 2002) and the archaic slang allowing us to see the antiquity in "flesh and blood" (Kruschwitz, 2010, p. 158). Briefly, ancient graffiti, like contemporary graffiti, defines space, discusses identities and belonging, and includes allusion, humour or even insult.

As expected, in some respects it differs from contemporary graffiti. First, ancient graffiti cannot be attributed to any subcultural movement or the desire for social change. Although they often appeared in significant public spaces, they were mostly produced by the elite. Second, ancient graffiti cannot be examined as an urban phenomenon because urbanity was not existing at that time. Ancient graffiti is merely a category of the written culture of

antiquity, with decorative and sometimes symbolic functions (Baird & Taylor, 2011, pp. 19-21).

Graffiti has continued to exist after antiquity. Before it emerged in the late 1960s as an urban phenomenon in the contemporary sense, it showed its face in many different places and contexts. For example, graffiti was very popular in medieval England churches (Champion, 2015). In the 16th century, protestants conveyed their religious messages by graffiti, (Jones, 2009) and in the 18th century, Louis XVI's prisoners in France gave the news of the impending revolution via their graffiti. In the following century, graffiti was also in art circles. Honoré de Balzac mentioned graffiti in his writings and Victor Hugo was a graffitist himself for a brief time (Pereira, 2005). In the process of time, graffiti became a medium serving the working class. Simultaneously, it was continuing its artistic journey. Francis Picabia and his friends' graffiti pieces were exhibited in Barcelona in 1922 (Adams, 2017). In 1933, French photographer Brassai published a photo essay on graffiti (Pereira, 2005) and Pablo Picasso presented his famous light graffiti (Payne, n.d.). People have continued to use graffiti even during world wars. For example, "Foo was here" was a famous Australian World War I graffito became popular among the schoolchildren of post-war generations. Its World War II version "Kilroy was here" is still alive as an internet meme with its contemporary jammed versions. In Nazi Germany, it was used for propaganda. Ironically, during the French Resistance, graffiti was also used to spread messages. In 1960's *pichação*⁵ was spreading across Brazil's big cities. Those who opposed Mao's revolution in China wrote their *dazibaos*⁶ on the walls. After the 1960s, the workers and student movements surrounding Europe wrote their very creative slogans on the walls. Briefly, throughout the 20th century, it was very possible to encounter graffiti, especially in places where social and

⁵ São Paulo's 'angry' alternative to graffiti (Siwi, 2016).

⁶ Big character poster; handwritten posters containing complaints about government officials or policies in the People's Republic of China (Britannica, n.d.).

political changes were happening (Pereira, 2005, pp. 16-25). Nevertheless, graffiti was not yet an integral part of everyday life, the lived space and urbanity, as we understand today. Although its historical journey has a continuum, it is accepted in the literature that contemporary graffiti appeared in the United States in the 1960s.

Contemporary Graffiti. Albeit it is difficult to write a precise and chronological history of contemporary graffiti, it is possible to date its emergence in the late 1960s (Dennant, 1997). After the Second World War, there was an intense migration flow from the popular urban centres to the suburbs in the United States. Low mortgage rates and the construction of many highways have caused the middle classes to move away from the city centres. Besides, the deindustrialisation and the civil rights movement profoundly changed the urban structure, and especially neighbourhoods of minorities were badly affected by this alteration. These neighbourhoods were under-served, and in a brief period, issues such as the rapid spreading of drugs and gang violence, mostly among the young population, appeared. During this period, gangs were using graffiti-like symbols to mark the boundaries of their territories and to announce their dominance (Bates, 2014, p. 26). The emergence of contemporary graffiti begins with teenager Darryl McCray, aka Cornbread. He started to practice graffiti in 1965 in Philadelphia (Gastman & Neelon, 2010).

Cornbread was writing his graffiti mostly next to the wall signs of the North Philadelphia gangs. Meanwhile, other graffitiists Cool Earl, Kool Klepto Kid and Chewy were practising graffiti on the southern side of the city. In 1969, these graffitiists have founded the first-ever known graffiti crew. Shortly after, graffiti became widespread throughout the city and newspapers started publishing interviews about graffitiist. Cornbread in his interview with Today Magazine said to Sandy Padwe that he practised graffiti because he had nothing else to do, and did not want to get involved in gangs or drugs (Bates, 2014, p. 28). Graffiti has spread to New York in the early 1970s and started to receive huge attention. The first famous

graffitists in New York were Taki 183, Eva 62, Barbara 62 and Tracy 168 (Lewisohn, 2008, p. 31). Their nicknames were referring to the streets where they live. Spaces and identity were the first issues mentioned during the first appearance of contemporary graffiti in New York. In 1971, the New York Times published an article on Taki 183, and after that, more and more young people in the city began to practice graffiti. In those years, New York, like Philadelphia, was struggling with socio-economic problems such as industrialization, domestic migration, and the exclusion of disadvantaged groups from the public sphere. According to Dennant (1997, p. 13), the economic and social gap between the prosperous white-collar employees leading the financial life and the unemployed/underemployed black and Hispanic population was increasing during the 1970s. Also, the disadvantaged sections of the city were becoming increasingly more invisible in public spaces and were heavily deprived of the blessings of that international metropolis (Austin, 2001).

Relevantly, in an interview, Taki 183 has told New York Times that he was unemployed and practising graffiti to pass time wherever he went in the city (“Taki 183 spawns pen pals”, 1971). In those days, graffiti produced in New York were mostly *tags*⁷. The graffitiists aimed to leave their signatures and labels on the walls. Graffiti quickly spread to the subways and subway cars started to tour the entire city and were swiftly recognised by many of the New Yorkers (Gastman & Neelon, 2010). Graffiti has spread in New York rapidly because it provided opportunities for people who felt excluded and live in the marginalised parts of the city to be someone. According to Lewisohn (2008), graffiti was used by graffitiists to make a mark in the world, to be a creative individual and to be a cool star. It has changed the views of young people about their lives, and the world has become a place where they can be inspired.

⁷ Graffiti type in which the graffitiist simply writes its name or identifier using one colour (Street art and graffiti words – The ultimate glossary, 2018.).

Contemporary graffiti was soon noticed in art circles. The first graffiti exhibition in New York was organised in 1973. Following that, the first graffiti art exhibitions were held in Northern and Western Europe in the 1980s. Graffiti has spread from the United States to the world through three different channels; gallery exhibitions, the media and interpersonal relations (Novak, 2017). Between 1979 and 1985, twelve graffiti exhibitions that took place in Western Europe were held in Rome, Kassel, Rotterdam, Groningen, Bologna, Munich, Amsterdam, Basel, Humlebæk, Otterlo, London and Stockholm (Jacobson, 2001).

Eventually, in European capitals such as Paris, Amsterdam, London, Berlin and Madrid graffiti became popular (Pereira, 2005, p. 29). Also, movies like *Wild Style* (1982), *Style Wars* (1983) and *Beat Street* (1984) have contributed to the popularisation of contemporary graffiti (Novak, 2017). With the rise of hip-hop, graffiti became mainstream (Lewisohn, 2008). Today, it is considered as one of the four integral parts of hip-hop culture, with breakdancing, emceeing and rapping. (Bates, 2014). However, it is not possible to argue that all graffiti artists are coming from or care for the hip-hop culture (Kramer, 2009).

Graffiti have entered South America and Asia with westernisation during the 1990s. In the same way, it became widespread in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. Most graffiti artists in Europe regarded themselves as young followers or fellows of the graffiti artists from the USA, and this relationship, which is intertwined with hip-hop culture, has survived until the present day (Pereira, 2005). However, graffiti transformed as it spread across the world and gained different local features. Influenced by local perceptions and different urban fabrics, it was redefined by graffiti artists. Graffiti, like architecture, is influenced by physical, social, political and economic environments. In this sense, it is possible to argue that graffiti is a matter of relationality and transformation.

Nevertheless, it is one of the most diverse and major cultural phenomena in the world today (Bates, 2014).

Contemporary graffiti is today a phenomenon with glocality. This feature can be better understood by examining different graffiti scenes spread around the world.

Nowadays, North America leads the world of graffiti and street arts. It has been the scene of the transformation of graffiti from classical textual examples to street art. It has become the centre of not only the transformation from classical textual examples to street art but also of formal and contextual innovations. Many graffitiists from around the world come to the region to write or paint their pieces. According to Schacter, (2013) New York graffiti stands out with its grittiness. On the other hand, San Francisco is one pioneer of the transition from textual graffiti to more descriptive and symbolic graffiti. Graffitiists in San Francisco redraw the boundaries of graffiti and urban arts. Los Angeles is famous for its colourful and entertaining graffiti. The city has been home to many groundbreaking developments for graffiti and street arts. Briefly, North America is the centre of the graffiti world and hosts a great variety of graffitiist as the cradle of many innovations (p. 15).

Although graffiti started with the westernization process in Latin America, the continent hosted many unique graffiti movements that affect other graffitiists in the world. Today, Latin America is a major centre of graffiti. Across the continent, graffitiists who have created unique styles successfully melt the local and the global notions in the same pot. For example, Mexico City is known for its primitivist and surrealist muralism. Sao Paulo has its figurative style and pichação. Buenos Aires is prominent in political stencilling. Graffiti from Latin America has its narrative constantly developing and stimulating. It focuses more on social issues and contains a higher sense of colour (Schacter, 2013, p. 97).

The Northern European scene has the attitude that exalts the graffiti conceptualism and rejects its commodification. In this context, graffiti gains value as an action rather than aesthetic formations. For instance, London is the scene of the graffiti that produced in a bold and anarchistic manner, and these pieces clash with the society of the spectacle. Banksy, one star of the graffiti world, is from London. Besides, there are versions of graffiti focused on writing styles and indifferent to politics. The city is one of the world's largest street art markets. The graffiti scene of Paris has a sophisticated conceptual structure pursuing stylistic innovations. It is an experimental scene in these respects. Berlin's graffiti scene is the one that pushes the limits of the discourse most. In Berlin, the content is more important than the form. The city also hosts many scholarly efforts that contribute to the social analysis of graffiti (Schacter, 2013, p. 149).

The Southern European graffiti scene is more vivid than the Northern European scene since it emphasises graphic aesthetics. Conceptualism predominates, but emotions and enthusiasm are strongly felt. Barcelona has become a global centre for graffiti and street art in the early 2000s. The political graffiti tradition, which has continued since the Franco era, was partially overshadowed by a new style producing icon-based works in the 1990s. Graffiti developed as an underground movement in the city and gained experimental features in time. Also, graffiti in Barcelona has always used vivid colours. In the mid-2000s, changes in the laws partially restricted the freedom of the graffitists on the stage. However, the city continues its unique multi-coloured graffiti tradition.

The history of contemporary graffiti is not ancient; however, it is associated with one of the oldest habits of humans and society. It is influenced by social, economic and political transformations, and its emergence, popularity and glocality cannot be understood through analyses that ignore these influences. Today, how contemporary graffiti is defined, depends

on which discipline, actor, or institution defines it. Definitions are variable according to which side of the phenomenon constitutes the case of the given study.

Defining Contemporary Graffiti. According to Ross (2016), four contextual foci that are related to each other are useful in defining, categorising or analysing graffiti and street art. The first one is that graffiti and street arts are traditionally considered illegal. The second focus is on the content, aesthetics and composition of graffiti and street art. The third focus concerns who defines the practitioners of graffiti and street art. Finally, the fourth focus includes spatial evaluations of graffiti and street art (pp. 2-3).

Graffiti and street art are traditionally seen as illegal because they are applied on surfaces or objects without the permission of the owners of these surfaces and objects (Ross, 2013, pp. 392-393). For some, graffiti symbolises disorder or a threat to the order. The phenomenon has been seen by many as urban pollution, garbage, dirt, disease, epidemic, contagion, madness, insanity and vandalism (Cresswell, 1992). In Glazer's article, (1979) a commuter from New York, stated that graffiti artists have vandalised almost every subway. Also, graffiti was being mentioned among the deeds of vandalism in *broken windows theory*⁸ (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Some evaluations that see the graffiti as a perturbation, categorise it rather than condemn it altogether. For instance, Gomez (1993) distinguished the graffiti art and graffiti vandalism and alleged that scrawlings that produced to mark territory, to become (in)famous, or to express the opposition against law or society should be classified as graffiti vandalism. Differently, for Halsey and Young, (2002) graffiti is both crime and art, and it is very important to understand the overlapping points of graffiti and vandalism. Although the mainstream and institutional perspectives see the graffiti as damaging public and private

⁸ The theory suggests that the visible signs and symbols of crime, anti-social behaviour and civil disobedience encourage larger-scale crime and disobedience, and by intervening in minor crimes such as vandalism and public drinking, it is possible to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness in which further crimes can be prevented (Harcourt, 1998).

property, there is no evidence that graffitiists have been involved in other acts of vandalism such as breaking windows, slashing train seats. Moreover, there is no evidence that those who engage in these crimes are also practised graffiti. Therefore, graffiti and illegal forms of writing are fundamentally different from regular vandalism actions, but not completely different. It can be viewed as a crime or tolerated depending on its content, context or application (Halsey & Young 2002, pp. 168-169).

In terms of content, aesthetics and compositions, definitions of graffiti are varied. For example, Bloch (2012) defined graffiti as letters, characters and images that graffitiists consciously and publicly paint on city walls with spray paints. For him, graffiti is what graffitiists produce independently and illegally to gain fame or to point out the critical issues in society. Lewisohn (2008) defined graffiti as the application of an unsanctioned message/medium to any surface. Austin (2010) claimed that graffiti is a social practice with aesthetic intentions, and its semantic aspects outweigh its formal aspects. Additionally, French photographer Brassai entitled graffiti “the bastard art of the streets”. According to him, graffiti does not arouse interest due to its notoriety. It is ephemeral and it has values derived from its strong authority that overthrows established aesthetic rules (1933; as cited in Lewisohn, 2008, p. 29).

Distinguishing graffiti and street art also contributes to identification efforts. For example, according to Waclawek (2011), this distinction can be made according to the content. Graffiti is usually produced by spray-painted names, pseudonyms and accompanying images, and focuses more on letters. Street art encompasses more understandable practices and efforts designed to be noticed. Lewisohn (2008) distinguished graffiti writing from graffiti and associated it with hip-hop culture. Graffiti writing appears mostly in the form of tagging, and street art is a sub-genre of graffiti writing. Although these two different concepts are sometimes used interchangeably, they differ according to their level of ignoring social or

external reactions. Graffitists do not care about others' reactions to their work, but street artists care about feedbacks. Lewisohn (2008) argued that art historians often mislabel graffitists and street artists, and he accused the scholarship of failing to grasp the graffiti movement. For him, graffitists do not want to be called artists. They use destruction as creativity and produce a sudden-art. Lewisohn also added an annotation on whether graffiti is vandalism. "Despite all of its destructive tendencies, tagging is a highly aestheticised form of vandalism" (2008, pp. 18-19).

The concept of street art is not well-defined as the concept of graffiti. It was coined by Allen Schwartzman (1985) and it refers to paintings, illustrations and markings on urban walls. Compositions and methods of street art pieces vary according to street artists. It can be produced in various ways such as stencilling, stickering, tethering, spray painting, collages and collages. Symbolic values of spaces are important for street art, and meaning is constituted through social and political expressions connoting with certain ideas and ideologies. Street artists select a specific space or location and prepare sketches, stencils or stickers before they do their work. On the contrary, graffiti writers practice graffiti more spontaneously. They do not have such a relationship with spaces (Lewisohn, 2008). According to Manco (2002), graffiti art differs from other arts because it goes beyond the established borders of the art, and it is a way of self-expression, which uses methods that are seen as crimes.

The definition of graffiti can also vary depending on who the perpetrators are or who defines it (Ross, 2016, p. 2). Mainstream approaches consider murals as art and tagging as vandalism. However, as Snyder noted that there is no tendency among graffitists and scholars to split contemporary graffiti into rigid categories (2009; as cited in Ross, 2016, p. 2).

Another focal point for naming, defining or categorising graffiti is the space. Contemporary graffiti and street art are mostly encountered in urban areas. Spaces and surfaces to which

both are applied are very diverse. Walls of toilets, buildings, streets, overpasses, highways, train tracks, sidewalks, streets, floors, billboards, bus stops, garbage cans, benches, subway wagons, trucks, cars and so on (Ross, 2016, p. 3).

The scholarship on contemporary graffiti is extended into different disciplines and approaches. Many scholars have written about the emergence and spread of contemporary graffiti in New York and the surrounding areas (e.g. Cooper & Chalfant, 1984; Chalfant & Prigoff, 1987; Lachmann, 1988; Austin, 2001; Gastman & Neelon, 2010). Besides, many different ethnographic studies have been carried out to cover graffiti from the different cities in the world (e.g. Ferrel, 1993; Benavides-Vanegas, 2005; Halsey and Young, 2006; Chmielewska, 2007; Valjakka, 2011; Young, 2014; Bloch, 2018; Debras, 2019). There are also books discussing graffiti as an individual creative and artistic production (Banksy, 2002; Banksy, 2006; Morrisey, 2006; Jake, 2012). Moreover, many studies examine graffiti's relationship with the state, the power, institutions and mainstream media (Halsey & Young, 2002; Stewart, 2008; Kramer, 2010; Iveson, 2010; Bloch, 2012; Ross & Wright, 2014; Eyck, 2014). Some studies discuss the potential of graffiti as a pedagogical tool or evaluate the phenomenon as a window for understanding urban culture (Nandrea, 1999; Burnham, 2010; Balkır & Kuru, 2016; Baird, 2018; Campbell, McMillen & Svendsen, 2019).

An Ontological Analysis of Graffiti

This sub-section shows the relations between the concepts and categories concerning graffiti and aims to examine ontologically its variety of functions dispersed into distinct layers of social and political processes, from the singularity to the public. Thus, individualised social, psycho-sociological and political processes as the potential essences of urban movements, or their traces that can be followed through the graffiti practice, the

journey of the graffiti through the distinct spatialities and historicities, and its actional functions for social movements will be discussed.

Graffiti - The War Machine. Halsey and Young (2006) in their study that focuses on graffiti in urban spaces and reveals some points that are overlooked in cultural criminology, consider graffitiists as subjectivities. I believe that their findings and determinations are seminal for all those who study graffiti. Halsey and Young (2006), analysed the illicit writing in urban spaces with a focus on desire, pleasure and vision (p. 276). In this context, they emphasised that graffiti practising is not only about changing the material body of the city. It also affects graffitiists as bodies since it is affective for/on them (Halsey & Young, 2006, p. 277). Here, the notion of affection should be seen in a Spinozist-Deleuzean sense. In this context, affect is not about a personal feeling, rather it is the ability to affect and to be affected. It refers to the body's flows between experiential states and fluctuations in the capacity to act during these flows (Kristensen, 2016). Affect connects the body with the world, with others, and with other situations, and with an intensive affect, the sense of belonging to other people and places increases (Massumi, 2002). Intensity is the degree of power that a body or a composition of bodies can harbour. The differentiation of intensity is the differentiation of individuation between individual bodies (Kristensen, 2016, p. 21). Correspondingly, Halsey and Young (2006) argued that graffitiists do not do graffiti to build their identities or declare them. They practice graffiti for affection, to connect with other bodies. Also, according to Halsey and Young (2006), graffitiists do not describe or introduce themselves as "writers, young ones or outraged citizens", and do graffiti for the "desire to invest in networks that are familial, residential, pedagogical, and cultural and so on" (p. 278). Graffiti establishes connections between bodies with the proliferation of images, and it links graffitiists to the urban space because of its material requirements. However, graffitiists and urban surfaces do not provide all the conditions for the graffiti practice. Prostheses such as

spray cans that connect graffitiists to urban space and other bodies are required. Through these prostheses, the graffitiists and the other (city and other bodies) become connected, and they stop being separate things. Therefore, graffiti should not be discussed separately from the act of illicit writing (Halsey & Young, 2006).

According to Halsey and Young (2006), graffiti practice is closely related to strong mental and physical pleasures. As it is frequently mentioned in many studies about graffiti (Lachmann, 1988; Campos, 2012) achieving fame and recognition is another important reason, especially among graffitiists. For them, pleasure and pride and sharing these feelings and experiences with a group of people is a strong source of motivation. Motivations such as boredom or rebellion, which are seen in most of the stereotypical analyses, are not as decisive as it is thought. Graffitiists do not do graffiti based on their grievances or negative motivations. On the contrary, their motivations to practice graffiti are mostly positive. The efforts to put graffiti writing in a negative frame result from mainstream approaches. Besides mental pleasures and affection, graffitiists take bodily pleasure also while producing graffiti. It is perceived that alongside the catharsis that is felt by witnessing the emergence of a graffiti, a physically challenging and adrenaline-containing graffiti writing act gives graffitiists pleasure and joy. Moreover, Halsey and Young (2006) pointed out that graffitiists have a feeling that they are doing something right when writing graffiti. This feeling and the motivation that it is attached to are vague. However, they are the very reasons graffitiists take the risk of arrests or physical injuries (pp. 279- 283). For graffitiists, graffiti is an affective and visceral process. It is difficult to characterise the graffiti only as carnivalesque, playful activism that resists the capitalist urban processes in which the dominant discourse is imposed and try to push these boundaries, by excluded people or groups. Because graffiti practice does not involve irrationality or ignoring objective conditions, rather it is a rational production process with steps such as planning, designing and organising. According to

Halsey and Young (2006), what graffitiists do cannot be adequately explained by the conventional methods of explanation that take refuge in dichotomies. Graffiti is both irrational and rational, and it is unique. Therefore, reductive statements and analyses are doomed to fail. Only the approaches that carefully examine the relations between graffitiists' bodies, the urban spaces and surfaces will provide a more accurate analysis of the phenomenon because in this way transformation of subjectivities can be explained. At this point, scholars used Deleuze and Guattari's conceptualisation of the striated and smooth spaces (Halsey & Young, 2006, pp. 292-295). The smooth space does not have knobs, burrs or layers that will increase the frictional force and it consists only of uncoded flows and lines that have not yet solidified. Unlike the striated space that comprises subjects, objects, qualities and states of things coded by state, it is a field of individualised force relations where everything is in relation with each other. External relations of powers, which they enter through their differences, constitute the smooth space. These relationships give smooth space the dynamism that allows it to determine itself. The biggest difference of the smooth space from the striated space is that it is based on other differentiations, which perceived as differences of power by nomads, not on differentiations such as parcels, streets or walls. Thus, each force passes into a horizontal and creative relationship with the other. This is what gives the smooth (nomadic) space its superiority. While the striated space is a closed, rigid space, the smooth space is flexible and creative; it comprises processes, not results. This means territorialisation in deterritorialization. The smooth space has a certain autonomy that does not oppose coexistence and involves coercion-persistence relations. However, the state's existence depends on external factors. It is heterogeneous by its essence. The smooth space not only determines itself but also affects the striated space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 474-500). The smooth space is the place of nomadic thought. Nomadic thought does not need universal subjects; it desires the race of singularities. Therefore, it is not established through

integrative clusters (Karadağ, 2016). In their study, Halsey and Young (2006) explain the space of graffiti with the concept of the smooth space. Accordingly, graffiti writing is a flow that creates, uses and locates the smooth space. On the other hand, space, which represents the order, urban design and cleanliness, is the striated space. Graffiti is the birth of the smooth space in the striated space. Graffitiists do not see the city as a uniqueness as the state does. For them, the city means an infinite number of surfaces, on which they can affect or be affected, and it is an unlimited constantly changing smooth space for graffitiists. The condition, the relation or the difference, which becomes recognisable with the overlapping of these contradictory ways of perceiving and spaces of the state and graffitiists, can be explained by the concept of the other. The other helps us to find our place in spaces and transitions to happen by reminding the epiphenomenal existence of relations in time and space (Halsey & Young, 2006, pp. 297-298). Graffiti is an

“unfolding of a body (the illicit writer), its desires (to put up, to express, to communicate), its pleasures (in holding the can, in inscribing the letters along a chosen surface) and its capacities (to improve upon the last image, to put up more or less often, to make choices about locations, styles and surfaces)” (Halsey & Young, 2006, p. 289).

Graffitiists are not the other. Their writing and affection, which flows in and around the urban spaces create the other, by reminding the other. The idea of graffiti emerges from the desires of subjectivities. The satisfaction of these desires on urban surfaces connects the bodies through affection. However, this phase cannot be fully described by the processes that occur after the entrance of a graffiti to the public domain as a completed product. It is related to these processes but does not develop in a way dependent on them. Graffitiists do not see urban space like those who analyse graffiti and those who do not produce graffiti because both the graffiti and graffitiist are in the smooth space because of their nature of appearance

and existence. Therefore, they cannot be fully read with the logic of the striated space. Where the logic of the striated space sees crime and vandalism, graffitiists from the smooth space see pleasure, beautification, objects of desire and affection. This is why graffitiists and graffiti can turn into a multitude in this space. Where the logic of the striated space contains social opposition and political conflict, the logic of smooth space contains flows. Only when these two spaces intersect, they realise each other and interact. At this point, graffiti becomes the intersection of striated and smooth space for a time. Besides, the smooth space is abrasive.

When a graffito is completed, the abrasion is also completed and the smooth space alters the striated space at varying space-times before continuing its nomadic path of flows. The change in the striated space enables city dwellers to feel the presence of the other. This feeling is no longer fully accountable for the subjective reasons for the formation of graffiti. The realization of the other and the intersection of spaces require a transition to a new phase between the connected bodies of graffiti and the city.

I believe that another concept coined by Deleuze and Guattari (1987; 1990) would help us understand the other's role regarding the social and political issues through its relations with the non-other; the war machine. The war machine is outside of the state apparatuses. The state uses the police and guards, not warriors. It catches and ties all sorts of fights. It has an army, but it envisions the legal integration of the war and the organisation of a military function. The war machine stands beyond the sovereignty of the state as something that precedes its law. It breaks the agreement and unlinks the links. It is the power of transformation, the rise of temporality, a flock, a pure multiplicity and an immeasurableness. It is the anger against the measure, the quickness against slowness, the mystery against the public, the power against sovereignty, a machine against apparatus. It is of a different kind with a unique nature and it is not from the origin of the state (Deleuze & Guattari, 1990, pp. 25-27). The war machine plays a role in the historical changes of the state through the

coercion-persistence relationship. Through the creative activity, it constantly changes and cracks the image. It creates fractures through these cracks that will transform the entire structure. Thus, the lines of flight that pointed out by nomadic thought affects and rearranges the entire system. The war machine is a way of creative living and deterritorialising all social and oedipal codes. The purpose of the war machine, unless it is captured by the state, is not war. It is a form of social aggregation directed against the state and its dominance. The war machine tries to break the accumulation of power and does so by introducing the smooth space into the striated space (Deleuze & Guattari, 1990, p. 71). Robinson (2010) described The Squatter's Movement in Europe, Zapatistas, Palestinian Intifada and networks that protest global summits, as war machines. He also argued that war machines can be founded as practices of everyday resistance. The excluded commonly unite as war machines because the form of the state cannot harbour them. War machines are related to the formation of multiplicities. Multiplicities differ from large, non-dense and vertically assembled masses. They are connected through affection and emerge as intensive and horizontal relations. The locality is essential to the multiplicities. They avoid fixed hierarchies and scatter through space instead of concentrating in specific places. The multiplicities are not represented in the established conventional structures. They appear at many points and echo connectively and intensively. By breaking the materials in the striated space of the state from their connections, they build different universes and re-establish distinct ways of seeing and establishing relations and perspectives. Thus, they constitute an alternative to dominance. The war machine is a conceptualisation that explains how the other differs from the sovereign ways of social organising and collectiveness, and its difference is related to the possibilities of social transformation (Robinson, 2010). In this context, by referring to Halsey and Young's study (2006), I argue that graffiti writing is a war machine of lived space and related to multiplicities that form based on an affection that bonds different bodies. Graffitiists emerge

rhizomatically in urban space and do graffiti, and their relations among them are formed also in this phase. That suddenly appearing universe of graffiti cracks the forms of the striated space, and the smooth space infiltrates from these cracks. The interventions of the state to graffiti on behalf of the order and urban form make the other's presence felt and the cracks visible. The grotesque and improbable visual and textual structure of graffiti enables the encounter of ordinary citizens with the suddenly appearing universes. This encounter causes the state, form and even the multiplicity to be re-recognised and questioned. The graffiti, which is the product of this process, become fixed in a striated space after being produced. The smooth space of the multiplicity migrates to another place, but graffiti materially remains for a time on surfaces. After that, the presence of graffiti, which represents multiplicity and smoothness that conflicts with the state's striated space, enters a relationship with the public/urban space and creates an impact. Finally, the completed graffiti is ready to be captured by the residents of the striated space and to spark another aspiration for social change.

Graffiti - The Infestation of Linguistic Ghettos. The multiplicity of graffiti that passes from the smooth space to the striated space has high visibility in urban space because of its features that make the other felt. Baudrillard (2017) explained the meaning of graffiti for urban space within the striated environment of it, and its struggle with urban codes. The urban city is a place where distinctive signs are deceitful. It is a neutralised, homogeneous space of indifference wherein the recognition of differences is gradually decreasing. In the contemporary city, multiple codes assigned to each act and moment in space-time. Urban marshalling is an arrangement and environment in which the city is reproduced economically and spatially, and through signs and codes, social relations are symbolically destroyed. The political economy has a dimension that all sociality is invested, covered and dismantled by signs (Baudrillard, 2017, p. 94). The city is the primary site where the sign is executed. The

urban matrix does not realise the power but it realises the difference. The new urban scenario results from the analysis of the needs and sign-functions, which are formed and projected based on an analytical definition. All actions in the city become commutable in a homogeneous space defined as the total environment. The city is a zone of signs, media and codes. It is around everything in the form of signs of reality. All space-times of urban life are interconnected ghettos. The multiplicity of codes submit the desocialisation and everyone living in the city become commutable just like televisions, cars or brands. "This is the era of geometrically variable individuals" (Baudrillard, 2017, p. 95), and this code shapes the social relations by circulating in urban space. The system can continue to reproduce itself in the absence of material production, productive city or market-based social relations. However, it cannot do this without space-time of codes. Codes are the power (Baudrillard, 2017, p. 96). For Baudrillard (2017), graffiti is a brutal attack on the homogenizing system, which makes everything about the city commutable. This attack is a novel kind of intervention that changes urban content and terrain because it is a new space-time that terrorises the power of the media, signs and dominant culture. This new form makes everything commutable in a functional framework and makes sense as long as there is a term that can vary according to code. Under these conditions to say "I exist", means to rebel radically (Baudrillard, 2017, p. 96). According to Baudrillard (2017), tagging is not an attempt to regain identities. It is an effort to convert the indeterminacy of the system into extermination. It is the reversal and disruption of the code of the system within its logic and space. Graffiti is the transgression of the non-referentiality of what Baudrillard named semiocracy. It disrupts the code and throws the designations of the system off the track. It is an anti-discourse, which cannot be captured by any organised discourse. It is independent of all interpretation, connotation and denotation inherent in the system. It spreads to the urban space as empty signifiers and erodes the structure of the city full of signs by using incantations. Referring to Deleuze, Baudrillard

(2017) likened the urban city to a body without organs where channelled flows intersect. With these flows, graffitists come from the territorial order and territorialise the decoded spaces of the city. With this act, urban space awakens and becomes a collective territory. Linguistic ghettos surround and garnish the city with signs of rebellion via graffiti. Graffiti acts as a burst of an uprising in the urban landscape and reproduce the urban code. This new code works based on the difference rather than power. Thus, the order of the signs becomes disintegrated. As graffiti superimposes itself, it transforms the city into a body with no beginning and no end. This is like a primitive man covering himself with tattoos. Tattoos on the walls liberate the body from architecture, revive and make it a living social matter before it is trapped again with functions and institutions (Baudrillard, 2017, pp. 97-100). It can be argued that graffiti after its disengagement from the smooth space and becoming a part of urban space is perceived as an incompatible high-pitched scream. The other enunciated by graffiti as a multiplicity become perceived by the non-other of the striated space through its codes for the materiality it has changed in urban space. The spatial coexistence of the other and non-other creates possibilities for noticing the order that designs the city and its inhabitants. Graffiti's signs are remarkable and it attaches them to the equation of the urban order in an unsanctioned way with the power of its grotesqueness. At this phase, graffiti engages in direct and indirect dialogues with the public in the city as the ornamentations of the other.

Graffiti - The Ornamentation. Graffiti becomes one of the elements of the public space after it becomes concrete in urban space and begins to interact with people. It belongs now to the striated space and has the potential to be an actor of social transformation/change with the signs and universes it brings from the smooth space. At this phase, the artistic and social functions of graffiti can be incorporated into discursive, communicative and contentious processes of political participation and representation. This is also the phase

during which graffiti struggles with power and the power tries to seize graffiti. For this reason, it takes forms appropriate to artistic / design relations imposed by the order and the power over space. Schacter (2014) examined graffiti as ornamentations and analysed their trajectories of social, political situations on urban walls by scrutinising the phenomenon's existence spatially and socially. His analysis grounds on the fact that ornamentation is not merely a reflection or an extension of the order; also, it is a process, in which the order constitutes itself. Ornamentation is an act of ordering and harmonising. Beyond its function of aestheticization, it aims to reach utility and comprehensibility by communicating, completing and ordering. The ornamentation of urban spaces presents and emits the hegemonic order. It contains the transformative and agentive abilities of that power. Ornamentation not only designs urban space but also constructs the ways of how we make sense of the world and ourselves (Schacter, 2014). The cities are built and ordered environments, and we cannot perceive the world without the order of buildings, squares or walls of the cities. The arrangement of cities constructs our perception of the world, and ornamentation is the reordering of the order of cities. When we encounter and perceive ornamentations, we become assured of the urban order. With consistency and intelligibility, order speaks to us through ornaments and conveys its discourse. The conveying is complemented and reinforced by the ornaments' aestheticization. In urban spaces, the ornamentation of established and institutional order may yield to reordering of ornamentations that does not fit the order. Graffiti are contemporary urban ornamentations whose practitioners are unsanctioned and originate from the outside of the order. These actors have something to say discordant with the dominant discourse of the order and they engrave their ideas, arrangements on the material body of cities. Graffiti are ornaments and practices of those who look for alternatives to the dominance in urban spaces and think differently than the order requires or needs.

Schacter (2014) also argued that graffiti cannot be understood independently of the surfaces on which they are written, scratched or engraved. Thus, it should be examined concerning the urban material body. The course of graffiti is shaped by the material body of the city, and it appears in the dimension that Brett (2005; as cited in Schacter, 2014, p. 21) terms as the visual pleasure. Graffiti produces forms that pursue a demand for social recognition, perceptual satisfaction and a psychological reward, both publicly and sincerely, in the dimension of visual pleasure. Graffiti decorates, adorns, embellishes and beatifies the surfaces of the material body (Schacter, 2014, p. 22). Therefore, it is the ornamentation that works as a mediator. It sends messages, shows signs and symbols. It transmits representations, aesthetic and ethical values to ensure effective communication (Grabar, 1992). Ornamentation is not just about various artistic applications on surfaces. Beyond that, it establishes relations between objects, artworks, practitioners and viewers. In this context, the established order does not attack the independent public arts just because they are unsanctioned. It refuses them since they reveal the imposed sociality and prove the existence of those who disobey and oppose. In this sense, it can be claimed that graffiti saves and revitalises the urban space. It captures audiences and dragging them out of their conceived worlds by repulsing the imposed aesthetics and the sociality (Schacter, 2014, pp. 34-35). Graffiti as ornamentation creates a new sense of order using the material surfaces of the urban spaces. This sense of order re-negotiates the symbolic and formal expressions of the built order and reconstructs the meaning of the space. In this way, urban space reveals the conflicts between the value of use and the value of exchange; between the public and private spaces (Schacter, 2014, pp. 41-42).

Schacter (2014) examined graffiti in two different groups; graffiti as consensual ornamentation and graffiti as agonistic ornamentation. According to him, consensual ornamentation is “a practice in which open civic dialogue and rational consensus are key” (p.

55). It reflects the graffitiists' desire to establish an intersubjective relationship with the public. It is aimed to reach harmony and communion. Schacter has based his analysis on Habermas' concepts of the public sphere and communicative action. In this perspective, the consensual graffiti in contemporary society is the equivalent of 18th-century European coffeehouses. They not only try to contribute to the creation of an environment in which citizens can come together, communicate about important social issues, make critical choices and reach a consensus but also try to ensure a consensus among subjectivities about critical and valid demands. The aim is to overcome the hegemon practices, which prevents the emergence of rational, transformative and original opinions. Hence, they struggle with manipulations that disrupt public communication and try to maintain what is ethical by shifting it from the individual level to the rational community level. For a sociality that works under the control of constituent interests. In this framework, the use of language is important in the name of understanding and consensus because linguistic and non-linguistic expressions can generate valid claims only in this way (Schacter, 2014, pp. 57-59). Graffitiists who produce consensual graffiti try to open up a rational and fruitful public space. In this space, arguments and debates can be done freely. Unlike the coffeehouses and salons of the previous centuries, this environment has sprouted in an illegal structure. It is illegal, but it works for the benefit of the public. Its purpose is to serve the public, not to harm it. Consensual graffiti emerges in a public space open to all and paves the way for individuals' aggregation and shaping of public opinions. The presence of consensual graffiti indicates the fact that in urban space, a group of people communicate in public spaces. Graffiti shows the diversity and innovation of this new public space thanks to its artistic aesthetic capabilities and possibilities. It opposes the ideas, judgments and values produced by hegemony and repels the conditions imposed by state and corporations from urban space. It makes the manipulative design of the city visible by presenting its difference. It moves the communication from being

a process of persuasion to being a process of propositions. It does not demand obedience, but recognition (Schacter, 2014, p. 63). Consensual graffiti is a discourse aimed at creating a dynamic process of mutual agreement with the public through communicative rationality on an urban scale. It targets to establish a direct and purposeful relationship with the audiences. Consensual graffiti is an illocutionary act in Habermasian sense. It shows dedication to the rationality of public demands because it aims to bring people together. It has an aesthetic form that is understandable, decipherable, legible and simple. As a discursive practice, it aims to connect and communicate, and does not push the audiences to the certain consensus it desires. Consensual graffiti is an autonomous form based on intersubjective recognition of criticisable reality claims (Schacter, 2014, pp. 62-63). Briefly, modern graffiti as consensual ornamentation is the mean of communication that strives to generate a public space in which everyone can take part and directly and rationally form social opinions.

Graffiti may also be agonistic ornamentation. Agonistic graffiti is the product of an understanding in which consensus and its contributions to the public sphere, are no longer valid. Consensus means ignoring the possibilities of language, pluralism and authentic political actions (Schacter, 2014, p. 92). The agonistic approach argues that conflict and disagreement are necessary for the realisation of democracy and the existence of an egalitarian public space. Ending of embracing and creating harmony, adopting dispute and dissidence create opportunities in which hegemonic power can be questioned and criticised. Opposition, objection and disagreement are not notions that impede social and political transformations. They are the creators of an active and efficient public space. Dissidence allows for a public space wherein everything can be discussed indefinitely because it is not obliged to shared notions, which people would revolve around. This communicative dispute is not finite. It is an ongoing area where participants compete for recognition, superiority and validation (Benhabib, 1992, p, 93).

Schacter (2014) has built this second category of graffiti using Lyotard's and Mouffe's concepts. Lyotard (1984) in *The Postmodern Condition*, argued that real communication and invention can only arise from a disobedient will. In this context, the language itself and the act of speech are constant fields of struggle. He rejected the idea that the argumentative rationality and the science-based consensus will enable the free validity criteria to be achieved (Lyotard, 1988). Scientific statements or ideas are surrounded by predetermined scientific criteria. Therefore, Lyotard (1984) suggested little narratives that contain pluralism, heterogeneity and difference instead of meta-narratives that tell grand stories and dictate homogeneity. Little narratives negate the metalanguage of meta-narratives, which try to negate the differend. They bring forth the para-logical space, sensitive to differences and insightful to the indescribable. In this space, a pattern of dissensus and displacement is dominant instead of consensus. No narrative can silence or terminate other narratives (Schacter, 2014, p. 96). When the meta-narratives used to provide a unifying authority are ceased, dissent and dissonant language escapes the tyranny of episteme and science and becomes the cornerstone of an area that makes independent political practices and judgments possible. This new game of language is shaped within the relationality of the players. Every new rule changes the game forever, and every word, every expression is a new move of this game (Lyotard, 1984, p. 10). Besides, each new relationship or the unique structure of each new relationship means a new communicative process. The fact that everyone who is involved in the process can invent new rules allows them to reflect their beings through their own artistic or other means. The consensus is to find the path on a permitted map, it is an antagonistic form of the political practice (Villa, 1992, p. 716). Contrarily, little narratives or patterns enable to transcend or disrupt the borders of established social meanings, truth, and meta-narratives. Para-logical art witnesses the emergence of those who cannot be seen and expressed in public space.

According to Mouffe (2000), there is an endless conflict between liberal individualism and the democratic ideal. Because liberal individualism centralises the individual with its moral discourse, the democratic ideal aims to create an identity based on homogeneity. Because of the discrepancy between the logic of democracy and the logic of liberalism, every notion of equality created by the state leads to inequality. The modern story of liberal democracy is stuck between the balances of this quagmire. However, the relative balance of this contrast was disrupted because neoliberal hegemony considers only market conditions. Finally, the gradual departure from democracy took place. Because of this deterioration and the dominance of neoliberal bureaucracy, now it is almost impossible to consider the possibility of an alternative system to the established system today. The notions of the established system are perceived as representatives of an absolute situation. Therefore, there is not even a single room for legitimate forms of resisting expression that would remonstrate on the established system (Schacter, 2014, pp. 99-100). Nevertheless, Mouffe (2008) proposed a method that would nurture social opposition and conflict. That method will reveal what the ruling consensus excludes and obscures. In addition, this method does not completely reject the established system while achieving its purpose and does not stipulate a fundamental break from the existing conditions (Schacter, 2014, p. 100). It focuses on transforming the mindset of dichotomies such as us and them. This alternative method necessitates seeing old enemies as opponents and requires the fight with their ideas, not with them or their rights to have opinions. At this point, Mouffe suggested the agonistic pluralism rather than deliberative democracy, which completely excludes disobedient actors from the public sphere. Besides, she emphasised a transition from antagonism to agonism. In antagonistic processes, competitors do not share common symbolic spaces. In agonistic relationships, however, opponents share a common space of representation and a common symbolic space in which the public sphere comes to life. This is the area that will keep

democracy alive because it ends with the exclusion of actors who create social transformation for consensus. Agonistic pluralism suggests that sensitivities to conflict and non-compromise should change (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 13-14). Thus, with the return of actors expelled from the public sphere on behalf of the consensus, novel forms of progressive subjectivity may emerge and dominant social power may change. The agonistic struggle is “a never-ending struggle to confront truth and power at every level” (Schacter, 2014, p. 103).

According to Schacter (2014), some graffiti can be regarded as agonistic ornamentations and little narratives, which act in the para-logic field and fight against the false, ostentatious public space. Each agonistic graffito is a piece of art in which those who cannot make themselves heard and who cannot be enunciated by the capabilities and moulds of metalanguage appear and reveals the differend. It directly opposes the manipulating and deceitful visual culture of the city and the discourse of media. Agonistic graffiti wages war against them, and it plays language games that reveal tension and dissensus, both through their forms and perceiving. It is a discourse that functions within the framework of agonistic pluralism. This discourse produces practices rather than arguments and exalts multiplicity. Agonistic graffiti focuses on passion and fantasy rather than rationality or deliberation. Besides Schacter (2014) claimed that agonistic ornamentations can be linked with the constitutive power of actors outside the established system and can play a role in removing obstacles for actual critical practices and creating agonistic public spaces. Agonistic graffiti tries to communicate with a narrower public space, unlike consensual graffiti. It does not address everyone; it wants to reach the differend. Besides, it does not work with the surfaces of the urban area as its enhancements. It is against urban surfaces. It uses public space as a “multidimensional site of practice”, not a canvas (pp. 103-104).

Whether consensual or agonistic, graffiti is an urban medium of public opposition and transformation. Besides, as Lefebvre’s differential space and Deleuze’s war machine point

out to the existence of a dynamic relational continuance constantly fed by the difference between the other and the non-other, phenomena such as graffiti play a role in generating new codes, alternative universes and spaces objects of desire, and they reconnect bodies in episodes that smoothen the spaces. They are the bearers of the signs that give birth to desires. This continuously rotating antagonist dynamo of the rediscovered differences allows the multiplicities to follow their desires. Intersections such as graffiti associate the other with the non-other are meaningful for subjectivities because they enable the desires for new languages and representations. That is why graffiti is frequently used for communication and political participation as a practice and an action visible in urban spaces. The functions and potentials attributed to the graffiti after this phase, are related to the embodiments of the flows between the conceived space and the probability of the differential space. Sociality is relational and fluid. Taken cross-sections are more like frozen single frames of this relationality and fluidity. However, each of these frames provides meaningful perspectives for analyses. At this stage, I will discuss graffiti concerning these various cross-sections, since the discussion may be useful for understanding its roles in urban social movements. I believe that the resemblances and patterns among these cross-sections will reveal some invariant characteristics of graffiti.

Graffiti for the Right to the City. Graffiti is an urban phenomenon in its essence. Therefore, it plays a role in the processes of urban social production and it is about the relations of urban actors. Zieleniec (2016) examined graffiti with Lefebvre's concepts, which I have discussed in the previous chapter. In this context, graffiti is a phenomenon that takes a stand against the value of exchange and commodification dominating the urban space. It is also an everyday practice in which ever-changing ephemeral artistic inscriptions are inscribed on the surfaces of the city. Temporarily, it seizes, reclaims and reconstructs the urban space, just as Lefebvre (2016) has described it within the right to the city. Through graffiti, the

commodified and instrumentalised urban space becomes a social and public space again, and the value of use, heterogeneity, difference and humanity become re-manifested against planning, design, commerce, consumption and neoliberal modes of production (Zieleniec, 2016, p. 1). Graffiti indicates the reclaiming of urban space by urban actors who constantly change, transform, conflict, demand and express themselves. It conveys the grievances, demands and aspirations of these actors to the urban space, but also reveals their unsatisfied desires about the urban space. For this reason, it is labelled as illegal, disruptive or dangerous by control systems and power (Zieleniec, 2016, p. 9).

Lefebvre (2003) has claimed that public space and streets are essential for a democratic and inclusive society. A street is a place of gathering, cohesion, disorder, play and learning. Therefore, they highlight the value of use and resistance against the oppression, dominant social, political and economic conditions. Urban walls are the signifiers of protests, conflicts and oppositions where speeches turn into writings and desires and ideas are free from the grasp of ruling institutions (p. 19).

Urban spaces are places where the signs of sociality, signs that global production modes attach to the spaces are consumed (signs of happiness, signs of power, signs of science etc.). Production processes and social activities are organised through these signs. Writings in urban spaces also take their places among these signs (Lefebvre, 1996). However, if writings in urban spaces are not used to examine what is going on from an urban perspective, they become absorbed by the system and retrieving urban space ends. Examining the writings on urban surfaces are significant because thus it is possible to detect the production of sociality and the resistance to hegemonic forms of production. In this sense, the potential of urban space should be not overlooked. This creative potential is effective in the meaningful embodiment of differences, diversity, communication and information. Graffiti, for this perspective, refers to practices of recapturing urban spaces by actions such as writing and

painting by those who are weak and excluded. As an artistic marking, it enables a new way of spatial representation within the city, which is transformed into an architectural and semiological body of the neoliberal modes of production. Graffiti is a spatial intervention. It is a public act that tries to free itself from the homogenising effects of global capital, through art, humour, beautification, shock, or recognition (Zieleniec, 2016, p. 10). In this sense, it can be described as a practice of the right to the city. Graffiti can be seen as an oeuvre in the city and a “living creative work of art” (Zieleniec, 2016, p. 11). It enables graffitists and their audiences to perceive the city with a distinct perspective. It brings the multiplicity back to the urban spaces as an art, from the lived space where ideas, unique perspectives and views met. Graffiti function as signs, while they are signifiers because through them city dwellers can attach their experiences from the lived space to communicative and collective processes on the social scale. Graffiti changes the urban materiality, inhabitants and experiences about urban conditions. Through graffiti argumentation, communication, interpretation and explanation processes not driven by global capital and neoliberal market, can take place. It challenges " the gentrification, the development that priorities consumption, the privatisation of collective resources” by generating alternative signs, symbols, messages, images and discourses (Zieleniec, 2016, p. 11). It is not about the aestheticization of urban space in a limited and superficial sense. It is to make space and time the art itself. Thusly, urban space meets urban signs rooted in real demands of social transformation (Lefebvre, 1996, p. 173). Graffiti is an intervention and active interaction in the urban area. It disrupts the perceived space and emerges from the lived space. The goal is to transform or maybe destroy the conceived space, where the power lingers. Therefore, it tries to break the homogenising physical characteristics of the designed city. It proclaims the right to the city and works as a practice for the excluded dissident to regain the urban space. It opposes spatial order and

becomes political by creating spaces against dominant economic and political power through its creative, artistic means (Zieleniec, 2016).

Briefly, in terms of the right to the city, graffiti is a spatial intervention. There is the order, which builds the city with spatial arrangements and invents homogenising cultural and social abstractions consistent with its fiction that will guarantee its continuity. However, there are ways like graffiti that the order can be resisted. These ways are outside the homogeneous conceived space, but they are not completely unrelated to it. Because emphasising homogenization requires the existence of heterogeneity. According to this cross-section, graffiti is the means to create a conflictual space on the captured urban space, and it is a spatial intervention of the excluded ones aiming at the disruption of the spatiality of the order. The motivation of this intervention is the desire to rebuild the city for its real users.

Graffiti for Representation and Political Participation. In scholarship, graffiti is frequently associated with representation. When graffiti described as a practice of name writing, social commenting and identity building it becomes related to the politics of representation. Carrington (2009, p. 419) has associated graffiti with the decisive role of texts in politics of representation. In contemporary societies, people's lives are shaped through representations and textual mediation plays an important role in the construction of these representations. Besides, through representation, people make sense of the world they live in, the activities they participate in and even who they are. Therefore, the politics of representation is vital today. Representations are decisive in establishing social relations and generating ideological fluctuations. It is about deciding who will be represented and which representations will be accepted as an alternative (Fairclough, 1999). Carrington (2009) added another level to the discussion of graffiti and representation, by referring to Beck's works on the emerging of sub-politics. Sub-politics refer to the issue-driven small-scale participation instead of big P-Politics, such as party politics (Beck, 1992; 1999). The reason

for this novel way of representation is that conventional means of representation are completely obstructed. Therefore, do-it-yourself politics begins (Beck, 1992, p. 135). In this context, graffiti can be described as textual reflexive identity narratives, which are in interaction with social transformations. These narratives produce political representations at the local level. “Graffiti writing on the city is about writing oneself into existence” (Carrington, 2009, p. 420). It is a new and local arena politics of representation. Carrington also associated this new representation with the participatory culture, like Jenkins, Purushotma, Weigel, Clinton & Robinson (2006) have described. Participatory culture embraces artistic forms of self-expression and civic engagement, functioning with social connections, mentoring and sharing.

According to Carrington (2009), since graffiti practices are artistic expressions and parts of the civic engagement and mentoring processes, they participatory. Besides, the link between graffiti and participatory culture became strengthened with new communication technologies and networks. Briefly, graffiti can be thought of as narratives of a participatory alternative culture that occurs when traditional political channels are blocked or political systems cannot recognize the dynamics of the upcoming social transformations.

These textual narratives become the means of culture, politics, representation and participation, within a participatory framework that covers dissent and marginalised flows of sub-cultures (Carrington, 2009). Graffiti is again considered as means of political processes that attempt to infiltrate into a confined, closed area in representation and participation, just like the cross-section about right to the city. As a remedy for those who cannot benefit from the representational procedures of the order and cannot participate in institutional political processes, graffiti functions this time to overcome the sets drawn in front of people in an urban/local framework. At this point, it should be mentioned that although the cross-sections change, graffiti remains an intrusive and interventional phenomenon.

Graffiti and Political Communication. Graffiti is often seen as the leading actor of a certain cross-section, with its political/communicative abilities. According to Klee (2010), graffiti is not about merely graffitiists' acts or efforts for earning reputation and recognition among their graffiti communities or for the eyes, which know how to read particular graffiti moves, styles or slang. Besides that, it is a political communication tool that can be used in a variety of ways. Emotional reactions to political events, messages or warnings from certain political groups, political threats, threats in response to political threats, political satire, recruiting attempts and calls for direct political action are among them. Klee (2010) associated graffiti with the public space because of its inseparability from the urban space and claimed that graffiti redistributes and reorganises spaces for its subjective use. Graffiti is not only about individual reactions but also collective social and political processes. In this sense, it may be the agent of social response (pp. 110-111). Practising graffiti is an experience in which graffitiists cross certain boundaries within their sociality, and position themselves as actors in a process of socially symbolic integration or disintegration. (Here the above-mentioned distinction between consensual and antagonistic can be reconsidered). The processes of political identity formation also influence this positioning. In this context, graffitiists can be described as developing political actors. According to Klee (2010), graffiti has a significant place in politics as a form in which current social, political events are processed, discussed, and feedbacked through words, symbols and slogans. The political goals of graffiti are to express anonymously the individual approaches and emotions, to make political proposals, to participate in politics, and to reach politically like-minded people. Graffiti according to current spatial, temporal and political conditions, can serve as a provider of silent dialogue between the like-minded, as loud calls for direct action or messages that drive political decision-making. Besides, graffiti offers a low-threshold option for political participation and political protest. Unlike the institutionalised or traditional

processes of collective political participation or protest, graffiti paves the way for the political act, allowing the individual to interact at least temporarily, with the public space. Klee (2010) identified graffiti artists as political actors in a direct and immediate cause-and-effect relationship with the political-cultural space. Therefore, graffiti is a medium of politics (p. 118). Briefly, graffiti provides political communication. Communication is a process that includes transmitting the message to the target by the transmitter and receiving feedback about the message. In this context, it can be considered as an ongoing transfer of information.

Graffiti also serves as a means of collective social responses. These collective responses allow individuals to group under certain identities. Also, graffiti is not only a tool of political communication but also a political act and differs from conventional and institutionalised ways of political communication. Unlike these ways, it facilitates the communication of individuals with the public. Here again, a point compatible with other cross-sections emerges. There is a discrepancy and distinction between those who are deprived of established political and social processes and the established system's ways. In this perspective, when graffiti's political communicative functions are considered, it can be described as a transition, an intervention or a penetration. In the area opened up by graffiti, a new field emerges in which those who are deprived of political and social-communicative processes can interact. Therefore, it has been argued that instead of the communicative, representative or participatory conditions of the established order, in this new field, unusual and perhaps more democratic political and communicative conditions can arise.

Graffiti and Politics. The graffiti's capabilities to overcome, disrupt or stop the order of power for a while, are also in the foreground in the cross-section in which political graffiti is defined. Political graffiti refers to the unsanctioned texts written on urban surfaces that express political messages, approaches, comments, protests, criticisms, oppositions or agreements. In this sense, graffiti can be regarded as a political action in which graffiti artists

politicise the public sphere, mark ideological boundaries, and send political and social messages. In addition, producing graffiti can be described as political activists' and groups' efforts to create a counter-hegemonic space through cultural wars in urban space and by taking advantage of the tension between private and public spaces (Mitchell, 2000; Zaimakis, 2015). Zaimakis (2015) noted that political graffiti can be explained by Foucault's concept of cultural heterotopias (Foucault, 1979/2008; Topinka, 2010). Unlike utopias that are perfectly designed, imaginary and consolatory, heterotopias reverse all the reality they are associated with and open up them for discussions. They secretly shake or even shatter, other places in which they are involved and where the inhabitants settle naturally. For Foucault, the function of heterotopias is that they are fault lines, which provide transitions from the language of literature to discursive social space (West-Pavlov, 2009). They disturb because they undermine the language by making the naming impossible for it. They break common names or sometimes entangle them and destroy the syntaxes. Both the syntax which we construct sentences but also the less visible one allowing us to keep words and things together (Foucault, 2006). Waldner and Dobratz (2013) defined political graffiti as "containing ideas or values designed to influence public opinion, policy, or government decision making" (p. 378). Also, Klingman and Shalev (2001) described political graffiti as small peepholes used by graffitiists. Through them, they can express their social concerns, speak for themselves and their communities, and reflect on social conditions (p. 405). A similar emphasis on political graffiti is made in Nwoye's (1993) research on the graffiti in the lavatories (*latrinalia*) in the University of Benin. He argued that political graffiti is expressive modes in which sub-groups, that are excluded from other mediums, can express themselves, discuss political, social, economic problems and issues (p. 438). It is one of the safest communication tools for political groups and is also very economic, and effective for reaching the target audience. Common themes of political graffiti are civil rights, unemployment, working conditions,

freedoms, religious arguments and power (Pietrosanti, 2010). According to Hanauer (2004), graffiti carries discourses that are ignored by other media channels into the public sphere, gives the individual the chance to express publicly his or her competitive ideas and builds a venue for marginalised people. Naturally, it can be said that graffiti becomes more important politically in circumstances in which all other political communicative channels are blocked (Oliver & Steinberg, 1990). As seen in many studies examining graffiti in terms of its political functions, most of the findings argue that the core significance of the phenomenon lays in discourse. Graffiti is often regarded as the medium of an alternative political discourse to established and conventional ways of political communication.

Besides, some consider the graffiti practising as a political action by itself, beyond its all representative, discursive and communicative capacities. Some argue all forms of graffiti are inherently political because they conflict with the hegemony and capitalistic ideology (Waldner & Dobratz, 2013). Hanauer (2011) evaluated political graffiti similarly. For him, graffiti is political because it emerges as an unexpected interjection in public space (p. 306). Unlike Halsey and Young's above-mentioned arguments, Walsh claimed that graffiti can be described as a ritual and symbolic action against capitalistic values, as long as it is viewed as a phenomenon within politics (1996; as cited in Waldner & Dobratz, 2013, p. 380). Political graffiti is not limited to expressions of anti-capitalist struggle. They also exist as forms of resistance (Waldner & Dobratz, 2013, p.380). According to Lewisohn (2008), public opinion depletes the visual guiding fiction that the urban space regulates by the state and the capitalist system. This process does not involve any dialogue, and unilateral. In this sense, graffiti can be seen as answering to the public and it turns graffitiists into resistant political animals (p. 104). Besides, graffiti can be considered as a social argument, which states that public rights should be superior to property rights and that the nature of public buildings should be appropriate to this (Reed, 2005, p. 123).

Political graffiti emerges in many forms, from very simple and prosaic slogans to complex and deep artistic creations. With slogans, it contains explanatory and simple political messages that try to address their audience. It is designed to be easily memorable. It uses rhymes, well-known expressions, original catchy phrases and popular artistic expressions. It often conveys messages about current political issues to criticise the mass media and propose alternative perspectives on political debates (Zaimakis, 2015). For instance, a stencil is a form of graffiti that uses a visual discourse. Its forms differ from political graffiti carrying only slogans. Political stencil establishes a creative relationship between local imagery and popular imagery distributed by the mass media and combines representative and discursive abilities (Kane, 2009, p. 9). It uses an apprehensible iconographic stylised language that interacts with the public through visual criticism, appeal and humour (Kane, 2009, p. 14). Stencil is a highly political and effective type of graffiti. Murals, on the other hand, are examples of political graffiti where the artistic emphasis is stronger. They blend political messages with cultural innovations. Thus, they inspire viewers both aesthetically and politically. They use stories and textual elements to tell explicit or latent political messages (Zaimakis, 2015, p. 376). At least three different colours are used in murals. Therefore, the graffitiist must visit the surface or the place of the given graffiti, more than once (Lynn & Lea, 2005, p. 41). Political graffiti increases its frequency during intense episodes of contentious politics when protests and social movements occur. For example, in May 1968, graffiti, which gained popularity among students in France, emerged as a flow of immediate inscriptions and a symbolic area where the social change could be discussed and reflected (Zaimakis, 2015, p. 376). Nowadays, graffiti is becoming more and more involved in the repertoire of contention of contentious politics, therefore it has been examined as an area where traces of protests, resistances, political transformations and contest can be tracked (Rolston, 1987; Peteet, 1996; Dragičević-Šešić, 2001; Luzzatto & Jakobson, 2001; Goalwin,

2013). Political graffiti is recurrently identified as an opposition, a disruption, a disturbance to utopias, the system, the order, the established, capitalism or the neoliberal order. In brief, graffiti plays a valuable and unique role in political representation, communication and participation. It is a natural-born tool of antagonism used by those who are not in power.

Graffiti and Contentious Politics. In social movement scholarship, graffiti is mostly described as an artistic and visual member of the repertoire of action. Artistic representations play an important role in the internal dynamics of social movements such as recruiting, solidarity and collective identity building. Through art, movements make their ideas known to the world and accumulate cultural references that useful to them, and with artistic representations, social movements define themselves, communicate, express their aims and point out their opponents. The contents of artistic representations vary, but their functions are constant (Eyerman, 2015, p. 549). Most of the studies examining the role of art in social movements focus on music (Eyerman & Jamison, 1995; 1998; Roy, 2010; Rosenthal & Flacks, 2011). For example, collective singing is seen as an effective method to draw sympathisers into the movements. Also, it is observed that visual artistic forms (such as posters, stickers) are used efficiently, especially in post-1960 movements. Movements perform collective practices to generate collectivity. Mechanisms such as visual displays and collective singing are well suited for this purpose (Doerr, Mattoni & Trune, 2015). Social movements use visual, textual and audial sources to be seen and heard, and art is used to show the collective sensuality. Artists help movements to express their grievances, goals and motivations. Art also plays a role in the formation and transmission of protest traditions. Developed practices and ideas to protest are saved in the collective protest memory in aesthetic forms (Eyerman, 2015, p. 552). In addition, social movements through art express whom they represent and designate who are the outsiders. Graffiti and street art have successfully spread slogans that call on people to act against dictators in protests and

movements in the Middle East and North Africa, especially during and after the Arab Spring. Guerrilla art has entered the lexicon of social movements and has been described sometimes even as the movement itself (Eyerman, 2015, p. 554). Artistic practices, when they connected with social movements, form the symbolic and expressive essence of movements. These practices, named cognitive praxis by Eyerman and Jamison (1998), reveal what reality is for a particular social movement (p. 166). “Movement art is part of the coming- to be of a social movement” (Eyerman, 2015, p. 555). Art enables the ideas and emotions of social movements to be embodied and helps movements to learn about themselves. It declares what kind of place the world can be or should be for a social movement.

Some analyses do not see graffiti only as a part of the repertoire of action for movements. Waldner and Dobratz (2013) explained political graffiti as a form of contentious politics reflecting contention and conflict (p. 377). Dobratz, Waldner & Buzzell (2016) identified some common aspects of political graffiti, despite the cultural or regional characteristics varying from society to society. First, political graffiti is separated from established and institutionalised political participation processes. Therefore, there are many cases in which political graffiti is considered a crime. (Austin, 2001; Dickinson, 2008). In more repressive circumstances, graffiti can also be regarded as treason or an attack on national identities, and graffiti artists may face fines, imprisonment and even death. (Peteet, 1996; Chmielewska, 2007). People who are excluded from established and institutionalised political processes often produce political graffiti; however, it should not be seen as an alternative field of political propaganda, criticism, and communication used by those who are excluded since they cannot find other ways. Beyond that, graffiti is the political action itself that disrupts the sovereign rhetoric, hierarchy, and re-relates the power with the oppressed. It strives to re-establish the balance in favour of the oppressed (Dobratz, Waldner & Buzzell, 2016, p. 210). Second, protest is not the only function of political graffiti. It also functions as

a propaganda channel in which political views and ideologies diffuse (Ferrell, 1993; Sluka, 1996). Political graffiti can be an agora where political ideas would be discussed (Nwoye, 1993; Obeng, 2000). Third, political graffiti is also used to create new cultural meanings that will constitute the essence of future political and social changes. It is a transgressive area of the micro-politics of individual actors who believe they can influence the political systems both at national and transnational scales. Political graffiti challenges the state and power (Hanauer, 2011). Fourth, political graffiti is a collective action in which graffitiists engage in discussions, react to each other and show solidarity through graffiti (Dobratz, Waldner & Buzzell, 2016; Nwoye, 1993; Obeng, 2000). Political graffiti practising usually requires a group organisation. Some members of graffiti crews paint or write, some of them provide security during the application or some members find ideas and slogans (Peteet, 1996). Johnston (2006; as cited in Waldner & Dobratz, 2013) argued that contentious political talk is important for understanding the emergence of the unorganised political agency in repressive regimes. Political talk appears where repressive power cannot reach, and it is occasionally manifested in the various forms of guerilla performances, such as graffiti. These hit-and-run protests are actions in which the transgressive contention manifested itself in repressive regimes. They are the opportunities where opposition socialises through the boundary-spanning groups.

Graffiti has a rhizomatic, interacting structure involving many actors, and it is spatially and temporally asymmetric and unorganised. It allows the multiplicity to express itself. From the perspective of contentious politics, political graffiti can be viewed as an art form that helps to constitute and maintain the internal dynamics of movements, such as collective identity building, solidarity and expressing of movements' authentic values. Also, graffiti contributes to the creation of symbols and the diffusion of the discourse. According to evaluations of political graffiti, as in other cross-sections, the phenomenon is

instrumentalised for those who cannot overcome the boundaries of institutional and established processes. For those on the disadvantaged side of the boundary, graffiti emerges as an area of political propaganda and an action pushing or crossing the boundary. In addition, it declares the impassability of institutional and established boundaries and calls for a collective exceeding. Simultaneously, it expresses and explains the necessity of political participation, which it demands, and effects that will take place in social life, after the destruction or the bending of the boundaries by using cultural notions.

Graffiti as Political Internet Memes. The emergence of social media and the transformation of activism led to the transformation of political graffiti. Today, social media is not just an essential communication area for activists. It also enables activists to interact and disseminate information in real-time, thanks to widespread mobile communication technologies. For example, the Arab Spring and the Occupy Wall Street movement have emerged and spread rapidly through social media, in different material localities simultaneously. (Fuchs, 2014; Valenzuela, 2013). Social media platforms are critical to disseminating political ideas to activists and coordinating their organisations. After the evolution of the internet, called Web 2.0, this importance has become even more clear. Web 2.0 is a term that refers to the evolution in the use of the internet rather than to describe a technological transformation. In Web 2.0, the user not only receives information or data but also takes part in the generation of new data and flows of information. In short, Web 2.0 refers to the use of the internet that allows users to produce content. Political graffiti has also changed due to innovations brought by Web 2.0 and social media to activism. This change has particularly affected its ability to infiltrate and influence the public sphere. In addition, the life span of political graffiti is different from before. Now, photos of political graffiti are shared on social media or political graffiti is prepared digitally and spread in cyberspace. As Hung Li and Prasad (2018) examined this alteration and used the concepts of Wall 1.0 and

Wall 2.0. As a reflection of the revolutionary change in internet use, the transformation of Wall 1.0 into Wall 2.0 implies that activists can now re-articulate their expressions of resistance or recognition on the walls via social media (Hung Li & Prasad, 2018, p. 494). Political graffiti can now be stored in digital space and has a kind of permanence. It became content that can be stored and shared by users. Besides, activists can create contents and recreate or re-post the already created contents. Thus, the graffiti and its political expressions are continuously renewed and transferred in cyberspace (Hung Lui & Prasad, 2018, p. 501). The transition from Wall 1.0 to Wall 2.0 has enabled activists, protests, and social movements to move their contention beyond the boundaries of geographic conditions into fluid and editable cyberspace. Political graffiti has expanded its boundaries and became networked. With Wall 2.0., the identity of graffitists has become insignificant and the importance of virality has come to the fore. Therefore, the level of digital interest of others on a given graffito, determines whether political demands, calls and messages are expressed successfully (Hung Lui & Prasad, 2018, p. 495). The transition of political graffiti from the surfaces of material walls to the surfaces of cyberspace through social media has also changed the linear relationship between graffitists and viewers of political graffiti. The co-productive flexibility of social media makes the messages, discourses, effects and narratives of political graffiti voiced, and transfer them rapidly. It can be said that co-graffitists in social media pursue similar political goals to graffitists who write/paint graffiti on material urban walls. In cyberspace, however, it is possible for people to see a large number of graffiti related to any social or political issue in a very short time, and that time maybe even less than the time it takes for a graffito applied on material walls. In this context, graffiti has lost its features of being isolated and individual with Wall 2.0 or has escaped related limitations (Hung Lui & Prasad, 2018, pp. 506-507). According to Hung Lui and Prasad (2018), Wall 2.0 is not an alternative to Wall 1.0. These two walls are interconnected and interact in

cyberspace. Whilst the material graffiti become digitised and spread in cyberspace, their messages, slogans, expressions and ideas become also digitally organised, converted, recreated and abstracted. Besides, digital political graffiti is capable of bounding politically like-minded people that would never find each other in material reality (Hung Lui & Prasad, 2018, p. 507). Eventually, digitally diffused, arranged, transformed, recreated and abstracted political graffiti return from cyberspace to the material world and inspire graffitiists to practise new graffiti.

I argue that the emergence of digital political graffiti can be better explained by the concept of internet memes. Internet memes provide an appropriate conceptuality to explain how political graffiti is affected by the smoothness of cyberspace. Cyberspace with its unique space-time structure affects and amplifies the formal, linguistic and interactive features of graffiti. I believe that is a point that should not be overlooked in analysing urban social movements and their hybrid spatiality. The term meme was coined by Richard Dawkins (1976), to describe small units of culture that spread from person to person by copying or imitation. The internet meme is commonly applied to describe the propagation of items such as jokes, rumours, videos, and websites from person to person via the internet. Internet memes are the sparks that ignite the flows of user-generated derivatives, such as parodies, remixes or mashups. Another fundamental attribute of internet memes is intertextuality; They often relate to each other in complex, creative, and surprising ways. “They are not only a striking example of intertextuality; it also demonstrates that this new arena of bottom-up expression can blend pop culture, politics, and participation in unexpected ways” (Shifman, 2014, p. 2). Under the conditions of Web 2.0, memes rhizomatically diffuse among individuals. Shifman (2014) argued that they reflect and shape general social thought structures.

The concept of internet meme expresses a cultural reproduction created by different methods of digital copying and imitation and draws attention to a new participant culture developing in the contemporary digital age. According to Shifman (2014), almost every major social event boom with a digital flow of memes (p. 4). An internet meme can be defined as a group of digital items that have common features in terms of content, form and viewpoints. These items are created in each other's awareness, and they are imitated, transformed and circulated by various users on the internet. From that perspective, internet memes should be understood as an inclusive concept in which various views and approaches are represented and socially constructed. Since memes are socially constructed digital items and have representative functions, they inevitably political. According to Shifman (2014), users relate internet memes to politics at the stages of generation and consumption. She refrained from evaluating political internet memes as members of internet humour, although humour is a common theme among memes. Political memes have a political stance and discourse. They express how the world should be and make suggestions for the desired social and political transformations. Political memes can be ways of political participation and formed as political graffiti. After the emergence of Web 2.0 and social media platforms, digital practices of daily life became able to host political agency and participation. These emerging areas of participation and representation allow people who want to stay outside the established political systems to engage in politics. Since the 2000s, it has been observed that almost all protests and social movements have been used social media and Web 2.0's facilities for organising, mobilising and forming public opinion.

Shifman (2014) asserted that political memes have three different intertwined political functions. The first of these is political advocacy and persuasion. Political internet memes spread virally and allow highly influential political discourses or actors to produce powerful effects. The second function of political memes is that they play important roles in grassroots

movements (pp. 122-123). Shifman explained this function based on the concept of connective action coined by Bennett & Segerberg (2011), which I have discussed in the first chapter. In this context, memes build axial bridges between the individual and the political. They enable individuals to participate in public and collective actions without having to abandon their individuality. Political memes do more than satisfy individual desires for political participation. They are also used as the rhetoric of social movements. Third, political memes serve as appropriate channels for political self-expression and participation in public debates (Shifman, 2014, p. 129).

Political memes often contain these three functions at the same time. Although serious examples of memes are frequently encountered, most of them enjoy pop culture and comedic effects. Since pop culture and humour are interwoven with everyday life, smooth transitions to political debates become possible. However, images of pop culture can cause the depoliticisation of serious political issues to which they are associated (Shifman, 2014, pp. 136-138; 144). In countries where repressive regimes prevail, political memes are not merely the means of increasing the opportunities for political discourse through digital means. They are the carriers and representatives of democratic aspirations. Political memes disrupt the discourse of sided mass media and become a public manifestation of the opposition through the internet. The digitalisation of political memes extends the individual's agency in expressing political ideas and disrupting established order in the public space. As performative displays of political opinions memes generate new digital spaces where unique views meet and encounter. Therefore, they differ from political jokes. They are visual, so they provide an easy integration between pop culture and politics.

Also, political digital memes are suitable for multiple interpretations and open to being polysemic because of their visual nature (Shifman, 2014, p. 150). I argue that digitised graffiti and its political derivatives exist in cyberspace as internet memes. They include

textual and visual parodies, rearrangements and mashups, and use humour. They are open to being re-produced by the users and digital activists. Thanks to the possibilities of cyberspace, users can instantly post many digitised political graffiti, and change their contexts and meanings with their comments or designs. These contexts and meanings can be very distinct from the original version of the graffiti. Graffiti shared, re-shared and transformed in cyberspace can become interacted with other graffiti. Among graffiti, which is constantly re-posted, re-designed and transformed in cyberspace, there is a nonstop interaction. Therefore, digitised graffiti has a high level of intertextuality in cyberspace. Moreover, there is no obstacle for graffiti taken from material spaces and copied and pasted in cyberspace to be part of these processes.

Political graffiti in cyberspace uses popular culture or other cultural expressions that will be easily remembered, and performs political advocacy and persuasion, just as in urban space. However, it has different spatial and temporal abilities compared to urban space. It quickly occurs, spreads and creates effects, and is independent of physical distances. As some observe, during the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street protests, it sprawls virally and produces powerful effects for social movements.

Connective actions such as digital graffiti sharing and practising do not require individuality to be sacrificed for political participation. Since they have a memetic nature, via digitised graffiti individuals can articulate their subjective, consensual or agonistic, political ideas. I also believe that the affection that graffiti artists feel when producing a graffiti in the urban area, is felt as a memetic affection by users who send, share or design digitised graffiti in cyberspace. The memetic affection inherently would be instant, ephemeral but fluid, recurrent, interactive and exponential, since users can observe that their posts can be liked or re-shared countless times. Being aware of such a possibility, they publish and share digitised

graffiti. Also, for individual users, joining a digital multiplicity is much easier than joining the collective multiplicity in urban space.

The transformation of political graffiti into a political internet meme, change the relationship between the graffitist and the graffiti because graffitist would take into account cyberspace's architecture and see graffiti as potential internet memes. I claim that this awareness has changed also the graffiti practising in the urban space. Today, political graffiti on the surfaces of the material walls are designed to be viral Internet memes under conditions of hybridisation of cyber and material spaces.

Beyond the individual agency, that is also a motivation compatible with the efforts of social movements to efficiently use social media and the internet in a communicative, organisational and connective manner. The cyber presence of political graffiti has become much more essential for the movements than its material existence. In the analyses of the roles graffiti plays in the name of social movements such as the Gezi movement, it is essential to consider this substantial transformation that changes the reasons and forms of graffiti.

Evaluation of the Concept of Graffiti for Theory Generation

Graffiti initially is a matter of affection for graffitists. On an individual level, graffitists connect to urban space and other graffitists through affection, and this process develops within a logic independent of the logic of the striated space. Graffitists do not regard graffiti, urban space, and the multiplicity of graffitists as non-graffitists do. For their eyes, graffiti marks the value of use in urban spaces and makes the value of exchange meaningless. Besides, graffiti produced by graffitists (whether political) are primarily pertinent to the desire to be networked. That desire comes from out of the order's borders. For this reason, graffitists transfer a way of thinking discordant with the order's logic into the striated space

whilst they produce graffiti and connect with the city. Thus, the difference in the smooth space becomes noticeable within the striated space. Graffitiists that are connected under the conditions of the smooth space, form multiplicities. These multiplicities become comprehensible by the transformation of the desires into affection. Because they are not affected by anything other than their existence and do not need the minimum requirements of publicity. However, the abrasion that multiplicities caused in the striated space facilitates the recognition of the possible social and political transformations because deteriorating effects of graffiti stemming from the smooth space, announces the possibility of different orders within the dominant urban order. It informs on the urban space in which the order reproduces itself, that there are logics that the order cannot encapsulate. Graffiti is, therefore, a war machine and has an innate capacity for contentious political processes.

Multiplicities of graffitiists constantly move, blink and displace in smooth space. However, the graffiti they produce partially change the striated space for a brief period. If these parts contain common reference frames for the striated space, the multiplicity of the smooth space becomes noticeable in striated space. This leads to unintended consequences for the order in Lefebvre's conceived space. The existence of graffiti in urban order is related to graffiti in smooth space, but it differs from it. Graffiti now exists as pollution, a crime or an intersecting in urban order, within the logic of striated space. The difference of the graffiti attracts the others of the striated space, the differend that pace back and forth, waits to surface itself. Through material and semantic cracks opened by graffiti, the urban difference emerges. These cracks, which are noticed in the straight space, are an opportunity for the understanding of graffiti's view of urban space within the logic of order. Desire, affection and attachment in the smooth space are understood as contention, opposition and resistance in the striated space. Graffiti is artistic urban surface ornamentation in which counter hegemonies, areas and discourses are formed.

After this transition, graffiti is now a matter of public. At this phase, it creates chances for the graffitiists to take part in public debates. It circulates the expressions of social opposition, grievances, announces injustices and gives voice to demands in urban space, and become functional and meaningful for its audiences; the public. This phase covers also the transformation of some audiences into graffitiists. The role of graffiti at this phase is to create counter-striated spaces within the striated space by bearing notions of the smooth space.

Graffiti embodied as an alternative under the conditions of the established order and its urban design, can adopt agonistic or consensual approaches, and function socially by ornamenting urban surfaces. Most sociological and ethnographic analyses on graffiti cover this phase.

Studies on whether graffiti is vandalism and how the order can manage the phenomenon in the name of public interest are clustered here. Also, studies that describe graffiti as a cultural alternative or a rebellious act of the oppressed, under the rule of the sovereign system or the power, are related to this phase. At this phase, graffiti becomes a microphone for those who cannot make themselves heard. It opens up novel ways of communication for them, shows their resistance, and makes their political representations and participations possible. It works for the reclaiming of urban spaces by the inhabitants and sometimes becomes the political act itself. All evaluations of this phase of graffiti are based on the dichotomy of the sovereign–non-sovereign. According to this perspective, the emergence of alternative discourses, counter-hegemonic areas and new social/political actors builds itself over this dichotomy. Additionally, all these processes have gained additional dimensions with the emergence of cyberspace and social media. Graffiti's scope and all representative, communicative, discursive and political functions have changed through cyberspace and social media. It is not a phenomenon that solely emerges under the material and immaterial conditions of urban space anymore. Because of the different time-space conditions and relationships of virtual reality, these functions have been strengthened, diversified and fluidised. Political graffiti

have become political internet memes in cyberspace. Contemporary digitised graffiti spread virally and circulate continuously through reproducing, posting and (re)interpretation. Given the fact that many of the contemporary social movements use cyberspace and new communication technologies frequently and effectively, it can be thought that political graffiti are designed and produced to be political internet memes. Cyber transformation of political graffiti can be considered as one result of the relationality between connective action and collective action. In the analysis of political graffiti, Wall 1.0 and Wall 2.0 should now be considered together.

After revealing the recurrent and shared qualities of the graffiti ranging from particularity to universality, from the individual to the public, which determined by the above-mentioned phases and cross-sections, I argue that It is necessary to redefine the graffiti. For this purpose, I will make a definition close to the conceptual spine indicated by the graffiti's immutable and consistent features, without ignoring the fluidity of its variables to generate an analytical key convenient for understanding the political graffiti in contemporary social movements.

Accordingly, graffiti is an intervention, an intersection and a connection. It is a phenomenon that serves for the actors who are outside the established orders, social processes, and understandings to intervene in the sovereigns' logic on urban spaces. It reveals the differend with its artistic, linguistic and operational characteristics and capabilities. Also, the awareness of the differend may differ. For example, the emergence of modern graffiti is associated with different local conditions in the USA and Turkey and has been shaped by these conditions. However, the rationale of the differentiation of differend is immutable. For example, what Cornbread and Turbo have in common is that they express themselves and their communities aesthetically and discursively in a way that the dominant urban order does not foresee and endorse. Graffiti, which is frequently used for the needs representation,

participation and political communication, gains importance in these areas thanks to its intrusive feature. Besides, it is an encounter. The demands, approaches, aesthetics and discourses of the actors intervening in the order encounter with their opponents throughout graffiti. That encounter or intersecting provides an opportunity to reconsider established approaches, explanations, aesthetics and discourse and to reveal their failures. In this context, graffiti can be regarded as an ideal medium for the arguments of social opposition. It is highly suitable to be a carrier of oppositional movements, actions and episodes. Graffiti links interventions, intersections and encounters. It can be applied easily to material or cyber walls and has a rhizomatic structure, which is difficult to be controlled and confined. Therefore, it has strong spreadability. It not only connects excluded different individuals, groups and political views but also makes it easier for them to make sense together.

Also, in this way, to the extent it spreads, it becomes socially meaningful. It spreads a multiplicity of textual and visual expressions, statements, slogans by its virality and it is contagious for pre-existing cultural codes and narratives. I assert that graffiti has three qualities that do not change, regardless of the conditions and contexts in which it emerges because of its nature. It is an intervention, an intersection and a connection. I believe an analysis of graffiti in terms of social movements, which does not overlook these three qualities along with its other features, would contribute to a more accurate understanding of the role the phenomenon plays. In chapter four, in which I will examine and interpret the Gezi graffiti, I will try to conduct such an effort.

Graffiti in Turkey

In Turkey, political graffiti has been also used by different social and political movements and organisations, before the Gezi movement. Although its usage differs from the Gezi praxis, it can be argued that this tradition may be used for creating a benchmark for the

analysis of the graffiti generated by Gezi graffitiists. Therefore, I will briefly mention pre-Gezi graffiti trends and currents in this subsection.

The Emergence of Political Graffiti in Turkey. Before I discuss by taking into account the stages of graffiti from individual subjectivities to public space, the various perspectives analysing the phenomenon concerning social and political issues, and the transformational effects of cyberspace, I will examine briefly the history of Turkey's graffiti. In this way, I intend to detect whether is there any meaningful social relation between the pre-existing scene of Turkish graffiti and the Gezi graffiti. I will also try to show the resemblances between the cross-sections' which I have mentioned above and academic studies and researches about the Gezi graffiti. Thus, apart from the local and cultural notions that I will discuss in chapter four, some global features of graffiti will be revealed.

According to the literature, modern graffiti appeared in the stiff conditions of the 1960s political environment in Turkey. Therefore, it is possible to claim that modern graffiti started with political graffiti in the country. In those years, there was a strong political polarisation between rightists and leftists, and since the politicisation among youth was high, it has spread to universities and streets. Young activists and militants have begun to use graffiti to mark urban spaces they dominate and liberated from their rival political groups and movements. It is notable that gangs in New York and members of revolutionary groups in Turkey have used the graffiti for similar purposes but in completely distinct contexts, during the 1970s. Nevertheless, in those days, graffiti was a way of demonstrating political power and domination in Turkey. They were expressing anger and grievances about the present time, and the hope and aspirations for the tomorrow (Jöntürk, 2003). During this period, graffiti was a propaganda medium and a political act and widely used by many political groups. Activists were calling the graffiti practice as *yazıya çıkmak* (to go out to write) and it was a widespread political practice (Şenyapılı, 2012). Walls in big cities were convenient

communication mediums for political groups and revolutionary university students. The country was not yet fully integrated into the global economic system. For this reason, most of the walls were free of billboards and advertisements. Graffiti was the most popular, inexpensive and useful tool for the dissemination of revolutionary and opposing ideas. Until the military coup in 1980, the walls of major cities such as Istanbul and Ankara were covered with political graffiti, stencils and posters. The leading production centre of political graffiti and posters was the *Devrimci Afiş Atölyesi* (Atelier of Revolutionary Posters), established in the *Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi* (ODTÜ). The workshop was founded by the *Sosyalist Düşünce Topluluğu* (Society of Socialist Thought) and it had become the distribution centre of political posters and stencils after its merging has completed with *Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* (DEV-GEN) (Aysan, 2013). The atelier has played a very important role in forming the visual memory of the leftist/socialist movement in Turkey. Some images are produced by the atelier has become an icon of left-wing politics. For example, one of these icons was derived from a frame from a film by Brazilian director Glauber Rocha who was one representative of the political cinema movement Cinema Novo. The frame has been recurrently used until today by different leftist organisations and publications (Aysan, 2013; Taş & Taş, 2014).

The ongoing political struggle in Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s was crushed by the military coup that occurred on October 12, 1980. According to official figures, 650 thousand people were detained and over 1.5 million people were blacklisted. Hundred seventy-one people died in queries and forty-nine people were executed. Furthermore, thousands of people had to flee abroad as political refugees. After the coup, a process of de-politicisation began in Turkey. ANAP's (the party came to power in 1983) economic program accelerated Turkey's integration into the global economic system and this process brought its social-cultural effects with it. New political and social conditions have changed the tradition

and culture of graffiti in Turkey. It has become a practice of individual motivations, issues and perspectives rather than political organisations' agendas. Individual graffitiists were the main practitioners, and graffiti was the carrier of hip-hop culture, computer games and popular American movies (Taş & Taş, 2014, p. 332). Most of the graffiti practised between the mid-1980s and late 1990s were in form of bangings or point shootings. The primary motivation was to criticise the monotony of urban life (Taş & Taş, 2014). It may be not incisive to estimate graffiti was completely out of politics from those years. Community-based graffiti has a political side in all circumstances since it reflects the social and political approaches of communities (Taş & Taş, 2014, p. 333). This deed expresses resistance to the uniformity of the urban spaces and reflects the values and desires of change of the marginalised (Armstrong, 2005).

Tunç Dinçdaş, aka Turbo, has produced the very first examples of this new graffiti wave in Istanbul in 1985. Miko, Ramon, Aki, Nasty and Laser were also well-known graffitiists of the period (Erdoğan, 2009). Afterwards, Turbo founded the graffiti crew named Shot to Kill (S2K). The crew is now globally well-known and has many members from various countries such as Germany, Bulgaria, Switzerland and Japan (Cansoylu, 2016). During the following decade, graffiti opened up space for itself as an art form on the streets. For example, founded in 1998, GNG Clan was the first graffiti crew starting to produce legal pieces in Turkey, with the encouragement of local governments. In the 2000s, various types of street art became widespread across the country, of course initially in Istanbul and Ankara. Besides, the rise of graffiti has been examined in academic studies. For example, Erdoğan (2009, p. 120) in her research examining the graffiti on Yüksek Kaldırım Street in Beyoğlu, Istanbul, identified that there was eight hundred seventeen genuine graffiti just in that two-kilometre long street. Since the 2000s Istanbul's Beyoğlu district, which covers Taksim Square and Gezi Park, has become the centre of graffiti (Schleifer, 2009). Today, Cins, Tab,

McCroy, Wase, Keos, Ari Alpert and Fly Propaganda are some of Istanbul's well-known graffiti artists. Also, Ankara hosts some street art and graffiti crews and groups like KÜF Project, Avareler (Ramblers), Vandalina (Taş & Taş, 2014), Blockfactory and 1TURK (Tanglay, 2005).

Unfortunately, the number of comprehensive academic studies analyzing Turkish graffiti artists in terms of social strata or categories is very few. Nevertheless, among graffiti artists, two distinct opinions are postulated. The first opinion argues that graffiti artists are mostly young people who have some level of art education and are from the middle classes. The second opinion predicts that there are also many under-educated young people from poor families among graffiti artists in Turkey. According to the graffiti artists who agree with that opinion, also the numbers of urchins who produce graffiti in Turkey too big to be underestimated (Ersoy, 2010; Ağgez, 2017). Information about graffiti artists in Istanbul is more and more detailed. It is estimated that there are approximately 5 thousand graffiti artists in the city. Three hundred of them practice actively and consistently graffiti, and some of them even earn their living with their work. Finally, it is estimated that 95% of graffiti artists in Istanbul are men (Aksel & Olgun, 2014). One of the fundamental reasons for the propagation of graffiti in Turkey and Istanbul was the successful advertisement campaign of GSM operator Aria. Aria used graffiti, hip-hop and breakdance in its campaign. This campaign significantly increased the recognition of graffiti in Turkey. Afterwards, graffiti has been used by many brands in advertising campaigns (Aksel & Olgun, 2014). Besides, since 2005, graffiti began appearing in biennials and contemporary art galleries. Turkey's first street art gallery The Milk was opened in 2009. In the same year, the German graffiti artist Kripoe came to Istanbul from Berlin and produced more than two hundred pieces. Istanbul was becoming slowly an international graffiti city, in those days (Aksel & Olgun, 2014). Most of the graffiti artists in Turkey, just like their counterparts around the world, say that the graffiti should be produced illegally. Turbo, the

father of Turkish graffiti (Hartley & Walker, 2012) argued that legal practices cannot be considered as graffiti (Ağgez, 2017, 10:59). However, the sanctioned side of graffiti practising should be mentioned as well. It can be said that legal graffiti in Turkey has spread thanks to neoliberal urban policies. This is especially the case where political graffiti is completely opposed. Municipalities allowed graffitiists to produce legal graffiti under the beautification and gentrification projects. For instance, in 1999, two municipalities in Istanbul allocated a factory to graffitiists to promote graffiti art (Erdoğan, 2009). The relationship between the state and the graffitiists has become smoother since the second half of the 2000s. Also, legislators' approach to graffiti and related penal sanctioning has been changed also. If graffitiists were arrested in the 1980s, they were being prosecuted for writing illegal slogans and spreading messages from illegal organizations. Therefore, the verdicts were severe. Today, unsanctioned graffiti is still an illegal act according to the law; however, it is considered within the law of misdemeanour and considered a crime of polluting the environment. Thusly penalties are lighter (Ağgez, 2017, 11:19). Since 2006, Istanbul has been the host of an annual international graffiti festival with the support of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality ("A graffiti festival in Istanbul", 2014). Also, The Beyoğlu Municipality supported the street art festival, the Renovation Tarlabası, in 2012. Tarlabası is a low-income district and one centre of urban renewal projects in Istanbul. Some graffitiists and street art groups have protested the festival, and they announced that they refuse to take part in the gentrification of urban spaces and institutionalisation of oppositional art (Taş & Taş, 2014). Nevertheless, it can be alleged that the formal approach of the 1980s that evaluated every writing on urban spaces as illegal and related to revolutionary political organizations, lost validity in Turkey.

The Re-emergence of Political Graffiti in Turkey. With the new millennium, political and social discontent has returned to the graffiti. Two striking examples can be given

in this context. In the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, a group named Nuri Alo Revival Organization (NARO) started to write the famous Turkish actor Nuri Alo's name on the walls in big cities. Nuri Alo is a famous actor and was portraying infamous villains during the 1980s. The group was practising tagging on behalf of someone else. Also, it published a very political, critical and vulgar online manifesto that criticized the country's situation by accusing the ordinary citizens and emphasising the banality of evil. The manifesto alleged that everyone was responsible in the name of martyrs who "lost their lives on the path of unconditional friendship, universal truth, revenge of the masses and mental resurrection" (yalnizlikprofesoru, 2013).

In those years, another political graffiti flow appeared in Istanbul. The flow was protesting the murder of Nigerian immigrant Festus Okey. After his detention in 2007, Okey was murdered by a police officer in Beyoğlu Police Headquarters. The police officer who committed the murder was identified. However, the court gave back the murder weapon to the police authorities during the prosecution process. In addition, the shirt that Festus Okey wore on the day of the murder was suspiciously disappeared. Briefly, there is a spoliation of evidence.

Along with some demonstrations, the protests against the corrupted justice system manifested themselves in the form of graffiti in urban spaces. The Festus Okey Case was ended in 2011 and the police officer was sentenced to prison for four years. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals Prosecutor's Office reversed the judgement in 2013 and reopened the case for a 20-year prison sentence. The Festus Okey Case is still pending ("Festus Okey case is reopened", 2014).

Today, most of the graffitists in Turkey are taggers. Turkish taggers stated that graffiti for them is an attempt to get more recognition and to say, 'I am here'. Besides, they described

graffiti with different words and concepts such as a sickness, the life itself, an excitement, an action, freedom or an identity (Ağgez, 2017, 26:45-28:03). Çağrı Küçüksayraç (2011), aka Cins, one of the most well-known graffitiists in Istanbul, in his master's thesis, which he analysed his own work, defined graffiti as the re-appropriation of streets. He argued that graffiti recaptures the power of the streets from the state's order. According to Cins, companies and the state are aware of the power of the street. However, the public has forgotten the significance of that power. Society has consented to billboards, advertisements, grey buildings and traffic jams that are harshly imposed in public areas, and for the awakening of the public, the streets must be taken back by graffiti. (Ersoy, 2010, 11:43-12:11) Cins, in this context, positioned graffiti within the urban politics and noted that he prefers to practice graffiti that carry political messages and awakes the people, rather than just tagging (Ersoy, 2010, 25:28-26:09). Researcher Şevket Uyanık also evaluated graffiti in a socio-political context and claimed that it is produced by individuals and social groups who wanted to end their invisibility in the eyes of the public and the state. According to Uyanık, "people are troubled in Turkey and they cannot find any other media other than the walls to explain their troubles" (as cited in Ersoy, 2010, 09:45-10:45).

In Turkey, many graffiti crews revolve around political and social goals. Although most of these teams remain active for a brief time, they are known for their actions directly intervening in everyday urban life, especially in big cities. Examining some of these groups would provide useful information about political graffiti in urban space before the Gezi movement. The KÜF Project founded in Ankara is a crew of graffitiists and street artists focused on urban policies. It is also active in Istanbul. In a manifesto published online, the group described itself as a rebellion movement aiming to expand people's awareness and show city-dwellers what is going on around them. For KF, urban citizens are surrounded by the greyness of the city, buildings, sidewalks, roads and streets. These urban arrangements

reduce the visual sensibility of the people and make their minds monotonous. The project also declared in its manifesto it aims to eliminate this monotony. According to the manifesto, Küf is independent of any institution, organisation, company or political party and neither political nor apolitical (Taş & Taş, 2014, p. 335). *Ankara'nın Avareleri* (Ramblers of Ankara) is another anonymous street art and graffiti group. The crew mostly produces stickers and posters about the issues of urban life in Ankara. Ramblers try to reveal the negative effects of capitalism and the market economy on the city and oppose the use of public space to make a profit. The crew is known, for its graffiti and street art that emphasise the value of use (Zırh & Can, 2012; Taş & Taş, 2014). Vandalina was a street art collective that produced mostly stickers about social issues. The most popular activity of the group took place in 2013 and included in the implementation of stickers related to women's murders in Turkey. Besides, Vandalina aimed to direct people to activism and graffiti. The crew shared its ready-to-use stickers via social media and invited the people to join them on the streets (Güler, 2013; Taş & Taş, 2014). Blockfactory, another street art and graffiti crew, was active during 2005 and 2006 and also published an online manifesto:

“We’re Blockfactory. It does not matter who we are and how many we are. However, there is something we know and believe. Instead of framed thoughts in art galleries, we do things that live and die with us on the street. We do these on the street; because we have no intention of being a part of the time, we live and engraving our name on the world. In public spaces, without our permission, we encounter many advertisements, signs, and billboards. Now, we take our streets back” (as cited in Tanglay, 2005, p. 52).

Crew's founder Cobi has explained to Tanglay (2005, p. 53) they wanted their works to be seen and interpreted by everyone. According to him, the street legitimises what they do and enables them to communicate with people from all lifestyles. He also defined the group's

purpose as to illegally fight against advertisements and described the crew's motivations as follows: "Previously in the city, there was no place where we felt we belonged. That's why we went out on the streets and met others, those who think like us" (Tanglay, 2005, p. 53). 1TURK was another crew criticized positive nationalism that became popular in the early 2000s. The word of Türk was used frequently in advertisements and brand names at that time, and 1TURK has produced many stickers and graffiti about that issue.

The founder of the crew, Kutlu Güreli, explained the motivations of 1TURK to Tanglay as follows (2005, p. 54):

"No one was doing what we wanted to see in the streets. Therefore, we created it by ourselves. What we wanted to see in the city was not ads, but marks. Authority does not want to see individuals in public spaces. But we voiced our thoughts and showed our presence".

Not all graffitiist crews have an antagonistic political stance. There are also some that seek consensus and agreement. The *Boyalı Eller Crew* (Painted Hands) is one of them. The crew was founded by two teenagers in Istanbul, and their aims are to promote graffiti, make it an efficient communication tool, contribute to urban development, and use graffiti for the common good. The crew prefers to produce graffiti in cooperation with local governments, non-governmental organisations, different companies and locals. Therefore, they take part in festivals, various events and activities organized for the public (Aksel & Olgun, 2013, p. 171).

Besides the crews, many individual graffitiists produce graffiti about urban problems and debates in Turkey. For example, Esk Reyn is a graffitiist and street artist who studied art. According to him, the urban area is full of perfect images of people, buildings, views and objects, which do not reflect what is going on in Istanbul. Therefore, he aims to re-shape this

virtual perfection and make the real narratives of the city visible via graffiti and street art. Esk Reyn is also the founder of Istanbul's famous street art event, Mural-Ist. He has defined himself as an artist and noted that artists are responsible for the city and the public since they can create better environments and make cities better places to live. According to him, graffitiists and artists through their works can make the public overcome the prejudices against graffiti and street art. Thus, it can be ensured that society would adopt a more embracing attitude towards different types of art (Aksel & Olgun, 2013, p. 172). Some graffitiists in Turkey bring together graffiti and traditional art. For instance, Krys 2 Looper from the Stilbaz Crew combines graffiti and the art of *hat*⁹. He named his style 'graffiti hat'. According to Krys 2 Looper, as a graffitiist, it is impossible to ignore Ottoman calligraphy that is on almost every historical building in Istanbul. Furthermore, finding an original style is crucial for graffitiists. Krys 2 Looper noted that the streets are areas of freedom and belonging where graffitiists can express themselves (Aksel & Olgun, 2013, pp. 173-174).

Briefly, modern graffiti in Turkey has emerged with politics as a medium for young revolutionaries and their rivals. After the 1980 coup, it has vanished from the public spaces for a while, just like many other political deeds. It has reappeared with imported popular hip-hop culture under the effects of socioeconomic transformations. This new wave initially, was more urban than it was political. However, it re-politicised in two decades again. The second wave of Turkish graffiti is a matter of individualization, like new social movements. This was the graffiti that express mostly urban problems. However, it was also antagonistic and because of local historicity can be associated with some aspects with the dissenting spirit of the pre-1980 era. Besides, it became widespread again as a medium in which city dwellers protest the effects of ever-strengthening neoliberal policies. It hosted the debates of injustice and femicide and many other systemic criticisms. Nevertheless, the real milestone for

⁹ Calligraphy art formed around the Arabic letters.

political graffiti in Turkey, was s the Gezi movement. With Gezi, graffiti has changed and boomed, especially in Istanbul; the third wave was born. The third wave of Turkish political graffiti is artistically simple; however, it carries novel and strong political messages and slogans. It utilises humour, satire and irony intensively (Aksel & Ongun, 2013). The relatively short but dynamic history of modern political graffiti in Turkey reveals its strong relation with social and political issues. Also, it has taken various forms in different contexts per that relationality. Political graffiti has been an important part of the repertoire of contentious political action in Turkey for fifty years. With the Gezi movement, its scope and power to influence have increased more than ever.

A Literature Review on Gezi Graffiti. Among the scholarly efforts the number of researches and studied that focus on the Gezi graffiti is few. Besides, most of them see graffiti as the amalgam of indicators of various social, cultural or political components that characterise the Gezi movement. For the Gezi graffiti scholarship, they are the narrators of narratives or counter-narratives, generators of discourses, communicative tools. Also, the virality of the Gezi graffiti in cyberspace is frequently emphasised. Some scholars regard graffiti as a practice of political participation, carriers of carnivalesque humour in a Bakhtinian sense and political art of resistance (Çelikkol, 2014; Çolak, 2014; Perin, 2015; Yalçıntaş, 2015; Dağtaş, 2016; Selvelli, 2016; Evered, 2019, Uluğ & Acar, 2019).

At this point, I will dwell on the analyses about the graffiti that do not reinvent the wheel and try to provide a clear summary and mapping of the scholarship.

In the literature on Gezi graffiti, the humorous language used by the graffitists is one of the most widespread themes. For example, Emre, Çoban and Şener (2014) described the Gezi graffiti as one mediator of humorous protest and a new language of resistance culture that teases the authority. For them, the discourse that revolves around this new language

challenged the authority and created new discursive opportunities for political opposition. Also, Lerna K. Yanık (2015) examined the Gezi graffiti in terms of humour and by its messages that challenged the authority in Turkey. According to Yanık, (2015) Gezi graffiti had three different functions. First, it challenged the authority and neoliberal system with ridicule and mocking and sent messages to the government in this sense. Second, social demands and suggestions were expressed through graffiti. Third, graffiti marked the existence of various strata of Turkish society and praised the resistance. Yanık (2015) analysed the first function in more detail. Accordingly, Gezi graffiti contained contradiction, exaggeration, metaphors and incongruity since its humorous. Also, during the movement, the majority of the graffitists directly addressed Prime Minister Erdoğan, the ruling party AKP, the police force, the state and the media. Yanık argued that there are some examples protested against the neoliberal system and neoliberal tendencies of the government, but their number is few. Also, Gezi graffiti has inter-textual references and counterstatements, which humorously responded to the statements made by Erdoğan or other members of the government, and it has presented the jammied derivatives of these statements to the public (2015, pp. 170-176). Yanık (2015) also claimed that Gezi graffiti clarified the messages and criticisms of the movement and amplified its impact. For him, the walls, which are means of the performative dissent of the movement, voiced the claims of those who cannot make their voices heard.

Additionally, some scholars sought to answer the question of what functions art performs in the name of social movements. For example, Aytekin (2017) defined Gezi graffiti as an aesthetic and political action and argued that it was the predominant protest form of the movement. He also pointed out that through Gezi graffiti the Second New, a powerful poetry movement from Turkish literature, took its place in the repertoire of aesthetic acts. According to Aytekin, (2017, p. 204) these strong poetic expressions carried by the

graffiti to the action repertoire of the movement, made it easier to come together, to emphasise anti-authoritarian identities and to be separated from the old opposition for the protestors. During Gezi, art was politicised but not instrumentalised, and it helped the protestors to defend their living spaces against neoliberalism. Aytekin (2017) argued that the role of poetry and art in the movement has proved that the organisational needs of social movements are not just technical requirements. Graffiti and other aesthetic political acts enabled the emergence of demands for equality and the spatial diffusion of the Gezi movement. In a Rancièrian sense, graffiti and poetry have disrupted the existing distribution of the sensible (Ranciere, 2004; Aytekin, 2017, p. 205).

Some of the studies consider graffiti as narrative members of the contention repertoire, and they focus on discursive and linguistic analyses. For instance, Seloni and Sarfati (2017) in their discursive analysis, tried to determine what kind of indexical elements were used in Gezi graffiti, what they meant for viewers and which counter-narratives were created, in their work. According to them (Seloni & Sarfati, 2017), the Gezi graffiti carried a variety of social and cultural multi-layered signs. Through graffiti, activists have created the imagery of a new urban space where they can voice their demands and engage in social interaction. In this new urban space to new kinds of social relations, identities and politics are articulated. Also, Gezi graffitists have established their meanings through various counter-literacy practices such as the appropriation of the popular culture, language mixing and code-meshing (Seloni & Sarfati, 2017, p. 8). Seloni and Sarfati argued that seeing the linguistic landscape of the city as a language performance opens up novel ways of understanding written texts in public spaces (2017, p. 24). Gezi graffiti served as a discursive tool for important issues such as social belonging and citizenship. It announced new ideas to national and transnational audiences and challenged the dominant language of the government with humour and satire. Also, Gezi graffitists shared common grievances and announced that they

were in solidarity with other popular social protest movements. They tried to ensure that Gezi finds a place in the alternative international public sphere against the global system (Seloni & Sarfati, 2017, pp. 8-15). Seloni and Sarfati (2017) asserted that Gezi graffiti symbolically and linguistically blurred the distinctions among polarised political and ideological groups. Besides, they transmitted the voices of the groups, which marginalised by the government and the state to the public sphere. Gezi graffiti responded with counter-narratives against the government's narratives and has criticized police violence, the increased authoritarianism, and biased mainstream media. It also announced demands for the right to the city and individual freedom. Oya Morva (2016) analysed Gezi graffiti with the critical discourse analysis model (Van Dijk, 2006) and she asserted that its humour distinguished the Gezi movement from its counterparts. According to Morva (2016), graffiti was one of the most commonly used bearers of Gezi humour. For her, the textual structure of Gezi graffiti reveals how activists formed their discourse and linguistic methods used for the formation of certain opinions among the audiences. Morva claimed that the humour of Gezi graffiti had three targets; the power, sympathisers and protesters. Morva (2016) noted that from target to target Gezi graffiti changed discursively. When graffiti was concerned with power, it used more negative, adversarial words, and generated linguistic ways that would reverse power relations. On the other hand, whilst it was concerned with those who sympathise with the movement and activists, it was focused on solidarity and unification. Also, by using the grammatical elements, the forms of modality and intertextuality, Gezi graffiti helped the movement to be heard and to form collective identities (Morva, 2016, p. 29). Morva (2016) also alleged that the language of humour separated the protesters from power and gave them an identity. Humour in Gezi graffiti was directly related to resistance and has facilitated it. Humorous discourse created a subjective, unusual identity and sovereignty. Power has failed

to know how to manage this new emergence. Therefore, it has lost its control over the public discourse.

Some scholars examine Gezi graffiti in terms of participatory and communicative processes. For example, Taş and Taş (2014) evaluated the Gezi graffiti as a participatory political practice. For them, street art and graffiti had three interconnected functions for the Gezi movement. First, they made urban space a site of political visibility. Second, they reshaped the relationship between art, political activity and communication. Third, they invited their audiences to be political agents. Taş and Taş (2014) also have examined the propagation and re-appropriating processes of Gezi graffiti in terms of networked social movements and social media. Accordingly, graffiti and street arts energised the movement with their strong visual and textual messages. These messages have spread rapidly in cyberspace and material space (p. 336). As the movement was spreading and the government was trying to control the media and protesters, graffiti were digitally copied, shared and reproduced on social media. When the internet access in and around Gezi Park was blocked by the government, graffiti served for protesters to exchange up-to-date information on what was happening on the streets (Taş & Taş, 2014, p. 339). Thousands of graffiti and street art pieces were produced during the movement and reached millions of people. through social media, Scholars claimed that the Gezi movement has initiated a large, creative and highly visible graffiti and street art movement in Turkey (Taş & Taş, 2014).

Analyses that directly or indirectly focus on Gezi graffiti, reveal similar results with their global counterparts examining the phenomenon of political graffiti. To summarise, Gezi graffiti was a political communicative, discursive and participatory tool, and its newness was recognised through its humorous and artistic language, creativity and participatory flexibility. In the literature, Gezi graffiti has been regarded as one of the linguistic, discursive and participatory indicators of the 'differend' of the Gezi movement. Besides, it has been

underlined that Gezi graffiti has played a role in becoming visible and recognised new or excluded identities. It has served as a gateway to public space, urban spaces and politics for the groups and individuals who were suspended from decision-making mechanisms by the power. It is possible to say that these conclusions have similar conclusions to academic studies examining different episodes of contentious politics.

The political and social roles attributed to the Gezi graffiti by the analyses I have examined in this chapter are almost the same as the political and social roles attributed to the Gezi movement by many scholars that I have viewed in chapter two. It can be argued that this indicates consistency. However, this can also mean that the genuine qualities and features of Gezi graffiti are overlooked. To detect recurrently Gezi graffiti's prominent linguistic, discursive, organisational and participatory features is not enough to explain why graffiti was the dominant component of the action repertoire. Also, to describe Gezi graffiti as an urban phenomenon in which the notions of the movement were announced and materialised, just like a mirror, or a prism for more complex analyses, is not sufficient to explain how and to what extent Gezi graffiti shaped the movement.

In a sense, the forms of action of social movements provide important clues about their identities and social roots. Each member of the repertoire works with its characteristics, and their selection and use can be associated with some structural and cultural contexts. Graffiti is one of them. Also, each member of repertoires is reshaped because of the specific nature of movements, protests or episodes. Therefore, this path can provide us with an insight into the internal transformations of movements and the cultural and structural effects of emerging or demanded social changes. What Gezi graffiti said and how it said what it said, must be analysed for sure. However, for these two reasons, it should also be carefully considered why graffiti is chosen as the prevalent form of action and how that choice changed the movement itself.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the literature review carried out by the researcher to enrich the interpretation processes of the codes and categories generated from data and to reach theoretical saturation is presented. Besides, the concepts of movement, space and graffiti are evaluated in terms of the Gezi movement.

In the movement section, social movements and the Gezi movement literature are examined. In the section of space, the concept of space has been discussed and evaluated in terms of social movements. Also, the social and political structure of the central space of the Gezi movement is presented chronologically. The graffiti section has defined the concept and discussed it in terms of various ways of existence and functions. This section also summarizes the graffiti scene in Turkey and took a brief overview of the literature about Gezi graffiti.

Throughout the chapter, the conceptual and theoretical backgrounds of the fourth and fifth chapters in which Gezi graffiti patterns and findings are evaluated and the theory is produced, are provided. In this way, it is aimed at the interpretative processes that form the core of the study that can be followed elaborately.

CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

Introduction

This chapter outlines the methodology used to answer the research questions presented in the first chapter and how the method is applied to the research. To this end, I will first explain in detail why I chose the grounded theory, and its constructivist design developed by Charmaz (2006). I will try to also illustrate the stages of the constructivist grounded theory and how I applied these stages to my research. When I decided to do my doctorate on the graffiti practised during the Gezi movement, all I knew was that I had an extensive graffiti collection in my hand. Also, I had a hunch that it would be not sufficient and fruitful to use the methods I have used before, for my undergraduate dissertation, master's thesis and some other articles; such as content analysis or semiotic analysis.

Throughout the movement, I was, of course, aware of the undeniable and dominant presence of the Gezi graffiti both in the streets and in cyberspace while I was shuttling between my observations as a journalist and actions as an activist. I did not take pictures of all the graffiti I have examined within this research, but I saw all of them with my own eyes. It was very clear that those who had the chance to observe the movement and the protesters have found the graffiti fun and unexpected. Besides, while the movement was still going on, I can say that I have perceived that the Gezi graffiti should be regarded as a serious phenomenon rather than being seen as a cute and affirmed detail or extension of the events. While I was working as a research assistant at the Institute of Social Sciences of Akdeniz University, I have decided to study Gezi graffiti for my doctoral dissertation. Afterwards, I have left Turkey, and I had the chance to continue my academic efforts in Germany, but my decision was not changed. However, my confusion and ignorance of finding the most appropriate method for the research I wanted to carry out also were not changed.

I was not planning to push the Gezi graffiti into any antecedent theoretical frameworks. Also, since I was deeply related to the subject, I was closely following the publications on the Gezi graffiti, however; I have not found them sufficiently descriptive or contributory mostly for their scope, intentions or methods. Most of the researches and studies was spending a lot of effort and energy to adapt the movement and the Gezi graffiti to their biased approaches or perspectives they have generated from somewhere in the literature. Also, most of the researches and studies published in Turkey, especially in obtaining and examining the empirical data, were not equally hardworking. They were not focusing on what happened during the movement, but they were suggesting many ideas and arguments about it. With my limited experience and knowledge, I knew this was not an efficient approach. Also, for me, the situation was the source of an ironic disappointment because established analytic patterns were applied to a movement that has criticised the established and imposed patterns. I knew I had to follow a method away from these deficiencies, but as I mentioned, I was ignorant and I did not know about the grounded theory. When I started reading and learning the grounded theory at the recommendation of my thesis advisor and supervisor Prof. Dr Albert Scherr, I have happily realised that the grounded theory would be the most appropriate approach that would make the research possible.

Because in the grounded theory, the researcher does not start the research with presupposition and preliminary hypotheses, and the theory is completely derived from the data. This gave me the hope that the deficiencies I have observed in the Gezi literature would not be the case for my dissertation. After four and a half years, I believe that I have learned how to conduct a grounded theory analysis. Besides that, I am confident that I applied the correct method for my case study.

The grounded theory provides the researcher with opportunities for being flexible, contributing to the data analysis and relating the components of the research. Beyond that, it

is a highly variable and inclusionary method, due to the way it handles the data. In the grounded theory method, since the theory is derived from data, the decisiveness of the data remains the same for each case study, but the nature of the data, the way it is collected and analysed, is always unique. Because the data will be blended with the subjectivity of the researcher and the participants each time and will differ according to the case. Also, the processual relationality among the researcher, the participants and the data will be unique for each research. In my opinion, this is a methodological approach that is very helpful to researchers, especially in addressing the emergent sociological phenomena. Besides, the grounded theory both requires and encourages the researcher to establish an authentic relationship with the literature and to structure his research differently for each research. In my view, it should be considered and developed as a rewarding method not only for researches but also for preventing researchers from repeating themselves during a research life.

Grounded Theory Methodology

Grounded theory is a research method used when a comprehensive theory or explanation is needed for any social phenomenon or process that is planned to be studied (Creswell, 2012). It is a methodology that discovers theories, concepts, hypotheses, and suggestions directly from data rather than a priori assumptions, other researches, or existing theoretical frameworks (Flint 2005; as cited in Çelik & Ekşi, 2015). It is a systematic, deductive and comparative qualitative research approach carried out to develop a theory that will explain a process, action or interaction on a broad conceptual level in a good and consistent way (Creswell, 2012; Bryant & Charmaz, 2007).

In grounded theory, data collection and analysis are done simultaneously, coding and categories are obtained from the data instead of hypotheses, a continuous comparative

analysis flow is followed, and every stage of data collection and analysis is focused on the theory generating. Besides, theoretical memo writing is done to distinguish these categories, determine their characteristics, define the relations and the gaps between them. Sampling is used to develop the theory, not to represent the population, and after analysis, a literature review and evaluation is made (Charmaz, 2006).

The ground theory is not linear and is an approach in which data collection, analysis and conceptual theories are repeated and these are considered in an integrative approach (Duscher & Morgan, 2004). This process is continued as long as the generated theory can explain every variation in the data. Thus, the generated theory can provide a sound theoretical explanation of the social phenomenon examined (McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007). Grounded theory, unlike other qualitative research methods, the processes of data collection, data analysis and theory generation are done simultaneously. Coding and memo writing begin immediately after the first research notes. Theoretical sampling is done to produce patterns and variations. The theoretical classification of memos sets outlines for the report writing. Data collection is continued until *theoretical saturation* is reached, and the literature review is made for the orientation of the research and the researcher. Theoretical categories are obtained by constant comparative data analysis. Coding is made for the generation of the theory and the theory is associated with other theories. Finally, all these steps are connected by clear and evidence-based ties and social processes that explain the most observed patterns are revealed (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007, pp. 12-13). Grounded theory is inductive at the beginning and it is deductive at the end (McGhee, et al., 2007). It is not applied to prove, develop or refute a theory. It is a method of capturing the essence of the theory by detecting the similarities and differences of patterns (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

For grounded theory, a theory is a set of relations that provide plausible explanations for the description of the case being studied. It is the association of the patterns that are not

related to each other and the discovering of the explicit and implicit. The categories found are theorised until the most appropriate explanation arises (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). The theory should be able to explain convincingly the relations of concepts and have a conceptual depth. Grounded theory researchers should realise the theoretical conceptualisation by concentrating on the patterns of actions and interactions among phenomena, actors or social units without neglecting the variability (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In grounded theory, the distinction between the two theory typologies is important; substantive and formal theories. Substantive theories bring theoretical comments to problems or events that occur in a particular environment, try to explain or manage them, and do not use explanations that are not based on data. Formal theories, on the other hand, try to explain what happens between several situations and provide more abstract, broader theoretical approaches to problems or issues (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Goulding, 2002; Charmaz, 2006). Formal theories can be produced by combining and conceptualising more than one substantive theory. Also, substantive theories can be used to refine formal theories.

The theory explains events, actions, or interactions, and is to produce or discover an abstract analytical scheme of facts (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Creswell, 2003). The purpose of grounded theory is to understand how people define their reality through their interactions and to examine the patterns and processes that develop in this context (Wells, 1995; Cutcliffe, 2001; Goulding, 2002).

The foundations of the grounded theory approach are based on *pragmatism* and *symbolic interactionism*. Symbolic interactionism is the dynamic theoretical perspective that observes human actions, behaviours, situations, and society while structuring. Interpretations and actions are seen as mutual and interacting processes in symbolic interactionism, which are expressed as the creation of reality in line with language and social processes. In symbolic interactionism, the focus is on how meaning is created and the mediation of symbols in

sharing this meaning. Pragmatism, on the other hand, assumes that theories and beliefs are based on effective practices. According to pragmatism, meanings are created as a result of practices in solving problems. It focuses on actions, situations and research results, rather than preliminary conditions, and tries to find what works to solve the problem. The problem studied is the most important issue of the research. Using grounded theory means to be in search of the information that people gain through their experiences and believe to be real (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015, pp. 29-30).

At this point, it is an experiential, practical phenomenon that works in the 'right' problem solution and arises from the life of individuals. Unlike positivism, pragmatism does not suggest an absolute reality and states that reality is not precise but also fluid and open to interpretation. These philosophical foundations allow the creation of open-ended theoretical perspectives in grounded theory research and form the basis for explanations of the phenomenon in a theoretical framework based on the information hidden in the data (Charmaz, 2015). According to the method, the phenomena are not stationary, on the contrary, they are considered being in a constant change that responds to changing conditions. Also, grounded theory rejects strict determinism because it recognises that people have control over their own lives and choices (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015).

The Emergence of the Grounded Theory

The methodological and theoretical foundations of grounded theory are based on a joint study by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss with terminal patients. The researchers have published *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* in 1967. Grounded theory combined Glaser's perspective of traditional theorising, questioning and quantitative research with Strauss' approach to focusing on in-depth interviews and pragmatic theorising (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015). The collaboration of Glaser and Strauss was revolutionary because with their work they

clarified the random distinctions between theory and research and explain how to distinguish between data collection and data analysis. Also, they answered the arguments that find quantitative research more meticulous than qualitative research, criticising qualitative researches for being impressionistic and a-systematic, and claiming that qualitative research should be limited only to descriptive case studies (Jones & Alony, 2011).

Glaser and Strauss have developed an approach that focuses on the discovery of concepts and hypotheses based on substantive data, as an alternative to attempts to validate and test existing theories dominant in sociology. Glaser, with an inductive perspective, made sure that the perspectives of the participants were an essential part of the research process and Strauss has made rigorous field researches an integral part of the grounded theory (Creswell, 2012; Çelik & Ekşi, 2015).

In the following years, Strauss and Glaser continued to develop and explain their grounded theory approaches separately (Glaser, 1978, 1992; Strauss, 1987). Also, Strauss and Julie Corbin developed a new grounded theory approach called systematic design, based on predetermined categories, and focusing on validity and reliability. Glaser, on the other hand, criticised this new model since it was suggesting to use of predetermined categories and frameworks that constraint the theory formation during the research process and it was recommending only the definition of actions instead of conceptualising the patterns and connections in the data (Creswell, 2012).

While these discussions were going on in the 1990s, Kathy Charmaz (1990; 2000; 2006), a student of Glaser and Strauss, developed the constructivist grounded theory design with a different philosophical approach. Charmaz criticised the other two models for being too systematic and found them insufficient to correspond with contemporary philosophical views.

The Development of Constructivist Grounded Theory

In the constructivist grounded theory, the data and their meanings are not seen as sole evidence. It is essential that the data are interpreted by the researchers, categorised, and that multiple possible meanings are created (Charmaz, 2007). The constructivist design approves multiple realities and the joint structuring of the data. The data are problematic, relational, situational and partial. Also, it is acknowledged that the values and priorities of the researcher affect the opinions and formation of the categories. Determinations are situational and partial and related to time, space, actions and interactions. The design aims to constitute the interpretation and interpretational intellection (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015, p. 102). Charmaz (2006) has focused on the meanings attributed to the participants when developing the model because the world comprises multiple individual realities influenced by concepts (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015).

Also, the information is created jointly and mutually by participants and researchers. The meaning produced in this process is interpreted and evaluated, and multiple meanings produced are tried to be revealed. For this reason, the meanings of explicit or implicit values, beliefs, assumptions, understandings and ideologies infiltrated into the data are examined rather than the meaning of the data on the surface (Charmaz, 2006). The interaction between the researchers and the participants enables the generation of the data, and the researchers define the meanings by observing it (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015, p. 104). In the constructivist grounded theory design, the use of active codes expressing the actions that the participants or the data point to facilitates the capture of the notions that will contribute to the generation of the theory, and minimises the effects of the researcher's preconceptions.

As the co-producers of the meaning, researchers should not overlook the influences of their interactions with participants and with the data on their perception of the course of the

research. The researcher must dive into the data and reach the categorical and conceptual diversity that will enable the theory to be revealed in this way. To this end, the raw data should be included in the theoretical memo writing and that should be continued until the memos gain an analytical quality (Charmaz, 2000). Besides, the developed provisions are suggestions. They are incomplete and inconclusive. The researcher continuously focuses on views and experiences and avoids predetermined categories (Creswell, 2012). The research process is fluid, interactive and evolving. The research problem portrays the first methodological choices used for the data collection. Researchers are part of the research and should achieve a sequential level of abstraction via constant comparative analysis. Analytical trends appear depending on how the researcher interacts with the comparisons and how these comparisons are interpreted and analysed (Charmaz, 2006, p.178; Çelik & Ekşi, 2015, p. 106).

Choosing Constructivist Grounded Theory Design


My main rationale for choosing the constructivist design to use can be explained by the nature of the data source in which I searched for the grounded theory throughout the research. In grounded theory research, researchers often use data sources such as interviews, focus groups, and field observations to collect data. Resources, such as documents, media content, or graffiti are often seen and used as secondary resources.

However, for my research, the 984 graffiti I had in my data corpus and the observations I made in the field had to be my primary data sources. All the Gezi graffiti are anonymous, without exception, and there is no accessible research and information allow to detect Gezi graffitists and have interviews with them. Therefore, I had to put popular grounded theory data sampling procedures aside, such as the interview and/or the other data

sources in which the researcher can gather information about how participants build their realities and make sense of their actions; at least in the ordinary sense.

Figure 5

Constructivist Grounded Theory Process



Note. Adapted from *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis* (p. 11) by K. Charmaz, 2006. Sage.

Instead, to find out what Gezi graffiti tells about the Gezi movement, I treated graffiti as texts and visuals where I could interpret how graffitiists interpreted the movement as an experience and action, how they positioned their own experience and actions within this world of meaning, and how they interpreted what happened. Of course, this limitation would not provide continuing flows of data extending to the details of the graffitiists' individual lives. In this sense, establishing likely relationalities would not produce healthy analytical opportunities. On the other hand, to consider the graffiti as a data source comprising artefacts that contain the movement's articulation and the agency would mean reaching a very rich source that would keep me always on track while looking for answers to the research problem; the theory.

This can be compared to asking participants to draw a picture or write a poem about the case after sampling has been determined to collect data. Besides, it can also be seen as a facilitating factor in achieving the abstract, analytical, productive and conceptual study saturation that the method tries to direct the researcher. Nevertheless, since the raw data from the data source include various metaphors, abstractions, word plays, messages, rhetoric, discourses and sometimes visual designs, and I could predict that the stages of coding and category building would be immense and intimidating. Graffiti was designed, applied and completed. The only way to make the data fluid, again and again, was to utilize my inferences and interpretations as a researcher. For this reason, I chose the one that provides the most flexibility to the researcher among the grounded theory patterns. That can be seen as the secondary rationale of my methodological preference.

The constructivist design does not see the researcher and the researched separately. Meaning is not a secret waiting to be discovered in the data. Rather, it is a process in which the researcher interacts and interprets experiences, narratives, ideas and perspectives.

Meaning is built together by the researcher and the participants (graffiti). The researcher follows the data and constantly reinterprets until saturation is reached. Research is a dynamic and unexpected process. It is encouraged that uncertainty, pattern production, association and multiple realities are possible together (Charmaz, 2006). I believe that what the constructivist design expects from research and the way it encourages researchers, makes it the most suitable model to study the Gezi graffiti as a complex, distinct, contingent, fluid and dynamic data source.

Methodological Components and Research Process

As a requirement of the theory to be generated as a result of grounded theory research, one of the first steps to be taken for the researcher is to determine what can cause prejudices. The detection and notice of these prejudices contribute to the scientific resilience of the study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Nevertheless, the researcher cannot leave completely behind the knowledge and experiences used during the collecting, interpreting and relating the data. Therefore, it is necessary to remember the knowledge and experiences may affect the researcher and objectivity may be impaired. Additionally, one should be careful about the possibilities in which the researcher may obtain new prejudices from what is learned in the research process (*double hermeneutic*; Giddens, 1987, pp. 20-21), and the likelihood that the participants will exhibit participation to satisfy the researcher (*the observer-expectancy effect*; Salkind, 2010).

Within the research, the observer-expectancy effect is out of the question since no data collection process involving human participants has been carried out. On the other hand, as a researcher, my involvement as a journalist and then an activist in the Gezi movement shows that I might have prejudices about the case. However, I believe that the seven years that have passed, and the latency phase of the movement allowed these prejudices and my

partiality to be eroded. Besides, I have examined the data and the literature with the ethical perspective, which I tried to develop during the research, I have tested my efforts of interpretation from multiple angles, and I have constantly kept my connectedness to the data. These are the prime reasons and factors that allowed me to minimise my prejudices and partiality about the case.

Processual Approach

Grounded theory research requires approaching the research problem as a process. In this context, the process refers to sequences of actions and events that occur among people concerning the subject. The researcher abstracts these sequences, creates categories from them and tries to understand the process by linking actions and interactions. There is not necessarily a process in the data or it does not occur by itself, although the process' presence is necessary. It is mostly related to the researcher's realising the variances in the data and determining the relationships (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015, p. 118).

Theoretical Sensitivity

Creating concepts based on data in grounded theory and comparing them with other theoretical models express theoretical sensitivity. Building a theory based on data means not only that hypotheses and concepts are derived from data but also requires a systematic analysis of the relationships within the data throughout the research. The researcher must be open to conceptual formations, maintain the analytical distance with data, and be able to tolerate confusion and be predictive. Also, the researcher must have the ability to conceptualise, organise, establish abstract connections, visualise and multi-dimensional thinking (Glaser & Holton, 2004).

Constant Comparative Data Analysis

Constant comparative data analysis is an analysis method applied by the researcher to generate the concepts from the data by conducting coding and analyses simultaneously. This method is defined as a process in which data collection, coding and analysing are systematically integrated. With theoretical sampling they are developed into a theory that is integrated, data-driven, and testable (Kolb, 2012). Constant comparative data analysis is an inductive method that generates concepts and relates them by comparing the events with other events, the concepts with other concepts in the data. The aim is to ground the concepts within data (Creswell, 2012). This analysis method includes four basic steps; comparing events for each category, integrating categories and category characteristics, limiting the theory, and generating the theory. It is a comprehensive process that requires the researcher to review the categories with their all features and continues until obtaining sufficient quality of detail and abstraction (McCann & Clark, 2003).

Memo Writing

Grounded theory researchers write memos about the data they collect from the beginning to the end of the study. Memo writing is the capture of ideas during the research process. In this way, the researcher keeps constant contact with the developing theory and elaborates the ideas about codes and categories (Charmaz, 2006). By looking for comprehensive explanations, the researcher writes memos and discovers novel hunches, ideas, and thoughts. Memos help the researcher for identifying new data sources, develop new ideas and find his way into data.

During the research, I tried to establish relational processes among the data while continuing the analytical phases of the constructivist grounded theory design. Also, the data has provided a variety of processes that could be interpreted concerning graffiti and the movement. Besides, to pursue and maintain comparative data analysis, I have continuously

combined, merged and dismantled the categories stemming from the coding, and searched for new codes and categories. At the same time, I tried to reach theoretical precision by writing memos related to categories and inter-category relations, reviewing and comparing these memos after a certain time, and considering the literature as data.

Sampling and Data Collection

Graffiti. The sample of the study is its key data source. This data source includes 984 singular graffiti practised during the Gezi movement. Some of these were photographed by myself and some were collected from various digital and private sources. Although I cannot claim that the data source that I examined during the research cover all the graffiti produced during the movement, I believe that it contains an enormous part of it. This claim is based on both my observations and my intensive research on the internet and my contacts with other Gezi graffiti collectors. Also, I did not eliminate any graffiti until the theoretical sampling phase for research. Thus, I aimed to carry out the most comprehensive coding, memo writing and category creation phases I can perform.

Literature Reviews. In grounded theory scholarship, it is a matter of debate at what stage and how the researcher will use the literature. Glaser and Strauss (1967) have advised against conducting a literature review in the early stages of grounded theory research, and many grounded theory students agree with them on various levels. The fundamental reason for the refusal is the risk that the categories that emerge from empirical data may be affected or prevented by pre-existing theories and their associated hypotheses. Because of the early literature review, the processes of data collection, analysis and theory development can be contaminated (Dunne, 2010, p. 114) and the quality and originality of the research may be decreased. Also, the work of others may impress the researchers and lead them to underestimate their analytical capacity and value (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2006).

According to Glaser (1998), in the early stages, the grounded theory researcher cannot know about the relevant literature because of the unpredictability of the method, and literature review may become ineffective and time-consuming. As Dunne (2010, p. 115) noted, the views that oppose the literature review in the early stages of grounded theory research arise from the ideological stances of a post-positivist ontology (McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007) and pragmatic concerns for a more efficient implementation of the researches.

Avoiding reviewing the literature in the early stages of grounded theory research can also create situations that will influence adversely the successful implementation of the research. First, not reviewing the literature in the early stages may mean that it will be not possible to determine whether the researcher is in lack knowledge about the subject. Also, it will not be possible for the researcher to discover how the literature should be utilised without having prior knowledge of the field. This will slow down the researchers' engagement covering data, literature and analysis (McCann & Clark, 2003; McGhee et al., 2007; Dunne, 2011). Reviewing the literature in the early stages of grounded theory research can also provide several benefits for researches and researchers. First, the persuasive rationale for the necessity of the research and the research approach can be conducted thanks to the literature research. Second, the researcher can be prevented from reinventing the wheel and the authenticity of the research can be preserved, and thusly the context of the research may be created. Third, the researchers are provided to develop their unique approaches by learning the pre-existing researches about the case, if any. Fourth, the researcher becomes conceptually and theoretically more equipped and sensitive, and thus creative thanks to the literature review (McCann & Clark, 2003; McGhee et al., 2007; Dunne, 2011). Briefly, the literature review allows the researcher to connect the emergent ideas and other researches in the field. Also, it serves for developing the researcher's understanding of the field. In this

way, the researcher can confirm the context of the ongoing research and use the skills in defining novel ideas and findings. The literature review also enables clear and persuasive connections between previous studies and the grounded theory in which the researcher can make inferences and interpretations.

As part of my research, I conducted literature reviews for original purposes in two different stages. The initial literature review I conducted was dictated to me by the data and carried out to interpret the data in a more creative, rich and efficient way. Based on the actions, expressions and contexts of the graffiti I was examining, I have determined the need for such a review after the initial coding, memo writing, and categorisation phases. Because my initial interpretations and inferences have revealed multi-layered and diverse contexts. Gezi graffiti contain multifarious opportunities for interpretation with its textual and visual elements referring to numerous linguistic, cultural, social and historical issues that are complex and intertwined. Therefore, at this stage, I decided that I could only counterbalance and analyse the multiplicity of these flows with a *theoretical agnosticism* (Henwood and Pidgeon, 2003, p. 138; Thornberg, 2012, p. 10) rather than a *theoretical ignorance*. Theoretical agnosticism is a literature reviewing approach in which the researchers increase their theoretical sensitivity and competence, by the knowledge they obtain, rather than overlooking the existing theories. Thus, a researcher conducting grounded theory research can apply a critical and sceptical selective permeability to the literature in the study's favour. In this way, researchers address and question the existing theories and concepts that appear in the literature and which concern their research, thus establishing a general reference framework in a pluralistic and critical way and enriching the ongoing study becomes possible (Thornberg, 2012, p. 10).

After completing the early literature review, I gained an extensive knowledge of the background of the contexts the data provided, which enabled me to make multiple

interpretations and bindings and identify repetitive patterns and gaps in the literature. Thus, I could use the data for the production of the theory within a meaningful relational framework, and as a researcher, I could find my way again after every immersion in the data. Besides, I have implemented a data collection that includes the textual and visual analyses together because of the content structure of the graffiti I examined within the study. I should have been particularly careful of the contexts since most of the graffiti was extant texts (Charmaz, 2006, p. 37) that I did not play any role in their construction as a researcher. Because these extant texts are built for specific purposes and this was done by linking the context of the Gezi movement with other social, economic, historical, cultural and situational contexts (Charmaz, 2006). Therefore, I did not have a problem with the discovery of the main context because while I was applying the textual analyses for each graffiti it was obvious that they revolve around the movement's primary context. For this reason, I have identified other contexts that graffiti add to this main context, considering the literature as a data source. The same contextual convenience also applies to graffiti, which contains only a visual expression or combines text and graphics. For these graffiti, I revealed their subjective contexts that attached to the main context by deconstructing the visual construct and interpreting them as socio-visual expression forms (Bryant & Charmaz, 2019, p. 369).

The second literature review was carried out to make refined theoretical memo writing and conceptualisations in the late stages of the research, and it aimed to discuss and absorb the concepts of the social movements, space and graffiti, independent from the Gezi graffiti data. In this way, I tried to ensure that the original categories derived from the data are contextually associated with the literature and are constituted via meaningful echoes for the readers.

Observations. During the research process, I have retrospectively benefited from my observations from the field during the Gezi movement and articles I have written as a

journalist about the movement. Also, I and my other three friends have founded a Facebook page named The Chapulcu People's Party (Çapulcu Halk Partisi at the beginning of the movement, shortly after the page was followed by around 20 thousand users. Thanks to that page I reached questions, comments and information from protesters. These were other materials that contributed to my interpretations and associations in a retrospective sense. In this context, I believe that while evaluating the data; I take advantage of an authentic interpretation perspective, based on my experiences about the matter.

Analysis Process

Data analysis for the constructivist design begins with the coding of the data. Coding of data is revealing the elements on which the research will be built, be associated with theoretical integrity. Therefore, it is not a simple process of coding. It is about the researcher's forming the analytical framework. During coding, the researcher discovers what is in the data and their meanings. Thus, generalisable theoretical expressions independent of time and space and contextual analyses of actions and events occur. Coding is carried out simultaneously with data collection and analysis processes and keeps the researcher's analytical focus fresh (Charmaz, 2006). There are three stages of coding: *initial coding*, *focused coding* and *theoretical coding*.

Initial Coding. This coding phase is to identify all the theoretical possibilities perceived in the data. It also directs the researcher to decide about the coding core categories. Initial coding should be implemented as a process where the researcher constantly interacts with the data. Researchers should code with words and expressions that reflect actions at this coding stage. Focusing on actions is the essence of initial coding. Initial coding is provisional because it is made to discover the most suitable codes for the theory generation. It is also comparativist and embedded in the data. During the initial coding, the researcher should

determine the codes according to the data, then return to the data to bring these codes to saturation and explain them. In this phase, the researchers realise whether the data in his hand is insufficient or whether there are disconnections between the data and this is part of the analytical process. Researchers should make continuous discoveries in the field, and through these discoveries, they identify the required data sources in the next step of the research and collect the new data they need. Thus, categories are developed (Charmaz, 2006).

In constructivist design, initial coding is applied fast and spontaneously. In this way, it is ensured that the researcher creates fresh perspectives regarding the data and generates the codes suitable for the data. Initial coding can be done by quoting words, lines, paragraphs, actions or groups of words and/or sentences used by participants during the interview (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2012).

Following the advice of Charmaz, I have completed the time consuming and rapid initial coding. I have done word-by-word coding since the graffiti mostly contain few words or a single line. Thus, I could examine the data by attending to meanings, images, word structures and flows (Charmaz, 2006). The vastness of the data I examine while coding and the number of codes that are emerged when I completed this initial phase were remarkable. The initial codes mostly reflected actions and emotions. Also, graffiti were multi-layered. Mostly every word was summoning another context, and their social and political connotations were dynamic and countless. The abundance of codes that at the beginning seemed to be a disadvantage turned into an advantage for me during the initial memo writing. I have noticed that there were many repeating patterns among them, and graffiti was the right case to study. There was a vast and rich content to be interpreted. That fruitfulness encouraged me to form tentative categories.

After the initial coding, I have generated the following codes: challenging authority, addressing Erdoğan directly, objection to humiliation, requesting recognition, sending environmentalist messages, expressing identity, reporting, belittling the authority, humorousness, referring to popular culture, making a situation analysis, breaking the spelling rules, reconstructing a historical story, to relate present with a historical narrative, political criticism, economic criticism, to complain about the pepper spray, making a political determination, threatening the authority, criticising the violation of human rights, steering audiences spatially, using sarcasm, addressing the police directly, praising resistance, addressing the public directly, sending messages to the public, praising critical thinking and questioning, describing protesters, encouraging, criticising the society, proposing alternative ways for political communication, criticising police violence, consensual attitude, praising passivism, addressing protesters directly, motivating, referring to traditions, glorifying activists, using internet memes, using slang, mocking, disdain, criticising Erdoğan indirectly, criticising the system, referring to movies, referring to cuisine, making word games, using common reference frameworks, to say that protesters' lives are in danger, fear and apprehension, using irony, praising anarchism, revolting, stating that protesters are subjected to violence, feeling tired, making fun of the authority, using sexual content, humiliating Erdoğan, using accents, demanding the subversion of the government, claiming to seize the power, hopelessness for the social change, being irrational, blaming government for corruption, hoping that the future will be different, claiming that social change has started, demanding radical social change, personification of anti-riot vehicles, frustration, directly addressing the public, sadness, longing, referring to music, confronting Erdoğan, inviting people to be self-critical, dissatisfaction, using metaphors, questioning, personification of Taksim Square, sharing information about the course of events, sincerity, explaining what the Taksim Square and Gezi Park represent, highlighting the shared/common values, using lyrics,

criticising political Islam, answering Erdoğan, criticising Erdoğan directly, threatening the rich and the political elite, demanding political change, complaining about the economic disparity, claiming that the movement will lead to change, criticising the mainstream media, describing the movement as a revolution, praising protesters, calls for resignation, belittling the police, calls for joining the movement, anger, being out of patience, undermining Erdoğan, blaming Erdoğan for what is happening, threatening Erdoğan, accusing Erdoğan of collaborating with the United States, claiming Turkey is not a free country, praising peace, declaring that violence does not intimidate protesters, using Erdoğan's first name, making fun of efforts to stop the protests, claiming Erdoğan has touched a social sore spot, swearing, expressing physical pain, referring to Twitter, absurdism, mentioning pepper spray, expressing the police are on the wrong side, making fun of pepper spray, announcing that protesters are undaunted by pepper spray or the police, claiming that the movement is not just about Gezi Park and the trees, inviting the whole country to unite, claiming the whole of Turkey is a resistance area, addressing the families of protesters, accusing families of not taking action, expressing that youth lost their dreams, ridiculing Erdoğan, claiming that Erdoğan is afraid of protesters, creating an us and a them, questioning the legality of the policing, addressing directly mothers, describing how to overcome fear, praising solidarity and unity, drawing attention to Erdoğan's cooperation with the Gülen movement, referring to philosophy, requesting more pepper gas, provoking the police, explaining the reason of the movement's emergence, building a collective identity, turning upside down Erdoğan's discourse and using it against him, culture jamming, describing the protesting as a new lifestyle, using poetry, criticising capitalism, praising love, giving a social message, loneliness, criticising working conditions, criticising the concept of working, identifying the movement, using proverbs, warning the opponents of the movement, demonisation of Erdoğan, demonisation of the police, criticising the disproportionate use of force, criticising

transphobia, criticising discrimination, naming protesters as the public/people, criticising Erdoğan's exclusionist and accusatory attitude, demanding Erdoğan's rapprochement with the people, criticising the removal of graffiti, praising diversity and criticising uniformity, criticising those who did not participate in the movement, accusing the state of being gloomy, announcing that a solution to a social problem is sought, make a general determination about life, referring to football, inviting the public to read books, criticising the separation of people according to their appearance, addressing lovers, praising socialism, describing the movement as a historical milestone, congratulating the protesters, using English, referring popular TV shows, emphasising that the resistance and the movement is the decision of the protesters, referring political leaders, making fun of political leaders, demanding for economic welfare, referring to computer games, describing Erdoğan, blaming Erdoğan for being unjust, using koine, stress, asking Erdoğan to apologise to the public, asking Erdoğan to apologise to the police, cursing Erdoğan, portraying the movement as a grassroots movement, referring to comics, personification of the Gezi Park, describing movement as an ecologist movement, using clichés, describing protesters as normal people, not extremes, referring to the literature, boredom, referring to TV series, protesting against sexual harassment, warning graffitists not to use profanity, generating the ethics of the movement, praising contrariness, calls for resistance, criticising sexist graffiti, making propaganda, highlighting that the protesters are human beings, ensuring the public that the movement will achieve its goal, calls for more freedom, generating legitimacy for the movement, criticising for the emergence of police state, referring to Atatürk, praising republican period and revolutions, speaking in the public's name, describing movement as a street movement, calling for peace, using an embracing language, describing the way of life longed for, praising fellowship, accusing police for murder, describing the movement as a renaissance, criticising the partisanship of mainstream media, criticising the slogans of other protesters,

criticising the opposition, defending minority rights, criticising the state, expressing that art has lost its freedom, stating that pepper spray is addictive for the protesters, stating that pepper spray is delicious, playing with orthographic rules, using colloquial language, stating that resistance is the only remedy, stating that resistance is the only option, astonishment, drawing attention to the problem of freedom of expression, criticising authoritarianism, emphasising on origins and historicity, expressing that the protesters set the country's political agenda, praising the crisis created, emphasising the need for recognition, stating that the resistance is with the oppressed, find the movement fun, holding Erdoğan responsible for what is happening, opposing the construction of the shopping centre, criticising established values, referring to religions, announcing who the prime minister should be, firing Erdoğan, stating that the movement is not understood, describing Turkey as an unsuccessful country, criticising gender inequality, gentleness, roughness, supporting the movement, criticising social inequality, referring to global popular culture, linking the movement with the labour movement, describing movement as a success of political left, disappointment, using social stereotypes, making fun of social stereotypes, canonising protesters, expressing the movement is contagious, qualifying the events as unusual and crazy, expressing the pleasure of that the normal life is ceased, offering solutions, expressing emotions, inviting people for having dreams, world weariness, being deceived, being harmed, expressing that the truth is found, quoting, expressing the longing for individual independence, laying down conditions for ending the movement, using Turkish, expressing that violence increases motivation of protesters, using smileys, appropriating the Taksim Square, diarising, stating the clashing with the police is a daily activity, individual expressions, expressing social demands, claiming rights, using Spanish, demanding an end to violence, proclaiming victory, describing the movement as a game, gallows humour, using advertising slogans, referring to Rumi, speaking for the police, ridiculing the police force and policing, liking protesters to the

penguins, praising the persistence, to describe the movement as an event worth experiencing, emphasising the necessity of social media, being happy, wanting to be happy, seeing the world as a place full of agony, rhyming, appropriating the Gezi Park, melancholy, fearlessness, referring to Marx, blaming capitalism, expressing that the movement belongs to the millennials, referring to May 68, linking the Gezi movement with May 68, using French, describing the movement as a legend, criticising Erdoğan's for acting like a sultan, claiming that the movement is writing a new story for the people, expressing that Erdoğan uses religion to hold power, praising revolutionism, using popular brand logos, emphasizing the innocence of protesters, defining freedom, optimism, to describe the movement as a party, inviting all segments of society to join the movement, expressing that the risks are taken for a better future, referring to mangas, stating that the movement has spread, criticising haphazard urbanization, referring to the religious sayings, criticizing the unfair gain of Islamists, helping protesters by sharing information, criticising bigotry and fanaticism, announcing kissing, praising Atatürk, finding Turkish youth lazy, commemorating those who lost their lives, purposelessness, incapacity, being happy about Erdoğan's desperation and loneliness, fear of the escalation of strives, describing smartphones as protesters, using brands, deliberate miswriting, referring to avantgarde art, criticising free market, making political analyses, associating the movement with other important social and political events, civil disobedience, praising alcohol, describing the movement as a result of social pressure, deriving a collective identity from an insult that Erdoğan used to describe protesters, finding Erdoğan ignorant and uneducated, asking different segments to respect each other, praising the occupation, offering absurd and irrational remedies, insulting the police, accusing the police of being fascists, solidarity for Ankara, referring to Koran, expressing that insurgents have taken power of authority, praising social media, defining Gezi as a Spartacist movement, declaring Erdoğan's political career is over, apathy, catharsis, activist mothers and homemakers, ludicrousness,

announcing the urban spaces are reclaimed by their rightfully owners, praising hacktivism, desiring the movement to spread all over the country, praising chaos, trying to predict how the movement will end, asking for a sexual revolution, reproducing and using the old leftist slogans, demanding respect for different lifestyles, demanding a novel political rhetoric, attempting to recruit new protesters, speaking for the whole movement, claiming Erdoğan is a failure, describing the movement as a resistance, praising Kemalism, giving hope, using aphorisms, claiming that joining the movement and rebelling is a moral humanitarian imperative, making calls for a reformation in Islam, making fun of the movement itself, addressing directly the Istanbulites, writing graffiti with hashtags, associating the movement with revolutionary old movements, praising cannabis, suggest Erdoğan to use cannabis, praising pornography, criticising internet censorship, creating symbols for the movement, demanding autonomy, claiming that the police is defeated by protesters, demanding just policing, questioning the parliamentary democracy and the voting system, criticising high costs of living, making fun of traditions, solidarity for women's movements, expressing that Erdoğan does not understand the movement/protesters, describing Erdoğan as a bully, protecting Atatürk against criticisms, demanding equality, drawing attention to the economic inequality between the groups participating in the movement, doing citizen journalism, praising citizen journalism, criticising those who stay silent, praising graffiti and its propagation, solidarity for feminist movement, describing the movement as a fight for freedom, panic, describing the events as a punishment for the government, describing activists as unhappy individuals, claiming that the movement has liberated the streets, describing the events as a beginning of massive transformations, claiming that the police is a failure, referring to Banksy, claiming that resistance is a requirement of being a Muslim, mocking with the political left, showing Erdoğan as the sole responsible of the social discontent, being antipolitical, criticising Erdoğan for being arrogant, ridiculing Erdoğan

supporters, criticising the repressive mindset, express everyday troubles, using other worldwide known movement's slogans, confusion, establishing a dialogue, calls for occupation, referring to contemporary art, expressing difficulty in finding new slogans, describing the movement as the second war of liberation, describing the movement as a cyber movement, demanding social change for the whole world, solidarity for the animal rights, solidarity for the Turkist-shamanist movement, announcing the disobedience for the laws, solidarity for the LGBTQIA movement, declaring Erdoğan as a dictator, praising Çarşı football fan club, drawing attention to femicide, criticizing the limitation of alcohol sales, giving messages to other activists, criticising militarism, criticising categorisation, making fun of middle class/ petit bourgeois, declaring Erdoğan as a fascist, mystification of the movement, expressing the desire to live in a world where the values of the Gezi movement are dominant, criticism for religious sects, praising the pluralistic democracy, making fun of political Islam, expressing political apathy, criticising the anti-democratization, declaring AKP's political career is over, outrage, expressing to being hopeful again for Turkey's future, personification of spray cans, referring to political leaders.

After all these codes generated, I have created tentative categories to better evaluate them, make more relational and creative inferences, and conduct a non-reductionist deblurring. I have changed or abandoned many of these categories during the focused coding and theoretical sampling stages of the research. However, these categories have become my conceptual beacons to find my way in the data and codes. I have generated the following tentative categories: attitudes, messages and slogans, participation in current politics, alternative culture, causes of the movement, situational analyses, us and them, establishing new relationships, historicity, composite structures, popular culture, art and philosophy, deconstruction, taboos and stereotypes, shared values and references, media, social media,

phenomena, resistance, interactions, the public, concerning society, mediums, humour, the leader, pepper gas, the police, ancient political issues, criticism.

After the creation of the tentative categories, I conducted a long literature review, realizing that I was not knowledgeable enough to grasp all these context, topics and issues uncovered before returning to the data. Studying the literature was the only way to achieve the theoretical and conceptual sensitivity needed to interpret and relate (if necessary) all these contexts, issues and issues. At this stage, I used the literature as data and benefited from the analytical facilities it offered me to get ready for the focused coding and the second immersion in the data, and also for the stage of theory generation phase, which I had only some forethoughts about.

Focused Coding and Conceptual Categories. Focused coding is more directive, selective and conceptual than initial coding (Glaser, 1978). At this stage, the researcher chooses the codes that most reflect and emphasise the opinions of the participants. Extensive amounts of data are parsed and synthesised, and to do that the initial code is used. The researcher decides whether the codes revealed by the initial coding are sufficient or not. If it is determined that the initial coding does not categorise the data completely, the researcher should return to the old data and the data should be re-examined. The codes resulting from the initial coding are carefully examined at this stage and converted into temporary/possible theoretical categories. At this point, it should be decided whether the categories have sufficient analytical carrying capacity. The analytical momentum of the study depends on the creation of these categories in the most appropriate way (Charmaz, 2006).

As a result of the literature review, I made before the focused coding, I examined the codes I generated in the initial coding phase and the tentative categories, in terms of sociology, political science, political sociology, and history. Simultaneously, while coding

the codes, I tried to connect these contexts with the *sui generis* conditions of Turkish society because I thought the meanings and contexts that emerged from the initial coding should have been also affected by local variations and the cultural formations. For example, for a graffiti opens the concept of state for a discussion, I reviewed the literature to understand the general concept of the state and to learn the state is perceived in which contexts and meanings in Turkey. In this way, I tried to reach adequate analytical equipage. Therefore, it can be said that the codes resulting from focused coding are generated with a more improved and local lens.

After the focused coding, I have generated the following codes: The significance of the public, power plays, centre-periphery conflicts, Gezi for the trees, Gezi for the variety of means and ends, the cultural discrepancy between the leader and the protesters, Erdoğan, criticism for everything, humour, questioning the concept of state, political polarisation, the police state, anti-democratisation, the subjects or the citizens, rejection of institutionalised politics, anti-capitalism, political apathy, police violence, cultural articulations, aggrieved groups, struggles for legitimacy, human rights and the law, corruption, demands for social change, identity, communicative action, analyses, emotions, religion, populism, class conflict, solidarity, coalitions, Web 2.0, irrationality and absurdism, global perspectives, needs for consensus, antagonism, ignorance of the people, allegories, art, ridicule, calls, resistance, diffusion, utilising values, discursive struggles, hybrid structures, new linguistic structures, inclusionary deeds, culture jamming, isolation and atomisation, announcement of individualisation, culture-based political conflicts, definitions, re-litigating core notions, everyday life, ethical discussions, re-building of the public sphere, popular culture, injustice, economic problems, the rise of activism, appropriating and directing the movement, abandonment of the conventional media, lack of belongingness, depicting and making sense of events, raking up the past, ecologism, pacifism, hard and direct accusation, fluidity,

variability and unexpectedness, questioning the concept of politics, indignation, mystification/de-mystification, traditional cultural forms, innovative forms of action, avoiding suggesting solutions or failing to offer solutions, generation of the truth, urban issues, writing new stories, producing new icons and symbols, opposition to authoritarianism, questioning the republican values, idealism, transcendence, carnival, modernity, irony and satire, the youth, liberation, collective memory, pluralism, internationalisation, imposed ideal types, volunteerism, affection, social capitals, anti-predestinarianism, civil rights, secularism, questioning the system, intellects and creativity, questioning the concept of public, rapid politisation, supra-institutions politics, denial for stigmatisation, the significance of the morale, questioning the order, glorifying the movement, philosophical justifications, questioning the concept of power, relations between politics and religion, unsanctionedness.

As noticed, when I completed focused coding, I reached unvarnished and more conceptual codes. Besides, I compared data, incidents, contexts, and categories (Charmaz, 2006) during the focused coding and along with the additional memo writing to see the relationships and patterns.

At this point, I have decided to conduct a literature review for the second time, to get help for identifying the conceptual categories. Before I started this, I also conceptually categorised the literature. This categorisation was made possible by the fact that the outlines of the theory that I will generate were becoming evident through data and codes. Before moving on to theoretical sampling, I explored the general concepts and contexts to which the study would be generally associated to test the analytical relevance and convenience of these lines. I divided the literature into three categories based on data, actions and events; movement, space and graffiti. I have completed a wide literature review for these three categories while returning to focused codes and data recurrently. Most of the codes generated during focused coding have turned into conceptual categories covering all contexts. This

time, it was unnecessary to eliminate many codes, as after the initial coding. Besides, at the end of the second literature review, I was able to interpret the data to the benefit of my theory more effectively since I have discovered more functional conceptual contexts to produce conceptual categories. At the same time, I realised that some high-frequency concepts that I generated were novel because they have not been discussed before in terms of Gezi graffiti and the Gezi movement.

Generating conceptual categories from codes is about re-evaluating them in terms of their characteristics and analysing them. When the characteristics of the codes are detected, the processes and relationships among them begin to emerge, so that the codes are conceptualised. Categories are interrelated and integrated. In other words, at this stage, the researcher decides which codes to pursue the theory, which issues, problems, processes or relationships they express will be interpreted and how to link these categories (Charmaz, 1990). Conceptual categories, like many stages of embedded theory research, are carried out by constant comparison and memo writing.

After the literature review and focused coding, I have generated the following conceptual categories: the public as a social fabric that covers everything, emergent or delayed norms, individual, state and society, populism as an omnipresent social capital, leadership as a source of appropriable and condemnable charisma, bodily simple and intellectually complex resistances, religious Turkish neoliberalism, individual mind as a medium of communication, networked actions, spatial flows of opposition, identities negating identities, innocence, familial ties and politics, Dadaist usage of the culture, social effects of virtual reality, gallows humour at the end of known society, disreputability and disputability of the social contract and the law, the politics of space and the space of politics.

After the second literature review was completed, I wrote memos about all the focused codes and categories I have. Thus, before the theoretical coding phase, I had the chance to think about the relationships in the focused codes and make new inferences.

Theoretical Coding. Theoretical coding involves an abstract coding process in which the relationships established between the categories created in the focused coding phase are discovered (Charmaz, 2006). At this stage, the fragmented data or the story is reassembled (Glaser, 1992) and how the codes are related is conceptualised and the analytical narrative of the research is moved into a theoretical dimension (Çelik & Ekşi, 2015, p. 117). Theoretical coding is used to explain and sharpen the analysis, but care must be taken not to impose some frames on the data due to the codes. The researcher should be convinced that the theoretical codes interpret the data. Theoretical coding helps to make analysis compatible and understandable. Besides, general and specific contexts, structural sequences of analysis, and participants' strategies can be examined at this stage (Charmaz, 2006). At this stage, I theoretically re-coded the conceptual categories and focused codes according to the causes, contexts, consequences, contingencies, conditions, processes, cultural notions, overlappings, degrees, strategies and interactions (Glaser, 1978). In this process, I aimed to theoretically and analytically strengthen the categories I obtained and to create a map before I start the theoretical sampling. I saw theoretical coding as a process of re-evaluation of codes, categories and memos on a conceptual and analytical dimension and conducted it in this way. After the theoretical coding, I have generated the following codes: the exclusion of various social discontents by the same mechanisms, huge gaps between the political system and some segments of the society, huge gaps between the social groups, the inability and idleness of the political system in responding to the rapid changes in the society, effects of the changing and expanding conditions of mediation, rapid urbanization and the accumulation of the population in the cities, the overlapping, accumulation and sudden unfolding of social grievances, the

government's reluctance and incompetence in managing the process, power's reforming policies on the political system and the state, the centralization of power and the emergence of apparent targets for the opposition, the losses in terms of representation, participation and agency, suffering from the defects of the political climate as a movement offering alternatives, forced disruptions or conversions of social symbols and icons, outrage for the forced disruptions or conversions of social symbols and icons, facilitated individualized actions, efforts to establish counter-hegemonies, occupation of novel kinds of actions and discourses, constant generation of legitimacy through the use of shared values, strategic use of grievances, technological opportunities enabling cognitive liberation, the need for an alternative narrative for the society and efforts to this end, the encounter of striated and smooth spaces, implicit tactical and rational steps, the incomprehensibility of the emergent opposition for the established political system, cyber virality-oriented pluralism, solidarity between advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

Theoretical Sampling. Theoretical sampling for grounded theory means that the researchers choose data collection forms that will provide them with useful texts and images. The sampling is purposeful and focused on the generation of the theory. Besides, theoretical sampling is also used to compare the conceptual ties and categories created with the new data developed (Creswell, 2012). Theoretical sampling is the process by which researchers decide what the next specific data will be and from where it will be collected and ultimately combine all (Duchscher & Morgan, 2004). Theoretical sampling is continued until theoretical saturation is reached. Theoretical saturation occurs when the researcher decides that the new data to be collected cannot provide different insights or insights for the developing categories (Creswell, 2012). For the theoretical sampling phase, I returned to the data to address my incomplete ideas and provide my final categories. To this end, I reviewed the coding stages and memos along with the data. The theoretical sampling phase did not take as long as other

coding and category generation stages for me. Along with the outlines of the theory I was generating, the relationships of the categories were also becoming more and more evident. Therefore, I wrote a long memo as my first draft and generated 17 categories ready to be sorted and integrated. It is possible to group the emerging categories conceptually as follows; *humour, Erdoğan, leadership and power, citizen-state relationships, policing, the emergence of novel collective identities, culture as an arena of social and political struggle, youth, apoliticism and political apathy, virtual reality, games and the movement, the fall of conventional media, the issue of who constitutes the public, Gezi as a networked movement, existing ways of political participation and representation, space and spatiality of the movement, coalitions and solidarity among distinct social groups and movements, the religionization of the movement.* My interpretations, inference and analyses about these categories are presented in detail as findings of the research in chapter 4, before the presentation of the theory that was being grounded. The final above-mentioned categories that I have generated after the theoretical sampling can be found under these headings in the following chapter as follows; the unstoppable humour of everything, Erdoganism, mothers at the barricades, solid, liquid and gas, chapuling, political jamming and cultural plagiarism, deliberate political void, material truth generated in virtual reality, penguins' media, people versus people, resisting smartphones, soldiers of nobody, the space-time curvature, the unimagined coherence of the unconnected and whirling depolarisation.

Theory Generation

Theory in grounded theory research is the abstract explanation or understanding of a real subject embedded in data. It may not have great coverage, which is valid and applicable to many situations or people, since it is produced from the collected data. However, grounded theory can be seen as a medium theory derived from many data sources and producing explanations about a real subject (Creswell, 2012).

In the theory development process, the interaction that occurs between memos, diagrams and data produced by the researcher is significant. In this context, three important strategies come to the fore in embedded theory research; category reduction, selective sampling of the literature, and selective sampling of the data. The researcher should cluster the categories generated throughout the research and create sub-categories. Also, the researcher can integrate the literature into categories and subcategories as a data source. Finally, the researcher constantly collects more data to develop hypotheses, test these hypotheses, and reveal the characteristics of the major categories (McCann & Clark, 2003).

According to the constructivist grounded theory design, the study tries to understand why and how participants produce specific meanings and actions in certain situations. The theory is shaped by the researcher's perspective. It cannot be out of it. Different researchers may suggest similar hypotheses about the same topic, but how the theory is produced makes the key difference here. Theory generation is about seeing possibilities, making connections, and asking questions. The researcher descends to the basics, ascends to abstractions and dives into experiences. Thus, the questions and interpretations that have not been asked and made before become generated (Charmaz, 2006, p. 130, 135). The generated grounded theory of the study can be found in chapter five.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the reason for choosing the methodology adopted by the study and the methods applied for this purpose is explained. Besides, detailed information is given about coding, memo writing and category formation processes from the initial coding to theoretical sampling stages, and how the patterns, which will be interpreted and evaluated in the next section, emerged.

CHAPTER 4 – PATTERNS OF GEZI GRAFFITI AND FINDINGS

Introduction

This chapter includes the interpretations of the conceptual categories produced from Gezi graffiti data and blends them with theoretical concepts based on the literature that has been used as data. It can be also seen as the refined and sorted presentation of the theoretical memo-writings carried out during the research. Thus, it is shown how the research reached the sorting, integrating, diagramming and theory generation processes, which will be included in the next chapter, and it is aimed to enable readers to accompany the interpretative and analytic path of the research.

As the researcher, I have picked the graffiti shown and interpreted for each category by considering the required theoretical and interpretive saturation. The graffiti shown in categories are selected epitomes and they symbolise the patterns of the Gezi graffiti that I have found in the data corpus. Therefore, every category in the chapter should be taken under consideration as flowing patterns containing a variety of levels or dimensions. Accordingly, every section of the chapter tries to interpret and describe the fundamentals or the essence of these patterns.

Readers may think that some patterns are intersecting or overlapping, these junctions have been seen during the research as one spark of the theory generation. Also, some categories have been created by combining the sub-categories depicted by different graffiti, and some categories are interpreted and explained with a single example and some with multiple examples. These differences were shaped by the inferences made about the power of the sample under consideration to represent the pattern to which it relates.

The Unstoppable Humour of Everything

Humour constitutes the most prominent pattern of Gezi graffiti. According to the data corpus I have examined, humorous components find their place in almost every single graffiti produced by Gezi graffitiists. Before graffiti interpretations, I will try to scrutinise humour to reveal why and how this rhetorical preference was being prevailed during the movement. Thus, the interpretation of the pattern can be performed under the conditions of an emerging social movement in Turkey.

Humour and politics are two inseparable phenomena and their relationship throughout political history has been in this way (Speier, 1998; Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014). However, the relationship takes different forms. Accordingly, I will focus on the concepts related to humour that would facilitate my interpretations of the graffiti of the pattern. Humour can provide opportunities for social movements to spread, to make themselves heard or to influence public opinion. It may also harm the legitimacy of its user, or dangerously it may cause attention to be drawn more than necessary. As Kutz-Flamenbaum (2014) has stated, the tension and balance between humour and importance, frivolity, legitimacy and affordability, are the axes of the subject in terms of social movements (p. 294).

There are three basic theories about humour. The first one is the *superiority theory* postulating the aim of the humour is to grant power to its user and simultaneously is to weaken the target. According to this theory, humour is created with mock and disdain (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014, p. 295). From this perspective, humour determines social and political values, both for the hegemony and those who oppose the authority. For instance, in the Roman Republic, humour was used to impose a particular social reality and an ethical understanding upon society (Corbeill, 1996). Also, Norris (2013) has described the role of humour in his study on the cartoons created by Efimov during the Soviet Union era.

According to him, humour in these cartoons presented for the people a discourse about what it means to be an exemplary citizen. Thus, people have found something to laugh about and believe. According to the theory of superiority, humour emerges from a sudden glory when we realise our superiority over others (Hobbes, 1651/1998). Kant's (1790/2007) definition of humour as a sudden transformation of a tense expectation into nothing, and Plato's and Aristotle's views arguing that humour comes from aggressive emotions, are in the scope of the superiority theory. In a more contemporary sense, humour is seen as a weapon used by representatives of lower social classes. According to Ross (1998), people laugh when they move away from the consciousness of their inadequacies and impossibilities. Also, people laugh by making fun of someone or something, and the very idea of sharing jokes with other people generate power and status.

The second theory of humour is the *relief theory*. For this theory, humour is considered as a mechanism to discharge repressed negative energy and stress. A joke frees the person from being the target of a critical argumentation, and therefore, humour frees the person from the shackles of the social, familial and marital institutions (Freud, 1905).

Humour is necessary for the individual to find his psychological balance back again (Billig, 2005).

The third theory of humour, the *incongruity theory*, evaluates humour through the concepts of daily life and politics. According to this theory, people laugh when two unrelated ideas come together. From then on, they begin to make sense of this incongruity. Also, this theory focuses more on the cognitive functioning of humour. The first two theories focus more on the relationship between the source of the message and its receiver. On the other hand, the incongruity theory focuses on the potentials of humour to emerge from the contrariety, new ideas, and alternative possibilities. Accordingly, it is generated by the

questioning of the established and the ordinary, and through the interpretation processes assigned to this unexpected and odd concurrence. For this reason, the incongruity theory is more favourable to examine political humour (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014, p. 296).

Besides, humour is a temporary liberation from the boundaries of reason and society (Douglas, 1991; as cited in Klumbytë, 2011), that can be perceived as minor disturbances in the social fabric. For the incongruity theory, the core element in the generating of humour is the astonishment, because it offers people something beyond their expectations. Apart from astonishment, other prominent elements of humour are ambiguity, double-sidedness, delusiveness, and the punchline (Hassan, 2013, p. 552). Also, the register is an important concept for humour. "Humour is produced by the clash between the register used and the register that would be appropriate or expected in a situation" (Hassan, 2013, p. 552). If humour is without context, irony comes into play and creates aggressive humour. There are semantic and pragmatic components of humour. In a semantic sense, humour is established by bringing together two opposing texts or frames that are somewhat compatible, as can be observed in Gezi graffiti. Briefly, if two unique interpretations are possible, the joke happens.

If there is double entendre, the joke becomes incompatible and humour gains a surprising, innovative and unrelenting quality. At this point, irony arises as pragmatic humour, because it uses semantic elements but is built for pure pragmatic aims. Hassan (2013, pp. 552-553) argued that pragmatic humour emerges when the situation does not coincide with the cooperative principle. The cooperative principle is required to build a successful conversation: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice, 1975, pp. 45-46). A person should say nothing if the communication quality is low or there is not enough evidence. Also, a person should be as informative as is required by the current objectives of the communication. Communication

should be relevant, systematic and brief, and ambiguity and incomprehensibility should be avoided (Hassan, 2013, p. 553).

Humour is a cultural product based on common norms and ideas. For a joke to appear, both the joker and the audiences should share the same reference frame. Also, political humour is a product of a delicate understanding of cultural balances, and the joker should know the norms, ideas and beliefs of the related social formation. These elements should be carefully and successfully structured and balanced. The required balance, the usage and the conception of political humour are shaped around the power relations (Speier, 1998).

Although some researches stated that political humour increases its effectiveness in democratic societies and is suppressed in oppressive regimes (Hart, 2007; Bayat, 2007), many other studies pointed out that the political humour does not completely fade under repressive conditions, and even plays critical roles (Merziger, 2007; Shehata, 1992; Sorensen, 2008). Scott (1985) has described humour as the weapon of the weak, however, it can be also used to weaken the political resistance, and to strengthen the status quo. The conditions under which political humour is produced for social resistance differ little from those of physical resistance. Resistance, occupation or humour emerge when people cease believing in the institutional ways of claim-making, representation and decision-making (Hassan, 2013, p. 556). So, the humour and social movements are historically intertwined (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014, p. 296).

Humour can be divided into two modes that show it may be related to both obedience and rebellion; the serious mode and the humorous mode (Mulkay 1988; as cited in Hassan, 2013, pp. 553-554). In serious mode, everyone is considered perceiving the outside world in the same way, and as long as the serious mode sustain, the distinction between the real and the unreal remains clear. In this mode, reason and logic are in the foreground and disputes or irrationalities are seen as problems. On the contrary, in humorous mode, there must be

conflicts and disagreements, and if these elements do not exist, humour does not happen. In this mode, misunderstanding, dichotomy and incongruity are essential. To create humour, something must be turned upside-down and re-submitted in multiple frames (Sorensen, 2008).

The difference between the sincerity/innocence and the seriousness, for the use of humour against the repressive regimes, is critical since they are serious. Therefore, using humour against these systems may change the course of events. Changing or re-submitting something humorously, may plant the seeds of the idea that something may change in the society, create opportunities for fresh changes. Even the most aggressive humour, which is produced with serious intentions, contains innocence and while it is conveying its serious statement, it tells that it should not be taken seriously. This may disrupt the dominant logic of oppression (Sorensen, 2008).

Sorensen (2008) has theorised humour as a nonviolent way of resisting by focusing its three different functions. First, humour can easily spread to larger scales and mobilises people. It is a way for a social movement to reach the ones outside of the movement. It makes movements remarkable and attractive in the eyes of the people. Second, humour helps to create a culture of resistance to movements. In this way, the solidarity within the movement and the individual's capacity of participation increases. Humour shows people what is going on in the movement. There is a serious difference in content and form, between the humour for the outsider and the humour for the participator. The culture of resistance, which produced through humour, works in both groups and individuals. Therefore, humour helps to regulate movement dynamics, such as enabling solidarity between participators or overcoming political indifference. Third, humour is a nonviolent form of resistance to overthrow oppression. It changes the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed. In this way, it helps the oppressed to confront the oppressor and makes the oppressor

vulnerable against ridicule and mocking. Although this reconstructed relationship with the oppression has the potential for increasing the stiffness of the interventions that the movement would face, it may also help protesters to conquer the fear. Because when people laugh at something together, they are less afraid of that thing. Also, humour reduces the manoeuvrability of the oppression and lead it to do things that cannot be legitimised. The methods and coercive powers of oppressive systems are not designed to struggle with humour. For this reason, humour can make the oppressors incompetent. Besides, when oppressors try to suppress movements or protests by using physical violence, they may lose their legitimacy in the public's eye and they may become ridiculed again (Sorensen, 2008, pp. 177-180).

According to Hart (2007), the usefulness of humour for social movements is related to three mechanisms; framing, collective identity building and emotions. In framing, the movement must make clear the reason for the opposition. Clear claims and slogans play an important role in the social movements to take on a character and to mobilise people. Humour can be used as an effective method for framing.

Collective identity-building enables social movements to generate a 'we consciousness'. They shape their repertoires of action, organisational structures and strategies under their collective identities. Since humour rises from conflicts and differences that may facilitate the emergence of harsh practical processes, laughter may save movements' actors from fear and the burden of oppression. Humour is fruitful for the formation of collective identity because it can take people out of the serious fiction built by the authority and allow them to be united in another universe. Humour plays an important role in the formation of the collective identity, in spreading solidarity and in defining the confrontation. It also facilitates the participation of new and various groups in a movement, the defusing tension, the steering conflicts to consensual areas and the expressing of alternative political views (Fominaya,

2007). Additionally, humour plays a role in the strengthening of emotions such as intimacy, solidarity or loyalty and in finding long-term answers for values they represent (Hart, 2007, pp. 8-13).

I believe that the concept of *carnavalesque* would be convenient for my interpretations of the pattern as a complementary layer. Because it explains the function of humour for social movements by considering the unique circumstances that fit with the humorous narration of the Gezi graffiti.

Social movements use humour to criticise the authority and to shatter its network of relationships, and for non-violent protests, humour takes a carnivalesque form (Emre, Çoban, & Şener, 2014). The concept of carnivalesque is derived from the carnival, which has been played an important role in the historical evolution of Western societies. Carnivals are rituals that the authority has been withdrawn from squares, streets and minds for a brief time. In carnivals, “for a short time, life goes beyond its usual, legitimised and blessed flows, and enters the realm of utopian freedom. Shortness and temporariness of this freedom increase its fantastic nature and utopian radicalism” (Bakhtin, 2001, p. 109). They are the events in which the authority is shown as temporary or incompetent through blasphemy and humour.

The concept of carnivalesque refers to the different social fabric that occurs when the established world is reversed by carnivals (Bakhtin, 2001, p. 238). Life is out of control during the carnival, and the world can be seen with different eyes. Because of this experience, even after the authority is returned, carnivalesque effects on the social consciousness and sub-consciousness goes on. These effects make it possible to recognise the narrative defined and imposed by the authority, and the normal becomes questionable (Emre, Çoban, & Şener, 2014). Carnival ridicules and disrupts the order of the authority. Besides, until the authority returns and re-validates its fiction, the carnival realises its own order in which everyone is

equal and free. Carnival plays a time game, which both destroys and generates at the same time by altering the old notions into new ones and allows none of them to be immortalised. It highlights the future and utopian tendencies that are always present in carnivalesque moments and imagery of the celebratory joy of people (Bakhtin, 2001, p. 102). Carnavalesque is a criticism of the existing time and social moments. Also, it is a process of emancipation that emerges when all rules are temporarily abandoned and its participators set new boundaries. Carnavalesque gains strength by creativity and opens the doors of another world where everyone has a different status. The prospective expectations of the society are reproduced in the carnival, and in its possibilities of practising the change. Creative destruction is complemented by creative reproduction, and the re-created world becomes a performed utopia (Emre, Çoban, & Şener, 2014).

Carnival is a reaction against any kind of restriction, limitation and hierarchy. It mocks and ridicules the authority and uses the disruptive power of laughter. It despises everything that represents the order and wages a war against it through aestheticised visual violence. This humour-based war gains legitimacy in self-defence when authority reveals its visible and invisible methods of violence. Carnavalesque defiance gives a chance to anti-authoritarian groups or individuals who are from various social classes or educational backgrounds to come together. Humorous protests differ from traditional anti-authoritarian protest forms in which certain groups are centralised and the others are excluded. Because it emphasises individuality and creates a more inclusive space. In a carnivalesque moment, everyone is equal, and no one is authority. Moreover, actors trying to be authoritative immediately become the targets of the humour. (Emre, Çoban, & Şener, 2014). In carnivalesque moments because of the absence of hierarchies and status, humane and joyful aspects of life become revealed, and building playful and undefined relationships becomes possible. As a communicative strategy, the humour breaks the defence mechanisms of its

target and tries to convince it. It is very difficult to refute humorous criticism with rational arguments. Strongly emotional and carefully constructed humour can break even the legal boundaries (Hart, 2007; Scott, 1985).

In terms of social movements, carnivalesque is used to explain the constructive influences of collective language, the political disruptiveness and the rich potential of the collectivity. Carnivals are the places of coexistence where grotesque imagery manifests itself in incomplete, deficient, abnormal, absurd and caricatured incarnations. The grotesque imagery of carnivalesque symbolises being independent of the serious and normative live flow of the authority. It is about the possibilities of the future and invests in creating a place where people gain experiences prospectively, albeit limited by time and space (Tylor, 1995). With this new way of imagining and expression, alternatives to religious or sacred images are produced. Also, the incompleteness of the grotesque images and the fact that they are constantly in motion destabilises the logic of authority. Hierarchical systems see stability as the core necessity of their existence, and they always try to keep the social change under control. On the other hand, the grotesque is always unstable and incomplete. It constantly destroys and reproduces itself and creates new alternatives. The grotesque imagery can transform the fear into something else, which is not coming from the official imagination (Tylor, 1995). Briefly, humour is an effective component of the grotesque imagery to produce supporting emotions and moral structures that would ease the emergence of social movements. Because it disaccords all forms of power, it opens paths to disruption of the hegemony in all areas. Also, during the carnival, art liberates itself from all commercial relations. It reclaims its own areas to revive and thusly humorous aesthetics expressions may prevail.

I believe that it is a necessity to mention the tradition of political humour and satire in Turkey, before starting to make interpretations about the graffiti belonging to the pattern. In

this way, the pattern may be examined in association with the genuine social peculiarities, contexts and formations of Turkish society and the reasons for its emergence may be understood thoroughly. Using irony, sarcasm and mocking in a critical and opposing manner goes back to ancient times in Turkey. Necmi Erdoğan (2000) has explained the manifestation of humour in terms of politics by the concept of *popular metis*. The concept can be understood as the methods that Turkish society invented to cope with the policies of the power throughout the centuries. It is the repertoire of heterological, deflective practices developed by the subordinates. Metis is a concept coined by de Certeau (2002), inspired by the work of Detienne and Vernant (1991). It describes an infinite variety of tactical creativity, cunningness, trickery, littance, disguise, ploy, simulation, dissimulation, paralysis, parry, slacking, chariness and cynicism. Erdoğan (2000), however, has utilised the concept to distinguish the practical intelligence and tactical creativity applied by the subordinates from the strategic cynicism of the power.

Popular metis is an art of coexistence and a form of relationship with power. It is based on the rejection of the laws of the ruling apparatus. It is used to divert the laws or policies of the power from their path or to invent ways to handle them (de Certeau, 2002, p. 28). The famous and ancient humourist characters from Turkish folktales, such as *Nasreddin Hoca* (Nasreddin Hodja), *Keloğlan* (Kaloghlan) and *Karagöz - Hacivat*, are examples of the popular metis. In folktales, these characters do not protest against the power or confront the oppressor; rather they emerge as heroes who reveal the corruption, the unfair and insufficient logic of the power through satire and humour.

Erdoğan (2000) has given an example from Karagöz tales from the 19th century which describes the relationship between the popular metis and the Ottoman hegemony: The authority forbids going out in the night without a lantern. Karagöz goes out with a lantern one night but does not put a candle inside of it. Zaptiah (police officer) catches Karagöz and takes

him to the police station. At the police station, Karagöz tells that the law only prohibits going out in the night without a lantern, and but it says nothing about putting a candle in the lantern. Since the police commissioner has no choice but to accept the logic of the hero, he lets Karagöz go, only with a warning about the candles. When he gets out of the police station, Karagöz puts a candle in his lantern and continues his path without lighting it. Because the warning just orders him to put a candle in his lantern, it says nothing about lighting the candle (p. 224). The tale reveals the existence of the dissident humour that contains mocking with the authority and avoiding any confrontation and shows the mental agility generated through humour. Also, it can be described as a humorous nullification of the power's centralist and controlling interventions in everyday life. Turkish society has created countless folk tales or stories that have served as popular metis throughout the centuries.

According to Georgeon (2000), humour in Ottoman society has been used for two purposes; making friends by entertaining people and making enemies by mocking people. It has brought together many individuals/groups living in the cosmopolitan society of the empire. Different generations, different ethnic, religious and social groups have communicated through humour and stereotypes have been used to reflect the structure and components of society. Also, political humour has been used frequently during the episodes of contention of various social groups against the almighty Ottoman Empire (van het Hof, 2015, p. 32). With the entrance and the spread of modernity into everyday life in the late 19th century, the popular metis was replaced by political humour publications, and they maintained the tradition of cynical and satirical political humour in the country.

It can be said that repression and censoring have an extensive history in Turkey, just like political humour. There have been many prohibitions and prosecutions against these publications. *Diyojen Magazine*, named after the cynic philosopher Diogenes who lived in Anatolia around the 4th century B.C., was the first Ottoman political satirical magazine and

its first issue was published in Istanbul on November 24, 1870. The magazine was temporarily closed three times for its content and was finally permanently banned on January 11, 1873 (“Diyojen”, n.d.).


Intolerantness of the power against the publications, which pursue the way of political humour and satire has also continued in the republican era. *Markopaşa Magazine* has started its life on November 25, 1946, and rapidly became one of the highest circulated publications of Turkish history. The magazine was an influential oppositional publication at that time. Many lawsuits were filed against its authors, and some issues of the magazine were pulled off the shelves. Many issues of *Markopaşa* have been published with main headings like “published when it is not banned” or “published when its writers are not arrested”. The magazine was banned permanently on May 19, 1947 (Cantek, 2015).

Nevertheless, prohibitions and pressure could not stop the development and diffusing of the political humour magazines in Turkey. For example, *Gırgır Magazine*, which was active between 1972 and 1993, had reached a wide group of audiences and became the most popular political humour magazine of all times in Turkey. The weekly circulation of the magazine was exceeding 500 thousand copies between 1981 and 1983. Today, *Gırgır* is defined as the publication that laid the foundation of contemporary political humour in Turkey. The magazine has gained a large fan base, especially by mentioning the problems of youth and led to the popularisation of political humour. After the 1980 military coup, the magazine was banned and some of its caricaturists and writers were fined or sentenced (Şenyapılı, 2003, pp. 170-172; Özocak, 2011, p. 275; Arık, 2003, pp. 94- 95). Following *Gırgır*, many other magazines began their publishing life, such as *Çarşaf*, *Limon*, *Hıbrır*, *Pişmiş Kelle*, *Leman*, *Penguen* and *Uykusuz*. These magazines continue to be critical, antagonist and satirical during the AKP era. Briefly, despite the prohibitions and repression, political humour publications in Turkey have always been popular and continued the tradition

of political humour arising from the Turkish popular metis. Cynicism, humour and irony observed in the Gezi graffiti may be understood better through this linkage. Also, in this way, it can be argued that such cultivation may have been enabled by the Gezi graffiti to generate such popularity and influence, through humour. Therefore, the Gezi movement can be defined as the successor of the tradition of political humour in Turkey (van het Hof, 2015).

Graffito 1

Puff out the Lamp [Lambaya Püf De]



Note. (2013, June 4). Photograph taken by the author.

“Humour is universal but also culturally specific” (Jiang, Li, & Hou, 2019, p. 1). Cultural differences can change the way humour is perceived and when it is suitable for use, (Martin & Ford, 2018), and above all, humour is subjective. For this reason, I should admit that comedic resonances of the graffiti I will interpret in terms of humour, may vary from person to person. There may also be a loss of impact, because of translation. Nevertheless, I do not aim to find out how humorous Gezi graffiti was. The purpose of my interpretations is to show why and how humour has been used intensely, by paying attention to the political and social connotations.


Graffito 1 uses a humorous allegory based on a well-known Turkish folk song (“Puff out the lamp”, 1977) , and it has two components that generate an incongruity when they come together. The first component is the textual expression, which involves the name of the song, and the second component is the visual expression made up with a lightbulb resembling AKP’s official logo. The folk song that the graffito uses originally tells a sensual and mildly humorous story, and the puff out the lamp phrase is understood in this context. However, here, graffitist by linking the visual component with the name of the song generates a new political call or a message. In this way, the phrase takes on a new meaning. Since the bulb image symbolises the AKP, graffito’s call can be interpreted as an invitation to overthrow the government or end the AKP’s power. Also, the graffito can be seen as an attempt to describe the aim of the movement, to mobilise and steer people for this aim. The humour appears when audiences comprehend the creative thinking links the name of the folk song and the AKP’s logo.

Normally, the song does not carry any political connotations. In my opinion, the joke here is not generated by transferring the song’s humorous structure to graffito. Rather, it stems from the textual resemblance between the name of the song and the given political message. The heterography in the graffito is grotesque and unexpected, but it is also very suitable for intended meaning creation.

Graffito 1 becomes humorous by overlapping the connotations of the folk song and the political opposition. Also, it does not apply direct, targeting and confronting humour. It conveys its political message clearly, however; it prefers to use an allegory to be indirect and trusts the audiences’ perception to share the joke that will enable the reinforcing of the message. After Graffito 1, I will examine two different graffiti that address Erdoğan, criticise his policies and use humour.

Graffito 2

Do You Want 3 Children Like Me? [Benim Gibi 3 Çocuk İster Misin?]



Note. (“#resistgezipark#3”, 2013).

Graffito 2 graffiti should be understood as an answer for Erdoğan's recurrent statements about he expects every family to support the economic development of the country by having at least three children (“Erdoğan explains why he wants 3 children”, 2013). The graffiti takes the main theme of Erdoğan's statements, and re-contextualises it within the frame of the Gezi movement.

It can be said that it is ironic and sarcastic because according to the logic of the power, having three children would signify an investment for the economic development of the country. The conceived meaning of the theme of the argument normally would be understood

in this way. However, the textual expression that constitutes the graffito signifies an opposite or a different meaning by using the theme and it creates a humorous effect. According to the logic of the graffito, it can be said that the very children whom the prime minister talked about actually create troubles for the power by being actors of an oppositional social movement, instead of being practitioners of the imposed ways of economic development. It emphasizes the huge participation of the youth in the movement and criticizes ironically Erdoğan's view on increasing the population.

The irony and sarcasm are based on the difference between the conceptions of youth. For the logic of the power, population growth among youth means growth in the workforce. On the other hand, the logic of the graffito population growth among youth means the emergence of new dissident actors. At this point, it can be also interpreted that the graffito blames Erdoğan for not knowing his people. In addition to this, it can be alleged that the graffito tries to present the movement in a superior position in contrast with the power. The graffito asks Erdoğan for thinking twice about his plans with the expression 'Are you sure?' and it refers to the events and circumstances in which the prime minister had been having hard times and caused by the movement. It is a warning given to him by the protesters.

Briefly, the graffito's humour arises from its satire, irony and sarcasm and it does not attack its target directly. Rather, as the Karagöz popular metis example does, it plays with the logic of the power and tries to diminish the consent about its policymaking.

Graffito 3 builds its semantic background concerning the law whose entry into force coincided with the Gezi movement and banned the sale of alcohol in shops between 10:00 p.m. and 06:00 a.m. Also, it uses sarcasm, exaggeration and absurdism. Graffito's punchline is created with the verb of *ayılmak* (in the past tense form, *ayıldı*), which has three different meanings. The verb can mean to become sober, to revive or to come to oneself according to

the context (“Ayılmak”, n.d.). Graffitiist takes that polysemous structure of the word as an opportunity and establishes an absurd and exaggerated causality between the emergence of the movement and the ban. In my opinion, the graffiti contains two significant layers of meaning working interrelatedly. The first layer links indignation clustered around alcohol sale restriction with the movement’s mobilisation. Here, the graffitiist explains why the movement happened, by correlating the government policy and the related backlash. Since the law was only one of the many issues on the agenda of the movement, it can be said that the graffiti depicts a more general situation. From a broader perspective, through the layer such interpretation can be made: Government’s policies inhibit freedoms and intervene in lifestyles. Thus, accumulated grievances arising from these interventions have led some groups and individuals to mobilise and form a collective action.

Graffito 3

You Banned Alcohol People Sobered Up! [Alkolü Yasakladın Millet Ayıldı!]



Note. (2013, June 12). Photograph taken by the author.

When graffito 3 is interpreted by focusing on the punchline, it is seen that a cognitive liberation process or a social awakening is expressed. Thus, the second meaning layer of the graffito becomes also revealed. The ayılmak word, in all its different meanings, refers to a cognitive comeback experienced after the weakening or loss of consciousness and awareness for different reasons. According to the example, the movement results from the people regaining their social consciousness and awareness, and the main initiator of this liberation is the government's restrictive and prohibitive policies. Also, for the graffito, it is the people who have undergone this transformation, not just protesters. Sarcasm and exaggeration come into play also in this layer. Because of the content of the law in question, graffito's joke stems from the claim that all people in the country were drunk before the law, and the movement is their sobriety.

The sarcastic expression here can be explained as follows: The law restricts alcohol sales hours because the government is trying to interfere or design people's lifestyles to gain more control. However, such a policy to increase the government's control has caused people to get out of control more, and the Gezi movement has emerged. According to this logic, alcohol consumption should have been encouraged more to strengthen control. In the graffito, it is emphasised that the government has become the victim of its policies.

Sarcasm is used to mock the government. Also, the absurdity and exaggeration that graffito uses are created by explaining the entire movement with a single law and portraying the entire society as newly sobered up drunkards. I argue that when the sarcasm in the second layer comes together with the first layer an incongruity appears, and the example becomes humorous as an expression of a socio-political insight.

Graffito 4

Welcome to the 1st Traditional Gas Festival [1. Geleneksel Gaz Festivaline Hoş Geldiniz]



Note. ("Gezi Park resistance in the streets", 2013).

The last graffito, graffito 4, I will try to examine for the pattern has a more carnivalesque characteristic in comparison with the preceding graffiti that I have discussed. The humour of graffito 4 consists of three separate jokes. The first joke was created by using two incompatible qualities together; being first and traditional at the same time. Things that happen for the first time normally would not be regarded as traditional. With this deed, the graffito generates an incongruity to create a comedic effect. The second joke is created by analogy, which describes the situation around Gezi Park as a festival. Finally, the third joke is made by the word 'welcome', and it has a strong sense of irony. As it is known, the events

that took place during the movement have been so severe that many protesters were injured, some even died. Such an environment contains the opposite of all the connotations in the word festival. In other words, people would not feel welcomed. So, the third joke points out the dire situation by describing it as if it has occurred oppositely.

Graffito 4 has a more carnivalesque characteristic in comparison with the preceding graffiti of the pattern, and it can be interpreted in various ways. First, it can be said that the graffiti delineates the situation humorously to alleviate the deterrent effects of police violence on protesters. It emotionally supports the protesters and works for the movement's longevity. Second, it can be claimed that the graffiti tries to portray the disproportionate use of force of the police and communicates with the public to weave a public opinion that would support the movement. My further interpretations about the example focus on the carnivalesque approach of the graffitist regarding the circumstances. From this point of view, it can be assessed that graffiti essentially is an expression of appreciation. Instead of referring to carnival-like practical and performative fragments of being a Gezi activist, it describes the entire movement through a carnivalesque narrative. In the graffiti, removing authority from the public sphere to a certain extent, the emergence of utopian freedoms, the disruption of the order and the display of grotesque social suggestions are celebrated since they are seen as signs of emancipation. Besides, graffiti 4 may be seen as the carnivalesque itself. Within this way of interpretation, it does not solely mock with the established order as expected, in the Bakhtinian sense. Rather, the mockery is about the whole situation, including the practices of activists and coercive powers. In other words, it mocks with everything related to the movement from a situational point of view. In this way, it differentiates its narrative and enables a joyful aspect to emerge.

Graffito's political disruptiveness, collective accent and grotesque narration go beyond the frame of the movement. It symbolises being independent of the seriousness of all

events of the moment. Therefore, it destabilises both the logics of the authority and the movement. The graffiti can be evaluated as a humorous situation analysis that critical and sarcastic thinking has spilt over into a broader detection process. It speculatively satisfies the need for expression for what was happening in the country, and thus, it questions the whole situation rather than being a mere critical or supporting element of the repertoire of action.

Humour forms a pattern that encapsulates almost every Gezi graffiti. Therefore, it was an enormous challenge for me to transfer the comprehensiveness of the pattern. To overcome the problem, I have selected and examined these graffiti, which would be sufficient to expound the features of the humour used by Gezi graffiti artists.

When the pattern is examined thoroughly, it can be observed that irony, sarcasm and tactical creativity have been the prominent elements for Gezi graffiti humour. The pattern does not use humour to attack its targets directly, unlike the Erdoganism pattern. Rather, it teases them and deteriorates their rules, policies or logic. With indirect humorous expressions and perpetual cynicism, it works as the weapon of the weak. Therefore, it would be convenient to determine that the humour of Gezi graffiti correlates more with the incongruity theory. Disparate components are aggregated and incomprehensibility is eliminated by activating local cultural elements or the history of current events.

The humour of Gezi graffiti is effective in all the aspects mentioned by Hart (2007). As it may be observed in the “puff out the lamp” example, it contributes to framing processes. As we can see through the “three children” graffiti, it contains efforts for collective identity building and evidently. Also, it plays an important role in the emotional level by amusing the protesters and audiences. It facilitates the unison of people under the umbrella of laughter and makes them physically and emotionally challenging conditions more bearable for the protesters. Besides, I believe that the use of humour gave chance

graffitists to gain the upper hand against the power since neither discursive nor coercive powers of the authority could cope with it.

Generating humorous graffiti requires critical thinking and creativity. By evaluating the pattern, it can be asserted that Gezi graffitists meet these requirements. Also, as we can see in the last graffiti of the pattern, using humour may have enabled them to experience the events as carnivalesque moments. Because, in my opinion, Gezi graffitists did not see themselves merely as participators or witnesses of the carnivalesque. Rather, they have characterised themselves as the actors of this world-changing, unusual phase of temporary cognitive liberation.

To my mind, that should be regarded as a conscious decision, and associated with a social consciousness stemming from ideation, which sees the possibilities of replacing the life-world with a narrative. Therefore, I assume that Gezi graffiti were partly the carriers of an endeavour to create a carnivalesque perception of the movement. They both announce and embrace this perception for its constructive potentials in the name of social change. The carnivalesque may provide more unordinary opportunities than an ordinary collective action because it is based on equality, freedom and joy.

This awareness might have arisen from the critical thinking and creativity used for practising humour. Nevertheless, it is rather significant to monitor that practising humour has ripened the circumstances in which protesters could narrate the situation as a carnivalesque experience. In this way, also the Gezi humour changes dimension and becomes a medium that protesters describe themselves as the real actors of the carnivalesque and perform such social analytic thinking.

Erdoganism

One of the most remarkable patterns that appeared during my data analysis comprises graffiti that mention or address Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister of the period. The pattern involves graffiti that categorise, describe, answer, imitate or depict Erdoğan, and it has a high frequency in data.

Prior to the interpretation of some graffiti from the pattern, I believe that Erdoğan's indisputable popularity among the Gezi graffiti should be discussed. To this end, I will use the concept to explain Erdoğan's popularity among Gezi graffiti, the features of the pattern and the role it played in the movement.

Bora (2017) has argued that Erdoğan's role in the Turkish political arena can be approached in comparison with the Orban regime in Hungary and the Putinism in Russia. He placed Erdoganism in the context of the global authoritarian - populist period and described Erdoganism as a form of governing and ideology, built around a single man and a cult of this person. In Erdoganism, the ideational and ideological flexibility is maximised, and the priority of the power and arbitrariness are dominant and decisive. In this structure, powerful leaders are mostly nationalist conservatives, but they are always populists. These powerful leaders directly address the people, and they relativise or undermine the principle of separation of powers. They omit the political parties, rules of the democratic systems, and mechanisms of the regimes, and confiscate and undertake all the ways of the representation. According to Erdoganism, the source of the indivisible power is the people. Leader attains the power directly from the people, the nation, and the power cannot be shared. Erdoganism is the manifestation of the new authoritarian formation of the 21st century. It has strong tendencies towards fascism. There are similar formations in many developing countries of the world (Bora, 2017). Also, Erdoganism contains a strong dose of Islamism, a wide spectrum

of nationalism and neo-Ottomanism, along with the ongoing state-security discourse. These components become activated according to particular situations. Islamism constitutes the main body of Erdoganism, however, it is an important characteristic of this ideological formation that the content and motifs can be quite variable. According to the circumstances, any material can be activated (Bora, 2017).

Additionally, Kuru (2015) has defined Erdoganism as a one-man regime that uses polemics and populist rhetoric. Akyol (2016) has considered Erdoğanism as Erdoğan's philosophy of the hegemony. For him, it is the new official ideology of Turkey, which took Kemalism's place. Erdoganism revolves around populism. Before discussing Erdoganism in more detail, it would be useful to look at a few articles that provide striking descriptions of what Erdoğan represents in Turkish politics. For instance, Salt (2015) described Erdoğan's way of governing as follows:

“Erdoğan is aggressive and authoritarian; increasingly, he is the state. When he speaks, others follow without question. ‘Enemies’ are being flushed out of the system; the judiciary has been brought under tight government control; intelligence and police powers have been extended, and the media is being harassed. Yet, for his loyal supporters, the leader can do no wrong, no matter how serious the evidence of malfeasance within the government and disruption of the constitutional system” (Salt, 2015, p. 5).

Watson and Levs (2013), in their article published during the Gezi movement, described Erdoğan's approach as follows:

“All these recent developments show that these introductions are no longer subtle and gradual in the Party's policy; however, in point of fact, Turkish society has become more and more polarised as Erdoğan's authoritarian approach gets ahead of his

political activity, which is one of the crucial elements to have intermittent conflicts within the society. Interestingly enough, Gezi Park events may be the peak point showing this kind of contrariness proving that he can be both popularly elected and powerfully authoritarian” (Watson & Levs, 2013, p. 8).

At the same days Turan, a political scientist at Istanbul’s Bilgi University, told New York Times, Erdoğan “has a highly majoritarian understanding of democracy. He believes that with 51 % of the vote he can rule in an unrestrained fashion. He doesn’t want checks and balances” (Arango, 2013, p. 5).

Erdoğan sees himself not only as the head of the state but also as the guarantor of the national will. In Erdoganism, the government, the policies and Erdoğan’s persona encompasses all the identities, cultural products and political tendencies of the people. Erdoğan has turned the AKP’s ideology into a single entity covering both the state and the nation, and this entity is himself. He does not consult or discuss, and even his deputies have little to say. After elections, they take their places in the parliament with little initiative in the decision-making. Therefore, the new Turkey of Erdoganism cannot be described as a developing democracy. It is not a regime that facilitates the participation of the religious conservative population in political and democratic processes, as claimed. All power has been consolidated in one person, and democracy has stopped. Erdoğan’s persona has an untouchable position above all parties, the parliament, the judiciary, and the constitution (Günter, 2014). Also, Erdoğan draws a portrait of a proud, self-confident, cocky, and vindictive leader. He cares about his popularity and image as a very strong leader. His supporters call him *reis*, which means the chief. Erdoğan manages to present his interests as social necessities and to rationalise them as social demands in the eyes of his supporters. He manipulates people with his references about Ottomans or Islam, and he thinks that a strict Sunni approach and Islamic values should replace Kemalism as the genuine values of the

society. He considers himself the legitimate leader of the religious people that must be revered by everyone (Yeşilada, 2016).

After examining Erdoğan's attitude towards governance, democracy and himself, the structure of Erdoganism should be deepened. Because the authenticity and characteristics of Erdoğan's authoritarian leadership will contribute to our understanding of the graffiti pattern. Yılmaz and Bashirov's (2018) analysis of Erdoganism has a comprehensive explanatory structure. They analysed the concept in four mechanisms; electoral authoritarianism, neopatrimonialism, populism and Islamism.

The first mechanism, electoral authoritarianism has three main features. Uneven distribution of the manoeuvrability for the opposition, dubious elections and decline in rights and freedoms. In these regimes, the opposition is allowed to exist, however, it may not win elections. The presence of the opposition only provides the legitimacy of the political system, and the system represses the opposition heavily. Elections in these systems are dependent on laws, however, implementing agencies work in favour of the power. In other words, elections are far away from being actual competitions. Besides, some parties may be prevented from elections or campaigning. During the elections, there can be false votes, vote-stealing, or the voters can be intimidated. These regimes severely restrict civic liberties. The media is under pressure, freedom of expression and government criticism is disallowed (Schedler, 2006). In Turkey, these three features of electoral authoritarianism manifest themselves since 2011 (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016). For example, in the 2011 elections, nine candidates of the parliament from various parties were in prison until they were elected ("How the 9 deputies in jail will get into parliament?", 2011). This can be regarded as an example of the uneven distribution of manoeuvrability for the opposition. Also, there have been many allegations that accuse the AKP of voting fraud. These claims are escalated, especially after 2007. For the criterion of decline in rights and freedoms, extreme police violence used against people

who wanted to walk to the Taksim Square on May 1, 2013, can be a good example (“May 1 started eventfully”, 2013).

Second, neo-patrimonialism can be described as a system in which two different, coexisting, nested hegemonies exist together; the patrimonial hegemony and the legislative bureaucratic hegemony. In patrimonial hegemony, all political and managerial relations between the rulers and the ruled are personal relations. In this regime, loyalty and obedience to the ruler are essential, for both formal and informal levels. However, neo-patrimonial systems have not only these relations. There is also a logical distribution of benefits. The boss buys his client’s loyalty and protects him. Clientelism is an important part of this regime. These bonds need not be provided by the kinship ties in neo-patrimonial regimes. The continuation of coexistence and the equilibrium of mutual interests are sufficient for these relations to emerge (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

Erdoganism helps the regions and cities where the majority of its voters live, provides these people with free products and services under the name of social aid. Also, the regime punishes the people who do not vote for the AKP in the same regions and cities by making them deprived of these benefits (Sayarı, 2011). In this way, Erdoganism has established clientelistic relations with its voters, and these relations have been maintained by religious backgrounds and religious institutions. Erdoganism also established similar relations with the market and big holdings by distributing wealth through privatisation. A similar punishment system is applied for this category as well.

Briefly, Erdoganism has monopolised the state resources to generate support and consent. The party and the state became intertwined within the logic of Erdoganism and it reinforces itself by allocating economic benefits to its partners and supporters on both

individual and institutional levels (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). AKP has become a mean for strengthening the neo-patrimonial regime (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

The third mechanism of Erdoganism is populism. (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Dinçşahin, 2013; Selçuk, 2016). Populism is a political conception that sees the world in a moralist way, and it carries a totalist approach. Frequently, the oppressed is positioned across a degenerated elite group (Muller, 2016). Populist politicians present themselves as the protectors of the people against the corrupted elite, and divide societies mostly through identities. The polarisation that is formed in this way carries the perception of a 'us and them' society (Stanley, 2008). Populists are also opposed to pluralism. They claim that they are the only possible representatives of the people.

Besides, populists may label those who do not represent the real people as traitors. Populists may blame their opponents for being in cooperation with traitors, terrorists or external forces and corrupted elites. In this way, the opposition becomes excluded from the political arena. Populism also uses an individual and patriarchal form of leadership. Charismatic populist leaders may have divine qualities. They represent the national will and have unlimited competence to direct society to prosperity (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). Populists use authoritarianism and neo-patrimony as techniques of governing. They fill bureaucratic institutions with those who are loyal to themselves, take over the media and prevent the opposition from doing the same. State-owned projects are carried out with clientelism and redistribution of wealth. Populism buys mass political support, with mass clientelism (Roberts, 1995). Also, populists support discriminatory policies. Some groups benefit from the protections provided by laws and some groups not.

Tuğal (2002) has noted that Islamism in Turkey uses populism influentially and it utilises a strong, religious sense of morality. Turkish Islamism asserts that the religious

grassroots are excluded, exploited, and thus they are the moral superiors. It claims that it represents the oppressed Muslims, and it attacks West and Western values. Erdoğan and AKP use populism deeply, and that populism divided Turkish society as pure people and corrupt elites. Erdoğan's charismatic leadership also plays an important role to increase his popularity and keeping the power. Those who vote for him divinise Erdoğan's personality (Lancaster, 2016). Erdoganism presents Erdoğan as the saviour of the nation, the leader who embodies the glorious past and future. Also, Erdoğan's populism pursues an anti-institutional attitude. It is against the horizontal accountability of the Constitutional Court or other judicial institutions, and it considers them as diseases of Turkey (Dinçşahin, 2012).

Erdoganism gives a normative and moral superiority to Erdoğan's persona through the national will concept and facilitates the polarisation in the society by articulating recurrently the distinctions such as atheist / religious, secular/conservative, Turkish / Kurdish or Alevi / Sunni. It is possible to give examples of Erdoğanist populism also from the pre-Gezi period. For instance, Erdoğan made a speech in September 2012 about religious vocational high schools and he said, "What damage did you get from these schools? Did you close these schools because they did not produce terrorists and anarchists?" ("Erdoğan: Did you close these schools because they did not produce terrorists?", 2012) and he stigmatised the graduates of different schools as terrorists and anarchists. Erdoğan also made a discriminatory statement on different lifestyles in 2012:

"Does a mother or father who cares about their values want her daughter to sit on someone's lap? I see the people who pass in front of my office in Dolmabahçe. When I see all of this, it is not what I actually match my values. Nevertheless, I say that they are the people of my society, I cannot interfere with their dressing styles or so on." ("Erdoğan: If the boy and the girl sit on the same bench...", 2013).

Finally, in his speech on May 28, 2013, Erdoğan has spoken as follows: “No one should make alcohol an issue of identity. If you want to drink it, take your alcohol to your home, and drink. Go and drink” (“Erdoğan: If you will drink it, take your alcohol to your home, drink!”, 2013). The number of these examples can be increased.

The fourth mechanism of Erdoganism is Islamism. Islamism is the use of Islam by individuals, groups or organisations to fulfil certain political goals (Ayoob, 2009). It generates answers for contemporary social issues through the concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition (Denoeux, 2002). Islamists are rational actors of politics, who make profit/loss analysis. They make pragmatic decisions and gain political advantages by using theological ideals. Islamism is a strategic instrument to gain votes and legitimize its policies (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

Erdoganism began to use Islamism in both practice and discourse after the elections in 2011 when reinforced its power. It makes the Sunni Muslim values fundamental in defining the nation. In discourse, what Erdoganism desires for Turkey is to create an ideational neo-Ottoman society, which would build the future and the past, and to traditionalise it in this way (Yavuz, 1997). Via Erdoganism, Ottoman motifs gain importance in education, media and international politics. In practices, Erdoganism conflicts with Turkey’s secular institutions. Here, the aim is to cultivate the ultimate religious society. However, it does this not only to achieve its ideological goals. Political ends are also decisive.

Erdoganism is not only the name of an ideology; it defines the emerging regime in Turkey. The electoral system of this regime is electoral authoritarianism. Its economic system is neo-patrimony, its political strategy is populism, and its ideology is Islamism (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

After the features of Erdoganism, I will try to explain why this graffiti pattern contains the highest level of frequency among data. One can easily argue that Erdoğan's persona in the political arena is huge enough to make him the first target or the object. From this perspective, it can be thought Gezi graffitiists perceive the movement as a backlash against an absolute leader and his discriminatory, reactionary and populist policies. This leader not only ignores them and but also labels them as corrupt.

In my opinion, Gezi graffitiists and protesters were exposed to the physical and discursive pressure of an aggressive and oppressive hegemony throughout the movement. Erdoğan maintained his populist, discriminatory, incriminating and repressive attitude during the Gezi movement. In order to reveal the emotions of those who are mobilised in front of walls with spray paints in their hands, it would be useful to highlight a few statements, which Erdoğan made just after the Gezi movement has begun. Because the presence of the movement has ignited situations that allowed Erdoganism to be detected more easily (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Bora, 2017; Günter, 2014).

“We have seen and experienced many times how the opposition are in solidarity with illegal organisations, how they create disturbances and irritate us, they cannot produce policies, cannot produce a single plan. I am addressing my nation that watches me from their televisions. I want you to see the game they are playing. For days, there are some demonstrations and protests about the Gezi Park in Taksim. For what reasons? One; trees that are chopped down. Two; the artillery barracks. Artillery barracks will be rebuilt there as its original. Oh, there will be also a shopping mall” (“Prime Minister's statement on Gezi Park, 2013).

“They are too low so for insulting the country's prime minister. If you trust your faith, do not be afraid of the freedom of belief. If you trust your opinion, do not be afraid of

the freedom of expression. If you have something to say and you are an environmentalist, there is a green prime minister in this country. You can come and talk to him. However, these protests have nothing to do with environmentalism. We have at least 50% of this country, and we keep them barely at home. We say to them, please be patient (“Erdoğan: We hardly keep the 50 % of Turkey at home”, 2013).

After the evaluation of Erdoganism, I will interpret graffiti examples from the pattern. In graffiti 5, we see a transformed political propaganda billboard. Erdoğan’s cheeks are painted in the colour of pink and the textual expression of the graffiti is written in the same colour. According to the visual components, it can be said that Erdoğan is compared to a little girl. In addition, this similarity is reinforced by textual expression. The textual component of the graffiti describes Erdoğan as sweet. In the context of the characteristics of Erdoganism, it can be interpreted that this description was built as a disruptive intervention to the leader’s persona. The humorous pattern of the Gezi graffiti leaves its place in the pattern of Erdoganism that works with mocking and ridicule. When Erdoğan is the theme, graffiti shift to another dimension.

At this point, I will briefly discuss ridicule and mockery in social movements and politics and afterwards, I will continue to interpret. Ridicule is described as making fun of someone cruelly and harshly. Afferbach (2015) has identified ridicule as a process that everyone is exposed to and practice. In this process, individuals understand what it means to be in a society, and they realise who sets the standards, and who can influence others. Who is ridiculous is the one who deserves to be ridiculed (Afferbach, 2015). It is not a local phenomenon to declare something or someone ridiculous. However, what is ridiculous may differ depending on the localities. Rules and expectations of society are learned in ridiculous situations or by being ridiculed.

Graffito 5*You Are So Sweet [Çok Tatlısın]*

Note. (“Erdoğan’s masculinity and the language of the Gezi resistance”, 2013).

With ridicule, people experience the fun of laughing at someone or something, and when they do this collectively the given idea becomes supported and strengthened. A person, who witness ridicule or is the target of ridicule, learns which standards are demanded and the costs of her/his errors. Those who ridicule experience joy and superiority and targets feel humiliation and exclusion. They are punished with shame. Ridicule punishes and redirects the target to the correct action. It presents to others an unvirtuous example and allows those who laugh at the target to feel better about themselves. This may cause the mockers not to have realistic ideas about themselves as well. Ridiculing has a practical and sudden effect to redefine social roles in the opposition of a noticed foolishness and absurdity. Effects of

ridicule on individuals or groups are enormous and often underestimated. Showing that a target is not taken seriously means keeping it away from serious discourse and controlling it. Because empathic bonds with the target or the target's narrative become disrupted. This weapon can sometimes also shoot the one who uses it. If ridicule contains subjective reactions and agreements, it may return to its source, and if ridicule does not work, it may increase the sympathy about the target (Afferbach, 2015). Ridicule promises people a reward for being better than the target and helps individuals or groups to escape from their despair and inabilities. Ridicule is humour that wants to hurt the target and is related to the superiority theory. According to this theory, with ridicule and mockery, the source of communication raises itself by putting down the target (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2014).

In terms of social movements and politics, ridicule is the most direct and demeaning method that humour can reach (Billig, 2005). Ridicule helps to press against the devil that movements oppose. Metaphors and negative relations dehumanise the opponents. Therefore, ridicule can be seen as an effective way to clarify the distinctions between the protesters and their rivals (Steward, Smith & Denton, 2012) According to Alinsky, (1989) ridicule is the most powerful weapon for the people since it makes the counter-manoeuvres almost impossible. It infuriates the targets and pushes them to make poor decisions.

According to Stewart, Smith and Denton (2012), there are certain levels of use of ridicule in social movements. At the first level, it draws a portrait of an inconsistency or an inner contradiction parallel to beliefs, claims and actions of the movement. Ridicule at this level, attacks directly beliefs, claims or actions, but targets individuals or groups indirectly. The attack is more ideological and disputes the credibility, sincerity, honesty and fairness of the other by revealing inconsistencies. At the second stage of ridicule, protesters take a more personal attitude and try to show the ideals, actions, and propositions of the target as unreasonable. At the third level of ridicule, protesters directly engage with individual targets.

They describe their targets as stupid or inept. At this level, ridicule draws attention to the target's stupidity, ignorance, dishonesty and irrationality. It not only aims to belittle the target but also gives the source a clear advantage. At the fourth level ridicule, rivals are shown as silly, insignificant and droll characters. Such ridicule targets actions more than ideals since it finds opponents trivial. At the fifth stage, ridicule directly attacks the targets because they are monstrous, bizarre and grotesque. In this case, targets are not just fools but ugly monsters. Ridicule, at this level, describes targets as malignant entities. Targets are dangerous for humanity because they harm others. At the sixth stage of ridicule, the targets are inhuman and brutal. Therefore, ridicule shows opponents as pigs, rats or bugs, and defines them using no reason, logic, knowledge and fair judgment.

From the perspective of social movements, the role of ridicule varies according to the qualities of the target. If the target is irrational, the movement is rational. If the target is stupid, the movement is intelligent. If the target is monstrous, the movement is attractive. Practising ridicule enables the movement of actors to feel strong and superior, make them believe that they can reclaim control of their lives. Ridicule is a confrontational strategy for social movements.

Concerning graffiti 5, it can be claimed that it ridicules Erdoğan by disrupting the core characteristic of Erdoganism; the patriarchal and masculine persona of the leader. It has two components; the visual/graphical component containing the subversion of Erdoğan's propaganda billboard, and the textual phrase. About the visual component, it is possible to say that all the other elements of the billboard, except Erdoğan's portrait, are removed. Thus, it is demonstrated that the given message is only about Erdoğan. Besides, Erdoğan's cheeks are coloured with pink spray paint.

My interpretation of that visual intervention is about a visual cliché. Ruddy-cheeks are generally used in cartoons or comics to depict kids, little girls and their sweetness, like Zuiyo Eizo's famous character Heidi. When we contextually combine the cartoon cliché with Erdoğan's masculine, serious and paternal persona in Erdoganism, the subversion emerges as ridicule. Erdoganism's narrative of Erdoğan is ooked with the ruddy cheeks because he is portrait is re-generated as if he is a little sweet girl or kid.

The textual expression, the second component of graffito, supports the generation of the ridicule, by saying Erdoğan that he is so sweet. Graffito 5 does not talk about the leader, it addresses directly Erdoğan. Therefore, it can be said that it takes a clear stand against the leader, and confronts him, as ridicule requires. In my opinion, the reason for the ridicule is to alter the powerful positioning of Erdoğan. Via the graffito's humorous story Erdoğan is downgraded, and the power balance between the oppressor and the graffitist is redressed, for the benefit of the movement.

Here, another point should be emphasised; graffitists have spent much more effort and time cleaning other elements of the billboard than other Gezi graffiti, which usually contain only text. Graffito 5 lefts the leader alone by taking him out of his political context. I believe this is also an important dynamic about how graffiti confronts Erdoğan. In this way, the graffito became able to choose the space and the context of the ridicule, so the target cannot respond or intervene.

The persona's image symbolising the power is still present., however, all mechanisms of the manipulation are under the control of graffito. This structure also complies with the ridicule. Graffito gives a message that Erdoğan is not someone that should be taken anymore as a serious rival or an opponent. Also, it can be said that the example tries to enrage Erdoğan

for further manoeuvres of the leader to steer him into the emotional and strategically wrong decisions. In Stewart et al.'s (2012) categorizations, the graffito is fourth level ridicule.

In graffito 6, we see a grotesque visual design derived from the world-famous punk rock band Sex Pistols album's cover; 'God save the queen' (Hall, 2017). The graffito, like the previous example, refers to Erdoganism, also Weber's (1978) Sultanism, the one-man regime in Turkey through the sultan analogy. Graffito 6 combines a dissident, internationally famous cultural background (the reproduced album cover) and a local strong symbol (moon and crescent from the Turkish flag), and uses them to depict and criticise Erdoğan. From the graffito's way of placing crescent in the visual, it can be interpreted that Erdoğan is described as a monster, probably a vampire, because they resemble fangs.

Graffito 6

God Save the Sultan




Note. ("The story of a resistance", 2013).

Together with the usage of the star, the narrative of the graffito can be interpreted as follows; Erdoğan is like a vampire and he sucks the blood of the country, or he is a monster with fangs and he feeds on the country. Also, graffito 6 textually refers to the Islamism of Erdoganism. The leader exploits the religion and acts like a sultan; as if the god grants him power. I would argue that the graffito states that Turkey has lost its democratic regime, defines Erdoganism and criticise it by implementing combined cultural components. It openly ridicules Erdoğan at the fifth stage of ridicule (Stewart, et al., 2012).

Figure 6

God Save the Queen



Note: Jamie Reid's cover for the Sex Pistol's God Save the Queen album (Hall, 2017).

From the fact that the graffiti pattern targets Erdoğan directly, it can be propounded that it regards the leader's persona as the sole responsible for the country's situation and the grievances. The pattern not only ridicules Erdoğan but also Erdoganism and aims to bereave their political agency and change the power balance between the leader and the movement. However, the graffiti pattern can also be interpreted as Erdoğan is considered an absolute power block. From this point of view, it can be claimed that it re-approves the persona it is trying to disrupt as a symbol of power. Beyond any doubt, Erdoğan and Erdoganism were the

most significant targets of Gezi graffiti, and the famous Gezi humour turns into ridicule for them.

Mothers at the Barricades

One of the patterns I have discovered among the Gezi contains many examples in which Gezi graffiti artists instrumentalise the traditional stereotypes and gender roles attached to women, and their relevant socio-political connotations, to convey their messages. This pattern mainly revolves around motherhood, but it is also about women since the associated social roles are produced based on the identity of motherhood by the tradition and dominant cultural perspectives.

I have determined that there are two layers in the pattern. The first layer brings in the mothers and aunts (as a secondary conception of motherhood unique to Turkey) into the movement as ingredients of articulation processes and builds a narrative. On the other hand, the second layer addresses directly to the mothers to ask questions, give advice or tranquillise them. I find the pattern is unique and fertile for discussions and interpretations since women, like mothers or aunts, have never come into prominence in such a way in Turkish politics before the Gezi movement. Therefore, first I will try to describe the relevant traditional conception of womanhood and motherhood in Turkish society and then examine the graffiti of the pattern. In this way, I aim to reveal the functions and meaning of the pattern in Gezi graffiti. To this end, explaining the characteristics of traditional women typology depicted by the graffiti in the context of Turkish society is the first step that must be taken to study the pattern.

In graffiti 7, a typical traditional Turkish woman is depicted. This typology, like all social typologies, refers to a social role and status, and it has been attributed to women by tradition, religion and patriarchal power. Like every attempt to generate a typology, graffiti 7

also involves an inductive process. It contains some picked-common features of women, and it expresses a phenomenon regarded as inherent for social formation. Nevertheless, it does not relate to any descriptive certainty about the women in Turkey. The graffito reproduces this fiction to display its narrative regarding the movement. I believe that on the condition that typology's social role can be clearly understood, accurate evaluations would be possible about the function of the graffito. After that, it can be interpreted in terms of the Gezi movement.

Graffito 7

Resisting Mother



Note. (“The story of a resistance”, 2013).

Graffito 7 depicts a typology with multiple interrelated social roles attributed to women. I will try to explain these social roles and identities relationally, in the opinion that it will be useful in interpreting graffiti belonging to both layers of the pattern. Therefore, I will explain why the woman in graffito should be considered a traditional woman and the meaning of the headscarf seen in graffito. Following this, I will mention three different social identities that can be associated with the typology depicted in graffito 7; womanhood, motherhood and aunties.

We understand through the clothing that the graffito, as a stencil, depicts a traditional woman. Clothes give meanings to their wearers (McKee, 2003) and depending on these meanings, certain social roles and identities can be interpreted by the wearer itself and others (Eco, 1993). In this sense-making processes, colours, styles, forms, how clothing present bodies and whether they are in line with cultural values are decisive. The differences in these characteristics are also indicatives of the individuals' stance towards life, their ideological point of view and religious convictions (Gürer, 2016). From the same perspective, it can be said that the woman, which is depicted in the graffito wears traditional clothes and it represents the social roles and status assigned to these clothes.

I believe it would be useful to examine the traditional typology used by the graffito. However, it would be misleading to deny the fact that social roles attributed to specific clothing are constantly changing since social formations are fluid and transforming. Therefore, it would be more accurate to consider the depiction of the woman in graffito 7 not as a panoramic projection about a social phenomenon, but as a single frame photo.

Another point that should be highlighted concerning graffito 7 is the headscarf. The headscarf in the graffito should not be confused with the turban, which is a guise or a custom for political Islam. Both the headscarf and the turban are accessories used concerning

religious principles or traditions. However, the narrative of turban differs greatly. The turban debate has emerged as a political issue in Turkey after the military coup in 1980 because the junta has forbidden female students to enter university campuses while wearing a turban. The debates about turban have been periodically significant in the political arena, because of the variety of policies of governments that sometimes softened, lifted or hardened that ban from that date until today. Briefly, in Turkey, whenever the turban dispute rises, secular-religious conflicts also rise; and it can be said that there has been a strong political polarisation around the issue (Kubilay, 2009). The turban issue is still one of the chronic disagreements of the Turkish political agenda. However, the headscarf is not a way of dressing related to political Islam, unlike the turban. Although they seem similar, they belong to distinct social identities. Turban indicates a political consciousness and preference.

On the other hand, the headscarf we see in the graffiti represents a religious habit, a tradition (Hakan, 2007). This difference can be read in parallel to the distinction between Muslims and Islamists, as Göle (2011) has underlined. While the turban expresses a religious identity, the headscarf refers to political awareness and social act. Islamism means an Islamic political affiliation, and a sense of belonging and a group identity (Göle, 2011). For this reason, the woman in the graffiti should not be identified through the appropriation of a politicised religiosity. She has a traditional and religious tendency, but at the same time, she symbolises a more rural, non-politicised typology for social perception. Wearing a headscarf is partially related to Islamic belief. However, it is more related to the Turkmen, Anatolian and Mesopotamian traditions that are originated from antiquity (“Headscarf comes from Sumerians”, 2009; Tema, 2017). Briefly, some women wear headscarves in Turkey and they can be Sunni, Alevi, Christian or Jewish. The headscarf is not a clear religious symbol, and it does not refer to any political preference.

After determining that the woman Graffiti expresses visually refers to a traditional context, I will consider its first social identity-based connotation; the womanhood. The women depicted by tradition in Turkish society, live at home and responsible for the housework. Women's identification is made through the concept of home, and their social life is limited to what happens at home. I do not use the concept of the house here, because the position of the typology in the family resonates better with the concept of home. Also, since it is related to the roles and statuses such as motherhood, wifhood or being a bride, are more meaningful in the concept of a home, rather than a house. This traditional typology should not be thought of as an obsolete and dysfunctional context. It may vary in terms of generation, education, class or social station. Nevertheless, it is always fixed on the women's relationship with the home (Aktaş, 2013).

According to the survey conducted by the State Planning Organisation of Turkey (DPT) in 1988, the most important duties of women as follows; household chores, raising the children, educating the children, giving moral support to their husbands and children, looking after their children and husbands, raising children and helping the family by breadwinning. The percentage of women who say "for women the most important thing to do is housework" is 69.46%, and the percentage of those who agreed on this opinion among men is 76.29%. Besides, men stated that they did not expect women to work and earn income (Atalay, 1992).

In another and more up-to-date survey conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) was detected that women play a greater role in traditional domestic responsibilities such as cooking, ironing, setting and clearing the tables. The proportion of men was higher in paying the bills, maintenance or repairing (Family structure research, 2006). Based on the visual expression preferences of the graffiti, it can be argued that the woman depicted also symbolises these familial and social roles. Also, the clothes in graffiti belong to a non-urban

woman type. However, it does not mean that this typology is not a part of the urban fabric because of phenomena such as internal migration.

The second social identity-based connotation of the women imaged in graffito 7, is motherhood. Motherhood in Turkish culture is an important, sublime and complicated concept. Although it is possible to say that Turkish sociality is shaped around a warlike, patriarchal army/nation structure, the importance of motherhood is great. Its position and its decisiveness for shaping human relations cannot be denied. According to the traditional narrative, women gain a respectable status in society when they become wives and mothers. Just being a mother or being a wife does not provide the same status change. Essentially, giving birth to a son and educating him are considered the most important duties of a woman. Motherhood determines the status of women both in the family and society. It is the most important feature that separates women from men (Bars, 2014).

Such importance of motherhood is only important in the framework of patriarchal understanding, and mothers are sacred as long as they are mothers just like men would approve. The point that should not be missed here is the distinction between the identity of the mother and the woman. If the woman is a mother, it reaches this important and sublime level. Pregnancy is also a respected position. This status becomes the arch stone of the family after childbirth, especially with the birth of a son. Accordingly, women should fulfil their roles as mothers, spouses and homemakers under the expectations. It is expected that the woman will be clean and resourceful in her domestic responsibilities (Ersöz, 2010).

The mothers' position in Turkish society is corroborated by religion. Much importance has been given to the mothers in Islam, but because of the patriarchal order in Muslim societies, this so-called importance does not mean anything in practice. The importance given to women in Islam is also embedded in the concept of motherhood.

Therefore, women without children or refuse to be mothers are left out outside of this protected area given by the religion. According to a hadith attributed to Prophet Mohammad, “heaven lies at the feet of your mother” (Özdener, 1988). Not women’s. The importance given to women in the Islamic religion is only in discourse, and not mostly observed practically (Komut, 2011). Briefly, it can be said that in Turkish social formation, the concept of the mother refers to a very important social identity and it gains more importance via religion.

Graffito 7’s third social identity-based connotation resonates with the concept of *teyze* that means aunt in English (“Teyze”, n.d). Unlike German and English in Turkish, the word aunt means only the mother’s sister. That is the core meaning of the word. However, the word of aunt has also another connotation in Turkey. It is very common for people to address women that older than themselves and looking traditional like in graffito 7 by the aunt word, in the flow of everyday life. This is a form of a semi-formal oratory including a certain level of sincerity and respect used in both urban and rural areas (Gürel, 2015). That usage is popular among educated youth as well. A similar oratory is also available for men and applied with the *amca* that means uncle in English (“Amca”, n.d.). This connotation or the secondary meaning of the aunt word relates to the mother's identity. When motherhood goes beyond the familial boundaries and enters a broader social context transforms into aunthood. In other words, it can be seen as another social identity that is related to the mother's identity, contains many features of this identity but does not express motherhood. There is a widely used proverb in Turkey: “The aunt means a half mother” (Aksoy, 2013). Regarding graffito, the woman depicted in graffito can be seen as a generic aunt for all and, of course, the mother of someone at the same time. Again, a woman who looks after her children and does housework. A social position passive in social and political life, sacred and innocent, according to the dominant cultural formation.

Briefly, an individual who would encounter graffiti 7 in Turkey, would see a woman who is devoting herself to her family, especially to her children. Also, they would see a person who is undereducated and economically dependent mostly on her husband or other men of her family. They would see also a woman always has to have, righteous and sacred because the holiness and righteousness of the mothers (whether for the younger generations or other generations) is a value engraved in social memory and consciousness in Turkey (Sever, 2015). It is possible to argue the mother or the aunt woman depicted in the graffiti was essentially perceived in that way and the graffiti was built on this social basis. However, graffiti 7 uses these existing social connotations and identities only as a background. By using these structures, it establishes its original meaning and narrative.

The graffiti takes this mother or aunt, whose characteristics I have described above, and unexpectedly places it in the context of the Gezi movement. The innocent, secret, naive and passive traditional mother becomes a protester and an actor who lifting her fist in the air, wearing a gas mask and surrounded by white flames. I believe the power of the graffiti comes from its surprising effect, and it is surprising since it creates a discrepancy. This depiction of a mother outside the boundaries of her social identity is shocking and remarkable for the eyes accustomed to the images of the role attributed to this identity. Graffiti 7 not only presents a grotesque derivation of these connotations but also ensures the expression of a difference or transformation that can be explained through these identities. At this point, I will try to make interpretations about graffiti 7 based on this finding.

First, it can be said that the graffiti makes a situation analysis. It announces that even mothers known as pillars of our homes are on the streets for the movement. Also, graffiti does not convey its message humorously, unlike most Gezi graffiti. It depicts a mother who resists stoically. In my opinion, graffiti tries to make audiences ask a particular question; What could have caused even mothers to rebel? In this context, the example can be as

follows: The social strain, the injustice and repression that caused the movement became so widespread and evident that even innocent, ignorant, passive and apolitical mothers whom we knew closely were mobilised. Now, Gezi concerns everyone, including the people who have been kept their noses clean.

Participation in the Gezi movement does not mean performing one of the usual manoeuvres of politics. This movement is not an organisation trying to gain ground for the social opposition. It is also not a movement of those who only define themselves as elites, secularists, white Turks or intellectuals. Gezi is a phenomenon beyond political praxis, as mothers have shown it. It has reached our homes, to the essence of society. Mothers and aunts took part in the actions because they want to protect the future of their children.

Graffito 7 can also be interpreted in terms of legitimisation. It can be argued that the graffito tries to generate legitimacy and create a discursive protective shield by transposing the affirmed values symbolised by the mother/aunt identities to the narrative of the movement. With this relation, the movement becomes also holy, righteous and innocent, as mothers and aunts. Besides, the graffito can be seen as a strategic counter-narrative attempt against the counter-narrative of the power that was fixed on showing the Gezi protestors as extremists and vandals. In this sense, it says movement belongs to decent and normal people.

From this perspective, graffito 7 also may be seen as an example of a powerful individual counter-narrative targeting the government that has been claiming traditional family values are the base of their policies. This inference comes from the fact that 37% of the AKP's electorate are traditional homemakers; mothers and aunts (Uncu, 2018). So, the graffito tries to shoot the power with its weapon and alleges that the people who elected Erdoğan have turned against him. People approved by the government are now protesters. At this point, the widespread social acceptance that assumes the mothers and aunts cannot be

criticised or held responsible for any political reasoning is utilised by the graffitist and becomes an effective argument against the government initiatives that wanted the public to be steered to a negative perception about the movement.

Graffito 7 can also be evaluated in terms of the communicative roles it may have played in the name of the movement. Because the narrative presented here can be associated with the actual events that took place around Gezi Park. During the movement, mothers of protesters have been in and around Gezi Park. They visited the park, brought their grandchildren, and they distribute homemade food at the node. It can be said that this support was given per the established social identities. However, the mobilisation of mothers has transformed into something else; the chain of mothers action (“A chain of mothers in Gezi”, 2013). On June 14, Istanbul Governor Hüseyin Avni Mutlu addressed to mothers of the protesters in his speech and he said: “Come on mothers, get your kids out of Gezi Park, their lives are in danger there” (“Governor Mutlu: Come get your children, their lives are in danger”, 2013). After that call, on the same day’s evening, hundreds of mothers have come to Gezi Park and formed a human chain to protect the protesters. The act was not only done by traditional mothers or aunts that we see in graffito 7. Also, it is not possible to know whether the graffito was produced after the event. However, the chain of mothers can be seen as an incarnation of the narrative, which I interpret of the usage of the traditional identity-based connotations that the graffito works on. Briefly, the graffito utilises the given identities, connect them unexpectedly with the movement, re-contextualises their connotations to generate political and oppositional imagery. Graffito 7 is designed in a way that everyone can recognise quickly. It tells its story by using common reference frames stemming from tradition, so its depiction can be comprehensible and affirmed. Also, it uses its paradoxical structure to present Gezi as a movement with shocking developments, and it attempts to seize the power’s superiority based upon tradition. Besides, the example announces that the

movement does not exclude traditional and religious segments of society. Furthermore, moving from the estimation that mothers or aunts did not practice graffiti during the movement, it can be said graffiti 7 was produced by someone belonging to a different social identity. In this sense, the graffiti brings together two distinct social worlds in its context, and a powerful message, a positive moral shock, and a counter-narrative on behalf of the movement emerge.

I will interpret graffiti 8, 9, 10 and 11 to examine the second layer of the pattern. All the graffiti that belong to the layer convey original messages and have distinct narrations. However, the way they position mothers or motherhood can be seen as a clear indication of bringing forward a major issue about Turkish society and politics. For the layer, I generate a dichotomy to support my interpretations; the mothers of the Gezi, and the father state.

I argue that the relation and the contrast between these two concepts would enable us to examine the layer richly. To this end, before I examine the layer's graffiti, I will mention the father state concept and its meaning for Turkish society.

In Turkish tradition, the state reaches had been gaining meaning through the *devlet baba* (the father state, *parens patriae*) concept for centuries (Tok, 2019). Devlet baba owns the country. Just like a father (the *paterfamilias*) who owns his household. The concept of devlet baba refers to the state that is organised as a direct extension of a kingdom dynasty, as Weber (1978) has described with the concept of patrimonialism. For instance, the Ottoman Empire was a patrimonial state (İnalçık, 1995). In the Turkish state tradition, there is both a spiritual and earthly relationship between the father state and its subjects. Subjects are meant to be protected by the father state and the god assigns this duty to the sultan. Just as a father who is assigned to protect his family. This expresses the spiritual dimension of the relationship. Also, the father state has to ensure the prosperity of its subjects. That constitutes

the material dimension of the relationship (Gencer, 2009). The Ottoman modernisation and the establishment of the Turkish Republic are processes in which the father state concept is partly abandoned. However, it is possible to argue that the effects of the Turkish father state tradition and mentality are still felt vividly in people's perception of the state, and the Turkish state's view of the people and citizenship (Alpman, 2017). Concordantly, it can be stated that the initially conceived and afterwards perceived opinion, which suggests that a state is expected to hold masculine and patriarchal characteristics, is common amongst the public.

Graffito 8

Mother Am I Unconstitutional? [Anne Ben Anayasaya Aykırı Miyim?]



Note. ("Mother, am I unconstitutional?", 2013).

The father state concept refers to a mentality that sees the state as a monolithic entity, not as a series of institutions, and is problematic for constitutionality. It features the state's

operational aspects as an absolute sole actor. The father state's equivalent in the modern constitutional orders is executive power. Besides, the father state, which is an abstract institution covering all the institutions, takes a human form. It is like an omnipresent father who protects with certain transcendence.

Although it is conceived through a human form existing only in the minds, is much more powerful than a normal father, and refers to a transcendent entity embedded in the father concept of the Turkish family structure (Tok, 2019). Briefly, the father state protects, takes care of, and when it is necessary punishes. It is a union of the ideas referring to all functions of the state and its sovereignty, which covers all the areas of politics. After this brief description, I will examine the graffiti that constitutes the other element of the dichotomy.

All graffiti in this layer address an uncertain mother figure. In Graffito 8, it appears that the graffitist questioned her/his constitutional existence and the relationship with the state as a citizen. When it is interpreted in terms of the Gezi movement, a graffitist is an actor who makes claims and an activist who uses the right to assembly and demonstration and the right to legal remedies, which are natural and necessary parts of democratic systems. However, despite using her/his legal rights, the state's response contains police violence, stigmatization, exclusion and rejection.

Turkish state acts as a father state that does not share power with its subjects even to articulate their grievances and punishes them for acting as citizens. Also, the question in the graffito can be read with irony and described as a criticism aimed at the government that was labelling in every opportunity Gezi protesters as vandals, extremists or terrorists.

In both cases, the questioning is associated with the traditional understanding of the state in Turkey and the government's policies that maintains and even enhances the old habits

of the father state. As I noted, the father state does not allow individual initiatives, which possibly would threaten its absolute sovereignty. It does not negotiate and does not seek consensus.

Graffito 9

Mom, I Am an Anarchic Now [Anne Ben Anarşik Oldum]



Note. (“#resistgezipark#3”, 2013).

In graffito 9, we see an announcement. The graffitist says that she/he has become an anarşik. Before I interpret this particular graffito, I must shed light on the context of the anarşik word. The anarşik means anarchic in Turkish. However, its meaning for the graffito’s context differs. While the political struggle between rightists and leftists has been continuing as street clashes during the second half of the 1970s, Turkish state television was naming the

people who were the members of illegal leftist organisations as *anarşist* (anarchists). Because according to the official discourse, they were disturbing the order and creating anarchy across the country. However, the word of *anarşist* had been pronounced by the undereducated people like homemakers, farmers or villagers as *anarşik* (as written in the graffiti), since it was difficult for them to pronounce the word. For this reason, the word was spread in this broken form, into some segments of the society who could not enjoy modern education sufficiently. Today in Turkey, most of the population lives in urban areas, and the number of those who are educated enough to pronounce the word correctly is much higher than in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the word *anarşik* has remained as a nostalgic political word joke, until today.


Besides, after the 1980 coup, it was the major concern for the mothers whether their children are in active politics. They were afraid that their children would be interested in politics and pay similar prices with the activists of the previous generation. “Do what you want to do, but stay away from politics” has been the most widespread advice of mothers for their kids. Graffiti 9 uses the word *anarşik* because it is structured as if it talks to a mother. It is designed as an announcement or a confession of the graffitist’s participation in the Gezi movement. So, for the mother, the graffitist finally becomes an *anarşik*, and the biggest fear of mothers comes true. Graffiti can be interpreted mainly as the announcement of recruitment or the spread of the movement. However, also it maintains the old political joke involving a mild contempt. It keeps the perspective that sees the mothers politically ignorant. At the same time, the graffitist prefers to address to her/his mother, not to her/his father, who would probably have the same difficulties pronouncing the word as well.

Differently, graffiti 10 addresses a mother to calm her down. It is rather understandable that during the Gezi movement all mothers whose children were around the park have been deeply worried about their safety and health. The graffiti is written as if it is

an answer of a young protester to a mother's warning before she/he goes to the Gezi Park. In the graffito, the graffitist assures her/his mother, by explaining that she/he is not in the front where heavy clashes with the police take place and reminding her that she/he is not alone. The graffito emphasises the physical hazards that Gezi protesters faced during the movement and the solidarity among them. Again, it prefers to talk to a worried mother.

Graffito 10

Don't Worry Mom, I Am Not at the Front, We Walk All Together [Merak Etme Anne, Önden Gitmiyorum, Hep Beraber Yürüyoruz]



Note. ("The one who traces blue", 2013).

In graffito 11, the appeal to the mother should be interpreted concerning traditional motherhood in Turkish social formation again. As I noted, mothers are imagined as self-sacrificing and subservient figures who would do anything to fulfil their children's needs. The graffitist uses that connotation as background and complains to the mother about the lack of lemon. The graffito is structured like a childish complaint to the mother, and it mentions

lemons since protesters used lemons to reduce the effects of pepper gas during the movement. Graffito describes the situation on the streets in which protesters were having rough times against the disproportionate use of force of the police. Also, it depicts the circumstances by summoning an emotion related to an established traditional social role. Mothers could not play their traditional roles bodily in the movement, because they often could not take part in the physical struggle and resistance part of the movement. Therefore, it can be argued that this call for aid carries slightly humorous absurdism that points out another point. Yet again it addresses a mother.

Graffito 11

Mom, There No More Lemons Left [Anne Limon Bitti]



Note. (2013, June 6). (In the middle bottom) Photograph taken by the author.

Now I will interpret the graffiti I have portrayed the second layer of the pattern relationally. In a conceptual perspective, in all graffiti of the layer, graffitiists talk to the/their mothers and summon motherhood and its connotations to create emotional political rhetoric. First, it can be argued that motherhood is utilised by graffitiists to create a counter-narrative and framing against the government's accusatory approach that finds the ways of the father state and its patriarchal discipline acceptable and valid. Accustomed social roles of the mothers are mediately transposed into the graffiti, and thus into the politics because they express situations, emotions and understanding that fathers and the father state do not express. The graffiti of the pattern, utilise motherhood's innocence arising from the tradition that regards mothers politically ignorant and absorb the relevant values such as compassion, forgiveness, sympathy and naivete. In this way, unsoiled and unspoilt imagery emerges as a reference point to frame the protesters and the movement. Because Gezi protesters become unsoiled and unspoilt children of the unsoiled and unspoilt mothers. Also, it can be claimed that the framing was built to negate the official discourse that labels the protesters as looters.

Second, despite the mothers are seen as subservient figures, as I mentioned above, the tradition and shared beliefs distinguish mothers from other women and grant them sacredness and importance. Although these notions result from the same patriarchal structure, they put mothers in a position in which they are always virtuous and righteous as long as they care about their children. Additionally, I think a mother who tries to protect their children carries universal righteousness for almost every form of cultural accumulation. I believe these notions are re-contextualised as forms of power and agency that is unfamiliar for the patriarchal sovereign. Accordingly, the aim of the layer here can be interpreted as efforts for creating an ever-winning stranger framing or a narrative in the movement's name.

I argue that the prevalent manifestation of mothers amongst Gezi graffiti can be explained through the dichotomy that would be structured between motherhood, and the

fatherhood of the Turkish state. Because of the historical tendencies and traditions in the background and the present policies of the government that resemble the androcracy, Gezi graffitists may have perceived the state as a frightening father who punishes those who disobey. On the other side, mothers are blessed, virtuous, merciful, forgiving and altruistic figures. Significantly, motherhood and mothers are handled as targets for complaints, announcements or calls for help by Gezi graffiti. In my opinion, these graffiti bypass the father state by taking shelter in the above-mentioned characteristics of motherhood and express the desire for a new dimension in which an alternative social contract can be discussed, again embedded in a parental relationship.

In Turkey, the father state builds itself on a traditional base that is masculine and patriarchal. It feeds its policies and discourses from this base as well as legitimises itself and generates consent. In Gezi graffiti, this structure is confronted by motherhood. Motherhood contradicts with the father state and strengthens through its features, which are important, precious and sacred in the eyes of the society. In this way, criticism becomes voiced about the relations between the individual and the father state. Besides, it may be claimed that a distinct understanding of the state is offered by highlighting these matriarchal features. *The mother state* does not punish. It listens to the grievances of its citizens and sees individuals as its children, not its subjects. Making claims or protesting is allowed. The mother state exists to ensure its citizens' welfare and does not treat them as anarşik. Through the allegory of the mother state, it is possible to determine that Gezi graffiti associated another ancient social taboo with politics.

Besides, since graffitists did not discuss or criticise the mothers' disadvantaged position in the society or the inequality between women and men in Turkey, the mother figure of the Gezi graffiti is not related to women's rights. Quite the contrary, these traditional social roles of the mothers are instrumentalised. It is not possible to detect if the

usage of motherhood was incidental or a strategic decision. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the dichotomy, the father state and the motherhood, it can be said that Gezi graffitists have touched on a fundamental issue; the relation between the state and the citizen. The second layer of the pattern recurrently refers to a contrasting cultural construct that partially coincides with a state that is longed for by the protesters.

Solid, Liquid and Gas

Graffiti mentioning the police and crowd control tactics including pepper gas, water cannons, riot squads and anti-riot vehicles (TOMA) constitutes a significant pattern among data I have examined. First, the foremost reason for the pattern's emergence is the police's constant presence and interventions around Gezi Park and Taksim Square. The second reason is that the police interventions that continued throughout the movement were extremely violent and misconducted, and that has also changed the protester's responses. The authorities' response to the Gezi Park protests had been characterised by the "extreme level and sustained nature of abusive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations" (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 15).

To manifest the level of violence, I will present some quantitative data. During the events, more than 8 thousand protesters and 6 hundred police officers were injured. Also, eleven activists have lost their eyes, a hundred and four protesters have suffered head traumas, and unfortunately, seven protesters lost their lives (Mehmet Ayvalıtaş - 20, Abdullah Cömert - 22, Ethem Sarısülük - 26, Medeni Yıldırım - 18, Ali İsmail Korkmaz - 19, Ahmet Atakan - 22, Berkin Elvan - 15). There are strong shreds of evidence that the use of excessive force by the police has caused the deaths of three of them.

Additionally, four bystanders died from a heart attack because of excessive use of pepper gas (İrfan Tuna - 47, Selim Önder - 88, Zeynep Eryaşar - 50, Serdar Kadakal - 37) and

one police officer lost his life by falling into a subway construction site (Mustafa Sarı - 27) (“Those who lost their lives during Gezi Park resistance”, 2013). Also, there have been allegations that 6 police officers have committed suicide influenced by the events. However, these claims are denied by the Ministry of the Interior (“6 police committed suicide last week”, 2013).

From the first day of the protests, the police arbitrarily and disproportionately have been used pressurized water and pepper gas to disperse protesters. Many images of mistreatment have been broadcasted by television channels or posted on social media by eyewitnesses. Thousands of videos showing police officers beating protesters were shared. Journalists, doctors and lawyers who were doing their duties during events also were among the victims of police violence. Moreover, many women detained by the police have said they were subjected to verbal sexual harassment. During the protests, it was observed that water cannons often and arbitrarily targeted peaceful demonstrators for hours. Also, water cannons were used against people who were only standing on sidewalks and watching. Pressurised water was seen being used against people who were hiding in the various buildings and the infirmaries. Furthermore, there was strong evidence that the use of irritant chemicals was added to the water used during the Gezi movement. Like water cannons and TOMAs, pepper spray also has been used recurrently and arbitrarily against protesters, since the first days of the Gezi Park protests. According to the government, in the first twenty days of the protests, an inventory of 130 thousand pepper gas capsules was consumed, and new orders were given to renew stocks. The previous annual supply rate was limited to 150 thousand capsules.

Throughout the movement, pepper gas has been used excessively, and in violation of human rights. Besides, there are numerous news reports, photos and videos that show the police used pepper gas against protesters running away. The police used the gas against passers-by, and in houses, shops, hospitals, infirmaries and hotels. Police officers were

repeatedly seen firing pepper gas canisters horizontally at the suspected protesters. Plastic bullets were used both in peaceful demonstrations and in clashes between police and protesters. The police also used real bullets on a few occasions. In addition to these unofficial detentions, beatings and sexual harassments were among the violations and crimes committed by the police throughout the Gezi movement (Amnesty International, 2013). In brief, it can be said that there is a strong relationship between police misconduct and the mobilisation of the protesters. Accordingly, 49.1% of the protesters have stated that they came to the park after they saw the police's violent approach (KONDA, 2014, p. 18). The policing was one reason for the indignation that mobilised Gezi protesters.

Third, Gezi protesters while they were in and around the park, they had to struggle against the government mainly in two areas. The discursive arena involves social media platforms and partly other communication mediums, and the arena of bodily struggle, which contains the streets, alleys, hotels, hospitals, infirmaries, the square and the park. All physical or performative practices like demonstrating, resisting, running away from the police and the occupation had been taking place in these places. Police officers, TOMAs and the pepper gas were tangible rivals that protesters faced every other day, and therefore events were shaped by the bodily struggle between these opponents and Gezi protesters.

Fourth, the policing towards the movement was one reason for its flashpoint and the backlash phases. Effects of the policing on the course of Gezi events should be evaluated since there was also an ongoing dominant political discourse, which possibly caused the related grievances. During the Gezi movement, practices of policing were mostly culpable and fuelled both the collective mobilisation and the formation of collective identities. Urban rebellions that emerge in disadvantaged neighbourhoods are triggered or accelerated mostly because of mistreatment, aggression and violence of the police forces (Atak & Della Porta, 2016), and the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against protesters may lead to

a flashpoint. The concept of flashpoint, coined by Waddington, Jones and Crticher (1989; as cited in Atak & Della Porta, 2016, p. 612), refers to a situation stemming from interactional processes in which people think government no longer follows the rules. Relevantly, flashpoint may lead a collectivity to cease abiding by rules.

Besides, Atak and Della Porta (2016) have argued that the outrage that led to mobilisation cannot be explained solely by protest policing. Instead, it has been fuelled by intimidating and discriminatory policing that was being encountered in everyday life (p. 612). Movements that started peacefully, such as Gezi, may transform into a backfire if the public recognises policing is unjust (Hess & Martin, 2006). Also, how the police behave towards protests to protect the order is shaped by dominant political discourses. These discourses build themselves on the coalition between the law and the order and describe rebellions, protests and other forms of collective action as attempts to disrupt the social order. Such definitions and descriptions may be useful to justify the violence in the police's perception and to enable applying harsh methods where the public order is disrupted (Atak & Della Porta, 2016, p. 613). At this point, police training plays an important role. However, most of these training programs often teach police officers to see protesters and activists in, as the crowd theory assumes (Stott & Reicher, 1998). Police officers sometimes differentiate relatively good protesters from the looters and vandals, but often identify them by a single typology (Della Porta, 1998, p. 242). Briefly, dominant political discourse is the determinant of the behaviour of the police towards various forms of social opposition such as protests, actions and insurrections (Atak & Della Porta, 2016). Accordingly, the police violence experienced in the Gezi movement is not unrelated to the legal regulations.

When the law amendments that are made in the pre-Gezi period in Turkey examined, it possible to observe the legal sub-structure which gives the flexibility to the police for arbitrary use of excessive force. In 2007, the ruling party AKP made several legislative

changes, which increased the powers of the police. With this amendment, the police gained authorisation to make stop-and searches, to fingerprint people and to use lethal force at will. The amendment summarises the objectives of this increased authority as follows; to prevent crimes or misdemeanours, to ensure that the escaped perpetrators are arrested, to identify the perpetrators of the crimes or misdemeanours, to identify people who should be arrested, to prevent dangers to the body integrity of people and their properties (“Approval for the law that increases the powers of the police”, 2007). Also, the above-mentioned amendment was an addition to the anti-terror laws that make it easier for the police to perform operations against every objector and the expansion of the police force in numbers. Therefore, for the pre-Gezi period, one can argue that the power was trying to narrow and control the public sphere in Turkey (Atak & Della Porta, 2016). Atak and Della Porta have suggested that policing was decisive on two breaking points in terms of the Gezi movement; the flashpoint and the backfire. Accordingly, the flashpoint for the Gezi movement was the decision of the police force to set on fire the tents of people who were watching the park, and the backfire is the transformation of this local and environmental action into a mass upheaval (Atak & Della Porta, 2016, p. 615).

The police have adopted a zero-tolerance approach and policing was concentrated on deterrence and incapacitation. According to the scholars, for two key reasons a dialogue-oriented policing was not applicable; “the negative perception of police officers about protests/protesters” and “the prevalence of a law-and-order approach to crowd control and public order” (Atak & Della Porta, 2016, pp. 618-620). Police culpability was the catalyst for the mechanisms that transformed the Gezi protests into a mass upheaval. Also, responding violently caused a backfire because the movement had a high legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the government’s repressive policies narrowing the public sphere have paved the way for this backfire.

The pattern I will interpret has appeared under the conditions, which the police was becoming gradually more interfering with daily life experiences and the public sphere as a coercive power, because of the government's policies. Besides, during the movement, violent and excessive police interventions continued without interruption, and the riot police and their methods were the sole concrete rivals for protesters. Graffito 12 addresses directly to the riot police to ridicule. In Turkey, the official name of the riot police is *çevik kuvvet*, which can be translated into English as the agile force. The graffito takes the word of agile and uses it to describe a situation in which protesters prevailed against the agile force. This preference can be interpreted in two ways. First, officers of the force had to be literally agile to cope physically with protesters. Second, the agile force had to run from protesters. In both contexts, it can be argued that the graffito refers to the superiority of the protesters against the agile force, and in this way, the ridicule achieves its goal. Besides ridiculing, the graffito openly challenges and incites the police.

Graffito 12


Police Yesterday You Were Very Agile [Dün Çok Çeviktin Polis]



Note. ("Sounds on the wall", 2013).

Graffito 13

Tonight We Are the Law!



Note. (The third graffito in the picture with the last three lines) (2013, June 1). Photograph taken by the author.


Graffito 13 can be regarded as an example concerning policing because it questions the issue of law enforcement. I believe the graffito can be interpreted in two ways, according to addressees. First, it may be directly addressing the police with a reference to the fact that it is a law enforcement force. In the context of this interpretation, the graffito is an analysis of a situation, in which the order of things has been turned upside down by protesters. It refers to a change in the balance of power and announces that protesters (we) have become those who enforce the law. It narrates the situation as if a real power balance change has taken place, and in this way, it pronounces that the coercive powers' sovereignty is being interrupted. Therefore, the graffito can be regarded as an expression of victory and incitement. In the

second interpretation, the graffito addresses the Gezi protesters and the public. Within this context, it can be seen as an invitation, a call for solidarity or motivation, or an announcement for a probable change in the balance of power. In both interpretative possibilities, it can be observed that the graffito describes the relationship between the protesters and the law enforcement force as a rivalry and refers to a probable or a de facto superiority of Gezi activists against the riot police.

The pattern involves two layers. The first layer, as can be seen above, is constituted by examples that directly challenge or address the police. On the other hand, in the second layer that I will examine, graffiti mention crowd control tactics with irony, sarcasm and humour.

Graffito 14

May the Orantısız [Disproportionate] Force with You



Note. (2013, June 1). Photograph taken by the author.

Graffito 14 uses a popular culture element to criticise the disproportionate use of force of the police. It seizes and alters the world-famous phrase from the Star Wars movies; “may the force be with you”. In Star Wars, the force is a kind of omnipresent cosmic energy that connects everything in the universe, and it has its own will. The phrase is hijacked by the graffito, is used to wish good luck and show goodwill (Groome, 2017). The graffito is written in English and uses this homophony to strengthen its sense and criticism. In this way, for the people familiar with Star Wars movies, the graffito becomes catchy and humorous. On the other hand, since the graffito uses the term of disproportionate use of force, it can be argued that the graffito keeps its meaningfulness for all people who know about the movement and the related situation. During the movement, this term has been constantly on the agenda and was often used in criticising policing during the movement. However, graffito 14 does not copy the Star Wars phrase exactly, by adding the word disproportionate it also activates irony and sarcasm. As noted, the original phrase that makes up the graffito’s semantic roof expresses goodwill. With the addition of the word disproportionate, the emergent phrase keeps the original toning and structure but gains a new context and meaning. Because the police use of disproportionate force has been a severe physical challenge, even a life-threatening condition, for the protesters, the graffito is not well-wishing. Rather, it can be regarded as a sarcastic criticism on policing that utilises a popular culture notion to amplify its effects.

Before I begin my final evaluation concerning the pattern, I would like to exhibit another significant feature of the second layer. A lot of Gezi graffiti of the pattern that mentions the pepper gas and TOMAs praise them. Despite all the arbitrarily violent interferences of the police, graffitists express their emotions ironically. For example, graffito 15 describes pepper gas as an awesome thing through hijacking and altering an actor’s line from the motion picture Scary Movie. The line belongs to a character who makes the same

comment about marijuana in the movie and as follows; “that is some awesome shit man” (Gold & Mayes, 2000, 01:01:29). Thus, graffito implies that pepper gas affects protesters in the manner marihuana affects the character in the movie. In other words, meaning is created as if the protesters have found pepper spray great and become dependent on it. Graffito 16 contains a clear statement in which graffitist declares her/his love for the TOMAs (anti-riot water cannon vehicles).

Graffito 17 makes the same declaration for the pepper spray. Also, it uses the layout of the well-known logo of New York City, which designed by Milton Glaser (Brower, 2015), and replaces NY letters with the word *biber*, which means pepper in Turkish (“Biber”, n.d.). All these graffiti are very similar in terms of how they build their meanings with sarcasm and irony.

Graffito 15

That is Some Awesome Pepper Gas Man [Bu Biber Gazı Bir Harika Dostum]



Note. (“Humour in the days of rebellion!”, 2013).

In this context, it can be argued that graffiti of the layer generates an incongruity between what is said and what is understood, or what is expected, and what occurs. Thus, the humour appears, and attracts audiences' attention, for thinking about what these graffiti say. When audiences notice the incongruity, graffiti reach their goal, because now they can recognise the essential message wanted to be given. It is also possible to claim that these graffiti are the expressions of resistance. Because according to the pattern, although the conditions were serious enough to be fatal, Gezi graffiti artists have chosen to generate a narration, which announces that protesters are still determined to pursue the movement, the disproportionate use of force and police violence will not dissuade them.

Graffito 16

I Love You TOMA



Note. (2013, June 2). Photograph taken by the author.

Based on the use of irony and sarcasm, it can be interpreted that these graffiti provoke riot police for more violent interventions. However, it should not be overlooked that police violence is the greatest source of legitimacy and motivation for the movement. Therefore, it can be asserted that policing and police culpability have motivated protesters even more to continue their actions, and the layer of the pattern might result from strategic thinking.

Graffito 17

I ♥ Pepper [I ♥ Biber]



Note. (2013, June 2). Photograph taken by the author.

The pattern that mentions the policing, riot police and crowd control methods such as the use of pepper spray and TOMAs, is focused on the police culpability and violence.

Throughout the pattern, graffitiists' narrative efforts to make protesters superior against the police are easily observable. Besides, there are two layers in the pattern that have similar purposes but differ in terms of their procedures. The first layer, challenges, targets and incites the police directly and seriously. It alleges or implies an alteration in the power balance has taken place between the police and activists. It declares Gezi protesters as victorious and the police as defeated. The second layer pursues more or less the same goal; however, it brings with it a more intensive use of irony and sarcasm. It uses popular culture as a toolbox that empowers the sense-making processes. Unlike the first layer, it uses the harsh conditions that protesters are exposed to as reference frames and expresses the determination and resistance of the movement. In general, the pattern contains efforts to belittle the police and to praise the protesters. These efforts may have been made to keep the actors of the movement together and to motivate them to continue their activism under violent police interventions.

Chapuling

Gezi graffiti contains a graffiti pattern in which it is possible to observe the building of a movement's most distinctive, comprehensive and well-known collective identity. The graffiti I will examine and interpret in this pattern is fixed on the word of *çapulcu* or its variants. *Çapulcu* means marauder, looter or plunderer in Turkish ("Çapulcu", n.d.). This pattern has a strong frequency among the data and echoes consonantly with the surveys conducted to profile Gezi protesters. 88% of the protesters have identified themselves as *çapulcus* (Odağ, Uluğ, & Solak, 2016). Accordingly, the pattern will be examined in terms of that collective identity's generation, appropriation and presentation. Detailed information on the evaluation of collective identity in terms of social movements can be found in the second part of the study.

The emergence of the *çapulcu* collective identity is originated from Erdoğan's speech on June 2, 2013, one day after the occupation of Gezi Park has started. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the Ottoman Archives Building, Erdoğan said as follows: "Some looters went to the square and they provoked our people. We will not sit back and watch this. People voted for us because they wanted us to protect our history" ("Erdoğan named tens of thousands as few looters...", 2013).

With this choice of words, Erdoğan accidentally gave the Gezi protesters an exceptional opportunity to perform a discursive manoeuvre. They were angry and offended at Erdoğan's words. Being accused and labelled as looters means being severely insulted in Turkey. Also, the movement had high legitimacy in the eyes of the people, and this accusation caused outrage and backlash. However, Gezi protesters did not react directly against Erdoğan's pejorative speech. On the contrary, they embraced that labelling and began to describe themselves as *çapulcus* (Göle, 2013).

The manoeuvre first began on social media. Thousands of Gezi protesters and sympathisers have put the word *çapulcu* before their user names in their social media accounts. That cyber protest has become widespread, also on social media platforms that people, such as Facebook, often use their real names. It can be said that people laid claim to this new identity without hiding behind their user names or avatars. Synchronously, *çapulcu* started to be used in graffiti. Graffitiists produced numerous graffiti, which declared themselves as *çapulcus*. In a quick time, the word and its derivatives also became a verb that protesters used to express their actions. These variants include meshing Turkish with other languages and a variety of neologisms. Briefly, Gezi protesters took Erdoğan's word, changed its context and used it to build a new and strong collective identity in favour of the movement.

As the context and name of a collective identity, the *çapulcu* has become swiftly widespread, overtook the indifference of the mainstream media and achieved to infiltrate even into ordinary quiz shows (Gezi questions in Wordplay! *Çapulcu!*, 2013). As the popularity of identity increased, its social context and connotations also expanded and diversified. For example, Cem Boyner, the owner and the CEO of the Boyner Group Holding, has visited the Gezi Park while carrying a banner saying, “I am no rightist, I am no leftist. I am a *çapulcu*” (“Cem Boyner: I am *çapulcu!*”, 2013). Opposition parties have also utilized the emergent collective identity. CHP deputy Sabahat Akkiraz came to the parliament with a shirt which is written on it the *çapulcu* (“*Çapulcu* surprise in the parliament”, 2013).

In a brief time, the word has become a general title of the repertoire of action and most of the things related to the movement. Concepts such as *çapulcu* music, *çapulcu* humour or *çapulcu* books have appeared (“*Çapulcu* music archive”, 2013; Oğaç & Yılmaz, 2016).

Through *çapulcu* Gezi protesters have generated many adjectives, verbs, definitions and identifications. It has transformed into *chapuling* and its variants and started to being used to define the Gezi activism. Also, it has reached to transnational level through its memetic spread. International news sites have used the variants of *çapulcu* in their headlines (Hardin, 2013; Pistilli, 2013). Additionally, well-known thinkers and artists such as Noam Chomsky and Patti Smith used the word while they were announcing their solidarity for the Gezi movement (“Chomsky is also a *çapulcu*”, 2013; “Patti Smith: We are all *chapulchu*”, 2013). Today it is possible to find the word of *chapuling* in international online dictionaries such as Wikipedia and Urban Dictionary (“*Chapuling*”, n.d.). On the other hand, after the Gezi movement Turkish Language Association (TDK), which is a governmental office, has changed the meaning of the word as “the person who acts against the established order, who disturbs the order,” (*Çapulcu*, n.d). Briefly, *çapulcu* has become a concept on the trajectory of the movement beyond the intra-functions of a collective identity for a social movement. Also,

it has been used to realise the movement's recognition and to seek support in the public sphere.

Graffito 18

Everyday I'm Chapulin



Note. (“#resistgezipark#3”, 2013).

I will examine and interpret four distinct graffiti from the pattern. Graffito 18 is a stencil combining graphic and text. The visual part depicts a defiant protester wearing a gas mask. Along with the textual part, it can be said that the word chapulin means wearing a gas mask and participating in the Gezi movement. Also, the word every day is an element that emphasises the protesters' determination and continuity of the movement. At this point, two

slightly different interpretations can be made. First, the graffiti depicts a generic protester and defines the actions of Gezi protesters with the word *chapulin*. Second, graffiti is an expression in which graffitiist depicts herself/himself and her/his experiences in terms of the movement. For both cases, *chapuling* is the name of being a protester/actor of the Gezi.

Graffito 19

Keep Calm and Çapuling



Note. Keep calm and çapuling (“#resistgezipark#8”, 2013).

Graffito 19 uses a derivation of a popular internet meme stemmed from a poster produced by the British government during World War Two, to keep the public morale high. The original poster's text was *Keep calm and carry on*, and its interesting spread has continued to this day. In 2000, Stuart Manley has found the original poster and started to sell printed copies of it. In 2007, a variety of products featuring the poster's slogan were being sold online. One year after, a textile company began to generate the slogan's witty derivatives to promote its products. In 2009, Dr Rebecca Lewis kept a blog tracking these derivatives for her doctoral thesis. In 2009, an online image generator was created, [Keep Calm-o-matic.com](http://KeepCalm-o-matic.com), which enables people to generate their own keep calm posters.

One year after, Geekiz published a compilation of eighty-five variations of the original poster (Walter K., 2010). In a couple of years, keep calm-based posters, images, products, generators, online galleries were well spread all over cyberspace. Today, the countless versions of the original slogan can be found easily on the internet such as "keep calm and drink tea" or "keep calm and call Batman". In brief, the templet of "keep calm and..." "is one of the most popular internet memes ever. Graffito 19 uses the templet in the movement's context by adding the word *çapulcu*. It can be deduced that graffito aims to persuade other protesters to continue their actions and remain calm despite the harsh conditions of the movement. Also, the graffito uses the famous templet's popularity to build and convey its meaning. The usage of this popular internet meme can be also interpreted as an indicator of the graffitist's integration with cyberspace and concordantly, as a hint that shows the scale of the movement's communicative skills. Moreover, both graffiti utilise the re-appropriated meaning of the *çapulcu* to describe the actions of Gezi protesters, but beyond they signify the collective identity revolving around the word.

Figure 7*Keep Calm and Carry On*

Note. Original Keep Calm and Carry On poster (Davison, 2014).

In graffito 20, we see the word *chapul* this time. The graffito recomposes the famous aphorism of Rene Descartes; “*Je pense donc je suis / I think, therefore I am*”. (“*Je pense donc je suis*”, n.d.). I argue that graffito 20 carries a more obvious deed for the collective identity building compared to graffito 18 and 19 because it establishes a sarcastic and humourous connection with the philosophical background it refers and describes the *chapul*, the state of being a protester of the Gezi movement, as an existential problematic. I will blend my

interpretation here humbly with Descartes' philosophical proposition. For the graffitist to be part of the movement is the sole evidence of her/his existence. Like Descartes has put forward his scepticism as the only way to be persuaded of his reasoning and therefore his existence, it can be claimed that the graffitist here presents her/his activism as the only way to be persuaded of her/his self-political reasoning and existence. Besides, I believe that this little proposition of mine gains more dimensions and meaning under the conditions of the politics polarised by the AKP government. Holding on to this interpretation, additionally and accordingly, it can be argued that the graffito has a strong connectedness with the fact that the public sphere, civil society and unconventional ways of political participation have been restricted.

Graffito 20


I Chapul, Therefore I Am. –Descartes



Note. ("Sounds on the wall", 2013).

From this point of view and through graffiti 20, I would argue that the essence and the manifestation of the *çapulcu* collective identity lie at the heart of this political/existential problem. As noted, the word *çağulcu* was used by Erdoğan to demonise and trivialise the opposition gathered around Gezi Park. The way the government responds to social opposition has been in this way throughout the entire AKP rule. Especially in the 2010s, for the emerging new actors, the political arena was strictly closed. Even the established opposition was being under heavy pressure, and Erdoğan's and his party's approach to any criticisms have been reactive, accusatory and exclusionist. Therefore, Turkish society had turned into a plane where discontent and social strain accumulated and stuck.

Before the Gezi movement, public opposition and discontent from various places, nodes and scales were high. However, because of the repression of the power, and the incompetence of the established opposition, the circumstances were not suitable to open a crack on this wall. On the other hand, grievances were being crystallised and deeply embedded in daily life such that the mobilisation was waiting to be triggered. Excluded actors were longing to exist in the political arena with their initiative. In my opinion, the Gezi movement opened cracks on the wall separating claimants from the arena of politics. Even though the institutional political arena was still closed, by infiltrating from these cracks, the opposition took the opportunity of realising and manifesting itself. This can be regarded as a short-termed solution for overcoming the barriers. Besides, the power's persistence on its approach and its accusatory language enabled the opposition to widen the cracks. With the expansion of cracks, the oppositional flows gained speed in overlapping, and they accumulated under the matter of Gezi. At this point, Erdoğan's speech and words come into play as a very striking example.

*Graffito 21**We Are Multiplying by Chapuling! [Çapularak çoğalıyoruz!]*

Note. (“Sounds on the wall”, 2013).

Within the narrowing borders of the political opportunity structures, a novel oppositional collective identity was required to give resistance to the dominant discourse. Also, this new identity should not have evoked existing political ideologies, identities, parties and movements. Otherwise, it would not be possible to bond the oppositional multiplicity gathered in Gezi Park with a collective identity. In this sense, it can be claimed that a word whose source is rival and has never been used before, the *çapulcu*, had been useful in meeting

these needs of the movement. Accumulated discontented groups and individuals generate the collective identity of *çapulcu*. The identity and its connotations worked as remedies for the existential/political problems of frustrated and excluded ones. This determination explains why *çapulcu* identity and its variants became rapidly well spread. Because it was needed.

In graffito 21, we see a textual expression that says, “We are multiplying by *chapuling*”. Regarding the example, multiple interpretations are possible to be made. First, it can be interpreted that the graffito emphasises the aggregation of a multiplicity of oppositions, claimants and actors under the *çapulcu* collective identity. Second, it can be regarded as an expression of movement’s successful diffusion indicating the causality between the process and the *çapulcu* collective identity. For graffito 21, the word *chapuling* can be understood also in different ways. First, it may have been used to express the transformation of the actors involved in the Gezi movement. Second, it may have referred to Gezi activism itself. Nevertheless, all of these different interpretations (both by wording and phrasing) indicate that acts, protests, resistances from claimants and opposition actors have been infused into the identity.

I believe that the inference that would be made here about the graffitist’s motivation was grounded by the realisation of that infusion. Association of multiply and *chapuling* words refers not only to a quantitative excess but also a multitude of actors who have clustered via the relationality of shared or similar goals, demands, values or aims. In this sense, the graffito describes the togetherness of a plurality and the connectedness rising from the relationships among the individual, the one and the other. I believe that graffito describes the phenomenon of what Hardt and Negri (2001) have detected via the concept of the multitude; the emergence of an entity as a collective action. Accordingly, graffito 21 sees the movement as a process shaped by its flow.

Çapulcu identity was appropriated by the protesters while the movement was happening and has changed the course of its narrative and framing. The ability of Gezi protesters to implement such flexible elections can be explained by the movement's networked capabilities and the fluid nature of the given identity. I would claim that the emergence and the spread of the çapulcu identity just in one day show us that the Gezi movement could alter itself rapidly. Especially in cultural contexts, it was agile enough to adapt quickly to new concepts, use them according to various topics, and reproduce them.

The graffiti pattern on the çapulcu collective identity shows how the identity was perceived by Gezi graffitists. It also reports that Gezi graffiti has been played a role in building the identity and its collective becoming. Çapulcu and its variants were satire, humorous, ambiguous and unexpected, and thus invincible and powerful. Because its source was the main opponent of the movement, it became a concept that all accumulated discontent and opposition easily appropriated. The overthrowing and trivialisation of a discourse of power was not something any protester or graffitist would object to. In this context, it is a genuine counter-narrative. Also, it has taken the form of a collective identity when the awareness of accumulated opposition and discontent was shared by the multitude. This awareness enabled this collective identity to function like an engine that constantly produces dynamism. Because the government's othering and uncompromising attitude and police violence were the fuel of this engine. Besides, it was ambiguous and original since it was not referring to any existing political and collective identities, thus it was embraced by many disconnected claimants and actors. In this way, old judgements and prejudices attached to these previously known identities were cast aside, and the multitude that could have not been generated finally could exist.

Çapulcu word had no significance before the stigmatising speech of Erdoğan. To my mind, its significance for the Gezi movement, beyond its being collectively built as a novel

identity, was its appearance as a new idea about the concept of collectivity. The greatest commonality of the Gezi multitude was being a *çapulcu*. Words like *chapulcu*, *chapuling*, *çapulmak* or *çapullamak* were used to state everything covered in Gezi activism and repertoires of action of the movement. Defending the rights, resisting against the police's disproportionate use of force, upholding pluralism and democracy, dissenting and being in solidarity were worded by these variants. The identity went far beyond describing the groups that were in cooperation and contributed in collective action during the movement, has become a consensual relation defining the movement itself. I would argue that the identity-building processes of the *çapulcu* collective identity and the phases of its dissemination can be taken under the consideration as the explanatory mechanisms of how distinct social actors can act collectively in Turkish society.

Political Jamming and Cultural Plagiarism

One pattern of the Gezi graffiti allows us to determine how graffitists were producing meaning, beyond the messages that were conveyed. During my data analysis, I have observed that many graffiti form their semantic, linguistic and/or visual constructions through culture jamming. The culture jamming is rooted in the Punk and Hippie cultures, Situationist International, Surrealism, Dadaism and Anarchism. It refers to a form of direct action whose main purpose is to challenge the dominant culture and discourse. It is a way of cultural activism and a strategy aiming to criticise capitalism by jamming (disarranging) the cultural (mostly in art and communication) products that symbolise the dominant relations and lifestyles of consumption. Through the creative methods of culture jamming, capitalist culture can be jammed in linguistic, visual or auditory dimensions, and thusly its concealed inhumane aspects become revealed (Klein, 2000; Jordan, 2002).

Figure 8*Détournement for Velazquez*

Note. Innocent X (Velazquez, 1599-1660, c. 1650); Study after Velazquez (Bacon, 1909-1992, 1950).

Guy Debord (1967/1996) is one of the thinkers who put forward the culture jamming as one of the new revolutionary processes in theory and practice. He has laid the foundation of the culture jamming with his *détournement* method. *Détournement* can be defined as “political plagiarism, distortion, a hijacking or otherwise rerouting something against itself” (Opalsky, 2013, p. 3). Debord was a member of the Situationists International, “a group of artists, writers, and social critics that aimed to eliminate capitalism through the revolutionisation of everyday life” (“Situationist International”, n. d.). Accordingly, the group has intended to create situations in which people can liberate themselves from the routines and roles imposed by capitalism (Erdoğan, 2008, p. 39). Culture jammers of today see themselves as successors to Situationists International, and they use similar techniques. They

capture the presented cultural and aesthetic elements, reverse or reproduce them, and resubmit them to the public sphere where the dominant culture lingers, to convey their radical or oppositional messages (Carducci, 2006).

For Debord (1967/1996), *détournement* is a concept that emerged from the oppressive conditions to destroy them, and it is a part of a revolutionary project. It has two primary features. First, every distorted or twisted item becomes insignificant and sometimes loses its original meaning. Second, these items become reorganised around a new meaning. The power of the *détournement* comes from the coexistence and intertwining of the old and new meanings. Its target is the society of the spectacle and the imposed ways of socialisation. The spectacle covers the entire life in modern societies, function as a set of social relations, and brings together all aspects and consciousness as part of society. Also, it presents all the ideal social processes produced by the power or the system, which are expected to be perceived as reality, and it produces itself from this dynamic. It forms a world by being objectified, and the objective world is recurrently transformed into spectacles and images (Debord, 1967/1996, pp. 14-15). The society of the spectacle refers to a situation in which modern societies are not engaged in the productive processes but the production processes are constantly verified (Debord, 1967/1996, p. 15). The spectacle's relation with capitalism defines the main production of contemporary society as an advanced economic sector that directly shapes the growing number of image-objects. On the other hand, *détournement* turns the spectacle upside down and ceases the spectacle's invasion opportunistically by changing its form to say what it wants to say.

Similarly, culture jamming aims to expand and bend the existing ideological and cultural narrowness and tries to enable people to recognise other lines of reasoning different from the rationality imposed by the dominant narrative. Culture jamming can take various forms for various conditions. It appears in unexpected moments and spaces; it interferes with

the spectacle and with its rhizomatic and disruptive nature; it aims to poison the dominant narrative. It brings the power into question and bends the rules. It is radical, and it embraces guerrilla creativity and autonomy. As Lambert-Beatty (2010, p. 102) has noted, culture jamming has a deep common history with graffiti, media mischief, activism and art. It can embody the cultural form of anti-capitalism or a situation for a social movement. It has increased its power significantly with the development of information and communication technologies. In the contemporary sense, culture jamming often manifests itself as a form of cultural activism and anti-propaganda. It provides a new cultural opportunity to resist and oppose the reality of the previous century which struggle with dogmatism. Besides, it is a social struggle in its own right, and it reveals an alternative political program in the name of social change (Irzik, 2010, p. 137). Culture jammers try to sabotage the public sphere and stop the reception in communication. They act to overthrow the power, and hijack artistic and creative products and their contributions to the reconstruction of the society, and incorporate them into a radical political agenda. They create impediments for capitalist presentations. Culture jammers often practice actions such as changing billboards, parodying television commercials, and mocking websites. It can be argued that they implement what Umberto Eco calls the *semiotic guerrilla warfare* (Eco, 1986). Briefly, culture jammers try to disrupt the cultural impressions of the society of the spectacle where culture and power, image and reality are inseparably clustered, and to reintroduce the reality by pushing activism into the confusion.

Before I examine the graffiti of the pattern, it would be convenient to give an example from one of the most famous culture jamming acts. In this way, I believe the context of the concept will become more evident for the Gezi graffiti. An advertising campaign, which was started for Apple Inc. in 1997, has inspired one of the best-known culture jamming acts. The slogan of the campaign was 'think different'. During this campaign, photographs of famous

and successful artists, scientists and visionaries were used on the billboards along with the campaign slogan and the company's logo. The campaign was focusing only on branding; therefore, there were no products on billboards or posters. Albert Einstein, Bob Dylan, Martin Luther King, Jr. Richard Branson, John Lennon, Amelia Earhart, Dalai Lama and Pablo Picasso were among these visionaries that took place in these billboards (Paris, 2011). Billboard Liberation Front, a culture-jammer artist group, has transformed these billboards as shown in the figures. In figure 9, we see that the slogan of the billboard with Amelia Earhart's photo is changed from *think different* to *think doomed* (Segal, 2011). In figure 10, we see another example of jamming that changes the slogan of the billboard with Dalai Lama into, *think disillusioned* ("Think disillusioned", 1998). Gezi graffitiists have used recurrently culture jamming.

Figure 9

Think Doomed



Note. (Segal, 2010).

*Figure 10**Think Disillusioned*

Note. (Segal, 2010).

Graffito 22 uses the longest-running advertising slogan of McDonald's, the worldwide known fast-food chain (Hogan, 2016). The slogan belongs to a campaign that began in 2003; it was still in use in 2013 when the movement emerged. 'İşte bunu seviyorum' was the Turkey version of the original slogan; 'I'm lovin it'. An advertising slogan can be considered as a communicative product presented by a brand to the public sphere to achieve success in marketing. The graffito hijacks that product copies its slogan and places it on a wall as a textual graffito, near a barricade. It is a clear culture jamming that changes the slogan's space and context. The capitalist logic becomes jammed by the transposition of the slogan and is manifested as a graffito. Graffito 22 can be interpreted in three different overlapping layers.

Graffito 22

I'm Lovin It [İşte Bunu Seviyorum]



Note. (“#resistgezipark#”, 2013).

First, the graffito benefits from its familiarity to attract the audiences’ attention. Therefore, the graffito becomes catchy, as an advertising slogan would be. Second, graffito detaches the slogan from its context and the spectacle and put links it with the context of the movement that dignifies a distinct logic from the market economy. It can be argued that the emerging grotesque and inharmoniousness amplify the graffito’s reach and intensity. Thus, it becomes striking. Third, the graffito expresses the graffitist’s perspective about what was going on. Graffitist by jamming and hijacking the famous slogan states her/his affirmation for

the movement. For the society of the spectacle, the original slogan emphasises that the product is something to be loved. On the wall, the jammed slogan emphasises that the movement and the situation that came in view during the movement become the things to be loved.

Graffito 23

Tayyip Winter is Coming



Note. (2013, June 1) (Graffito on the far left of the image) Photograph taken by the author.

Graffito 23 addresses Prime Minister Erdoğan by using another popular cultural element. 'Winter is coming' is the name of the first episode of the worldwide known medieval fantasy television series Game of Thrones. Also, is the motto of House Stark that expresses vigilance, caveat and constant alertness. Because in this fantasy world, winters may last for long years and they bring with them many dangers. The motto has also another meaning in the world of Game of Thrones. It is a warning for the enemies of House Stark, whose

members are the main protagonists of the story. When their enemies die, the members of the house say *winter came*. Briefly, the phrase refers to a great danger approaching slowly and its target should stay on the alert (“Winter is Coming”, n.d.).

Graffitiist takes the motto, jams it by adding Erdoğan’s first name, and targets Erdoğan. In this way, the motto’s meaning in the series is transferred to the movement’s political context. The graffiti alleges that a great danger is approaching Erdoğan and threatens him. In other words, in graffiti 23, the movement takes the place of winters. Hence, it can be claimed that the graffiti jams a cultural/popular product by changing its context and textual structure to convey its message.

Graffito 24

Gas Me Baby One More Time



Note. (“Let’s resist Turkey”, 2013).

Graffito 24 jams a popular pop song; 'hit me baby one more time'. The song was the debut single by American singer Britney Spears, released in 1999, and it became one of the bestselling singles of all time. As expected, the song has no political connotations (Denham, 2016; Hunt, 2018). The graffito takes the name of this hit single and alters its first word. Instead of the word hit, it uses the gas word and refers to the disproportionate use of pepper gas during the movement. It can be said that graffito appeals to the police and produces a sarcastic and provocative message with culture jamming. It criticises the violence and simultaneously provokes the police force to use pepper gas again as if it does not affect protesters. Also, it may be evaluated as a sign of a will that aims to create an intra-emotional cement that would revolve around bravery, obstinacy and resistance. As other examples above, graffito 24 enjoys the familiarity and popularity of the original cultural product that jammed by graffitist.

The graffiti pattern uses the techniques of culture jamming to generate content and construct meanings, although the examples' contexts and messages vary. It plagiarises, distorts and transforms cultural products that normally resonate with the society of the spectacle, diverts them for different purposes. Also, the pattern exploits the strengths of these products such as popularity, recognition and generality to be impactful since the reconstruction or re-contextualisation of these familiar cultural products in unexpected ways, creates a high level of resonance among audiences. Culture jamming of Gezi graffiti weaves a satirical fabric enabling desired notions to be perceived by audiences.

Besides, in some ways, the pattern differs from the familiar examples of culture jamming. First, it doesn't change the cultural products physically. It appears as graffiti and happens in a semantic field. Graffiti of the pattern capture the mottos, slogans, phrases associated with tangible cultural products that can be named on their own as cultural

products. To put it differently, they jam the ideas behind these products and use their jammed versions.

Second, the pattern does not reroute these cultural products against themselves, as is often seen in the culture jamming. Instead, it directs them to the various incarnations of the power such as Erdoğan and the police or it uses them to express an opinion concerning the ongoing situation. Therefore, it would be not convenient to argue that the culture jamming graffiti of Gezi is directly against the society of the spectacle or capitalist production of culture. It would be more accurate to say that the Gezi graffiti uses culture jamming to produce abstract cultural counter products under the course of the movement. Although the basic forming logic is the same with widespread culture jamming, it involves only specific aims and acts, which can be meaningful in the context of the movement. Gezi graffiti artists have used culture jamming as a method of graffiti practising, but graffiti were not practised to perform culture jamming. Culture jamming was used to benefit from its fertile textual capabilities and high semantic conductivity.

Deliberate Political Void

As I discussed and examined in the second chapter at length, characteristics of the protesters and the diversity of the repertoire of action have led the scholars to analyse the Gezi movement as an indicator of the emergence of a social and political newness.

Paradoxically, the newness is generally associated with the uniqueness of the movement and explained with the obsolescent categories, definitions and causalities. It can be argued that the identification of this newness has been one of the main endeavours of the scholarship so far. The unique occurrence of the movement, de novo communicational mechanisms among its constituents, its unexpected slogans and its success in getting support from various and disparate segments of society have made many debates revolve around a single phenomenon;

the *Gezi spirit*. Gezi spirit is been dealt with, analysed and interpreted frequently, and it is possible to say that the motivations of these efforts are highly justified and most of the analyses are elucidator within their perspectives. However, I criticize these analyses, for being conducted to make the Gezi movement and its multiplicity understandable as fast and easy as possible. In other words, they find in Gezi what they want to find. Also, the preference for a vague term like spirit does not contribute to the genuine inferences of the movement's ambiguity, since these studies stipulate that it is required to produce a meta-explanation about the social transformations taking place in Turkey and the world. On the other hand, there is an unnecessary desire to find a consensus on the answers that explain what happened during the movement. I believe it would be not logical to think that this consensus can/should ever be achieved.

In my opinion, the Gezi movement includes many authentic narratives about the various layers of social formation and points out to a dead-end, for the established ways of doing politics. The movement has generated many performances and expressions through bodies, graffiti, art, forums, social media posts, slogans, barricades, the occupation and the resistance, and it has provided an abundance of data about itself. Also, it was a movement obsessed with expressing itself outside the box.

However, most of the Gezi analyses cannot deliver themselves from inflexible borders of their ideological backgrounds and preconceived opinions. Is there a Gezi spirit? What does it mean? What has happened in Gezi? What does it mean for Turkey? Ideologies, readings, frames or narratives are instrumentalised to answer these questions, and my claim can be crosschecked through uncreative iterations of these analyses. Besides, as far as I can deduce from Gezi graffiti, at least the graffitists of the movement did not describe the movement in this way, and they did not like such efforts. Explanations for the Gezi spirit are stuck between dichotomies like religious/secular, left-wing/right-wing, centre/periphery.

I should also note that most of the efforts that attempt to analyse the movement and to reveal the spirit of Gezi are not based on empirical data. In this section, I will try to contribute to these efforts through my interpretations of a single graffiti that expresses the uniqueness of the Gezi in its way. Thus, I will make inferences about a graffiti practice of a Gezi graffitist and try to base my arguments on data as a representer of one of the categories that make up my grounded theory. Graffito 25 has a kind of content that can contribute to socio-political evaluations about the movement and analyses about its aims. Also, it has a facilitative form for the efforts of describing what the Gezi movement was about. This graffiti pattern involves one of the most famous graffiti from the movement. Besides, it sums up precisely the approach of the movement to politics in Turkey with its ambiguity. The particular semantic flavour of graffiti 25 can be found slightly in many graffiti; however, this one is the prime example. Among its counterparts, the graffiti has been seen mostly as a unique example of the Gezi humour and political apathy. I think it offers much more than that for interpretations. Also, the graffiti has been discussed already many times from the perspective of political humour, as many analyses do consider the Gezi movement (Dağtaş, 2016; Değer, 2015; Çolak, 2013). Graffito 25 contains clues about the protesters' view of politics. Prior to trying to collect these clues, I believe that it is necessary to focus on apoliticism because it implies a certain level of political detachment and encountering analyses arguing that the Gezi was the political movement of the apoliticals, is not an uncommon thing.

Being apolitical is defined as being “not interested in or connected with politics or being not connected to any political party” (“Apolitical”, n.d.). However, many factors, resources, opportunities or cultural formations may cause political apathy. One should take under the consideration the fact that a low level of political participation does not indicate automatically apoliticism. Because politics may also take place outside the political area

directed by the institutions, the state, and the other controlled structures. Thusly being practically distant from this area may not be always related to being apolitical.

Scholarship on apoliticism is mainly related to youth, and it is shown that the interest of youth in institutional politics, voting and participation in political parties is gradually decreasing. It is also stated that the activism of young people in the conventional political systems are in decrease and they distance themselves from politics (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Benedicto, 2008; Phelps, 2005; Pirie & Worcester, 1998). Although these tendencies occur in almost every segment of societies, in the case of young people, they become chronic (Sloam, 2007). Studies on apoliticism can be divided into two main groups. The first group investigates the causes of apoliticism, and the second group tries to explore new channels that are used by young people for political purposes. Additionally, some studies suggest that we should deepen what we understand from apoliticism (O'Toole, Marsh & Jones, 2003). Differently, some studies emphasise that apoliticism emerges due to awareness rather than deprivation or indifference (Hill & Robinson, 2002). Adsett (2003) argued that the shift from social justice to neoliberalism in the West has distanced the youth from politics. Some researchers also considered the phenomenon not as alienation of young people, but as the distantness of established structures and processes towards young people (Sloam, 2007). In recent studies, it is claimed that apoliticism arises from their changing relations with politics, not from young people's political disinterest (Tanyaş, 2015). Overall, it has been determined that modern conventional political praxis such as voting, political party membership or watching news are not so essential for the youth. On the contrary, young people are more interested in the non-conventional praxis; such as political consumption, boycotts, protests or occupations (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Inglehart, 1990; Dalton, 2008; Norris, 2004). In post-industrial societies emancipatory political participation, individual needs and experiences are essential for politics.

In Turkey, the relationship between apoliticism and the youth has been frequently explained under the conditions of the post-1980-military coup period (Bayhan, 2015). According to the common perspective, before this period, the youth in Turkey was always politically active, and the bearer of certain political agendas from the early republic period until the military coup. However, the coup fractured the social fabric, and de-politicisation and apoliticism of the youth have begun along with other segments of the society. Lksl (2008) noted that especially in the 1990s, the youth was described with such expressions; the apolitical youth of the coup, the useless generation of the consumer society, the generation of impassivity. Besides, two pieces of research conducted by Erdoğan (2010) and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (1999) have demonstrated that showed that young people agree with these findings. Within this perspective, it can be said that the relationship between Turkish youth and politics was reduced to occasional voting. Besides these broadly scaled researches, participatory-focused studies have been carried out too to reveal the relationship of Turkish youth with politics. For example, Lüküslü (2008) drew attention to preferences as the reason for the youth becoming apoliticised. According to her, the youth in Turkey does not trust the political system and sees political institutions as authoritarian structures that do not listen to their grievances. Also, Oktar (2001) has determined three barriers to the political participation of the youth in Turkey; the family, the education and the state policies. He named this triangular structure of controlling the iron triangle and asserted that it was created to punish those who wanted to change the country. Additionally, another explanation of rising apoliticism among Turkish youth regards the events before the coup and coup itself as social and political traumas. These traumas have been constantly reproduced and remembered in society, and that caused young people to stay away from politics. Also, in some studies scrutinising political parties, it is found that the hierarchy is very rigid and the demands of the young people are not heard. They can only be objects of politics. Even in ruling parties, the

biggest achievement for young people is to obtain some positions at the outer borders of the power cluster (Yılmaz, 2010; Caymaz, 2008). Briefly, studies on the matter of apoliticism in the youth show that the phenomenon is rising and spreading both in Turkey. Moreover, significant portions of young people in Turkey agree with this assessment. However, the limited data obtained through the researches on the Gezi movement is incompatible with this general picture about the youth in Turkey. According to KONDA, 50% of those who took part in the Gezi movement was under the age of twenty-five (KONDA, 2014) Also, for 50% of the protesters, Gezi was the first collective action they took part in (Kılıç, 2013). Considering this information, it would be not accurate to define the relationship between the youth and the politics in Turkey by an ordinary justification that refers to the apoliticism (Alev, 2013; Erkmén, 2013; Nigiz 2013).

Scholars discuss the apoliticism of the Gezi protesters from different perspectives. For example, according to the ethnographic study by Arda (2015) that examined Gezi from the perspective of the public sphere, one of the most important achievements of the movement was that it has avoided the leadership of a single leader. Because being apolitical enables us to break away from the dominance of the capitalist system, and activism must rise from the area branded as apolitical against the expansion of the police state. Therefore, the political begins with the apolitical. Also, Sarfati (2015) has claimed that describing the Gezi youth as apolitical would be wrong because it has politicised the practices of everyday life (politics of presence) instead of participating in the conventional praxis of politics. On the contrary, for Dağtaş, (2016) Gezi protesters belong to a generation that has been described as apolitical youth. This generation involves people who are born during the 1980s and 1990s, and they grew up in a world, in which the consumer culture and new communication technologies dominate life. This generation can be described as a generation with a high level of technical skills and poor intellectual and ideological basis. Contrarily, Bakçay (2017) claimed that Gezi

youth was political. For her, after the 1990s young people have lost their belief in Turkish democracy since the political institutions cannot respond to their worldviews. That was the origin of the Gezi movement's apoliticism and it has changed the expectations and trajectory of the opposition in Turkey. Within this change, horizontal organisations have emerged and the opposition has been levelled up to a transnational scale. In the Gezi movement, young people mobilised because of their distrust of the political parties and unions. Also, for the same reasons, Gezi youth alienated itself from the established opposition that pursues the agreed-upon frameworks to seize the power (Bakçay, 2017). Konoşlu (2013) has suggested an alternative explanation and alleged that the Gezi youth has become politicised by creating a new language of politics. This politicisation was not caused by an external, imposed consciousness. Ongoing struggle and recognition shaped by the daily practices of the movement, resistance and occupation were always there, like a thin political membrane that covers all actions. Erkmen (2013) linked the formation of the movement to political reasons and asserted that the Gezi movement was not about demands or criticisms targeted on the established conditions of the political system. It was the movement's genuine desire to redefine politics and political action. In this way, the movement created a potential that could affect the political area and culture of politics.


Following this summary about the apoliticism amongst the youth and the related evaluations made to understand the Gezi movement, one more point must be underlined before making inferences about the graffiti. Cultural indicators are valuable to make meaningful and accurate determinations on behalf of politics. Cultural politics encapsulates the cognitive, emotional and moral dimensions of politics, and it emphasises the meaning and interactions (Jasper, 2010). Accordingly, it is not possible to evaluate apoliticism or political apathy separately from culture, and thus, there is a culture of apoliticism. Moreover, individual actors are important for social movements, their individual experiences and

perspectives play decisive roles in the formation of groups. The motivations of individuals contain clues to producing new analytical categories related to the social formation (Castells, 2013b). From this point of view, I will try to interpret the graffiti for such a purpose.

Graffiti 25 contains a simple textual expression: Down with some things. This expression is a derivative of a popular slogan that is frequently used by the political left in Turkey and the world; down with fascism. Also, according to the different contexts, the slogan changes its frames and targets. At first glance, the graffiti seems like an expression of political apathy. The first word of the text is directly copied from our popular slogan. However, graffiti is completed with *bağzı şeyler* (some things) and constitutes the punch line. The significance of the graffiti is harboured in the wording of *some things*, and the explanation of this importance depends on the discussion of that *someness*.

Graffiti 25

Down with Som Things [Kahrolsun Bağzı Şeyler]



Note. (2013, June 9) Photograph taken by the author.

It can be accepted that the graffito protests with the *kahrolsun* (down with) part since it uses the same element of our well-known slogan to do it. Also, it benefits from the introductory connotations of the original slogan. However, it is the expression of some things that creates the unique meaning of graffito. I will interpret the someness in multiple ways.

First, it can be thought that this phrase implies that many things should go down about politics. It is an ambiguous phrase, so it can be filled with any actor, concept or situation that is meaningful in terms of the context of the movement. Nevertheless, I am intended to keep the political context because of the first part of the text. Thus, it can be filled with anything meaningful in terms of politics. Second, graffito can be also seen as an ambiguous rejection of the current political praxis. Third, it is also possible to determine that the graffito rejects all the political familiarities and highlights the necessity of a new political understanding.

In my opinion, the use of some things was intentional, and it did not stem from the political apathy or the limited political arguments of the graffitist. I assume that the intention was about an effort aiming to ignore and discard all hierarchical, established structures of the politics and political discourses because it generates a phrase to create a floating signifier that can absorb any concept that must be crippled according to its logic.

Besides, the word of *bağzı* was deliberately misspelt. The correct spelling of the word is *bazı*, meaning some. It is very hard to recreate the same purview in English it can be imagined that the word of some is written deliberately as som. This is a common spelling mistake in Turkish. Also, in social media people deliberately do such mistakes to create a humorous language in Turkey, as in every country. These jokes of misspelling have some virality in cyberspace, and the graffito seems to operate a similar humorous mechanism. It creates also disdain through that humorous orthographic disruption, and that can be interpreted as the left was despised since the original version of the text belongs to that wing.

Also, twisting this popular and powerful slogan in this unusual way can be considered as disdain.

To my mind, the disdain is factual, and the graffito criticises the political left for being inefficacious to catch the novel forms of antagonism, emergent demands and grievances. One can also assert that the original slogan, down with fascism, has lost its effect since it has been used frequently for a very long time. Nevertheless, the graffito pointedly indicates the movement's unconnectedness with the political left by taking advantage of the popularity of the original slogan. Besides, I would claim that the graffito, beyond its criticism, points out a different political approach that emerged from Gezi Park. Therefore, graffito's attempt may not be seen as just a smart transformation of an old slogan to generate a catchy novel slogan. That may be regarded as a new way to build political discourses.

Graffito can also be interpreted in terms of political communication. In a conventional sense, political messages should be precise and understandable as required by the rules of communication. However, graffito 25 does not follow these rules and blurs its meaning. It can be argued that this opted ambiguousness is used to allow viewers to shape their personalised messages or slogans. In this way, audiences become able to generate their meanings by embedding their grievances, claims or demands to the graffito via the some things. Thus, political trajectories, connotations and messages to be expressed are formed during communication. There are no prefabricated messages here to be transmitted. In other words, the communicative process is not completed until the receiver contributes to the formation of the message. I believe that two interrelated inferences can be made here. First, the Gezi movement did not have any clear political agenda. It was a multiplicity of the opposing individuals and groups. The ambiguity was generated not to offend actors who are likely to join the movement. Also, if social movements do not have concrete goals, they are difficult to be grasped and disrupted by power and counter-movements.

Second, Gezi was a movement of denial and remonstrance against all political actors that pursue their specific agendas. Therefore, it avoided using the recruitment methods of these actors and gave messages per its horizontal structure. That can be also regarded as an embracing political approach that notices the importance of relations and thus enables the formation of a multiplicity of actors. These two interpretations are interrelated because they both show the importance the graffiti places on political actors and their political influence.

In terms of communication science, this can be described as a strategic mistake or a passive tactic. However, I believe that it shows the worth attributed to counter and potential actors. The graffiti states that identifying the Gezi spirit is difficult. Besides, it does not matter what things need to go down, stay on the surface, or rise into the air. On the contrary, the important thing is the counter-hegemonic potential corroding the pillars of the established politics within this discursive struggle.

I argue that graffiti 25 is not showing any sign of apoliticism. Nevertheless, it can be seen as an example of being anti-political. It draws a line that should be crossed. On that line, a new political emerges and is undertaken by the anti-politicals. It can be alleged that this novel way of *anti-political political discourse* belongs to the youth, however, it is not possible to confirm that via the graffiti. Besides, it can be claimed that the graffiti is about the youthfulness of this political understanding, which makes the multiplicity possible. Some things allow the flows to cluster and the multiplicity is formed in its being; therefore, it does not embrace aforethought slogans. The variety of the actors of the movement has formed a multiplicity to make the movement possible and maintained. Without the ever-gathering flows, it would not survive under the repression of AKP. Through this experience, a need for a new political program came to exist. The graffiti can be seen as the outcome of this circumstance and a discussion on the political possibilities in the name of the Gezi multiplicity.

Briefly, the graffiti uses an old political slogan frame to criticise both institutional and contentious politics. It shows there is a deep chasm between the dominant political praxis and the multiplicity of the Gezi movement. Moreover, it can be said that some of the activists decided not to have a clear path, program or strategy, on behalf of the multiplicity.

Categories and relationships orientated by class conflicts, economic conditions, political opportunity structures or the exchange of resources can be useful to analyse the movement. However, none of them can absorb the movement as a multiplicity of the various partial flows. For that reason, these kinds of evaluations on the multiplicity of the movement are insufficient since they are not compatible with ambiguous and fluid symptoms that are not stemming from the rational actors' motivations. Furthermore, when the movement expresses itself in its ways such as graffiti 25, because of that incompatibility analyses cannot go beyond reducing the data to apoliticism or humour. In my opinion, the graffiti emits a political satire indicating a blind alley for the movement, and it is about how this multiplicity will pass beyond the Gezi movement and will evolve.

Gezi movement cannot be described as the politicisation of apoliticals because what happened in the node is the discovery of a formation in which multiple and distinct forms of participation can occur. Gezi protesters have become familiar with these new forms and learned how to make them popular in original ways, and perhaps they have also developed new practices and definitions for politics. Describing the movement as the process of politicisation of apoliticals confines the arguments into generic understandings and trying to clarify the intentional ambiguity may obscure the essentiality.

Analysing a social phenomenon like the Gezi movement with immutable and inflexible lenses may lead us to ignore relationships, processes, and trajectories. The emergence of a social movement revolving around political apathy does not show that it is

apolitical. Also, a social movement can be simultaneously political, apolitical and anti-political. Social movements acquire these qualities according to the places giving birth to the flows that constitute them.

Material Truth Generated in Virtual Reality

Gezi graffiti frequently mention and use various video games or the gaming culture to generate their narratives. Also, according to the data, many Gezi graffitists are gamers. I considered these graffiti as a pattern because of its frequency of occurrence and its convenience in terms of the grounded theory I try to establish. The most striking graffiti of the pattern mention Grand Theft Auto (GTA) game. Accordingly, I will interpret such a graffiti in this section, which I believe contains all the features and functions of the pattern. To this end, first of all, I will try to explain what kind of games GTA games are.

GTA is the name of a series of games, which is released by Rockstar Games, designed as open-world simulations, containing sub-sections designed with architectures of other game types such as action-adventure, driving, role-playing and racing. Open world games do not offer players linear and structured gameplay. Instead, players act in a virtual world mechanics where they can discover the objectives of the game (Sefton, 2008). Most GTA games have certain levels of open-world game features (Moss, 2017). Every GTA game is focused on a different protagonist who tries to rise in the crime world, and side/secondary characters usually betray the protagonist or her/his family to stop the progress of the main character. Because of their plots, GTA games consist high level of violence, and the common feature of all GTA games is the criticism of American culture or the concept of the American Dream with black humour (De Vane & Squire, 2008). Besides, GTA games take place in imaginary cities such as Liberty City or Vice City that resemble cities in the United States such as New York or Los Angeles. GTA games simulate modern urban life through their rhetoric. In GTA

games, gamers take various assignments from important people of the crime world to proceed in the story. Killing and many other high crimes are major actions and dynamics for game mechanics. Also, it would be convenient to say that the main narrative of GTA games is based on a contemporary dystopia. However, they do not just present this dystopia to gamers, they also simulate it and aim to absorb players into this simulation and virtual reality (Ruch, 2012). In this way, gamers not only play these games but also become immersed in them. The immersion occurs through dynamic and interactive experiences in the framework of meaningful fiction.

Graffito 26

You Have Taunted the Generation Who Beat Cops in GTA! [GTA'da Polis Döven Nesle Sataştın!]



Note. ("The laughter revolution", 2013).

As Belk, (2013) has noted, video games present alternative concepts based upon the individualised relations between virtual and material realities. Through these concepts, it is possible to discover what kind of experience the transitions of the players between these two realities lead to (Boellstorff, 2008; Kendall, 2002; Kirkpatrick, 2013).

Video games are generally categorised by two distinct fundamental categories; those that reconstruct real-life and those present different fictional fantasy worlds (Galloway, 2004). These categories become intertwined in GTA games. They present to gamers cities that do not exist in material reality, and the rules that take the source from the material world are stretched for the protagonist. For example, gamers, as protagonists, can open fire to civilians or cops without having troubles, because the interval between being in the prison and being back on the streets is just one second, or for a GTA gamer, being dead and revived again is a matter of one click. Briefly, these games offer their players capabilities and circumstances that would not be possible in material reality. On the other hand, cities and stories in the games strongly refer to the material world. For example, Liberty City, which takes place in six GTA games, openly resembles New York City. Also, while playing the game, gamers act with concepts and motivations such as money, power, politics or corruption, which are directly related to the reality of the material world. The game consists of chapters where realistic conditions are imposed and allows gamers to play again these chapters in case of failure. In GTA games, graphical, spatial and social interactions happen in a simulation, and this simulation simulates the material reality (Ruch, 2012). Also, they consist of various mediums that have various logics within an open game world. The simulation serves as a conceptual adhesive that keeps these different artefacts and mediums together, and; it operates similarly to material reality (Ruch, 2012).

In my opinion, graffito 26 associates gaming with political activism. Therefore, first, I will examine the relationships between the play, the game and the politics. Because video

games as all games include some features of the play as an “open-ended territory in which make-believe and world-building are crucial factors”. Even if they are “confined areas that challenge the interpretation and optimising of rules and tactics” (Walther, 2003, para. 1).

According to Huizinga, (1949/1980) The play not only shapes the culture but also makes up its essence. It is significant for many various phenomena such as war, belief, language, art and politics. However, the play exists for itself. It is independent of daily life as a pleasurable and safe activity. I believe that the concept of the magic circle developed by Johan Huizinga (1949/1980) may provide a perspective that would depict the graffito’s relation both with virtual and material realities. Because as all play, video games are “temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act apart” (Huizinga, 1949/1980, p. 10), and the graffito is simultaneously about GTA games and the Gezi movement. I argue that graffito 26 expresses a transposition between visual and material realities whose outcome is a form of political action. Also, the magic circle explains where the play starts, what needs to be done to join the game, how a play can be designed. Therefore, I believe, it would be possible to trace the interaction between virtual and material reality with the view provided by the concept, in terms of the pattern.

Each play is an isolated space with its own special rules, which players must obey, and the magic circle expresses the threshold that differentiates the play and the non-play. In the magic circle, normal rules of sense-making and behaviour are suspended (Moore, 2011), and different moral contexts may reign even confirming abusive and violent behaviours (Huizinga, 1949/1980). In the magic circle, players partially or completely cease disbelief and their immersion in the play increases (Coleridge, 2013). The existence of the players becomes absorbed into the play, and existing definitions and components of their interpretations become disconnected from the reality of everyday life (Coomans & Timmermans, 1997). The magic circle concept is focused on the relationships between the

play and the non-play or the game and the non-game. So, it can be also utilised to explain the relationships between material and virtual realities. At this point, I find that the approach coined by Shields, (2003) which is not based on fixed distinctions and examines the relations between inside and outside of the magic circle is explanatory. Shields (2003) has reformulated the relations between material and virtual reality. According to him, whether abstract or tangible, everything can be both virtual and material. I will try to explain Shield's view through some ratiocinations related to the Gezi graffiti:

Ideals, expectations and imagery of a Gezi graffitist may be considered outside of the limits of the material reality as long as they cannot be realised. However, they cannot be regarded as disconnected from the material reality because even though they are confined in virtual reality, in an abstract plane in which the objective reality and abstractions are blended to generate narratives about how the material reality should be, they may cause concrete changes. Because, just like graffiti 26, they can appear as material changes or effects that result from the abstract plane. The same relationship can occur in the opposite direction. That is, the conditions of material reality can present the essential elements that play a role in the structuring of the virtual reality plane. The materialisation of virtuality and the virtualisation of materiality (such as video games) can be part of processes that affect each other and highlight the functions of the magic circle. For example, a Gezi graffiti, as seen in previous patterns, can criticise the material reality in which trees of the Gezi Park are cut down, through a narrative based upon its virtual reality in which the trees need not be cut.

Media contents and products, such as GTA games, blur the boundaries of the magic circle (Baudrillard, 1984) and allow the intertwining of these realities. Also, blurring the boundaries of the magic circle is the essence of the game pleasure (Salen & Zimmerman, 2003), because pleasure arises from the knowledge that the border is or would be passed.

Magic circle extends into the material world and has a permeable structure (Bogost, 2008; Castronova, 2005), and this permeability allows gamers to travel between realities and transfer their experiences (Calleja, 2010). Therefore, a game is an organic structure that constantly evolves and causes interaction (Nieuwdrop, 2005).

How does a gamer become politically active under the influence of these permeable conditions? How a gamer become a protester? According to Castronova (2005), gamers inevitably carry their behavioural inferences and attitudes beyond the borders of the magic circle. Therefore, their evaluations about both virtual and material realities become interweaved. This enables the emerging of an identity transformation, which changes constantly. After a certain point, gamers cease to remind themselves that the virtual world is a fictional product. Permeable structure of the magic circle increases chances of possibilities for identity formation processes of gamers (Denegri-Knott & Molesworth, 2010). Besides, technological developments in game design have changed gaming practices. Nowadays, gamers are capable to be part of the virtual realities of the games, rather than owning or consuming them. Rules, values, results and actions that games stipulate have to be accepted and followed by gamers to enjoy them. Thus, being a part of a game may affect politically gamers' continuous identity-building processes because they may involve political notions (Gee, 2003; Juul, 2003). In video games, various outcomes are assigned to various objectives that assigned various values. So, gamers can exhibit various political stances in games because of the magic circle. These virtual political practices may resonate strongly in material reality, even the players do not have genuine experiences as political activists. Political actions experienced in virtual reality can create, change or deepen the gamers' political perceptions (Bogost, 2006). Briefly, a gamer can encounter the representations of the political reality of the material world in the games and can establish meaningful connections with the socio-political contexts of the material reality (Demirbağ-Kaplan & Kaplan-Öz, 2017).

Shields (2003) has pointed out that in the space where these meaningful connections are established and virtual and material realities hybridised the boundaries between the production and consumption, the work and the leisure, the hegemon and the ruled become permeable, and the permeability between the game and the non-game can be explained via the concept of liminoid coined by Turner (1974). Liminoid is derived from the liminality that refers to one phase of rites of passage (van Gennep, 1960, p.11). Van Gennep (1960) has examined the rites of passage in three different phases; separation, liminality and re-aggregation. The phase of separation defines the detachment of the individual from previous statuses or identities. Liminality is a phase in which the person left the old status but has not yet reached the new status, and re-aggregation refers to the phase in which the transition from one status to another is symbolically completed (Turner, 1974, p. 77).

Liminality describes a state of the passage of individuals or groups to transcendence in rituals or some dramatic occasions, mostly in pre-industrial societies. State of self-transcendence and being between the separation and re-aggregation involve a transformation. Additionally, the concept of liminoid is similar to liminality, but it refers to like experiences in industrial society. It provides opportunities for playful and extraordinary experiences to infiltrate into everyday life in industrialised societies. Travelling to remote countries or visiting amusement parks can be given as examples of liminoid experiences. Abnormal, strange or extraordinary behaviours observed at carnivals, festivals, parades or other rites of passage are caused by the liminoid (Turner, 1974). Because people leave their status and identities immanent in their ordinary lives in such experiences and events, and for a while, they are free from the obligation to act under these statuses and identities. Liminoid activities are not compulsory and allow individuals to express themselves flexibly. In this context, it can be said that the concept of liminoid expresses extraordinary activities in industrial societies that occur within a framework not related to religion (Horn, 2010; Korg, 1995;

Illouz, 1997). Virtual reality experiences and video games may enable liminoid experiences to happen (Shields, 2003). Gamers, since they can be immersed by games on the other side of the magic circle, may cease to act under their status or identities in the material reality. Also, collective actions, protests and some phases of social movements can be described as liminoid experiences because actors can abandon ordinary attitudes and perceptions that are embedded in their status and identities. They may enter another reality, which can provide transcendent experiences. Collective actions and protests, like games, have their own game-like rules that participators must obey to maintain the process. Therefore, it is possible to allege that street protests, which are an integral part of social movements, also have a liminoid structure. Street protests are playful and have characteristics of being outside of ordinary everyday life (Bruner, 2005).

So far, to reach a fruitful level of interpretation on graffito 26, I remarked the transitivity between the virtual reality (where GTA is experienced as a game) and the material reality (where the GTA-related graffito is produced). Also, I mentioned that both gaming and activism are inherently convenient for liminoid experiences in which individuals or groups may abandon the established contexts, statuses and identities. In this way, I tried to explain the psycho-sociological basis that the graffito pattern arises. Now, I will try to reveal the performative connectedness between being a gamer and a graffitist.

Games are nonviolent actions that are taken to get the power in virtual reality and they offer new perspectives for social relations (Shepard, 2009), they may make resistance or participation possible. Also, in games, a certain level of performance has to be delivered because they include tasks to be done. In multi-player games, (some GTA games are multi-player games) this performativity should be supported with various forms of cooperation and organisation. Otherwise, missions cannot be accomplished and the pleasure cannot be reached. Therefore, gamers should expand their repertoire of action to find novel ways of

organising. Through visual performances, gamers become familiar with the notions of cooperation, organisation and solidarity during their liminoid experiences, and these notions can be transposed to the material reality when gamers are in the re-aggregation phase. Gamers may abandon their status and identities, and alter their stances or attitudes for the game of pleasure, and these practices and experiences can affect their actions in the material reality. If a game requires gaming with a certain political stance, this may affect the gamer's political stance in real life. Because liminoid experiences in virtual reality may also provide rites of passage in the opposite direction. The point to note here is that these effects are more related to the transitions that sharpen certain tendencies rather than cultivation or a cognitive change. Otherwise, an erroneous logic would be reached that assumes that every player who plays certain games has undergone similar transformations.

On the other hand, urban social movements such as Gezi mainly use action repertoires that include the occupation of urban areas, spatial transformations and performances. Concerts, street art, temporary communes, tent cities, graffiti, dancing and theatre can be considered as such performances. In the urban spaces where this performativity takes place, everyday life become interrupted, and social and political interactions happen, discussions and dialogues are made (Blanco, 2013). Playfulness is the primary catalyst of such performativity. Thus, protesters may experience a transition from the phase of being the objects of politics to the phase of being actors of politics. This breaks the hierarchical structure of ordinary life and ensures the emergence of collectivity. It can be claimed that there is a magic circle that separates ordinary life and the praxis of collective action. Besides, movements' actors should accept the rules of the collectivity to achieve the pleasure of collective action and maintain the movements practically. Within the context of the pattern, it can be argued that conditional and experiential resemblances between gaming and protesting may be overlapped, and generate hybrid performative outcomes on the axis of the

playfulness. Therefore, a simulation of the virtual reality in the space of material reality may emerge to articulate social longings, grievances, attitudes or political stances of the people. Also, the performativity in street protests or occupied urban spaces may be regarded as ephemeral virtual (fictional) realities that are performed by activists in material reality in order to show another material reality is possible (Shepard, 2009). The demonstration of such a virtual reality in material reality may be enabled through the liminoid structure and playfulness. When gamers become political actors on the streets, they may enjoy their gaming experiences, which are unlikely independent from the material reality. The liminoid phase at the threshold of the magic circle may allow gamers who start their journey as the consumers of the gaming pleasure, to develop political identities and to experience this transformation concretely as playful protesters in the material reality owing to the socio-political circumstances of a simulation of the transformed material reality presented within the virtual reality of the games.

Another reason video games are frequently mentioned by Gezi graffiti artists is their position in popular culture. GTA games are one of the most popular and best-selling games in the world. For example, solely, GTA V has sold 110 million copies in the world (Kain, 2019) and it is the third bestselling game in Turkey (Report of digital games, 2017). The value of the global video game market is today approximately 131 billion dollars and there are 2.5 billion gamers in the world today (Wijman, 2019). The video game industry is larger than the sum of the movie and music industries (Stewart, 2019). Therefore, as “pieces of media transmitted via the mass media that are popular and enjoyed by a majority population” (Reid, 2014, para. 4) video games should be considered as forms of popular culture.

The concept of popular culture refers to common aesthetic or life practices. It is mostly used to explain and to determine a common culture, which cannot be classified as the folk culture or the high culture. It is a mass-produced culture that is mass-consumed. On the

other hand, popular culture is a site of conflicts between the disadvantaged groups and the dominant groups. Both the resistance and power may be nested in popular culture. Thus, it is not entirely imposed by the mass culture and it does not emerge spontaneously from the people. It is a site wherein the resistance and the power relate, interact and negotiate (Parker, 2011, pp. 155-156).

“The field of popular culture is structured by the attempt of the ruling class to win hegemony and by the forms of opposition to this endeavour. As such, it consists not simply of an imposed mass culture that is coincident with dominant ideology, nor simply of spontaneously oppositional cultures, but is rather an area of negotiation between the two within which—in different particular types of popular culture—dominant, subordinate and opposition cultural and ideological values and elements are ‘mixed’ in different permutations” (Bennett, 2009; as cited in Storey, 2009, p. 96).

The relationship between popular culture and politics involves the politicisation of popular culture by the power. The power imposes its values and interests upon society through popular culture. Additionally, subordinated groups to make their claims, to air their grievances, to create awareness, to generate solidarity and to resist, can use the popular culture (Scott & Street, 2000). On the other hand, collective actions arise from socio-political structures’ evolutions as joint products of symbolic commodities, information and images, and thus the culture is a primal terrain for social movements and is produced by such processes (Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1985). Popular culture is an area wherein political activism may flourish and social movements can be nourished (Brough & Shesthrove, 2011; Jenkins, 2006). It is an influential culture that provides insights on political and social issues and presents narratives, especially for those who are immersed in it. Through popular culture, especially young people learn the values, power relations and practices, which belong to larger social entities, such as society and thusly they identify their social roles and identities

in a semi-playful way (Barnhurst, 1999). As Stuart Hall (2006) has noted, popular culture includes repression, containment and resistance, and these features will inevitably continue to exist. Contemporary media-related spaces and textual forms cannot define it. However, it can be defined by the power relations between certain objects, subjectivities and institutions that have become involved in a popular relationship as a collective engagement and field of activity. Politics is an area where various forces and relations actively operate in the economy, society and culture to produce power and domination. Politics is produced. For this reason, to create a resister political movement is to recreate classes and individuals as popular forces and appoint them as popular democratic cultural powers. Popular culture cannot replace politics, but it is very rare to see politics without popular culture. Because culture is one way of practising politics. Political actors and acts are emerged or produced within the territory of the culture.

New communication technologies and mediums such as video games are the carriers of popular culture. Thus, they can be seen as the melting pots of solidarity for revolutionary actions. Because political resistance is to influence the practices or approaches that are woven by the power in certain areas through the conflict or reclaim (Dahlgren, 2009). Democracy is not possible without the interaction of citizens with each other and hegemony in various forms. Because the realisation of democratic participation depends on cultural nourishment (Dahlgren, 2006). Political awareness and enlightenment are required for the realisation of political participation, and they spread into society through the mediums of communication and the popular. However, it is not possible to transform political awareness into political activism without interaction between individuals, groups and social networks. For the emergence of the collective action, the formation of a collective identity is a requisite. Hence, the information obtained through popular culture must be transformed into consciousness. This mutual consciousness enables the emergence of the affinities and connections, they may

turn into the social capital that can be the cultural resource for the realisation of political participation.

Some studies on video games and new communication technologies have found the interactions taking place within this scope favourable for the formation of social capital (Pena & Hancock, 2006; Steinkuehler & Williams, 2006; Molyneux & Zuniga, 2015). However, the concept of social capital addressed here differs from Bourdieu's concept of social capital derived from the social position of the individual. For Bourdieu, social capital emerges when it is used to obtain power. It is increased during various institutional relations at various levels and cannot be evaluated independently from class-based and other social stratifications (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). For that context, it can be explained as functionality, which is embedded in established relations with others that can be utilised in favour of the individual or the collectivity (Lin, 2008). As Coleman (1988) has defined, here, social capital always contains one aspect of social structure and facilitates certain actions of actors in the structure. It refers to the networks, which arise from relationships, reciprocities, trust and social norms, facilitating individual or collective action. It is a natural resource that eases every action.

Molyneux, Vasudevan and Gil de Zuniga (2015) argued that social media platforms are suitable for the generation of social capital. Also, video games can be seen as social experiences (Pena & Hancock, 2006) and social interactions in online games can generate social capital (Steinkuehler & Williams, 2006). Since multi-player games facilitate the generation of social ties in gamer communities, they may cause the emergence of social capital. This playful social capital is different from face-to-face social capital, but those who have the first are keen to develop the latter. Gamers interact with other gamers and during these interactions, they adopt social behaviours and attitudes, and they exhibit these behaviours and attitudes in their communities, in the material reality. Even in virtual reality,

individuals who feel connected to others become more enthusiastic to take part in social life (Molyneux, et al., 2015).

Gaming contains an interaction and simulation, in which an individual can own a virtual initiative. In this manner, these initiatives may resonate in the material world, if there is a social capital convenient to circumstances. Gamer's social capital is a bridging, functioning as a social facilitator (Steinkuehler & Williams, 2006), and it emerges when actors from different backgrounds communicate and interact through social networks. It is based on tentative relationships and takes place in a shallow and vast area. The bridging social capital involves a low level of emotional support; however, it can expand individuals' horizons and worldviews, and it provides necessary information for reaching new resources. Technological opportunities of virtual reality and video games allow such bridging mechanisms because they enable gamers to create or to find *third places* in their simulations.

In open-world games like GTA, gamers can decide how to experience them and also games can adapt themselves to gamers' choices. These games are virtual worlds in which gamers can explore and approach objectives freely, as opposed to a world with more linear and structured gameplay. Thus, a variety of gaming styles, gamer choices and gamer identities may be born. Moreover, when gamers reach platforms such as multi-player servers or gamer forums, they connect and interact with other gamers and share and express their gaming styles, choices and identities. I argue that open-world games and multi-player gaming platforms may provide similar third places (Oldenburg, 1999) in virtual reality, because social capital may be generated in these places.

Oldenburg (1999) has explained the properties and functions of third places where the bridging social capital can emerge. Third places are informal, undistorted spaces where social impositions do not exist. Cafes, bars and other places people may spend time willingly can be

examples of these spaces as opposed to spaces like offices, schools or homes. These places are cradles of social interactions and relationships that will allow social capital to emerge. Oldenburg (1999) identified eight criteria for third places.

First, third places are natural areas. According to this criterion, individuals should be able to enter these places with no permission or invitation, and they should not be at the position of a host. Besides, individuals should be able to leave these places when they wish. Concisely, third places should not bring with them any limitation or obligation. Thus, fair and informal social interaction may be possible. The second criterion of the third places is that the social status of individuals should be insignificant. Third places are places of equalisation. Third, in third places dialogue is the fundamental activity. The fourth feature of the concept is the ease of access and ease of staying. The person should be able to be present in third places whenever she/he wants with/as her/his friends. Third places should satisfy people's needs for socialisation and relaxation, unlike the places which require compulsory attendance. Fifth, in third places there should be regulars or patrons. "The reason why a third place is attractive is the presence of other guests, not by whom the space is managed" (Oldenburg, 1999, p. 29). Regulars shape the tone of the dialogues and the atmosphere of the space, thus space gains a character. Oldenburg's sixth criterion for third places is keeping a low profile. Third places are sincere places, where different people from various lifestyles are accepted. They should not be the places of pretentiousness and snobbishness. Another characteristic of third places is the playful mode. Seriousness means anathema for third place. They have a playful nature, where witty conversations and frivolous bantering are not only common but also highly popular. The eighth and last characteristic of third places is that they are like homes away from homes. In third places, people are surrounded by sincerity, a sense of ownership and belonging, as they would be at their homes. In third places, people have a feeling of

commitment and spiritual regeneration. Ignored or labelled personality traits and personal preferences are appreciated in third places (Oldenburg, 1999, p. 23).

Until this point, I discussed the structural and practical resemblances between gaming and political activism and their correlations as overlapping practices. After that, I remarked the video games as a major component of contemporary popular culture and I tried to explain the possibilities that can lead to the emergence of social capital that may facilitate the generation of political activism. Also, I described third places as spaces wherein the social capital may be shaped. At this point, in terms of the pattern, I argue that the graffiti, as a space of performativity, may be regarded as a third place in which social capital and political performativity of virtual and material realities coincide.

Because during the Gezi movement, the walls that have become the spaces of graffiti practice, did not require any permission or invitation for access. There were no hosting on the graffiti walls as parts of the urban public space and they could be left behind arbitrarily. On graffiti walls, social statuses were not significant, because the Gezi graffiti artists were anonymous. Additionally, the main activities on the walls of Gezi graffiti were establishing dialogues and communicating. Gezi graffiti artists were in constant communication with each other, protesters, their opponents and the public. Moreover, it can be claimed that graffiti artists and their audiences were the regulars of the graffiti walls. They have shaped the atmosphere of these surfaces/spaces mutually. Since graffiti has been practised continuously and intensively, a graffiti community has emerged, and rhetoric was produced that affected the people.

Besides, I believe that Gezi walls can be considered as sincere places or surfaces, away from the order and pretension. Gezi graffiti were produced in unpretentious ways and there were no limitations about who can be a graffiti artist. This feature has also been observed in

terms of content. Many of the Gezi graffiti contains only texts. Also, Gezi walls were the places of playfulness, subtle intelligence and humour. Gezi graffiti has been produced in this way and become the products of the disproportionate use of intelligence. (Emre, Çoban & Şener, 2014). Finally, I believe that to be homes away from the home, the walls of Gezi graffiti had the necessary features. It can be alleged that graffitiists practice graffiti also due to the affection and belonging they felt about these graffiti walls (Halsey & Young, 2006). The consistency in practising allows us to determine that the commitment was felt. Additionally, Gezi graffiti as a political performance has enabled graffitiists to express their personal preferences, traits and stances freely, which can be evaluated as deeds of intellectual and mental regeneration. For all these reasons, I consider the walls of Gezi graffiti as the third places for the graffitiists.

Also, if graffiti 26 is considered as a liminoid experience, the permeability between material and virtual realities allows graffitiists experience the rites of passages (the separation, the liminality and the re-aggregation), in a highly accelerated and non-linear form. Because these stages have emerged as intermittent, ephemeron and frequently repeatable graffiti practices, and it is possible to go through these stages also as audiences, as long as the reception takes place. This means a process in which the borders of the magic circle are constantly crossed within brief periods. Individuals become detached from their everyday life statuses and identities while they join the movement and become protesters. Also, while they practise graffiti, they detach from their protester status (the separation) and become graffitiists. When the graffiti (liminality) is completed, the previous status is activated to be detached (the re-aggregation) for another graffiti practising. However, the multiplicity of status and identities may cause the intersection of more than one magic circle. Hence, graffitiists may experience multiple phases of the separation, the liminality and the re-aggregation. In the case of gamers, graffiti practising requires the separation from both gamer

and protester positions, or gamer protesters can be regarded as gamer-actors only during the liminoid phase of graffiti production. Considering the digital activism dimension of the process and the different effects of different materials and virtual reality processes, we encounter a fluid and complex series of liminoid performances that cannot be explained by linear logic. In my opinion, two characteristics should be underlined here; these liminoid experiences are being experienced intermittently and the separation, the liminality and the re-aggregation stages transfer the traces and effects of these experiences to each other in the context of different identities. Because in the content of the graffiti 26, it is possible to find expressions bringing along some notions, related to a variety of statuses or identities; such as GTA (gamer), beating cops (protester) or the generation (the youth). Therefore, here the combinational liminoid experience refers to a cross-cutting phase of being among multiple statuses and identities, instead of a phase of being in between. The combinational liminoid experience absorbs other liminoid experiences and provides graffitiists with the ability to activate necessary social capital and to find new third places.

I believe the narrative of the graffiti could be generated only through the overlapping of the virtual (video gaming experience) reality with the material reality (collective tangible experience). Gaming requires temporary conceding. Gamers know that the game is virtual because the pleasure of the game comes from their knowledge that they have crossed the borders of the magic circle. Therefore, the immersion of the gamers cannot be definite or it cannot be independent of the material reality. This phase involves a presumption, in which a new layer of consciousness and knowledge appears. Therefore, just like gaming experiences, the virtual concepts are being utilised by gamers in the material reality, and they are no less real than abstract concepts of the material reality, such as ideas or narratives. For this reason, socio-political or sociocultural consciousness gained in virtual reality can produce a genuine

social capital in third places of the material reality. It can be argued that the Gezi graffiti served as a link chain for this articulation.

Also, video gaming and performative political actions, such as graffiti, can be associated with playfulness. Playfulness allows the liminoid experiences to be added in political performativity in which the overlapping of the virtual and material realities emerges. When these experiences coincide with the political circumstances or contexts a convenient relation appears for generating social capital waiting to be transformed into the resources of a repertoire of action, under the circumstances of third places. The hybridisation of the virtual and material realities amplifies and multiply these processes because borders of various magic circles and liminoid experiences can become intersected or joint. Besides, the popular culture presents a richness in which such amplifications and multiplications may take place, just like GTA did for graffiti 26. After this detailed examination of the background of the graffiti, I will try to interpret its meaning, target and function in the Gezi movement.

According to the textual expression of the graffiti, it can be said that the graffitist has a certain level of GTA gaming experience. Also, it is possible to determine the graffiti brings along one of the gaming-based experiences of GTA gamers into the material reality; violating the law. The graffiti accounts for the reason for the movement by blaming an indefinite opponent who has messed with the generation who beats police officers in GTA games. It can be estimated that this indefinite opponent is Erdoğan, the government or the police force. Also, the graffiti expresses that this generation is ready to challenge this indefinite opponent. It describes some Gezi protesters as illicit beings of the GTA simulation and states that they are now in the material reality and equipped with similar intentions and capabilities.

Thus, through the graffiti, it can be assumed that the generation plays a game within the boundaries of the magic circle in which political propositions and a transformed form of

the material reality. At this point, the liminoid resonance, comprising both virtual and material realities, appears. The graffito expresses that Gezi protesters do not hesitate to use violence against the police in virtual reality, and they would not hesitate also in the material reality. This expression evokes the narrative of the game describing an attitude and a stance, re-generate it on a wall with a spray can, in the material reality. In this way, the graffitist's status and identity as a protagonist stem from the game, and the police's role as an antagonist come face to face. In this way, graffito announces that the movement's generation can create troubles for the police, using the skills and courage that it derives from virtual reality. According to graffito 26, they are not afraid of the coercive powers of the government and of even beating them in the material reality.

It is also worth noting that, considering the textual expression of the graffito can be regarded as a description or an envisagement of a new collective identity. This collective identity is described as a generation that plays GTA games. Therefore, it can be argued that the gaming community in Turkey can participate in the movement as a distinct social group. Besides that, it can be interpreted that the graffitist sees the Gezi movement as she/he articulates; a movement of GTA gamers. I think using a video game for building a collective identity is new and rare for Turkish society, and it provides insights into ongoing social change in the country.

Graffito 26 may also have been produced to motivate protesters. In this perspective, the graffito's deed may be understood in a way that a generation's struggle to motivate itself by using the familiarity and the social capital, which emerge from virtual reality.

Besides, the graffito uses a humorous allegory to build a narrative, by likening the movement's circumstances to the GTA game-world. It positions gamers as the rivals of the police, the state or Erdoğan in Gezi, and builds a new identity through a play mechanism

invented at this liminoid phase. This new play transforms the circumstances of material reality and bends its rules.

In this way, gamers who are known as nerds, geeks, apolitical or passive become fearless actors by narration. In other words, the new game enables the transformation of highly inexperienced gamer-protesters into a new group of bouncers who have no fear at all, coming from the GTA world. Therefore, graffiti 26 can be seen as a simulation covering both the virtual and the material realities.

Also, the graffiti utilises GTA's equivalent virtual criticism, connotations and content to be critical, political and intimidating in the material reality. The required virtual social capital is generated via the interactive possibilities of the virtual platforms functioning as third places. Moreover, that virtual social capital is transferred into the material third places of the Gezi in virtue of the liminoid; the walls. On the graffiti walls, virtual social capital and material social capital that cover grievances, claims and criticism, interact. Therefore, the graffiti constitutes a meaningful whole that encapsulates the emotions of the gamers both for the police in GTA and around Gezi Park. The new social capital blended with the virtual and material antagonisms allows the emergence of the graffiti as a narrative of political criticism and social opposition.

Penguins' Media

One pattern of the Gezi graffiti arises from communicative actions of the movement and mainstream media criticism. The protesters have used graffiti as a medium to report developments and to communicate with the public, other political actors and various components of the movement.

I have discussed the role of graffiti as a field of communication for social movements in the second chapter part of the study. Therefore, I believe it would be appropriate to

examine the pattern directly. Before doing that, it would be also convenient to underline that Gezi graffiti has been active in two overlapping spaces; the social media platforms and the walls. Besides, the mobilisation, recruitment and diffusion of the movement were mostly initiated in cyberspace. In general, graffiti has a special place because they were posted, shared, spread and assumed certain functions in the name of the movement after they were practised on the material walls. Nevertheless, today it is still possible to access many graffiti galleries presented by various websites related to the Gezi movement (“110 graffiti escribing the Gezi Park resistance”, 2013; “The unforgettable graffiti of Gezi, 2017; “Photos, tweets and graffiti from Gezi days”, 2018). Graffiti was an important part of the ongoing struggle through social media during the movement.

In social media, Gezi graffiti were shared and posted intensely. Unfortunately, it is not possible to find a study examining Gezi graffiti’s presence in social media quantitatively. However, the few qualitative studies on the role of the graffiti in the movement make it easy to conclude that a significant portion of the digital content concerning the movement have contained graffiti (Yanık, 2015; Seloni & Sarfati, 2017; Taş, 2017). I argue that the diffusion of Gezi graffiti from walls to cyberspace is two-folded. First, Gezi is a hybrid spaced movement (Kluitenberg, 2006; Hung Lui & Prasad). Second, Gezi graffiti has a mimetic virality that fits well with the conditions of cyberspace (Shifman, 2014). Further information can be found in chapter two, in which I have discussed this twofold hybridisation. Now I will examine and interpret the graffiti pattern, revealing the movement’s approach to mainstream and social media. Also, it should be kept in mind that these two media have a contradictory relationship, both in practical and discursive fields in terms of Gezi graffiti. The pattern includes two overlapped and interrelated group of graffiti. The first group criticises the

mainstream media, and the second group *comprises citizen journalism*¹⁰ practices via social media and the redistribution of the sensible (Ranciere, 2006). I establish these two dimensions as the constituents of the same pattern because of the causality between them.

Especially in the first days of the movement, mainstream media had been overlooking the events because of the pressure from the government. However, these control and restraint mechanisms were dysfunctional for social media, and protesters and a large part of the public could follow two media with very different narratives and broadcast policies simultaneously. The discrepancy between the social and mainstream media caused indignation, and protesters began to practice citizen journalism while they criticise harshly the mainstream media. Both deeds resonate high among the Gezi graffiti and generate a pattern. I will start my comments on the pattern with the first group.

Graffito 27 is one of the most popular graffiti from the Gezi movement. On May 31, 2013, before the occupation has started, around the park and Taksim Square there have been heavy clashes between the police and the protesters.

Taksim Square was like a battlefield. There were many wounded and at the heart of Istanbul, life was stopped. However, big news channels have maintained their broadcasting schedules and acted as if nothing was happening. On the other hand, foreign media was following the events closely; CNN International has broadcasted live what was going on at Taksim Square on May 31. Meanwhile, CNN Türk, CNN International's branch in Turkey, was broadcasting a documentary about penguins. Shortly after, graffiti 27 started to appear on the walls to criticise CNN Türk, for being a part of the biased media.

¹⁰ An alternative and activist form of news gathering and reporting that functions outside mainstream media institutions, often as a response to shortcomings in the professional journalistic field (Radsch, 2013, p. 130).

Graffito 27*Resisting Penguin*

Note. (Tunali, 2013).

The graffito has become viral on social media and gas-masked penguins have become one of the symbols of the movement against censorship and the restriction of the freedom of obtainment of information. Accordingly, in the graffito, we see a penguin rising its left fist into the air and wearing a gas mask. It depicts the protesters as penguins in response to the mainstream media.

Besides its obvious criticism on media, it can be argued that the graffito tries to show the determination and the resilience of the movement. It underlines the fact that, even though

the mainstream media ignores the movement, the movement would go on. Also, graffiti 27 can be interpreted from a humorous perspective of criticism. The mainstream media is more interested in penguins; therefore, the protesters should be presented as penguins. In this way, perhaps the movement can engage the attention of the media. At this point, it can be also said that the graffiti demonstrates the disappointment of the protesters about media's blindness. In short, it is an important example of the movement's attitude towards mainstream media.

Graffiti 28 is a derivative of the graffiti 10, however, it criticises the media indirectly, and generates a collective identity from the context. In the graffiti, we see many penguins, symbolising activists.

I believe that there is a collective identity-building attempt in the graffiti because the penguins look the same and they are marching in the same direction or target. Besides, they are marching to the Erdoğan stencil in the graffiti, and his hands are on his temples as if he suffers a heavy headache. Graffiti 28 can be interpreted as follows; Erdoğan is in trouble because of the Gezi protesters who have been ignored by the mainstream media. From this perspective, it can be claimed that the graffiti generates a success story for the movement, and its narrative can be articulated as follows; even though the protesters are not allowed to appear on media, they have overcome this problem and now take firm steps forward towards their target. Within that context, one can argue that the graffiti generates a collective identity based on the unfairness suffered by the mainstream media, and utilises it to generate a narrative belittling Erdoğan. When all components have associated another function of the graffiti emerges; reporting. It informs the public and protesters about the situation on the streets by saying penguins are on the streets and they get Erdoğan into trouble. Hence, graffiti 28 can be identified as a product of another biased media, however that one works for the movement.

Graffito 28*Penguins and Erdoğan*


Note. (“Gezi journal of the media”, 2013).

At this point, I would like to emphasise two important points. First, the semantic articulation and relationship between graffiti 27 and 28 are significant because, in this way, we can understand that the Gezi graffitists have argued, posted, reshaped each other’s ideas through graffiti, both on the walls and in cyberspace. I believe this architecture shaped Gezi graffiti’s rhizomatic emergence and propagation. Second, it can be claimed that graffiti 28 is an act of citizen journalism. Through its visual phrase, it interprets the situation, builds a story about it and it shares that story as the news with the public. Also, it is a counter-

narrative against Erdoğan's accusatory discourse that has easily founded coverage in mainstream media.

Graffito 29

Media is a Lie [Yalan Media]



Note. ("Gezi Park resistance in the streets, 2013).

The pattern contains also much graffiti that criticise the mainstream media directly. Graffito 29, with its visual and textual components, is one of the most striking ones. It shows someone is about to shoot himself in the head, and there is television where the head should be. On the screen, we see a clear text; media is a lie. I argue that the criticism in the graffiti is not only about the attitude of the mainstream media regarding the Gezi movement. Because it does not say that the media lies, rather it says the media is a lie. Therefore, it targets all the

mainstream media and criticises it structurally. When we evaluate graffiti 27, 28 and 29 relationally, we see that Gezi graffiti's criticism for media extends its scale. Criticism scales up from a movement-based characteristic to a general perspective.

The graffito is not only about Turkish media or it does not speak about the penguin incident. Graffito is not just about the Turkish media's approach to the Gezi movement or penguins. Criticises the media in general. Besides the graffito's powerful criticism and striking blending of the virtual and textual elements, it can be also regarded as a trajectory that shows how the movement could develop its arguments up to the greater scales. I believe that graffito 29 indicates a transformation of a relatively focused criticism into a broader critical discourse, merging with broader grievances. In graffito 27, a relatively local scale grievance is mentioned. In graffito 28, this local scaled grievance is framed in a national scale political struggle as one of the circumstances. Finally, in graffito 29, it is possible to observe that this particular grievance is voiced on a broader scale.

The pattern also includes much graffiti that share the news. The graffito above is one of these graffiti. In this sense, it can be claimed that graffito 30 tries to perform a task that the mainstream media has failed to fulfil. The role the graffito plays here can be regarded in many aspects as reporting. It does tell what happened to who. It does report where was the incident and when. It can be said that the graffito is an act of reporting trying to reach the public and the activists. For this particular graffito, it can be said that it does not have an objective perspective. Protester Ethem Sarısülük was shot to death by a police officer in Ankara. However, it is impossible for graffitist(s) to have any documents or evidence that the AKP has given an order to open fire on Gezi protesters. Therefore, it can be argued that the graffito is interpretative and biased. Its biasness also fits in journalism. Journalistic objectivity does not exist, it is a poor ideal and it threatens democracy (Wijnberg, 2017). I would like to emphasise here that all the features of the graffito fits in citizen journalism.

Graffito 30

Ethem Sarısülük Was Murdered by AKP in Ankara [Ankara'da Ethem Sarısülük AKP Tarafından Katledildi]



Note. ("Graffiti and banners from Taksim and surroundings", 2013).

Graffito 31 encourages protesters and bystanders to create content and post news about what happens on the streets. It says, share, you are the media. The graffito reminds them everyone can generate a medium for communication through the communicative tools in the network society. It attempts to highlight the opportunities provided by web 2.0. Because the prerequisites for the effective use of communicative processes is no longer about having, capturing and using existing certain mediums.

Graffito 31

!Share! You Are the Media [!Paylaş! Medya Sensin]



Note. (2013, May 31) Photograph taken by the author.

Just like the walls' transformation into digitised mediums of communication through the digitisation of graffiti, the conditions of the network society enable individuals to create content and to transform their social media accounts into communication mediums for the movement. Besides, again like walls, users can generate novel mediums by digitising unexpected spaces, objects or surfaces in material spaces. Also, graffiti announces the inefficacy of the mainstream media and the increasing importance of social media for the movement.

The graffiti pattern includes criticism on mainstream media, a call for citizen journalism, and practices of citizen journalism. Also, the pattern provides information about the movement's communicative capabilities, encapsulating both the walls and the social media platforms. It can be argued that as a contemporary movement Gezi has utilised intensive communicative skills supported by new media technologies, and thanks to these opportunities, the movement made its voice heard both in the streets and cyberspace. I believe that pattern points out that mechanism that enables Gezi's digital and analogue protesters to become both the producers and the audiences of their media.

Besides, citizen journalism of the movement is not about the emergence of a new alternative media. Because the pattern does not direct its participants and the people to the existing alternative media channels and institutions. The fundamental reason for this preference may be the alternative media's partial disregard for the movement (Çoban & Ataman, 2017).

The movement has strived to create and organise its media. It can be argued that the communicative stance of the movement is in line with its political stance. It rejects established structures including alternative media.

Maintaining the status of being novel and authentic is important for the movement. Therefore, it refuses to make use of known sources, media discourses and concepts. According to the pattern, the Gezi movement recommends and prefers direct communication, and the communicative organisation of the movement emerges when the practices of the actors are connected. Besides, these practices are shaped under the conditions of the hybridised spaces. Activist citizen journalism is a part of the repertoire of action, and graffitists are voluntary reporters acting in a decentralised network of the movement. The influence of the communication technologies in the network society, which facilitates the

flows of autonomy, can be observed through the communicative acts of Gezi graffiti. Gezi graffiti not only were used to gather news and share this news but also wielded to produce news and share them for generating collective consciousness and solidarity.

People versus People

A considerable amount of the graffiti produced during the Gezi movement; use the concept of the *halk*. In Turkish, *halk* means the people, the folk or the public, and the use of *halk* in the Gezi graffiti has a particular meaning for Turkish society (“Halk”, n.d.). I argue that it was recurrently used to re-identify the people, and via this new re-identification, Gezi protesters have tried to change the balance of the power in Turkey, at least discursively. Because the opponent of the movement, the AKP, defines itself as a movement of the aggrieved ones who were oppressed by the republican ideology of Kemalism. Besides, allegedly, AKP is the party of the aggrieved ones, the *millet*. *Millet* means also the people, the folk or the public in Turkish just as the *halk*, and one of the main narratives of the power is built around the concept of *millet* (“Millet”, n.d.). It has been claimed that the AKP and its leader Erdoğan are the saviours and the sole representatives of the *millet*. Many words in Turkish mean the people, and *halk* and *millet* are the most popular ones. Although these two concepts appear only as synonyms on paper, their meanings and connotations transform depending on the socio-political processes in which the country passes through. According to the social groups and political movements that utilise these concepts, what these concepts express and symbolise in terms of representation, change. Also, the appropriation of these concepts by particular social groups, political organisations, the power or oppositions, combines them with new meanings and alters their social affects. *Millet* and *halk* have been used by political populism to mobilise the masses, to merge them, and to conduct successful political campaigns.

Before discussing how populism works through these two concepts and Gezi graffiti's relevance to this phenomenon, it is necessary to address the formation of the people in terms of political populism. At this point, I will benefit from the work of Laclau (2007) that evaluates populism as a political logic and explains how political movements build themselves as political agents and become attached to different social groups. I believe the Gezi graffiti of this pattern follow such a path.

According to Laclau (2007), utilising the concept of the people is a political act to build a collective subject on behalf of a political movement, and populism emerges from performative actions, not from a specific social basis or a particular ideological movement. He begins his analysis on populism by suggesting the demand as the smallest unit. The concept of demand is used to express claiming the rights. "As long as social demands are met/absorbed by institutional system/order, they continue to be born as differentially singularities" (2007, p. 90). Social logic that is highly institutionalised and successful to absorb social demands, is called the *logic of difference* (Laclau, 2015). Also, discriminative/institutional systems assume that there is no social divergence, and they legitimate the demands by non-antagonistic, administrative methods. However, in certain historical periods, institutional systems become inadequate in assimilating emerging social demands. Thus, a plurality of unsatisfied demands occurs. If these unsatisfied demands continue to exist for a time, the *chain of equivalence* emerges (Laclau & Mouffe, 1992). The latter form of social construction is based on the *logic of equivalence*, which is a social logic that emphasises the commonality of those demands with different characters. The logic of equivalence connects these demands that seem anomalous at first glance and forms a chain of equivalence (Watson, 2015). Thereby, an internal frontier emerges, as a chain of unsatisfied demands and the polarisation in the political spectrum spreads. At this momentum of fracturing, which is named by Laclau as the populist rupture (2015), a chasm separating

the institutional system and the public arises, and popular discourses divide social into two; the power and oppressed. Laclau, (2015) has noted that under the conditions of this dichotomy, the populist formation of the people as a political subject depends on the formation of this internal frontier, and the political dynamics of populism are based upon continuous production of that frontier. More systematically, preconditions of populism are the emergences of internal antagonism frontier separating the people from the power. Articulation of demands based on the logic of equivalence enables shaping of the people concept, and it associates these demands (which could not overreach an indefinite solidarity phase equivalences are saturated) with a stable and signifying interpretation system. These rings form a chain, make differences equal, and ensure their unity via the exclusion of the existing socio-political order. As a first step, the antagonistic border drawn between the people and the elite (oligarchy, power bloc or the state) is compulsory in the construction of the people to establish a common opposition against the order. However, the antagonistic contrast is a mandatory but insufficient step. At the second step, one of these differences represents universality, as a big articulated momentum of collectivity. That allows the people simultaneously to unite and to keep both their singularity and partial differences (Laclau, 2000). Since an empty signifier conducts the representation, the articulated integrity can establish the people. They are impossible objects and they are always absent, but society can only be grasped through the production of empty signifiers (Laclau, 1996). Briefly, the *partial* or the *pleb* can only become the *universal* or the *populus* through the representation of empty signifiers. It is the empty signifier that represents the chain of equivalence, in other words, the people.

One outcome of Laclau's (2007) conceptualisation of populism is the definition of these two types of discourse and political methods; the institutionalist discourse based on the logic of difference, and the populist discourse based on the logic of equivalence. The

institutionalist discourse is dominant in shaping, expanding and maintaining hegemony (democratic demands) and the populist discourse confronts the hegemonic formation (popular demands). Besides, it should be emphasised that there is no distinct dichotomy between the institutionalist discourse, in which the logic of difference works, and the populist discourse in which the logic of equivalence is dominant. Instead of this, in this relationship, there is a complex dialectic and an unstable compromising (Laclau, 2015). In this context, the equivalence and the difference are always incompatible, however, they require each other as the necessary conditions of social construction. Sociality is nothing but the focus of this irreducible tension.

Again, in parallel, social (discursive) identity is established at the junction of the difference and the equivalence. Laclau (2007) has maintained the same line of thought also at the level of discursive totalisation forms. Accordingly, the institutionalising discourse is the one that endeavours to make the boundaries of discursive formation and the community, overlapped. Therefore, the principle of universal difference will become dominant equivalence within this homogeneous communitarian space. On the contrary, in the populist discourse, an exclusionary line divides society into camps, and the concept of the people becomes something less than the aggregation of the community members. It is now a partial element that seeks to be understood as the only legitimate integrity. At this point, it is possible to consider the concept of the people simultaneously as two distinct things. First, the *populus*, the unity of all citizens, and second the *plebs*, the ones without privileges. This is what the concept of people means for populism; a pleb claiming that it is the only legitimate *populus*. In other words, a partiality that wants to function as the whole of society (Laclau, 2007). Populism presents a pole with two ends. At one end, institutionalist discourse in which a pure logic of difference prevails and at the other end, populist discourse in which pure logic of equivalence prevails. Between these ends, there is a continuum in which political practices

happen and populism forms. Besides, these two ends are inaccessible. Discursive installations cannot be fixed on the continuity between these two edges. They exist in a continuous flow. Laclau (2015) has also given examples from various historical cases in which logics of the equivalence and the difference were combined in complex forms to illuminate this point. In the first example, an institutional system becomes gradually insufficient to assimilate social demands, and that leads to the emergence of a deep fracture in the society and the emergence of two antagonist chains of equivalence. In the second example, a regime born from a populist fracture becomes increasingly institutionalised. The logic of difference begins to reign and the equivalence popular identity becomes a *langue de bois* (the language of the ambiguity), which is less capable of governing. In the third example, some dominant groups try to recreate internal borders through a growing anti-institutionalist discourse. All these examples, which demonstrate the convergence of the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference (and therefore populist and institutionalist discourses) come together in different configurations in different historicities, which allow us to make a series of inferences about populism. Another significant inference that we can reach in this sense is related to the two-sidedness of populism. Populism presents itself as a disruptive force (subversive) targeting the existing state of things and also as the beginning of a more or less radical new order's (reconstructive). Also, populism needs to be fluid to open various possibilities since it cannot be built on only two stable pillars; one is in the institutional system and the other is out of it. This theoretical approach provides us with a conceptual repertoire that explains the complex nature of discursive construction of popular subjectivities (most of the time the people or the nation) as a flowing situation.

This new antagonistic line is drawn between the people and the non-people, between the authentic and the precise. Those who heightened to the level of being a totality and those who do not have a right to be heard; victims of the displacement (Ranciere, 2010). Therefore,

the concept of people refers to the partiality and the whole, at the same time (Canovan, 2005). An important result that Laclau left incomplete but should be not excluded from the discussion is that the partial or the pleb is also not an objective reality. The singularity that is called as the people to obtain a universal status, is a populist construction. With Taggart's (2000) words, it is the dignification of a certain part of the population and an idealised conception of paradise. Laclau (2015) has argued that populist discourse not only articulates the demands to reach the integrity (the people) but also reduces the plurality of conflicts and discontents to a dichotomy by drawing an antagonistic border between two edges. A symbolic leader, whose personality becomes a host for the condensation of symbolic capital, creates a group from a sum that cannot objectively exist, and that can be only symbolised by the isolation of voters within the solitude of the voting cabinet. According to this, only the leader speaks for the people, and the people speak only to authorise the leader to speak in its name during elections. It can be argued that populism is not inherently authoritarian. However, for a founding narrative of an executive elite apprehending the people as an ethnos and regarding itself as the sole embodiment of that, some identities or values may be seen as threats to the people/nation, and they may be deprived of the rights to be members of the demos. They may be deprived of their political, social, cultural rights.

Now I turn to discuss the graffiti pattern within the above-mentioned perspective on populism. According to the TDK, millet is an Arabic word, and it means a community of people who live on the same land having a union of language, history, emotions, ideals, traditions and customs, the nation. Additionally, halk is also an Arabic word that means the community of people who live in the same country, have the same cultural characteristics and nationality, the folk (Millet; halk, n.d.). Apart from minor differences, it is possible to say that the two words have close meanings and connotations in dictionaries. Also, these two words are used interchangeably in Turkey, but only in everyday life, even in simple political

debates. However, this interchangeability disappears when political arguments become descriptive or appear in established politics. I believe it would be convenient to summarise these differentiations with a brief historical perspective.

In Ottoman Empire, the word of millet was used to define non-Muslim communities, and all Muslims were considered as members of *ummah*, (all people who believe in Muhammed). The concept of the people was expressed with the word of *reaya* until the reign of Mahmut II (1784-1839). However, in the period of Mahmut II, the *tebaa* and the *halk* words were used to define the people (Berkes, 1978). In this change, the effects of the French Revolution and starting discussions about the concept were decisive. Arguments were clustered around the re-identification of the people and the state. The question was clear and there were two answers; the people exist for the sake of the state, or the state exists for the sake of the people. Subsequently, the word of *halk* was used more and more as a concept representing the people during the *Tanzimat* Period.

Also, during the early republican period, *halk* and *millet* were frequently used by the status quo and new meanings were derived. They have become the names of the two principles of the founding party (Parla, 2017). Today's main opposition party CHP was established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the founding political organisation, and six principles picked for CHP and the young republic. Alongside republicanism, laicism, revolutionism and statism, two of six principles were related to the concepts of the *halk* and the *millet*; *halkçılık* (populism) and *milliyetçilik* (nationalism) (Karabeli, 2009). *Halkçılık* is derived from the *halk*, and the *milliyetçilik* is derived from the *millet*.

Halkçılık is the principle of Kemalism that accepts every Turkish citizen is equal before the law. It ensures equal participation in democratic processes, and it states that every politician in the country has to work for the sake of the people. On the other hand, Atatürk

described the millet as a society having a rich shared heritage, that is sincere about living together and having common wills to preserve this heritage. Therefore, milliyetilik is a principle that projects the love for the nation and keeping national interests above all else. The principle of milliyetilik is to accept all citizens as Turkish, and interestingly to accept no discrimination, to refuse racism. This principle is based on solidarity, integrity and the independence of the country. It can be argued that Atatürk and his cadres have used halk to design the citizenship and utilised millet to emphasise the historical commonalities mythically and to identify the people of Turkey by comparing it with other identities.

According to Atatürk, the principle of populism foresees that the people should have the power to guide their future, and nationalism is a principle that facilitates reaching to the nation-state that works with harmony and determination for the land, whenever it is necessary (Yücel, n.d.).


After the one-party rule, the period from the foundation of the republic in 1923 until 1946, millet appears in the populism of a political movement was against the status quo. Atatürk's party has won the first elections of the multi-party regime, in 1946. However, DP that arose from a rift within the party, has won the elections with approximately 55 % of the votes in 1950. DP was representing the periphery (Keskin, 2012; Mardin, 2009) against the centre and their famous slogan "Yeter, söz milletindir!" (Enough, the decision belongs to the people!) was the essence of its successful election campaign.

I think at this point it would be helpful to refer to sociologist Şerif Mardin's (1973) analysis of the centre and the periphery. Mardin (1973) argued that in Turkey there is a fundamental discrepancy and fracture between the elite and the people, and that is inherited from Ottoman Empire. Sides of that disengagement are the religious masses, the periphery, and the secular elites, the centre. The sociality of Turkish society leans on the dynamic of the

secular central hegemony, and the centre is culturally alienated from the religious identity of the periphery.

Figure 11

Enough! The Decision Belongs to Millet! [Yeter! Söz Milletindir!]



Note. DP's 1950 election poster (Wikipedia, 2006).

Mardin's observation that the social sphere is divided into a dichotomy between two opposing social forces is significant and explanatory. Since the 1940s, the criticism of

Islamists and conservatives towards Kemalist modernisation has become clear and strengthened. For these groups, modernisation must be compatible with the values, the cultural world and morality of the millet. However, Kemalist modernisation is guilty of imitating Western thought and it excludes the essential, indispensable elements of the national identity. Secularism, as an important element of the republican modernisation model, is a foreign, imported ideology, and it is strange and discordant to Islam. Because of secularism, the Turkish nation has lost its values and entered into a moral crisis. Allegations on the precedence of science and rationality are anti-religious and they are the reasons for this cultural/moral crisis.

Figure 12

The Man of the People Ecevit [Halkçı Ecevit]



Note. An Ecevit banner from Çarşı ("Ecevit is not forgotten!", 2006).

Especially in the second half of the 1950s, under the conditions of the conservative tendencies of the DP government, religion became the empty signifier of the absence of the periphery, against the CHP's secularism. Accordingly, it was alleged that Islam has been the cement and the totality of Turkish society, but the unity of the people has dissolved because of the exclusion of the Islamic notions. Society is broken down and frustrated. With these arguments, the narrative and the movement of the periphery began to represent the unity of social demands, the chain of equivalence, and Islam became the empty signifier that articulates social demands and generates the new meanings of these demands. In Mardin's (1973) perspective, DP was representing the people from the villages, little towns; briefly the periphery. I argue that through populism; the party has captured the millet, changed its meaning and social connotations, and made it the collective identity of the conservative, religious, oppressed and disadvantaged masses.

Like millet, halk has also undergone semantic shifts in the recent political history of Turkey, both radical and institutional left used halk, to refer to the people of Turkey. The political right has always been in the power with a few, short-termed exceptions in Turkey, and against the power of millet, halk has become one mediator of the populist discourse of the political left, the labour politics and the opposition. One example regarding the usage of halk by the institutional political left can be found in the general elections in 1977. In those days, the CHP was the representative of the institutional political left, unlike the period when it represented the status quo. The position of the CHP in the political spectrum includes historical oscillations. It is also usual for some periods to be considered as a rightist and oppressive party (Erdoğan, 1998). CHP has won the elections in 1977 with 41, 4 % of the votes. This is the highest number of votes in Turkish history reached by a left- leaning political party (Erdoğan, 1998). In those years, CHP's leader was Bülent Ecevit, one of the most influential social democrats in Turkey's political history, and for this reason, the CHP of

that period is defined as a left-oriented party. Before the 1977 elections, Ecevit's agnomen was *Halkçı Ecevit* that can be translated as, Ecevit who cares about the people, as the man of the people or as the populist Ecevit. Besides, before his political career started Ecevit was a journalist, and he wrote an article in 1954, under the title of Why being a populist? Ecevit, in his article, has criticised the established order by emphasising the concept of halk. His dissident populism can be instantiated with his words: "Those who are attracted to the desire to establish a totalitarian regime in our country will find the most powerful force standing against them, halk. And above all, they will have to destroy it, if they want to succeed" (Ecevit, 1954). Examples of usage of halk are easily found in radical left politics, especially in slogans from the pre-1980 period. Also, Halk is a word that can be found in many left-wing parties and organisations' names. For instance, *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* (Social Democratic People's Party), *Halkların Demokratik Partisi* (People's Democratic Party) or *Halkın Emek Partisi* (People's Labor Party). On the other hand, we can find the millet easily in the names of right-wing parties such as *Millet Partisi* (People's Party), *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (Republican Peasant People Party) and *Millet ve Adalet Partisi* (People and Justice Party). Briefly, two words or concepts having the same meanings on paper bear different political connotations for the political field and populism. Halk means the people for the political left, and millet means the people for the right-wing. This distinction had a continuing relevance also during the AKP rule and the Gezi movement.

AKP inherited the religious-conservative populism that is embedded in the tradition of right-wing politics. Moreover, the search for an authentic identity building for the people has become psychopathological because of the party's ever-growing resentment of the elite of the previous period (Açikel, 1996). For these reasons, millet has been frequently used in speeches of Erdoğan and the discourse of the AKP. It can be found on Erdoğan's posters that he was presented as *Milletin Adamı* (The man of the people) having the same meaning as Ecevit's

propaganda slogan from 1977, at least on paper. However, this time millet is a replacement for halk. Another striking example of the use of millet belongs to the Gezi movement period.

Figure 13

The Man of the People [Milletin Adami]



Note. Election poster for Erdoğan (“The process from being the man of the people to being the man of the state: A change?”, 2017)

During the movement, name of the rallies organised by AKP that Erdoğan criticised the movement, was *Milli İrade’ye Saygı Mitingleri* (Respect to the People’s/National Will Rallies). Milli means national in Turkish, and it is derived from millet. Furthermore, the concept of *milli irade* (the people’s/national will) is essential for Erdoğan and his political movement. The discursive shield that defends the government against dissidents’ criticisms is built via this concept. The concept can be explained by the following logic; AKP is the ruling party that was elected by millet. Therefore, criticising the AKP means criticising the people’s will. As can be seen, millet has been a means for the totalitarian discourse of power.

It is necessary to emphasise a point before starting to examine the graffiti that used halk. The millet is used in AKP's discourse; it refers to a whole as a source of sovereignty in an institutionalist sense. On the other hand, it also refers to the AKP electorate who transfer the power of the representation to the party by voting. Two different meanings used to create interchangeability between these two sub-versions of the people. In this way, millet means both the populus, the unity of all citizens, and the plebs, the aggrieved ones. Thus, the concept of the people, in the unstable fluidity of this two-pronged discursive line, takes a form of a universal partiality. That construction claims that millet is the only legitimate universal partiality and the only way of the sociality. I believe it will enrich the discussion to exemplify the populist use of this two-pronged discursive line with two short quotations from Erdoğan's speech from the Respect to the People's Will Demonstration on 16 June 2013, following the end of the occupation in Gezi Park.

“If there is someone who wants to see the actual picture of Turkey despite the international media, it is right here. Hey, international media, hide this please also, okay? Come on BBC hide this one too. CNN, come on, hide this. Reuters, please hide this. You have produced fake news for days and days. You have shown Turkey like a different country to the world. Now, you are alone with your lies. This millet is not the people that you introduced to the world. This millet is sincere, this millet is not doing cacerolazo¹¹” (“Erdoğan speaks at Kazlıçeşme meeting”, 2013).

“We embrace our millet. We are one with our millet. No one will separate us”
 (“Erdoğan speaks at the Kazlıçeşme meeting”, 2013).

Among Gezi graffiti, the pattern of the halk is vast. There are so much graffiti, which used this concept and its connotations to send messages on behalf of the movement. In this

¹¹ Protest action by banging pots and pans (“Cacerolazo”, n.d.).

section, I will interpret about three graffiti highlighting the concept of halk. In the Gezi graffiti, protesters were recurrently named the people as halk, and millet was not used even once. Even though in the movement, religious groups such as Anticapitalist Muslims were active, they were completely disconnected from political Islam, and they did not use the dominant version of rightist political discourse. Besides, it is easily understandable that the Gezi movement has tended toward the concept of halk, instead of the millet. First, the movement's opponent was the power and millet were being used by the power. Before the movement, a multiplicity of unsatisfied demands were accumulated in ranks of both institutional and non-institutional opposition. It can be said that with the impact of Erdoğan's and AKP's harsh populist discourse and policies, that accumulation has emerged as a chain of equivalence. One example of political polarisation formed by this chain manifests itself in the Gezi graffiti. Gezi graffiti reclaims halk and used it as an oppositional focal against millet, milletin adamı and milli irade. Also, if we consider the graffiti's function and the discourse of the power interrelatedly, the dichotomy of millet and halk emerges as always, however, we can confirm its novel transition to the dissident discursive area.

As can be seen through Gezi graffiti, graffitists tried to build a novel concept referring to people for the movement. That indicates the finding of a new pleb that would mean everyone who is aggrieved by the power, and at the same time, the generation of a populus that would refer to the unity, the entire society. Gezi graffiti does this by reconstructing the meaning of halk. The word was chosen to embrace the ones who are alienated by the current political order and to claim that it is a movement of the people. Therefore, it is possible to claim that preference to use explains both a general political strategy of the movement and one of its tactics against power. This preference and mechanism will be traced by analysing the examples.

Graffito 32*Incredible People [Halk]*

Note. (“The humour of Gezi as utopia hunger”, 2013).

As we can see in graffito 32 and 33 graffitists define the Gezi as a movement of the people, or a movement that acts together with the people. In both cases, it is not seen that graffiti clearly say that Gezi is the people. Graffito 32 contains an expression that praises and emphasises the people and the power of the people. Graffito 33 states that people support the movement. In graffito 33, although there is a latent emphasis on the dedifferentiation between the movement and the people, it does not apply the well-known populist formula that argues they are one. Also, graffito 33 can be interpreted as an announcement of the coalition between the movement and the people. Nevertheless, both graffiti position halk as the objector of millet. In this context, it can be argued that halk represented the pleb for the Gezi

movement. However, millet, which was the name of the pleb in pre-AKP times, is now the new name of the elite. Against the new elites, the unsatisfied demands have aggregated and the new pleb emerged in the form of halk.

Besides, I argue that the context of halk for the Gezi movement differs from the halk concept that is still being used by the political left. First, through these two graffiti, we see that the concept of halk was established with a unique approach. Both graffiti refer to an American comic book character, the Incredible Hulk, in different ways. The equivoque and the connection here is built via the homonymy between halk and hulk. In other words, Hulk in English and halk in Turkish, are pronounced the same. These graffiti provide a humorous analogy between the power of the comic book character and the power of the people joining or supporting the movement.

Also, they stress that the movement's power lies beyond the government's reach because Hulk gets limitlessly stronger as he gets more frustrated and angrier. Both graffiti establish a semantic and notional connection between the features of the Hulk and the people who support Gezi. However, the political left that used halk for years never tried to set up such a bond. Such an expectation would be in vain because the Turkish left is very anti-American and a popular American cultural product would be never used with an affirmative and humorous way to generate a discourse by this tradition. Politics in Turkey had been too serious to act in this way until the Gezi movement. Second, the political left in Turkey describes halk as oppressed ones and victims of the power who will seize the power one day. Contrary to this, in both graffiti halk is characterised as winners. The expressions state that the people have already seized the power, and they became unbeatable, like the incredible Hulk. Briefly, Gezi graffiti, by not using millet, separates the movement from the government, and, by using halk in its way, separates Gezi from the political left.

Graffito 33

We Have the Hulk [Bizde Hulk Var]



Note. (“#resistgezipark#8”, 2013).

There is another point that can be observed in all three graffiti of the pattern; however, it is more obvious in graffiti 34 since it has a more distinct populist approach. At first glance, it is possible to assume that here *hulk* means the people who support the movement, and thus they are awesome. In other words, the greatness of the people stems from their participation in the movement or their solidarity with Gezi. It is possible to deepen graffiti’s discursive

mechanism: The Gezi is awesome because it has earned the support of the people that are awesome as well.

Graffito 34

These are Some Awesome People Man! [Bu Halk Bir Harika Dostum!]



Note. (“#resistgezipark#8”, 2013).

Graffito 34 has two significant points in terms of political populism. First, it utilises the widespread people discourse; it gives a message to people saying they are awesome. That is a populist obsequiousness. Second, halk is used to create a populus from plebs. The graffito makes a new conceptualisation about the people based on the multiplicity that took part in the

movement across Turkey and refers to all people in Turkey. This is the same mechanism that Erdoğan uses for the word of millet and is an indicator of a similar political approach. It claims that the people are the Gezi, or the movement is realised by the people. Another interpretation of graffito 34 can lead us to think it refers to people who stand against the power, the government and Erdoğan, and they are as powerful and angry as the incredible Hulk.

In this sense, it can be argued that the graffito tries to encapsulate all opposition with the concept of halk. That is both a conceived and perceived reality, is an effort to displace millet and to substitute it with halk that belongs to the movement in the same populist way. As noted, that was the main strategy of the AKP to seize the power and to keep its discourse dynamic and fluid. Another point to be emphasized about graffito 34 is that it uses the textual pattern quoted from the Scary Movie (Gold & Mayes, 2000, 01:01:29) in the same way as graffito 15. Similar inspirations, quotations, and replications are common among Gezi graffiti, and the graffito can be considered as an indication that they were spreading virally like internet memes.

For this pattern, I argue that halk refers to the new partiality that has been displaced and excluded. In Gezi graffiti the concept of halk opposes the bureaucratized, institutionalized and fattened millet, which had once been the identity of the displaced and excluded. This new concept differs from its homonymous cousins owned by the political left. Those people have managed to seize power, so it is awesome. It belongs to the Gezi and it is new. The halk from the Gezi graffiti tries to rupture both the millet and the outmoded halk. It presents the redefinition of the people, and also it represents the newly defined people. Besides, I claim that Gezi graffiti do this in a populist way. To my mind, by analysing this particular pattern, it is very possible to interpret that the Gezi is also a reactive movement, and it fought against the government's highly effective populism with its populist discourse. These three graffiti

can be evaluated as discursive attempts of the graffitists who use similar methods with Erdoğan, although they appear differently in terms of mediation, language and values.

The pattern of halk I have discovered among the Gezi graffiti can be seen as the work of a logic that tries to construct a new periphery, and this periphery enables the generation of a new populus, which is predestined to become a possible totality. The pattern tries to create a new and authentic concept of the people to fight against the millet in which the power re-generates the dichotomies of the pleb/periphery, the populus/centre and the universe/whole. In Gezi graffiti, I have not come across efforts to define the concept of people with any class or through economic, cultural or social contexts. 'The people' was always conceptualised as seen in the examples.

Nevertheless, it can be said that the concept of people in Gezi graffiti clearly opposes the power but replicates its populist discourse. It says that if you join the movement; you are the people. On the other hand, if you are against the Gezi or in consensus with the power, you do not belong to the people. It is possible to assert that Gezi graffiti used populism to make its claims heard. Halk was chosen to create a collective subjectivity as an empty signifier. In this way, it was tried to build a new universal, a populus against the other populus. Against the oppression of the millet, a new halk emerged as a partiality, which should be interpreted as a singularity. Also, it is possible to evaluate that Gezi graffitists have chosen their fictional populus as halk based on the historicity of the political left. However, they utilised the concept differently, because they exploited it by creating a polarisation that refers to unity, not a dichotomy.

Resisting Smartphones

Graffito 35

The Phone is Not Connected, Please Tweet For Me Too [Telefon İnternete Girmiyor, Benim İçin de Tweet Atın Lütfen]



Note. ("Sounds on the wall", 2013).

The data includes many examples indicating graffiti have become nodes in which the connectivity and collectivity merged or coincided. So, this pattern is concerned with how the hybridisation of cyberspace and material space was perceived by Gezi graffitists. Graffiti that I will interpret reflect not only their perceptions but also experiences and practices on the

matter. Graffito 35 and 36 allow us to make interpretations on how the Gezi protests' view cyberspace as a space of action. It can be said that graffito 35 was applied by a graffitist whose mobile phone's battery was out. In graffito 36, a connection problem that keeps the graffitist away from the internet is expressed. Briefly, in both graffiti, graffitists complain about they could not connect to cyberspace for different reasons. Also, graffito 35 mentions Twitter, the social media platform that Gezi protesters use most during the movement.

Graffito 36

*I Don't Have Any Reception, F*ck :) [Telefon çekmiyor AMK :)]*



Note. (“#resistgezipark#8”, 2013).

For both graffiti, it is accurate to determine that the graffitiists were around Gezi Park and Taksim Square while the events were going on. However, when looking at the textual expressions in graffiti, it can be concluded that the graffitiists, as social actors, thought their presence in the material space corresponded to only some part of their agencies they mobilised for movement. Because in both graffiti, although the graffitiists were in the material space in which the resistance, occupation and movement were taking place, and producing graffiti within this space, they state they could not be present in the cyberspace and deprived of the capabilities of the digitised and individualised agency, action and communication. I believe that deprivation is presented as a crucial problem in both graffiti, and for the graffitiists, the lack of access to cyberspace means the lack of being a complete actor for the movement and falling behind its agenda.

In graffiti 35, the graffitiist asks other protesters to tweet for himself/herself. For this reason, it can be said that full participation as an actor in the movement for the graffitiist can only be completed through the activism that spreads both on the street and on social media. The graffiti is a request made on the surface of a material wall for solidarity that will embody in cyberspace. For the graffitiist, the importance of the movement's efficiency in cyberspace is well recognised, and for this, the continuity of the actors' participation in social media should be ensured. According to graffiti 35, cyberspace and digital networks are not just technological facilitators and tools working for the movement. They are the only genuine spaces that make the connective collectivity and action possible. Graffiti 36 is produced to express the same deprivation, and it signifies again the importance of the hybridisation of material and cyberspaces. However, it has a more straightforward and direct expression. It uses swearing that expresses the frustration caused by the inability to act as a social actor in cyberspace.

Briefly, it can be argued that these two graffiti show the importance of accessing social media and cyberspace for the Gezi graffitiists, who were practising their performances on the streets. For them, activism rising from cyberspace at the individual level is just as important as the collective action itself that emerges in material space. At this point, it can be determined that the necessity and significance of these two different logics of action (connective and collective) related to two different spatialities for the Gezi movement are reflected in the protesters' intra-movement demands. That shows that Gezi graffitiists do not distinguish these two logics of action and perceive them as integrated. Also, for them, their actions are incomplete unless they cover both spaces.

These graffiti should be regarded as outcomes of a change in individual participation, connectivity and perception of cyberspace under the conditions of the network society, rather than just being defined as strategic steps in the flow of movement. Gezi graffitiists perceived the non-connective collective action as incomplete or problematic and tried to ensure the sustainability of the oscillation between material and cyberspace, even at times when that transitiveness was interrupted.

Graffito 37 interestingly indicates the hybrid nature of the Gezi movement. At first glance, it is seen that the graffiti calls for solidarity and support to a smartphone battery, and personalises it as if it is another protester.

Gezi protesters often used the word resist (*diren*) to create calls for solidarity and support and related slogans. It also came to the fore as a label for various places, groups, ideas or actors to announce their participation in the movement. In this respect, it can be said that graphite reproduces the keyword in accordance with its purpose.

Graffito 37

Resist iPhone Battery [Diren iPhone Şarjı]



Note. (2013, May 31) Photograph taken by the author.

Besides, graffito refers to the protesters' struggles in cyberspace. Unlike graffito 35 and 36, graffito assesses cyberactivism of the movement. It does not represent a cyber situation arising from problems in material space. On the contrary, here, a cyberspace-based situation related to the connectivity and the action overflows into the material space.

Smartphone batteries run out quickly when they are used frequently. Therefore, it can be interpreted that graffito 37 expresses the intensity of the protesters' agency in cyberspace by

personifying a smartphone battery as a protester. I believe that situation in which an inherent agency to cyberspace is depicted through a graffito produced in material space offers a fruitful base of interpretation in terms of collective and connective actions. First, it can be argued that graffito 37 was produced to give information about the situation in cyberspace. In this case, the graffito can be described as a communicative transition node among these two spaces. Second, it may be thought that the graffito was practised to be sent to cyberspace because of its potential for transforming into multiple internet memes and to spread virally. In this case, the graffito should be described as a material graffito generated to be digitised and to be shared in cyberspace.

Besides, a user who would encounter the digitised version of the graffito in cyberspace would realise that the graffito was produced in material space and deployed into cyberspace to create a cyber influence. Additionally, the graffito would be re-posted, re-generated or commented on in cyberspace as an already digitised graffito. It can be estimated that all these processes would be recurrent in cyberspace depending on the virality capacity of the graffito. Although it is not possible to exemplify it, since my study only focused on graffiti produced in material space, it is also inappropriate to claim that there were no similar flows from cyberspace into the material space. Graffito 37 supports this argument, at least contextually.

Briefly, the pattern shows that the Gezi movement took place in both material and cyberspaces, just like many other contemporary urban movements, and the actors of the movement were aware of this spatial hybridisation. I believe that beyond the awareness, protesters did not even think such a distinction has existed or such hybridisation has taken place. They perceived the spatiality of their actions integrated because the conditions of the network society did not mean an emergent transformation for them, but the existing conditions. For this reason, their actions and graffiti were also shaped per this perception.

What is interesting here in terms of the pattern is that hybridisation has become immanent in social movements, instead of being perceived as a novelty by its actors.

In the pattern, hybridised connective and collective actions are not presented as new phenomena. On the contrary, they are described as related to the essentials of the movement. From this point of view, it can be said that the movement's occurrence both in the cyber and material spaces was natural for the protesters, and conditions limiting action related to any of these spaces were seen as critical issues. Gezi graffitiists did not consider cyberspace merely as an extension or a reflection of the movement's existence. Therefore, it can be argued that the spatiality of the movement was related to a genuine integrated space activated with its hybrid functions.

In my opinion, Bennet and Sederberg's (2012) concept of connective action can be convenient for evaluating the Gezi graffiti's functions in this hybridised spatiality. A detailed description and discussion regarding the concept of connective action can be found in the second chapter of the study. Nevertheless, according to the pattern, it can be argued that it contains the trails of the logic of connective action. Connective action emerges on the individual level by sharing already internalised ideas, images, plans and resources with others through the networks (Bennet & Sederberg, 2012). Although it has its unique forms of organisation and action, it is not an alternative for collective action. Connective action interacts with collective action in the hybridity.

According to the pattern, it can be argued that graffiti are hybrid acts that practised in the material space for cyberspace. The space for the collective action is the material space, and the connective action happens in cyberspace. However, Gezi graffiti were being applied with the logic of connective action in the material space. Therefore, Gezi graffiti not merely emphasize the importance and effectiveness of the connective action. They also overflow

from cyberspace into the material space, bring the forms and expressions of connectivity into the collectivity, and connect the logics of collective and connective actions. These two logics become also hybridised because of the hybridisation of their inherent spaces where these flows take place. Therefore, they should be not regarded as logics that forming distinct forms of action that belong to unique dimensions. By examining the pattern, it is not possible to identify Gezi's type of networked action in the frame of three types coined by Bennett and Segerberg (2012, p. 756).

It can be only inferred that the pattern bears signs of a kind of self-organising connective action network. At this point, it can be also alleged that there is another process that such networks of action proposed by Bennet and Segerberg (2012) cannot fully explain. The pattern may be seen as the manifestation of the connective action appropriate for cyberspace, with its genuine forms and logic, in the material space.

Soldiers of Nobody

The graffiti of this section form another pattern bringing some fundamental issues into question about the politics in Turkey. With the "We are the soldiers of..." phrase, the pattern generated much graffiti during the Gezi movement. The phrase refers to a popular political slogan; "We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal". However, the graffiti of pattern have changed or reproduced the slogan for criticism. The pattern has sparked debates on important issues such as the military's domination in the political sphere and problems about political representation and participation. Moreover, about the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and his political persona, which is still is a taboo being used as a mean in producing political consent amongst the people.

At this point, I believe that the origin of the slogan and its narrative should be taken into consideration to examine the graffiti properly because this graffiti pattern reflects the

Gezi movement's ideas, objections and approaches to the established order in Turkey.

Therefore, before I interpret two different graffiti from the pattern, I will briefly describe the path of the origin slogan, the concept of *neo-Kemalism*, the Turkish army's role in politics and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. They are the issues the pattern mentions.

The origin slogan is coined by Turgut Özakman, a well-known Turkish writer, bureaucrat and lawyer. Özakman in his speech at a conference, which was organised for celebrating Atatürk's 125th birthday said:

“The aim of people who want us to forget Atatürk is being achieved. They are doing it. We have to explain very well to our children how our republic was founded and how The War of Liberation was won. I have been a soldier of Mustafa Kemal since 1948, and I do not want to be discharged from this duty” (Özdil, 2013).

The phrase has become swiftly a popular slogan for supporters of the secularism and Kemalism in Turkey. Also, Turgut Özakman is the author of the book called *Şu Çılgın Türkler* (These Crazy Turks, 2005), which tell the story of Turkey's War of Liberation against imperialistic powers of the 20th century. The novel focuses on the period between the Mudros Armistice and the Second İnönü Battle and it has sold over a million copies.

On the other hand, between 2006 and 2013, shocking political events have taken place in Turkey, especially for the secular, republican wings. First and foremost, the ruling party AKP was reinforcing its power while its policies were intervening more and more in people's lives. Besides this general situation, two major events have affected the Turkish political agenda deeply and were perceived by the secular wings as regime-threatening incidents. Under the conditions of escalating political polarisation, for secular nationalists Kemalists, the first development that threatened the regime was related to the 2007 presidential elections. These groups were against the presidential candidate of the AKP, Abdullah Gül,

one of the founders of the party. Their key argument was that an Islamist could not be president of the republic because that would endanger the regime.

Until the amendment that changed the presidential system in 2017, the presidency was not a very active position. For example, presidents could not join political parties. Nevertheless, it was important in terms of the values it symbolises and it was a position that covers and directs politics to a certain extent. Atatürk was the first president of Turkey until his death and the presidency was about his legacy. In those days, the presidency was bringing with it many other titles such as the protector of the secular system, the chief commander and the headteacher of the country. To protest the nomination of Abdullah Gül, Kemalists, nationalists and republicans held big public rallies, called Republic Rallies. They have recurrently shouted that Gül should not be the president of the modern Turkish republic, the secularism and the gains of the republic must be protected (Yüksel, n.d.; Kabakçı, 2011). The most popular slogan for these rallies was the same slogan that provided a semantic roof and background to the graffiti pattern I will examine. Another popular slogan from Republic Rallies was calling the Turkish army for the duty: "Army, on duty!" Rallies could not reach their objectives and on August 28, 2007, Abdullah Gül has elected as the new president of Turkey.

Following the eventful presidential elections, the infamous Ergenekon Case has launched on July 25, 2008. It was the second major regime-threatening development for the Kemalists, and it rocked the Turkish political agenda. The same slogan was very popular again. Ergenekon Case prosecutors claimed that there is a terrorist, nationalist and secular hidden organisation named Ergenekon, and it was preparing for a coup, some assassinations and terrorist attacks. The case was dropped on April 21, 2016, due to lack of evidence later, and it was claimed that the case was a conspiracy, which prepared by the Gülen movement. However, in those days, the indictment was describing Ergenekon as a deep state terrorist

organisation, as a state within a state. For prosecutors, the organisation had already carried out many bloody attacks aiming to create an atmosphere of crisis, mayhem, anarchy, terror and insecurity, and it was an obstacle for the country's development and progress ("The full text of Ergenekon indictment", 2008).

During the investigation process, approximately 60 thousand phones were tapped and over 600 people were arrested. What makes the Ergenekon Case shocking for the Kemalists was the fact that the defendants were secular, republican, Kemalist soldiers, journalists, bureaucrats, politicians and jurists (Dündar & Kazdağlı, 2015). The opinion leaders and elites of the Kemalist opposition were accused of being members or sympathisers of a terrorist organization. Those who saw AKP as a threat to the regime perceived this case as a political manoeuvre of the government. In those days, support for Erdoğan in society was becoming more and more consolidated. With the Ergenekon Case, this nationalist/republican wing also has closed its ranks and became gradually rigid. During the hearing sessions, defendants were often shouting the same slogan: "We are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal!"

Briefly, it can be argued appropriation and reproduction of the slogan by the Gezi graffitists include movement's concerns, ideas or attitudes about these developments and about the political climate in which they have taken place.

The original slogan was stemming from the yearning for the discarded hegemony of the Kemalism that has ruled Turkey for many years. Kemalists were trying to regenerate and reproduce their narrative to oppose the rise of the AKP and Erdoğan. That is how neo-Kemalism emerged, and for neo-Kemalists, all these incidents were the parts of a massive conspiracy conducted by political Islam, that wants to weaken, transform or destroy the republican regime.

I believe it is necessary to examine briefly the socio-political background of the original slogan to analyse the graffiti pattern and its place in Gezi graffiti thoroughly because these important issues; the Turkish modernisation, Kemalism, neo-Kemalism and the military's domination in the political arena are strongly resonated with the graffiti pattern of this section.

Neo-Kemalism is one of the two fundamental elements of the origin slogan, and it is a contemporary version of Kemalism, the founding ideology of modern Turkey. Kemalism covers the whole of the principles symbolised by the six arrows of the CHP (Kabakçı, 2011); republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, statism and revolutionism. Since the state and the party was one at the time of foundation, these principles have also constituted the basic principles of the republic. Kemalism bears the connotations from Atatürk's persona and arises from his intellect and actions, but it is not limited to them. It is based on the acquirements of the Turkish modernisation that has begun with the Tanzimat period, and the 19th century Ottoman reformist tradition. Turkish modernisation, nationalisation and democratisation were sparked by the institutional reforms in the Turkish army and is sustained by a constitutionalist and political reform movement, *Jön Türkler* (Young Turks) (Mardin, 2008). For example, Istanbul Technical University (İTÜ) was founded to provide Westerner engineering education to Ottoman army officers, and it has set off with the aim of contributing to the modernisation of the army ("Short history of İTÜ", n.d.). After the Young Turks movement *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası*, (Union and Progress Party) has built the constitutional monarchy in Turkey and keep the power with some interruptions. The party was mainly composed of soldiers, and Atatürk was one of its members for a short period (Güler, 2006). Besides, afterwards, these military elites have become the heroes of the War of Liberation and the founding fathers of the Republic of Turkey. In the early republican period, the Turkish army was the sacred, legendary and epic entity embodied in Atatürk's persona.

The Turkish army was the owner and protector of the independent, secular and democratic republic.

Kemalism can be defined as the farthest ideological front reached by military and civilian bureaucrats, who came together to save the empire in the late 19th century. Also, it is an ideology in which influences of Westernism and Turkism and sensibilities for absolute independence can be found (Kazancıgil, 2001; Kongar, 1999; Ateş, 2004). According to Zürcher (2008, pp. 44-55), it is possible to summarise the defining elements of Kemalism as follows: The cultural nationalism that opposes aggressive and expansionary nationalism, the secularism that rejects the religious fundamentalism and fights against counter-revolutionary forces, the populism that sees socialism as a divisive ideology and regards society as a homogeneous mass, and finally a firm commitment to the positivism.

After the War of Liberation, the prime objective was the immediate establishment of the new state and the society in a Western way. In the minds of Kemalists, catching up with the standards of the West required the accelerated transformation of the society. That would be only possible, as Kışlalı (2003) noted, with a core power that internalised the Kemalist ideology. Therefore, this alarmism has led the elites to the top-down reforms and a state-driven modernisation performed by military/civil intellectual bureaucrats. The motto of *despite the public, for the public*, was adopted. Kemalist modernisation means to be a part of the West and it is also a way of social engineering reinforced by Atatürk's theory of rupture (Kaliber, 2004; Toker & Tekin, 2004). Atatürk has frequently justified his theory of rupture and did not hesitate to use radical methods such as the exclusion of the tradition and repressing religious institutions. Kemalism, alongside its agenda of establishing the new state and the society, was always on guard to eliminate the dangers for the state, because two essential elements; nationalism and civilizationism should have been well-grounded for its project to succeed. It was thought that the new republic could stand on firm foundations only

in this way (İnsel, 2001). The mission of protecting and strengthening the state brought a defensive political stance with it, and that stance caused Kemalism to be conservative. Under the wings of the founding ideology, many groups have become the actors or the free-riders of political and social dominance. Kemalism was hegemonic and dominant in terms of power relations, political struggle and establishing the basis of politics, it formed the politics. Nevertheless, it could preserve its dominance and hegemony as long as it could meet social demands (Çelik 2001). Kemalism was deeply weakened after the coup in 1980. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis of the military junta regime shook the confidence of Kemalists in the state. Afterwards, *Özalism*¹² (Erol, 2005) has emerged, and the market economy has entered the country. That broke the bureaucratic hegemony of Kemalism. Thus, it has become estranged to keep the unifying apparatuses of the state under its control. However, these apparatuses were not efficient in re-constructing and re-articulating the founding ideology of the republic in the face of ethnic and religious movements.

In the 1990s, with the rise of the counter-hegemonic identities and differences, being a Kemalist became the identity of struggling the reclaiming the hegemony (Çelik 1998). Eventually, these conditions caused the formation of a novel civilian Kemalism (Erdoğan, 2001). The purpose of this wave, which political scientist Necmi Erdoğan (2011) named as neo-Kemalism, was to gain popular consent back and to complete the reclaiming for the Kemalist restoration project, that based on Atatürk's understanding of nationalism, secularism and modernity. However, with the rise of AKP, it was drastically expelled from the army and the bureaucracy and had to retreat to a more civilian area. Justification and the legitimisation for the neo-Kemalism are produced by fetishising, the era of the War of

¹² Economically liberal and politically conservative current led by Turgut Özal. He was the founder and leader of ANAP, and he served as prime minister for eight years and as president for three years.

Liberation and Atatürk's rule, as an era of bliss. Neo-Kemalism is shaped around perceptions of internal and external threats (Kabakçı, 2011).

Neo-Kemalist opposition contains educated middle-class individuals and uses the origin slogan. That middle class encompasses the secular and advantaged segments that had been indisputably dominant until 1980 and are emerged from the centre, amongst people who embraced the Western modernity more than other segments of society (Mardin, 1973). They have enjoyed the advantages of the republic, felt like the owners of the regime. Also, they have formed the republic's idiosyncratic bourgeois and the intelligentsia and sanctified the features, methods and ideals of the Kemalist regime. Neo-Kemalism has polarised itself against the political Islam that threatens the regime and utilised a populist derivative of Atatürk's nationalism. It has become a nostalgic, status quoist civilian wing fanaticising itself and fetishising the Turkish flag and Atatürk. It names itself as the sole and true advocate of Turkish democracy and secularism. Besides, its arguments are based upon republican nationalism, one of the important constituents of the former official ideology of the state. Bora (2007) has argued that the mobilisation of the neo-Kemalist educated middle class should not be solely explained through nationalist fanaticism and indoctrination. For him, the rise of neo-Kemalism was because of the fear of losing the economic advantages and social status of these urban, educated and secular groups. Although the narrative of this movement contains references to Kemalism, anger and fear against the AKP government dominate it. Briefly, neo-Kemalism is the outcome of the national liberationist model of Kemalist nationalism.

Another point that should be emphasised in this context is that Atatürk and the Turkish flag have become popular icons of this movement, as they have been used for the propagation. Neo-Kemalism tried to swallow the other oppositional groups that do not define

themselves as secularists or comprise Kurds and non-nationalists. Some of these groups have also taken part in Republic Rallies. It was possible to see their distinctive placards and to hear their different slogans. However, they were overwhelmed by neo-Kemalist crowds and covered with hundreds of meters of Turkish flags (Bora, 2007). Republic Rallies were not as embracing as the Gezi movement. Briefly, this oppositional wave against the AKP and Erdoğan's hegemony was vastly mobilised because of the Republic Rallies and the Ergenekon case. Neo-Kemalism is a mutated version of Kemalism, the founding ideology of the republic, and its transformation was caused by the major political, economic and sociological transformations. It can be described as a harsh antagonist, statist, nationalist and secularist movement. Besides, the original slogan that is hijacked and transformed by the graffiti pattern, which I will examine in this section, belongs to the neo-Kemalist movement.

The second important axis of the origin slogan talks about being a soldier. The meaning of this phrase and its framing should be also examined because it is about the established way of political representation, participation and the domination of the Turkish army in politics. As I mentioned before, Turkish modernisation has begun through the reformation of army institutions (Zücher, 2008; Mardin, 2011). Turkish army was the founder, the carrier and the protector of the republican modernisation. The army was the decisive element and protector of Kemalism, and thus historically internalised the values of the regime (Cizre, 2001). The Turkish army has created a doctrine from Atatürk's thoughts and actions and announced Kemalism as the official ideology preventing Turkish society from shifting to other perverse ideologies. This ideology would unite society in a particular worldview/thought system (Akyaz, 2001). Starting from the 1960s, the army has continued to play its political role in the name of Atatürk and Kemalism, with interventions, coup attempts and coups, and stayed always in line with the founding ideology.

Between 1923 and 2013, three military coups, two military memorandums and two military coup attempts have interrupted Turkish democracy. All of this was done by the Turkish army with the claim of re-establishing democracy. Turkish army occasionally granted people some democratic rights and sometimes these rights were taken back, again by the army. With its official name, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the republican elites have assigned themselves as the owners of the order, and they have pushed the others to the periphery. Social strain caused by the Military's domination has always been a chronic problem for Turkish democracy. However, with the AKP rule, the struggle between the centre and the periphery has become upside down. Erdoğan and his party have announced many times that one of their most important aims is to end the military's domination in the political area. AKP claimed that the religious people in Turkey were deprived of politics, education and bureaucracy.

In my opinion, the original slogan is just another cultural indicator of the militaristic mindset that designates itself as the defender of the republic. However, this time, that role/duty was assumed by the neo-Kemalist opposition in civil society, it stood against the AKP government's hegemony that ripped the Kemalism off from the state bureaucracy. The original slogan is a product of the political contention between the AKP and neo-Kemalist secularists. The main target of the neo-Kemalist mobilisation is to reverse the counter-revolutionary order, and salvation would be possible by reviving the *Kuva-yi Milliye* (The National Powers) spirit. *Kuva-yi Milliye* refers to the armed resistance groups that started the War of Liberation and the Turkish Army that organised and maintained it. However, in a contemporary sense, it is used to refer to the spirit, determination and sacrifice of the people that saved the land from invaders and found the independent republic (Akşin, 2007). For neo-Kemalism, under the AKP rule, the nation is fighting the second war of liberation. Outer enemies (the USA, European Union and imperialism), their collaborators (AKP and PKK)

and inner enemies (Kurds, reactionism) want to harm the indivisible integrity of the country, the state and the nation. According to this narrative, the enlightened people of Turkey has awakened, perceived the danger, and filled the areas with Turkish flags and Atatürk posters. With our famous slogan, they crusade against imperialism, sharia, anti-secularism, separatism and the AKP that cultivates them. In neo-Kemalist worldview, a perception of a big internal and external threat and a constant state of fear are accompanied by the defensive stance fostering the segregation of them and us. It is a militaristic movement, and it constructs its narrative with nationalist/militarist elements such as war, the army and the flag.

I believe that the causality behind neo-Kemalism's these features passes beyond the history of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. In previous Turkic and Turkish states, the army has been always the essence of the nation or the folk. For Turks, throughout the centuries, soldiery was not a profession. Everyone was a soldier. Every man, woman, young or old were soldiers and military service was not a paid employment (Çetin, 2018). Soldiery was the way to socialise and build a society. Of course, these relationships have become complicated and modernised. However, the army has always been the basic founder and executive dynamic for Turkish states and societies. For example, Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, which has been the imperial palace of the Ottoman Empire for 400 years, is designed as a military camp ("Topkapı Palace as an anti-monument, 2011"). The origin slogan is a discursive product of a militaristic, nationalist oppositional movement, which sanctifies the army, its interventions and dominance in politics. Therefore, political representation and participation are described metaphorically as military recruitment. That perspective sees the individual actor just as a component to form a unity. The actor becomes only meaningful when it becomes a part of a whole. With the influence of historicity, this mentality is adopted by most of the institutional and non-institutional political organisations in contemporary Turkey. Even on the political left, top-down hierarchies and rigid structures are dominant. The origin slogan should be

examined concerning that socio-political context. Thus, accurate interpretations can be made regarding the graffiti pattern of the section.

Some neo-Kemalist groups have participated in the Gezi movement. *Türkiye Gençlik Birliği* (Turkish Youth Union - TGB) was one of them and its activists were very active and crowded around the park especially in the first days of the movement. The accumulated resentment against the AKP and Erdoğan among different social segments has facilitated the diffusion. Also, groups, organisations and parties like TGB have joined the Gezi to present themselves, make propaganda and recruit new actors from the crowds. That was possible at one condition; they had to accept the novel ways, which constituted the core of the movement, rejecting established rhetoric of politics and endorsed the formation of new ones. Organizations and groups that did not act accordingly were allowed to be around the park, but they could not enter the centre of the movement. They were silenced or deactivated. On July 1, after the occupation has started, TGB as a crowded and well-organised group, chanted the original slogan; we are the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal. I was at Gezi Park on that day, a few meters from the TGB group. The slogan was not embraced by other actors and groups. It went down like a lead balloon. Other groups answered the slogan with silence. Then, the graffiti pattern was seen on the walls around the park. I will examine only two examples from the pattern here, but it should be noted that their derivatives have been applied frequently throughout the Gezi movement. I argue that this pattern should be seen as a reaction and criticism of the Gezi protesters against neo-Kemalism and its socio-political connotations.

In graffito 38, there is a straightforward answer to the TGB's slogan. The graffito builds a new meaning by changing the words of the original slogan. First, it can be said that the graffito rejects the established militaristic mindset of neo-Kemalism. I argue that in the graffito, being a soldier means to fight for an idea or political dominance without questioning, for the graffitist who produce the graffito, because soldiers are only responsible for following

their orders. Therefore, being a soldier means not being a real political actor. It means also not possessing authentic and individualised mechanisms of comprehension, idea-generating, identity building. In other words, it means no agency. I assume that the graffiti rejects this traditional way of social and political participation, which roots in the very deep of Turkish politics. Being a political agent does not mean serving the country or the military for Gezi protesters. It means being independent and not taking orders from anyone.

Graffito 38

We Are the Soldiers of Nobody [Kimsenin Askeri Değiliz]



Note. (“We will not kill, we will not die, we will not be anyone’s soldier #dontbethePARTofthebloodbath, 2013”

Graffito’s objection marks a different mindset that questions the choices and alternatives with free will. Besides, it reveals the insistence and the sensitivity of the movement about not having any leader or any top-down hierarchy. In my opinion, for protesters, any activism within any political organisation meant being attached to predetermined rigid political views and losing agency. Graffito 38 also points out that

traditional ways of political participation and representation (the soldiery) impose conditions that are not beneficial to the individual actors and confine them to a weak and passive position that would constraint questioning the authority. For the graffito, being a soldier means to pledge allegiance and to carry blindly the totems of the political parties, and rejects all kinds of political presences that have been established in this way.

Second, it can be easily seen that the graffito criticises and rejects the TGB and neo-Kemalism for more or less similar reasons. I should note that the Gezi protesters have announced recurrently they embrace and corroborate Atatürk. However, they did that in different ways and for distinct reasons. The figure confirms the intellectual presence of Atatürk in the movement, but that was not generated by neo-Kemalism. Graffito 38 emphasises the importance of being politically free and taking the initiative. In my opinion, the reason that graffito strictly rejects neo-Kemalism's attitude and arguments is the desire of the movement to break the boundaries of the political establishment. The pattern points out that some segments in Turkey, even though they favour Mustafa Kemal, they do not want military tutelage anymore. They do not want to be seen as tools, mindless supporters or mere voters anymore.

That rejection and criticism emerged when Islamic populism was at its peak and interfering intensely with everyday life. Therefore, the arguments of neo-Kemalism could be attractive and useful to Gezi protesters. However, they refused. At this point, it is possible to say that Gezi activists attached more importance to democratic and institutional participation in politics in Turkey, rather than the discontent about the hegemony of political Islam. Graffito 38 was criticising neo-Kemalism, one of the most strong oppositional movements of those days, while it was questioning the ways of doing politics. Gezi movement usually regarded as an ambiguous movement with loose networks, fluid organisational structure and nebulous messages. However, I would argue here that the movement was becoming rapidly

crystallised when it was necessary. It had principles that would not be changed for any compromise, and these principles affected its relations with other movements. The movement has formed its dynamics and mechanisms that do not require soldiers, servants or any other forms of obedience, and as we can see in graffito 38, it rejected the army-nation- state ideology, the essence of the old republic. Also, it has criticised the militaristic mindset, and it has announced that Gezi is not a warlike movement.

Graffito 39

We Are the Soldiers of Dumbledore [Dumbledore'un Askerleriyiz]



Note. (*#resistgezipark#7, 2013).

The second graffito of the pattern, graffito 39, gives a similar message to the previous one. However, it uses humour and absurdism, like its many counterparts produced during the Gezi movement. It does so by using an international popular cultural fictional icon, Albus Dumbledore, by replacing him with the founder of the country, Atatürk. Albus Dumbledore is one of the main characters of the world-famous Harry Potter book series. It is possible to assert that graffito 39 is produced to emphasise that being the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal is as

ridiculous as being soldiers of Dumbledore. Again, the main issue is that people are asked to be soldiers of someone. I think, according to graffito 39, a militarist mentality that aims to promote freedom, human rights and democracy is wrong and harmful even if the values it advocates are true. Because that mentality is not very different from the power's perspective. It can be also claimed that here a criticism targeting the entire political arena, surely the neo-Kemalism.

The humorous and absurd structure of the graffito may also have been produced to make fun of those who use slogan resources. In this context, graffito 39 can be read again as follows: Whether it is Atatürk who died years ago or a fantasy book hero does not matter, if people in Turkey would not stop being minions of someone, the fundamental problems in politics will not be solved. Through the graffito, it can be explained why Gezi avoided any political organisation, party or movement having such a mindset. It was a leaderless movement with no hierarchy, no chain of command, and it has desired to remain so.

I believe that this pattern of Gezi graffiti has a strong significance because it contains explanatory components that illustrate the movement's approach to Kemalism and neo-Kemalism, and its attitude towards political participation, representation and democracy. First, the pattern criticises the totalist currents in Turkish politics and favours a political mentality, which includes an articulation based upon individuality, differences and the grassroots. Second, the pattern shows us that the Gezi graffitists were bold. They questioned openly two of the biggest political taboos in Turkey; Atatürk and Kemalism. It would be correct to say that neo-Kemalism or Kemalism are just theoretical concepts, and graffitists possibly did not spend so many times comprehending their nuances while they were practising these graffiti. However, both totalist political approaches, old and new Kemalisms, were on the table to be discussed openly.

Because of his undeniable and important leadership in the War of Liberation and his revolutions as a founder of the republic, Atatürk has still a vast influence over Turkish society and is taboo. Kemalism and neo-Kemalism have benefited from this basis to be untouchable against any criticisms. Neo-Kemalism has reclaimed the Atatürk's persona and utilised it to create a shield for itself. To this logic, Atatürk is the land and republic and neo-Kemalism is Atatürk, so criticising neo-Kemalists is criticising the republic and the land. The graffiti pattern indirectly initiates a discussion about that taboo and directly refuses neo-Kemalism. In this way, it argues about the essence of politics and the founder's mentality.

Besides, the pattern is also pertinent to the issue of public opposition. Until the Gezi movement, institutional oppositional opportunity structures were mostly dominated by neo-Kemalism. However, this graffiti pattern can be seen as a manifestation of efforts to open alternative opposition areas. This manifestation is against all totalist, old-fashioned political practices, including power. In my opinion, the real significance of the pattern stems from its search for creating new public spaces, beyond its bold criticism. This pattern, I argue, has reminded Turkish people, there are alternative ways to oppose, without being stigmatised as enemies of Atatürk and the land.

The pattern also shows that the multiplicity of Gezi was attentive and proactive about intra-movement controversies. There were some principles for the movement that cannot be abandoned, and to protect these red lines, it was reactionary. It did not allow the articulations were out of its simulation representing the alternative. Embodiments of this inner struggle can be found in the graffiti pattern. Another point that we can deduct from both graffiti, is that the movement was successful to generate spontaneous, flexible and effective communicative manoeuvrability. TGB's chanting of the original slogan was unplanned, nevertheless, related graffiti appeared on walls, just after the incident. That can be seen as a hint to determine that

the multiplicity of Gezi was listening, testing, criticising and reacting to things happening around it. Graffiti was one medium for these endeavours.

The Space-time Curvature

Gezi movement is an occurrence that encapsulates various phases and courses of events, which are interwoven and non-linear. Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate these phases based on the repertoire of action, the content and the scale of events. The first collective actions related to Gezi Park emerged as small demonstrations and park watch because they were revolving around the right to the city struggle which I have discussed in chapter two. After the incessant disproportionate police responses and the government's uncompromising attitude, rallies, marches, street clashes, bodily resistance and the occupation have appeared. As the severity and the scope of the events, the number of people involved, and public awareness have been increasing, cyberactivism was being hybridised more and more to these forms. Besides, the accumulated grievances on various social and political issues have been clustered and finally, Gezi has become a social movement expanding to the national and international scales from some aspects by increasing its resonance. The movement contained a multiplicity, therefore the meaning of the space as a concept and the values, emotions and stories embedded in spaces have been diversified by its agents. However, throughout these processes, the significance of the space and its perceiving was only the constant.

Gezi has begun in space, the node of Gezi Park and Taksim Square, and it was about the context of the space. As it was expanding, new places have flowed into this context and it has entered a continuous process of transformation in terms of space. Events and processes that transformed and affected the movement were also reflected in the perception and context of the space. Therefore, the causality between the space and the Gezi movement's practices

constitutes a contextual mutualist structure. This mutualism was the core dynamic of the movement's diffusion. Under these conditions, the node has started to absorb places. Whilst the place-related meanings, compromises, agreements were being overlapped, territories and regions of the movement began to expand and the node became the space of flows. As space of flows diversified, the scale of the movement shifted upwards and it has brought together and combined the meanings about the space.

The diffusion of the movement can be fragmentally observed through the graffiti pattern, which I will examine in this section. By examining the pattern, it is also possible to determine how space was the initial point of conflict for the mobilisation of the actors, and how it became an ideational and a symbolic catalyst facilitating the diffusion of the movement. I will examine and interpret the pattern in two layers. The first layer involves graffiti dated back to the days the movement was still on a relatively local scale territorially and contextually, however they are still about the space. The second layer contains graffiti that refer to the diffusion of the movement.

Graffito 40 announces that the riot police's withdrawal from the park and Gezi protesters' occupation. Besides its obvious communicative functions, the graffito can be further interpreted regarding its textual preferences. It uses the word *alındı* that means *taken* in English ("Alındı", n.d.). Therefore, it can be said that it emphasises the struggle and effort were given for the retrieval of the park. The text is designed as if it were a report that a task was completed. Also, the exclamation point used at the end expresses and underlines the enthusiasm that results from the success of the task. Lastly, graffito is spatially focused entirely on the situation in Gezi Park and on its occupancies.

Graffito 40

Gezi Park is Taken! [Gezi Parkı Alındı!]



Note. (Written in green in the upper left corner) (2013, June 6). Photograph taken by the author.

Graffito 41 mentions Taksim Square, one component of the node, the spatial origin of the movement. The text can be understood in two ways; however, in both cases, it gives an obvious message. First, it can be thought that the graffito's aim is the same as graffito 40's. It announces the current situation based upon the fact that after the reclaiming of the park, Taksim Square was also under the control of the protesters. Second, it can be seen as an expression of the determination of the actors in keeping this urban space as a public space against the government's urban transformation plans. Unlike the first graffito, the exclamation point and the word *lan* add a different meaning and an emotion to the example. Unfortunately, the word *lan* cannot be utterly translated into English. It is mostly used as an

exclamation word in Turkish, but its meaning varies according to its context. It is a slang locution and mostly used like hey, boy, dude or buddy words in English. Also, it can be used as a mild swearword or a threat word (“lan”, n.d.). From the context of the graffito, it can be observed that lan and the exclamation point here are used to create an uncompromising, serious, determined and daring meaning. The graffito strongly claims that Taksim belongs only to the protesters. It is about the right to the city and the rejection of the spatial transformations that the government wanted to realise, and it focuses on the urban space.

Graffito 41

Taksim is Ours Man! [Taksim Bizim Lan!]



Note. (“Sounds on the wall, 2013).

Graffito 42*Taksim Belongs to Taksim [Taksim Taksimindir]*

Note. (2013, June 2). Photograph taken by the author.

Graffito 42 is the last graffito that I will examine in this layer, and it contains also a textual expression concerning the space and the right to the city. Its claim associates the space and those who experience it as a lived space. Thus, it also refers to a place where an emergent form of social identity emerged and differentiated. According to the graffito, Taksim belongs to itself. In other words, Taksim only belongs to things or to people that make it Taksim. This assessment can be seen as factious at first sight, because it is a demarcation, however, because of its ambiguity, it can be considered also inclusive until a point. Because Taksim is the most cosmopolitan and moving place in Istanbul, and not an area where people live,

rather it is a space people visit, work, have fun or pass by. Also, it is a place of leniency, where the lifestyles considered unorthodox are accepted and the coexistence of distinct identities are possible. Therefore, Taksim cannot be linked with some certain group, ethnicity, religion, race, age, gender, education or income level. It is a unique place of flows.

Taksim symbolises diversity, variance and a certain level of freedom. In my opinion, the graffito should be interpreted within this perspective. Therefore, graffito 42 underlines these features of Taksim and states that space should be managed accordingly. It represents an urban political stance, which appertains to the space that gains meaning through the opposition against the government's policies. This stance can be summarised as follows; decisions about urban spaces should be taken by considering their genuine social fabrics. Once again, the graffito concentrates on the space where the movement originated and the right to the city.

Now, I will move on to the second layer that includes the graffiti, which gives clues about how the concept of space and place and their connotations have been changed, whilst the movement has been continued. Before my interpretations of graffito 43, I should explain what is Reyhanlı and its meaning within the context. Reyhanlı is a district of Turkey's Hatay province and on May 11, 2013, just seventeen days before the first sparks of the Gezi movement, two car bombings took place in the district. Fifty-two people were killed and one hundred forty people wounded in the attack. The attack is recognised as the second most bloody terrorist attack in the history of modern Turkey. Besides the massive death toll and devastating psycho- sociological effects, the terror attack caused political turmoil in those days.

I believe a brief detailing about the issue would be needed to understand the graffito properly. After the attack, there were two main international claims regarding the

responsibility for the attack. According to the first claim, the attack was the work of the Syrian regime because the Baath Party wanted to keep Turkey away from Syria. On the other hand, the second claim was regarding that some elements of the opposition in Syria were responsible. According to this claim, the attack was a provocation aimed at making Turkey directly involved in the conflict in Syria (Benlisoy, 2013). Thirty-two suspects were detained in connection with the attack, and twenty of them were arrested. Nine defendants were given life imprisonment fifty-three times, and thirteen defendants were sentenced to prison terms ranging from fifteen to twenty-two years and six months (“The fugitive defendant of the Reyhanlı attack is captured”, 2018). All the defendants were Turkish citizens. It was also claimed that the defendants were working for the *El Muhaberat*, the Syrian secret service, and the attack was planned by Mihaç Ural, the leader of illegal Turkey People’s Liberation Party-Front (THKP-C) (“Mihaç Ural response from Turkey”, 2018).

Additionally, it is necessary to consider the political and social developments that emerged after the attack to understand the graffiti from the perspective of the Gezi movement. For this purpose, I will briefly summarise the local allegations and developments of the period regarding the Reyhanlı attack. First, AKP was criticising the Syrian regime. Second, it was criticised for supporting some elements of the opposition in Syria. It has been also claimed that any proof showing that the attack was carried out by these opposing elements would have revealed the fact that Ankara’s Syrian policy was completely failed. Therefore, the number of people who believed that the government was not conducting an objective investigation was very high (Çakır, 2013c). Third, some news in the press has brought up the claims, which MİT has warned the border police against car bombings coming from Syria to the agenda (“The police did not notice the warning made by MİT about Reyhanlı”, 2015). Additionally, Turkish hacker group Redhack has leaked some documents belonging to the Gendarmerie Intelligence Department “that claimed that an anti-regime

group in Syria with links to al-Qaeda was planning a car bomb attack and this might take place in Turkey” (“Redhack released intelligence documents on Reyhanlı”, 2013). Fourth, after the bombing, tension escalated between the local population and the Syrians who have taken refuge in the region. Syrian refugees have repeatedly announced to the press that they were threatened and were afraid to go out of their houses. Also, it was alleged that refugees were physically attacked (“After attacks, distrust lingers in Turkey’s Reyhanlı”, 2013). Following that, it was stated that the police raided a group planning an attack on refugees in Reyhanlı and prevent the attack (“Turkish police prevent an attack on refugees in Reyhanlı”, 2013). Fifth, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTK) imposed a broadcast ban on news regarding Reyhanlı bombings. The rationale was the publication of the evidentiary crime scene images in visual, written and online media. The decision has increased the speculations and debates that keep the government responsible for the attack, and it was especially seemed by the opposition as a violation of the freedom of information law (“Publication ban for Reyhanlı news”, 2013). Briefly, the terror attack in Reyhanlı has strongly shaken the agenda in Turkey. AKP government was being harshly criticised for hiding the truth from the public eye and for its foreign policy interfering with the Syrian war. Also, the situation in Reyhanlı was being evaluated by the opposition as the incapability and culpability of government in both protecting its citizens and handling the refugee situation.

Graffito 43 associates the Gezi movement with the Reyhanlı attack. Beyond its literal translation into English, the textual expression can be interpreted as follows; Gezi and Reyhanlı are the same. From this point of view, it can be said that the graffito points to the existence of a causative commonality, rather than hypothesising a direct connection between these events. This commonality can be interpreted in two ways. First, Gezi and Reyhanlı have happened under the circumstances of the same political climate and during the rule of the same government. Also, by having regard to the fact the movement’s framing concerning the

AKP government, it can be said that graffiti deems the government responsible for both occurrences along with their reasons and consequences, due to its inadequacy. It does not value its citizens and their demands such as democratisation or the right to live, and tries to keep the truth hidden for keeping its votes. Second, graffiti can be interpreted as an indication of the movement's transformation and expansion of its scope. By the graffitist, Gezi is not perceived merely within the context of an urban movement opposing urban policies. It becomes related to other significant political and social issues, such as the Reyhanlı terror attack, which happened in a place approximately a thousand kilometres away from Gezi Park. In this regard, graffiti shows that the movement was embracing and absorbing the other issues causing grievances far beyond those that have ignited it.

Graffito 43

Gezi is Reyhanlı [Gezi Reyhanlıdır]



Note. ("Gezi Park resistance in the streets", 2013).

The reason for this diffusion can be explained through the fact that these various grievances from various issues were being aimed at the same target, the government. In other words, the movement has grown into a process in which various grievances caused by the government come together or at least begin to be mentioned together. Nevertheless, the diffusion that the example underscores may be seen as a propagation of the narrative enabling the re-framing processes and broadening the movement's scope.

The pattern also includes graffiti, which reveal information on the activists' perception and anticipation of the movement's spatial and ideational diffusion. Graffiti 44 can be considered as one of them. The example contains another binding of two different elements, which are the spaces. It interrelates Gezi Park with Kızılay Square in Ankara, the capital of Turkey. The square is the most important centre and the junction point of the capital city. Besides, it has been the second most significant node where Gezi related events have taken place. Almost from the first day of the movement, Kızılay Square has witnessed collective actions in the name of Gezi. In a short time, it became an urban space wherein heavy clashes happened and barricades were made, due to the uncompromising approach of the government and the police's use of disproportionate force. In Kızılay Square, police violence was sometimes much more than the violence witnessed in Gezi Park and Taksim Square. Unfortunately, Ethem Sarısülük, the first protester who lost his life in the Gezi movement, was shot in the head by police officer Ahmet Şahbaz, in the Kızılay Square. Harsh policing in the square stemmed from the special position of Ankara. The city is the political and bureaucratic centre of Turkey, and Kızılay Square is just a few hundred meters away from ministry buildings. It lies also four kilometres away from the parliament and surrounded by many other government offices. Therefore, police interventions were severe and great efforts were made to prevent protesters from approaching these areas.

Graffito 44

I want the Breaking of a Storm in Kızılay Resulted from Flapping of a Butterfly in Gezi Park

[Ben, Gezi Parkı'nda Kanat Çırpan Kelebeğin Kızılay'da Yarattığı Fırtınayı İstiyorum]



Note. (“#resistgezipark#8”, 2013).

Graffito 44 expresses the desideratum of the graffitist with relation to the diffusion of the movement. Moreover, it uses the butterfly effect as an analogy describing the causality of the events covering both Gezi Park and Kızılay Square. The butterfly effect essentially about the chaos theory coined by Edward Norton Lorenz (1963), and it describes “a situation in which an action or change that does not seem important has a very large effect, especially in other places” (“Butterfly effect”, n.d.). The concept is renowned with the following example

concerning the weather, “flapping of a butterfly’s wings in Amazons may result in the breaking of a storm in the United States” (Banerjee & Erçetin, 2014).

When the graffito is interpreted through the analogy of the butterfly effect, it can be argued that it clearly articulates the graffitist’s wish for the movement’s diffusion. Accordingly, the events in the Gezi Park are seen as the initial action (the flapping of a butterfly’s wings), which may result in desired great happenings in Kızılay (the breaking of a storm) within the frame of the graffito.

Additionally, the textual expression is also supported by a visual element depicting a butterfly. The graffito states that the diffusion of the movement is deeply wanted. However, it is also stated in the graffito that what is desired is a transformation that would create a storm. In other words, it is desired that the movement will spread and evolve to create higher resonance and achieve greater results. Therefore, it can be said that the example refers not only to spatial diffusion but also to growth in terms of impact. Further to that, the graffito may be pointing out the Kızılay, with the belief that Gezi events can have a powerful impact on politics and policies from this particular node, and because of Ankara’s political and bureaucratic importance and centrality. Besides, the graffito can be evaluated as an expression of an effort to steer people into this node or an utterance of an appreciation for the ongoing diffusing of the movement in the capital city. In any case, it can be said that the graffito differs from the other examples expressing the movement’s struggle, demands or aims for a particular urban space discursively. It oversteps the limits of the right to the city by repositioning the movement at a larger territorial scale and emphasises a spatial, ideational and effective development.

Graffito 45

Everywhere Taksim, Everywhere Resistance! [Her Yer Taksim, Her Yer Direniş!]



Note. (“#direngeziparki#8”, 2013).

Graffito 45 provides insights into the peak of the discursive and ideational diffusion of the movement. Gezi movement has been described and depicted many times as a resistance or a resistance movement by scholars and its actors (Tuğal, 2013; Germen, 2015; Yıldırım, 2014; Çolak, 2014; Koç, 2015). Although I think that the resistance should be seen as only one dimension of the movement, I agree that it was one component of its genuine collectivity, because the repertoire of action had to evolve into resistance actions due to circumstances. Under these facts, the graffito mentions and describes the movement as a resistance. Simultaneously, it expresses its spatial relevance through Taksim, one of the two components of the core node of the Gezi. Until this point, it can be seen that the graffito uses common

names, connotations or concepts regarding the movement. Also, by looking at the entire text, it is possible to say that it, like many other examples, invites the audiences to take part in the movement. Additionally, it can be said that the graffito tries to motivate the protesters and to keep their emotions alive to ensure the continuity of the movement. All of these interpretations would be accurate. However, the graffito comes into prominence with something else it does, and it typifies a layer constituted by similar graffiti doing the same thing.

Graffito 45 reconnects the Taksim and resistance words and reproduces their meanings with a new spatial context; *her yer*. Her yer means everywhere in English (“Her yer”, n.d.). This reproduction may be interpreted as an effort to take the movement to another level, to announce that henceforth the movement’s goals should be perceived in another level or to state that the movement passed into another dimension. In all cases, the major axis of the graffito appears through the phrase of everywhere, and this preference can be commented concerning its emphasis on the diffusion of the movement. First, the graffito takes Taksim as space and transforms it into spatiality whose scope is uncertain but its vastness is definite. Second, it re-identifies the movement or the movement’s most prevalent form of action, the resisting, as a connecting tissue for all deeds of the actors, and it frees it from spatial limitations. I argue that the graffito does not refer to the articulation of the spaces joining with the movement, and it does not mention the actual spread of a particular protest form. In my opinion, it speaks of all spaces becoming Taksim while it qualifies all the events, actions and happenings as a resistance. In this way, the above-mentioned dimensional change takes place.

With this change, movement is defined by the graffitist as a phenomenon that can infiltrate all imaginable spaces. In this way, what has emerged in the node of Taksim becomes become spatially transferable and augmentable. Certainly, the graffitist has

generated this sense of spatiality narratively and the movement did not take place practically everywhere. Nevertheless, the rapid diffusion of Gezi did happen and this may have inspired the very idea behind the graffiti. In the graffiti, as a narratively generated space, Taksim becomes an ideational node to cover every tangible spatial condition, diversity and difference, because all kinds of circumstances, actions, meetings, experiences or bodies are ineffective to constitute impediments to it. Everywhere is an ambiguous and constantly absorbing idea of space. It covers all places and directions. In everywhere, there is no way to be spatially excluded. Therefore, every place with its authentic conditions can be named Taksim, and they can obtain Gezi-related spatiality. Moreover, this narrative spatiality rearranges all places as potential Taksims. This makes it almost impossible for the power to take tactical space-oriented counter-framing steps or produce spatial solutions. In a spatial context, to express that a social movement occurs in all places and directions is to say that it protests everything. This is the most absolute representative saturation that can be expressed. In this way, the narrative that movement can realise itself anywhere and through any immanent spatial practices becomes claimable. In other words, in this context, Taksim is the name of a space in the minds that constantly changes the perception of space in the movement's name. This can be seen as a sign of an ideational upright scale-shifting and an example of the ultimate phase of ongoing re-framing. Also, with this re-arrangement, all the practices and actions related to the movement, which is expressed as resistance in the graffiti, become spreadable through the perception of space. Everywhere that is a Taksim, symbolically becomes a place where actions and practices belonging to Taksim can arise and be applied. The graffiti reveals how the Gezi movement, which has started as a social movement about a certain urban space and as a right to the city struggle, has become narratively and perceptually differentiated and diffusible. Besides, it denotes that the movement has turned into a phenomenon that covers aggregately the idea of space, which

transforms and instrumentalise spatiality in favour of the movement. When the graffiti belonging to the second layer are evaluated altogether, it is possible to observe that they provide clues of the spatial and ideational diffusion of the movement that occurred in different forms, with different associations and at different stages. The examples of Reyhanlı, Kızılay Square and everywhere, demonstrate the oscillations of this diffusion and do not contain a linear chronological relation. The same feature applies to the right of the city struggle and the first layer of the pattern which is about the node, the initial space of the movement.

The pattern as a whole does not progressively provide information on the movement's diffusion as the integrity of overlapping and gradually expanding processes. Therefore, per the graffiti, it can be claimed that this spread has taken place as a rhizomatic spread. On the other hand, it is seen that the movement has spread ideationally by keeping the concept of space at its shaft and as it spread; it absorbed different social issues, realities, resources and matters. The strongest case that this diffusion manifests itself is that, as seen in graffiti 44 (everywhere), the diffusion has ceased to be a feature of the movement and has become itself. In other words, the movement has transformed from a diffusing urban social movement, into a movement of diffusion.

Up to this point, I took the pattern as a signifier of the ideational and behavioural diffusion of the movement, and I have made interpretations about the process by thinking of graffiti as peepholes that allow us to pry into the certain stages of the diffusion process. In addition to all these, graffiti can be also considered as one of the areas that the agency, which render the diffusion of the movement possible, have arisen. In other words, it can be asserted that graffiti were one of the handmade, first-hand products of the political agency which made the diffusion of the movement possible. For this point of view, before further interpretations are made, the diffusion should be briefly discussed in some aspects.

Diffusion is the spread of protest tactics and collective action repertoires to different sites of a social movement, or from one social movement to another. However, since it includes innovation, reinterpretation, creative borrowing, adaptation and political learning, it is not just a simple process of imitation, transference or expansion (Givan, Roberts & Soule, 2010, p. 2). Diffusion does not occur independently of relational processes, so continuing interactions and combinations of different types of social, structural and cultural relations shape it (Tarrow, 2005). Besides, diffusion takes place when social relations are often established, where individuals, groups or organisations contact, and learn, borrow or adapt action repertoires or frames (Givan, Roberts, & Soule, 2010, p. 2). The frequency of the diffusion rises when the resemblance increases in terms of claims, complaints or structural factors among the variety of actors. However, these similarities may not be sufficient for diffusion to emerge. Determinants of this happening are networks, information flows and the presence of cultural comprehending (Givan, Roberts, & Soule, 2010, p. 6). It is likely that different groups in different locations having similar grievances and claims apply similar behaviours and tactics (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 126). Some types of collective tactics and frames can be borrowed and adapted more easily by different groups. The practical context by actors using similar tactics and frameworks in a social movement may differ. At the same time, actors with such partnerships can be actors of different movements (Givan, Roberts, & Soule, 2010, pp. 6-7). Diffusion emerges from the changes in the political consciousness of actors, and as Givan et al. (2010) have noted, it is involved by political learning processes, which can be described through the concept of cognitive liberation. In this context, learning and expanded awareness that come true during relational processes come to the fore. When actors see that unfamiliar frames and tactics become useful in expressing their peculiar grievances, claims, identities and the realisation of mobilisation, the change of consciousness occurs. However, diffusion is not only nourished by the positive results of using new

convenient tools. Also, it includes redefining and regenerating the tactics, frames, political targets and identities (Givan, Roberts, & Soule, 2010, p. 9.). There are three main ways of diffusion, relational, nonrelational and mediated. Relational diffusion is the spread of innovations because of the emulation between actors who have previously established reliable, close and continuous communicative relationships. Non-relational diffusion results from the emulation that emerge through the impersonal communicative processes between actors. Mediated diffusion takes place through the third parties and between actors who have had no relations before. At this point, third parties must have pre-existing trust relationships with all actors (Tarrow, 2010, p. 209).

I cannot make any determination about the behavioural and practical diffusion of the Gezi graffiti at the national scale since the data I have examined involve only the graffiti produced around Taksim Square and Gezi Park during the movement. Briefly, the diffusion of graffiti as activism on a national scale falls outside the scope of this study. However, it is also a fact that the graffiti produced in the node formed by Taksim Square and Gezi Park; convey the perspectives, comments and claims of the actors about the diffusion of the movement. Another fact is that the movement has transformed from a local and small action of fifty activists into a nationwide movement involving 3 million 600 thousand activists and covering eighty different cities (“Gezi report of Ministry of Interior”, 2013). Moreover, the number of graffiti produced around the park and the square during the movement is very high makes it easy to conclude that the graffiti has strongly diffused in this node. When these facts are associated, it is possible to make structural and functional comments about the roles that graffiti may have played in the name of the Gezi movement’s diffusion. In this context, I will make inferences about the roles that graffiti may have played as a member of the repertoire of action in terms of diffusion of the movement, through the graffiti I have discussed throughout the pattern.

Gezi graffiti might have played a role in all pathways of diffusion (McAdam et al., 2004; Tarrow, 2010), and enabled the flow of information through the trustworthy pre-existing networks and the attribution of similarity that facilitate the relational diffusion. Graffiti artists practising graffiti in the node may have established social bonds and personal networks because of the spatial proximity and similarities of their grievances during the movement. From this perspective, it can be thought that antecedent practices of graffiti may have provided the prerequisites for relational diffusion, which may occur through the graffiti practising processes that follow. Besides, as I discussed in detail in the second chapter of the study, graffiti practice generally requires a certain amount of organisation. It is often not an act of a single individual. Therefore, it can be assumed that graffiti are the productions of small groups of graffiti artists who are connected in their small networks. In this respect, it can be thought that Gezi graffiti artists' networks and practices may have been convenient for the emergence of relational diffusion or for the building of relations that can lead to the emergence of relational diffusion. Additionally, it can be also argued that graffiti may have played a role in the emergence of a non-relational diffusion among actors with no pre-existing social ties. Graffiti has become a form of action and phenomenon that has been increasingly popular during the Gezi movement. Accordingly, a variety of graffiti patterns thematically, textually, visually and semantically relating to each other, have emerged, just like the pattern that is the subject of this section. It can be thought that the existence of the patterns makes it possible to assume that non-relational diffusion also occurred through graffiti. Besides, in terms of non-relational diffusion, the intense presence and virality of Gezi graffiti in cyberspace reveal the convenience of the graffiti for this particular mechanism of diffusion. Finally, as a form of political practice and an area of diffusion that encompasses both material and cyberspaces, Gezi graffiti may have also functioned as a third-party actor among various and previously unconnected actors of the movement. Because it has created

nodes on the surfaces of urban space that every actor or group participating in the movement could connect directly or indirectly. Moreover, graffiti may have been the contributor of mediated diffusion by enabling these actors to communicate, exchange strategies, discuss how to build public opinion or swap ideas about maintaining the mobilisation.

It is possible to say that the most accurate examples of this kind of diffusion would be the acts of the actors who became acquainted with the graffiti as a novel form of action during the Gezi movement and performed it. In this way, graffiti may have served as a bridge between the initiators and the adapters, as a non-institutional third party, and have mediated the diffusion.

The Unimagined Coherence of the Unconnected

Gezi graffiti is full of examples produced concerning different social groups participating in the Gezi movement and their smaller-scale movements. During my data analysis, these graffiti have emerged with high frequencies, and I produced a category and pattern in which the movement can be evaluated in terms of intergroup relations. I think this pattern contains a richness that will feed the interpretations on both the functions of the Gezi graffiti and the way they interact with the components of the movement. These groups were selected only through data and do not cover all social groups or movements that actively acted with the movement. However, the pattern is suitable for making evaluations and generating ideas. These are; the football fan group *Çarşı*, Anti-capitalist Muslims and LGBTQIA groups.

Çarşı

Çarşı group that joined the movement and changed its course, has a high resonance among Gezi graffiti. The group is an influential fan/supporter group of Beşiktaş; one of three major football clubs of Istanbul. Also, Beşiktaş is one of the most central districts of the city

and just three kilometres away from Gezi Park and Taksim Square. Çarşı was founded in 1982 by the people from Beşiktaş. Çarşı means marketplace, and the group gets its name from Beşiktaş's marketplace area. Like many other football fan clubs, Çarşı members maintain some rituals such as meeting in cafes or bars in the neighbourhood before the match time, cheering all together and walking to the stadium.

However, Çarşı also has some characteristics that differ from ordinary supporter groups. It was founded under the circumstances of the political and social climate of the 1980 military coup that shook Turkey from its core and paused the civil society and democracy temporarily. It was a period of socio-political seizure that emerged just after the harsh cessation of the pre-coup period, which was filled with intense politicisation and political polarisation by high-ranking generals. In those days, football stadiums were the only sanctioned places that people could come together and utter their ideas about the country's situation in their chanting feeling no fear (McManus, 2013). As McManus (2013) in his ethnographic study quoted from Optic President (Mehmet Işıklar), one leader of Çarşı, the group's political stance can be described in line with anarchist and socialist tendencies. Also, these tendencies can be observed on the group's logo that contains the anarchists' A. As I noted, Çarşı differs from ordinary football fan clubs. For example, the group's most popular slogan is not directly related to football, rather it describes a stance against/about life; *Çarşı her şeye karşı* (Çarşı against everything). McManus (2013, p.7) has described the Çarşı as a football fan group that exploited, excluded, and the antagonists merge. The group does not have direct links with Beşiktaş Gymnastics Club, which has many sports branches. Çarşı is a contrarian group and its opposition revolve around issues such as the industrialisation of football and commodification and gentrification of urban spaces that are important pillars of AKP's neoliberal urban policies. Nevertheless, Çarşı's antagonism and protest culture are not limited only to these issues, they surpass the football and the neighbourhood. Over time, the

group has become a political actor expressing opinions and organising collective actions under its stance. Many themes and issues such as environmental issues, animal rights, fascism, paedophilia and women's rights have been in Çarşı's scope of interest and action. Most of these acts are done in the stadium during the games and in places where the rituals of a football group can take place. Some famous slogans and banners of Çarşı as follows; Çarşı against nuclear power, Çarşı against racism, being racist is something much worse than supporting Fenerbahçe (A rival of Beşiktaş), no to child porn, we are all Muhsin Ertuğrul (one founder of Turkish theatre, actor, director and producer), Çarşı is against the destruction of theatre halls, No to tanks, no to war, we are all Armenians (After the assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink).

Due to its actions and its political stance, Çarşı was well known in the public eye before the Gezi movement. Also, the group has many famous members like actors, movie directors or journalists. For example, the famous journalist Rıdvan Akar has written the Çarşı's anti-industrialisation manifesto. The group has strong ties with prominent intellectuals of Turkey. So Çarşı means strong social capital and many influential people from different segments (Helvacı, Dadyan & Erte, 2013). Another important point to underline in this step is the difference between the Çarşı from the ultra-fan clubs. Being an ultra means to associate everything with football and supporters movements. Ultra football fan clubs are strictly organised, hierarchised, politicised and goal-oriented (Kennedy, 2013; Testa, 2009). On the contrary, Çarşı has a heterogeneous structure, loose political and ideological ties, flexible and variable forms (Turan & Özçetin, 2017, p. 5).

In addition to these, Çarşı communicates with its various websites, internet forums and social media accounts that occasionally affect the agenda of sports media in Turkey, enabling the group to become well branded and to steer the Beşiktaş fans. The branding here refers to the effort to generate institutionalised activism and patterning of information

possible (McManus, 2013). Çarşı opposes the effects of neoliberalism and tries to resist or reverse the steps taken by the club's administration in the name of commercialisation or commodification through the moral and cultural values accumulated under its brand. For instance, in the 2009-2010 season, the massive club logo on the roof of the covered grandstand in the stadium was painted in turquoise according to the agreement between Trk Telekom, Turkey's largest telecommunication company, and the club administration. However, because of the fans' huge objection directed by the Çarşı, the logo was quickly repainted in black and white, the club's original colours. Çarşı is a group of supporters that generates a certain opposition via its dissident branding and identity. It has strong ties of trust with its members are from different ethnicities or social groups., and it can transform them into actors. Çarşı was a formation that already could mobilise people for collective action prior to the Gezi movement (Eder & Öz, 2017), and its dissident brand had spread from Istanbul to all of Turkey.

Beşiktaş district, where the Çarşı was born, is a progressive and left-oriented neighbourhood. In his study, Kozanoğlu (1990) noted that Beşiktaş was the only football club in Istanbul that dominated by a leftist fan base. Also, the Beşiktaş football club is often described as a working-class team. Furthermore, Çarşı has manifested itself as a left-oriented alternative in the 1990s. Football in Turkey, in those days, was a steppingstone for the re-rising nationalist discourse and groups.

During the 1990s nationalism was dominant in stadiums, but the climate has changed after the AKP came into power in 2002. With the effects of the great economic crisis in 2001 and recognition of Turkey's candidacy to be a member of the European Union, nationalism in stadiums has entered a period of latency and left its place to the rivalry and hooliganism. Following the referendum that carried out important changes in the constitution in 2010, the AKP has started to expand its hegemony in football by subsidising football teams that are

affiliated with local governments. The government was holding these local governments and transferring its resources to these clubs. Thanks to this support, Bursaspor, the team of Anatolian city Bursa, has won the league in the 2009-2010 season. AKP also has brought major capitalists into important positions in institutions. Some board members of the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) and executives of major clubs', such as Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş, were chosen from these groups close to the government.

AKP's plans to dominate the world of football also faced resistance. For instance, Galatasaray's new stadium was completed in 2011 with the help of TOKİ. At the opening ceremony of the stadium, the fans booed Prime Minister Erdoğan and TOKİ President Erdoğan Bayraktar. That was the first open reaction against AKP's hegemony in the football world has emerged. Only a few months later, AKP made a law stipulating that the fans who create problems in the stands would be severely punished. During the same year, the infamous match-fixing case has started. It was claimed that during the 2010-2011 season, some games were rigged and some teams to the others pay incentive bonuses. Many football players, managers, and board members were detained in fifteen different cities. This is one of the biggest scandals of Turkish football. Following the end of the political cooperation between the Gülen movement and the AKP, the match-fixing case was named a conspiracy case, just like the Ergenekon Case, by the state. With the operation launched in 28 cities on April 19, 2016, many journalists, lawyers and members of some police organisations of the period, started to be taken into custody because they were co-conspirators. Thirty-six defendants were acquitted, but the Istanbul 13th High Criminal Court overturned the decision in January 2020 on procedural grounds. This case is still pending today.

Nevertheless, in 2011, supporters of the clubs, which were targeted by the match-fixing operation, were outraged. The case specifically targeted Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe executives and in July 2011, many club employees, including Fenerbahçe President Aziz

Yıldırım, were arrested. Supporters of Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş organised large demonstrations and protests criticising the government, justice system, the police and the media by using blogs, internet forums and Twitter. There were many clashes between Beşiktaş team fans and the police (Irak, 2020). During the case, football has prominently become an area of dissidence towards the AKP government. Çarşı was on the streets not only for the case but also for various social issues and demands that are not directly related to football and the group was constantly faced with police violence (Özçetin & Turan, 2015, p. 130).

It is possible to group Çarşı's violent encounters with the police in three; during the protests against the demolition of Emek Movie Theatre, during the protests around the Taksim Square for the government's decision to close the square for May 1 demonstrations, and during the heavy interventions of the police before the farewell game for the Beşiktaş's old stadium. All these protests and clashes occurred in 2013, just before the Gezi movement. Thus, it can be said that Çarşı was already mobilised for both football-related and football-unrelated contentions, and was facing police violence. I argue that the accumulation of that fan-based resentment and Çarşı's experiences have significantly determined its roles in the Gezi movement.

Now in the light of this information, I will interpret how the Çarşı was handled in Gezi graffiti. In graffiti 46, from the walls inside of Gezi Park, it is clearly stated that Çarşı is against the government. The lightbulb is the main graphic element of the AKP's official logo and used as the nickname of the party. Also, we see that a derivation of Çarşı's popular slogan pattern, "Çarşı against...", is used. The graffiti's meaning and message are clear, and it has a catchy rhyme. Because in the Turkish language, karşı means against, and it rhymes with the word of çarşı ("Karşı", n.d.)

Graffito 46*Çarşı is Against the Lightbulb [Çarşı Ampule Karşı]*

Note. (2013, June 3) (The graffiti on the left side) Photograph taken by the author.

The point that should be underlined here is that different versions of this slogan have been used by the group also before the Gezi movement began. Many examples can be given such as; *Çarşı engellere karşı*, (*Çarşı against obstacles*), *Çarşı küresel ısınmaya karşı* (*Çarşı against global warming*), *Çarşı kendine karşı* (*Çarşı against itself*). While it is not known whether Graffito 46 was produced by a *Çarşı* member, it can be regarded as a piece of evidence showing the group's presence in the movement. *Çarşı*'s ongoing dissidence was recognised or deliberately brought into Gezi Park by the graffitist. Therefore, it can be argued

that the values that Çarşı symbolises in its neighbourhood, Beşiktaş, such as humaneness, cooperation, solidarity, and unity were also brought via the graffiti onto the Gezi walls. The Çarşı's antagonism to the industrialization of football and neoliberal urban transformations was expressed by its members with humour and catchy slogans, not much different from the discursive preferences of the Gezi movement. The easy unification of the Çarşı with the movement may be related to this discursive and attitudinal harmony.

Graffiti 46 announces the presence of the Çarşı in the park and makes a call for action to Çarşı's members and sympathisers. The famous slogan template indicates an opposition against the government party. The graffiti does not lay down other preconditions for being against the government together with Çarşı, which was sympathetic by almost all opposition groups. Therefore, the graffiti can be seen as an announcement that Çarşı added itself to the Gezi and established bonds with other groups that were in solidarity with the movement. At the same time, it can be seen as an attempt to recruit or attract more supporters for the Çarşı by using the opportunities, which was created by the Gezi movement.

There is another point that needs to be underlined when interpreting the meaning of graffiti 46. It characterises the movement through the eyes of the group. Çarşı is against the lightbulb because the government's policies, and the policing for the Gezi, contradict the codes it symbolises. In other words, injustice and violence bring Çarşı to the Gezi, therefore joining the movement is legitimate and rightful. As one of the founders of the group *Çene* (The jaw), Ergin Demir has stated, that Çarşı rebels against everything unjust, and for the group rebelling against injustice is a democratic right and necessity (Helvacı et al., 2014). Hence, the collective identity and the narrative of Çarşı becomes associated with Gezi's narrative and collectivity.

Graffito 47

Does Anyone Know How to Fly a Helicopter? [Helikopter Kullanmasını Bilen Var mı?]



Note. (2013, June 4). (The graffito written in blue) Photograph taken by the author.

From that perspective, graffito 47 is an output of a frame alignment process between two movements. Graffito 47 and graffito 48 reveal the role of the Çarşı in the Gezi movement and how it was perceived by Gezi protesters. Both graffiti mention the courage and success shown by Çarşı members to maintain occupation and resistance, especially during the street clashes with the police in neighbourhoods surrounding the Gezi Park.

According to KONDA (2014) report, 44.4% of protesters have not taken part in any protests or demonstrations before the Gezi movement. They were not experienced in resisting police violence physically and mentally. However, Çarşı members were knowledgeable about how to behave and organise in such situations, and they conveyed their experiences gained

from stadiums and streets to the movement. Çarşı members have prevented the police from entering Gezi Park many times throughout the occupation and contributed to the physical continuation of the movement. At the same time, Çarşı's effective presence has enabled inexperienced protesters to pass the threshold of fear. The group has served as the Gezi movement's guardian with its muscle power and set a solid example in creating professional activists from amateur participants.

Graffito 47 is based on the famous POMA incident. On June 3, 2013, while the occupation of Gezi Park was continuing, there were violent clashes between the police and the activists in Dolmabahçe, which is very close to the park and Beşiktaş district. The group members did something that night that protesters considered a definite victory over the police. They picked up a heavy equipment vehicle from the construction site of the Beşiktaş's new stadium and repelled the police from Dolmabahçe and chased them. The incident was perceived as a great victory by Gezi protesters and spread rapidly through social media. The vehicle was renamed POMA by Çarşı's social media accounts. The name was derived from TOMA, the abbreviation of anti-riot water cannon vehicle.

Graffito 47 emphasises the success of the Çarşı in the field and mocks with the police. The text is formed as an expression from the mouths of Poma heroes as if they search for a helicopter to expand their dominance in the streets against the police. In my opinion, the graffito, besides its humorous function, reflects the influence of the Çarşı on Gezi protesters' passing the fear threshold. Also, it echoes the affection and the joy of protesters who believed after the POMA incident that they obtained physical and psychological superiority in their struggle with the police thanks to the Çarşı. Graffito 48 shows how the Çarşı is perceived by Gezi activists; the group's significant contribution to the Gezi movement was recognised.

Graffito 48

I'm Looking for a Husband from Çarşı[Çarşı'dan Koca Ariyorum]



Note. ("Sounds on the wall", 2013).

Similarly, graffito 48 describes the Çarşı members as a group of approved husbands-to-be, humorously. To interpret the graffito better, I need to explain the roots of that metaphor. Çarşı's sub-football-culture revolves around the hood culture from old Istanbul comprising a certain level of masculinity and chivalry (Özçetin & Turan, 2015, p. 134). That is the main cultural dynamic of the group's actions. Çarşı is not only a mere football supporter group but also a phenomenon involving heroism, masculinity, protection and dispense of justice, and its members identify themselves as knightly kids from the neighbourhood (Özçetin & Turan, 2015, p. 135). I believe that Çarşı's these features became

amplified and strengthened with the courage and success that its members displayed during the movement. For many protesters, Çarşı means a group of fearless knights who protect and serve. Also, graffiti 49 describes the group accordingly. Çarşı's values, solidarity and bravery are expressed in the graffiti in the form of a prince charming labelling. In the example, like the other examples, it is shown that Çarşı was an influential and efficient group for the movement, and it was deeply appreciated by the protesters.

Anti-capitalist Muslims

Another social group that came to the forefront during the Gezi movement and mentioned frequently by Gezi graffiti is Anti-capitalist Muslims. Anti-capitalist Muslims is an umbrella term referring to the opposing groups rising from the Islamist wing during the AKP rule. These groups are opposed to the neoliberal policies of government, and capitalism claiming that Islamic belief requires that.

Although the AKP has alleged that to be a non-Islamist party in its programs and its discourse (Akdoğan, 2010), it has integrated the institutions of the Islamic tradition, which it originated from, into the political system. AKP has reconciled with the capitalist system unlike the fair order ideology of traditional political Islam that it has emerged from, and became a practitioner of neoliberal policies (Karanfil, 2015). This has led to conflicts, dissociations and opposition within the political Islam movement in Turkey. Some Islamist groups that oppose the welfare theology represented by the conservative capital, Islamic bourgeoisie and the AKP, have proposed the anti-capitalist theology as an alternative (Haenni, 2011; Ekinci, 2014). According to the Anti-capitalist Muslims, the redundancy of possessions means *shirk*¹³. Islam requires an economy of necessities because if people try to have more than they need, that creates poverty for the others (Ekinci, 2014, p. 96). Also,

¹³ The sin of practising idolatry or polytheism.

Anti-capitalist Muslims argue that capitalism has strengthened in Turkey during the Erdoğan and AKP rule, and therefore class inequalities have deepened. With this detachment among the religious segments, these groups started to organise and became active in the political arena. Anti-capitalist Muslims are mainly composed of following organisations; *Kapitalizmle Mücadele Derneği* (The Association against Capitalism), *Devrimci Müslümanlar* (Revolutionary Muslims), *Toplumsal Dayanışma, Kültür, Eğitim ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Derneği* (The Association of Social Solidarity, Culture, Education and Social Research) and *Emek ve Adalet Platformu* (The Platform of Labour and Justice).

These groups have a different understanding of Islam than sovereign political Islam and identify themselves as anti-capitalists and anti-imperialists. Anti-capitalist Muslims argue that they adopt rationalism recommending the reason should be prioritised in religious interpretations, and thus they oppose the AKP government. Also, they differentiate themselves from other Muslim groups who think political, cultural and social hegemony established through AKP power is auspicious, and who suppose they have the power because of shared beliefs, cultural and religious codes. İhsan Eliaçık, one of the leaders of the group, describes the Anti-capitalist Muslims as follows:

“We are pacifists and anti-capitalists. An anti-capitalist is a person who opposes capitalism, and a Muslim is a person of peace. We dream of a world without borders, classes, exploitation and wars and try to realise this dream” (Türeyen, 2018, p. 12). In essence, it is possible to consider Anti-capitalist Muslims as constituents of an Islamic reactionary movement, which is discontented with capitalism and its neoliberal policies. Anti-capitalism is the base of their discourse and for them being an anti-capitalist is a requirement of being a good Muslim. A good Muslim should be critical of capital accumulation, market economy and private property. Briefly, capitalism is a structural sin.

For Anti-capitalist Muslims, the AKP is guilty of pursuing policies in favour of capital and against labour. Therefore, they have developed a discourse in favour of the blue-collar workers and to generate a political Islamist opposition emphasising the labour-capital contradictions. Anti-capitalist Muslims claim that AKP's economic policies deepen the oppression. Unlike other Islamic opposition groups that revolve around religious identity issues, they focus on political-economic criticism. That can be regarded as the formation of the first Islamic opposition that does politics based on class and socio-economic problems in Turkey. For these groups, the religiousness of power is not relevant. It is important for these groups how much poverty, injustice and victimisation the government has caused rather than its religiousness. Anti-capitalist Muslim's antagonism towards the AKP can be summarised as follows: This is not true Islam.

According to them, the AKP's political Islamism became integrated with the order and thus have failed its test against capitalism. The Muslim cadres who have seized the power are in a position that Islam will never approve because they glorify the capital and luxury.

For Anti-capitalist Muslims, Islam is not compatible with capitalism, and Muslims should adopt an attitude aiming the social justice and fighting against the uneven distribution of welfare (Ekinici, 2014, p. 58). Sub-groups of Anti-capitalist Muslims involve leftist Islamist activists. Within these groups, socialists and people who have joined politics through Islamism are in dialogue, and some activists state that they are both Muslims and socialists (Ekinici, 2014, p. 133).

Besides, before the Gezi movement, Anti-capitalist Muslims organised some protests that attracted successfully the public attention. On the first Saturday of Ramadan in 2011, the Labour and Justice Platform organised an alternative iftar in front of a five-star hotel in Istanbul to protest against the luxurious iftar held at the hotel. Members of the group have

broken the fast, together with passers-by, street urchins and African immigrants on the pavements, and shouted slogans such as “Do not break your fast with capitalism”, “We are hungry for humanity,” “Yes to fairness, no to extravagance,” and “We are here to spoil your expensive enjoyment”. After this initial protest, the group repeated that every year under the name of iftars on the earth. Another noteworthy activism of the Anti-capitalist Muslims, before the Gezi movement, was their participation in May 1 rallies in 2012. The group, including women with headscarves, did a demonstration march together with the labour unions and other activists and shouted slogans such as “property belongs to Allah” and “Allah, bread, freedom” (Büyüksaraç, 2016, p. 240).

Before I examine graffito 49, I should mention the group’s acts that were openly supported by other protesters during the movement. Thus, the position of the group in the movement can be understood more clearly. Anti-capitalist Muslims organised a mass prayer in the park and prayed to Allah for the Gezi movement’s success and the failure of the oppressors. Protesters were not among the members who also took part in this prayer. Also, they organised a Friday prayer in the Gezi Park (Friday prayers are the collective praying rituals similar to Sunday mass for Christians), and non-religious protesters formed a human chain to protect the prayers against the police intervention. The biggest accomplishment of the Anti-capitalist Muslims took place on the day of Miraj. This day is holy for Muslims because it is believed that on this day Prophet Muhammad has ascended to heaven and before he returned to the earth. On Miraj, the group has organised a celebration, and all the protesters in the park attended this event and alcohol was not consumed that day to show respect for beliefs.

Graffito 49 comprises a single textual expression; all dominion belongs to Allah. It is a slogan used by the group recurrently also before the Gezi movement and epitomises the group’s political stance. I should also note that the graffito and another banner bearing the

same slogan were at the centre of Gezi Park all along with the occupation. Also, it was one of the largest graffiti ever produced for the movement and its many copies were seen all around the park the Taksim Square. First, graffiti announces the involvement of Anti-capitalist Muslims in the movement, as a group that produces its opposition against the power based upon the criticism of private property, the market economy and economic inequalities that contradict Islam. Also, it can be said that graffiti 49 depicts the group's perspective on the right to the city and hegemonic relations of production with an Islamic reference. At this point, I will try to deepen my interpretation about the graffiti utilising its connotations: Like all properties in the world, Gezi Park belongs to Allah. At least it seems plausible to assume that those who saw the graffiti for the first time might have made such an interpretation.

Graffiti 49

All Dominion Belongs to Allah [Mülk Allah'ındır]



Note. (Graffiti at the left corner) (2013, June 2). Photograph taken by the author.

Also, graffito brought the well-known slogan of Anti-capitalist Muslims to the park and was produced in the context of the Gezi movement. However, the slogan was not produced specifically for the Gezi movement. For this reason, it can be claimed that graffito 50 was also produced to announce the political stance of Anti-capitalist Muslims to Gezi protesters. It serves the group's political agenda. Anti-capitalist Muslims try to pronounce themselves as effective political actor and to reach a higher level of recognition by being in Gezi Park, through the graffito. Unlike the graffiti about Çarşı, it is possible to think that the graffito was practised by the members of the group due to its uniqueness and size.

I argue that the graffito tries to highlight the most unifying notion per its context. From this viewpoint, it does not differ from the many other graffiti produced during the movement. Graffito 49 can be regarded as an effort not to marginalise other thoughts, ideologies, people or groups. Even it tries to unite them. Because the concept of god is the most inclusive entity that can be reached and underlined for religious people and thus Anti-capitalist Muslims when considered in this context. It is omnipresent; it covers everything and associates every single individual/protester. This preference may have been effective in the Anti-capitalist Muslims becoming popular among other groups in the Gezi movement. Because it does nothing but expressing a religious notion that anyone with faith can agree without difficulty. I believe this preference worked especially for the religious people of the movement because it does not have any strong claim. Besides, graffito can be also seen as a sympathetic slogan for non-religious protesters since it does not maintain the polarising Islamic discourse of the AKP and Erdoğan that were the primary rivals of the movement.

The attribution of Gezi Park's property to a divine power first transfers it from the material world to the world of beliefs, from tangible to intangible. After that, the property is

sent by the graffito back to the earth together with a divine message. The park belongs to Allah; therefore, it is now sacred and blessed. I think graffito builds its narrative and meaning similar to most theological arguments. It relates the theme or the subject with divine and unquestionable imagery and takes its power from that. We see here the production of a principle about tangible life that is based upon an intangible divine origin. Therefore, the source of that moral principle, which the graffito is built on, is not a thing that can be targeted, grasped or conflicted by people. Graffito 49 gives a message that originated from superior and supernatural power and speaks about a palpable social/economical issue. That paradoxical clearness and remoteness make the message of the graffito undisputable.

Also, non-religious protesters might have perceived and approved the graffito as a successful discursive attack aimed at political Islam that is in power. According to the Gezi graffiti, it would be not accurate to assume that the protesters were focused on class contradictions and Marxian analyses of the situation. It is interesting to observe that such criticism has been included in the movement's agenda by a group such as Anti-capitalist Muslims. Nevertheless, the graffito and the group have remarkably enriched the movement's narrative.

Besides these, graffito 49 can be interpreted as a sign of the temporary coalition between the Gezi movement and a relatively emergent form of political Islam. That determination leads us to two distinct explanations. First and ironically, the property of political Islam does not belong to only the ruling party. Especially since secular segments were perceiving political Islam as a merged mono block movement completely captured by the AKP. However, Anti-capitalist Muslims, as we can see through the graffito, has announced that there are other emerging formations. It changed the perception of political polarisation in the country because the participation of the Anti-Capitalist Muslims in the Gezi movement reported that there was a great rift in political Islam and that some Islamist

groups were leaving the political Islam that is in power. Besides, these groups are more open and flexible to stand together with the other non-religious groups, the other pole of the polarisation. This may have been interpreted by other oppositional groups as an indication of the government losing power.

Second, since the first day of the movement, Erdoğan and the AKP spokespeople were trying to demonise those who take part in the protests, especially in the eyes of their party grassroots. They labelled the protesters as disbelievers, having no respect for their religion and beliefs. The fact that a religious group from the political Islam tradition has supported Gezi and articulated this solidarity with such a slogan originated from a verse of the Koran, may have undermined these efforts. Also, this collaboration may have contributed to Gezi's efforts for self-description, facilitated the conveyance of a message to the public; the Gezi is against the government's political Islam, not all religious people or groups. At this point, I should note that at the beginning of the movement, most of the religious segments have utterly announced that they do not support or approve it, and Anti-capitalist Muslims had a much weaker agency. The spread of false news claiming that Gezi protesters were controlled by radical leftist groups and external forces, attacked women with headscarves and committed hate crimes against AKP voters were effective in generating that approach. Memories of the oppression of the February 28 period, when the military took harsh decisions against reactionary activities, were also effective at this point. Although the Gezi movement has interacted with Anticapitalist Muslims and established a network, it can be described as a secular movement (Damar, 2016).

At this point, it can be claimed that the Gezi movement involves a series of interactions among distinct individuals or groups, in which people expanded their mental boundaries, acknowledged other cultural codes they do not belong to, and acted with solidarity. For Turkey, an atheist is not in direct conflict with religiosity is an ordinary

portrait at the individual level. However, this perspective does not apply to collective actions. The behaviour of atheists and non-religious people who participate or openly support the religious repertoire of action of Anticapitalist Muslims, therefore, should be considered unusual. Briefly, Anticapitalist Muslims may be regarded as a group that has played an important role in the spatial centre of the movement. The fact that a political Islamist group played a very important role in Gezi, which is a mainly secular social movement against Erdoğan's religious discourse, ideology and neoliberal policies, is one of the surprising phenomena of the movement.

LGBTQIA

Even though the Ottoman Empire has removed homosexuality from being a crime in 1858, people who build their sexual identities with different orientations than accepted social gender roles, LGBTQIA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual, queer/questioning, intersex, allied/asexual/aromantic/agender) groups have been exposed exclusion, neglecting and oppression in modern Turkey for years, and this reality has not changed during the AKP rule. For example, in a speech, Erdoğan clarified that he found homosexuality immoral ("Erdoğan: Gay coupling is immoral", 2013). Partog (2012) has argued that in the post- 1980 coup era while Turkey's integration with the global neo-liberalism was taking place, LGBTQ and feminist organisations gained momentum and found more areas and ways to make their voices heard in the public space. Because the restrictive articles of the coup constitution mostly targeted political left and left-wing civil society organisations. Nevertheless, until the beginning of the 2000s, LGBTQIA groups have remained underground because of social pressure from the belief that homosexuality is against tradition and religion (which is not a factual determination e.g. Zelyut, 2016). Therefore, these groups spent this period by gathering in private bars, cafes and entertainment venues away from the effects of social pressure, strengthening their identities and organising themselves. With the escalation of

identity issues in Western Europe and the USA, they also became to be more visible in Turkey (Partog, 2012, p. 172).

The LGBTQIA groups and individuals have played a central role in the Gezi movement, and their presence was felt strongly. This has to do with the conditions of these groups and their own social struggle, regardless of the Gezi movement. First, Gezi Park has been a popular meeting place in Istanbul for gay men, transgender women and those seeking queer companionship (Stoekeler, 2014, p. 3, Yıldız, 2014). Second, Beyoğlu district, which includes Gezi Park and Taksim Square, is a centre for LGBTQIA people and movement. Most of the LGBTQIA bars, cafes and clubs are located in Beyoğlu. Also, the annual Istanbul Pride Parade starts at Taksim Square and passes the entire district along İstiklal Avenue.

LGBTQIA presence in Gezi Park has started separately from the Gezi movement, but approximately in the same space and time. On May 29, while the first sparks of the Gezi movement appearing, there was also an LGBTQIA action in the park. It was a sit-in protest organised against the exclusion of discrimination on sexual orientations and sexual identities by the new constitutional amendment package on anti-discrimination provisions. From that day, LGBTQIA groups and individuals were actively involved in the Gezi movement and the ad hoc community that clustered around the park. They were also among the most active actors of the movement behind the barricades, where resistance to the police continued (Stoekeler, 2014, p. 4). It is possible to follow the same influence among Gezi graffiti that was most likely produced by LGBTQIA groups or individuals.

I have realised that a familiar word among the Gezi graffiti on LGBTQIA repeats constantly. This locution is *ayol*. It is not possible to translate this word directly and perfectly from Turkish to English. Still, it can be described as a feminine *hey* (“Ayol”, n.d.). *Ayol* is frequently have been used during the movement in graffiti, slogans and banners associated

with LGBTQIA groups or identity. Beyond my field observations, I believe that the use of ayol results from a political and identity-related choice made by LGBTQIA individuals and groups because it is an ordinary and unimportant word as long as it is used by heterosexual women and outside political and identity context. Also, it was used by the dominant discourse to stigmatise gay people for years and in daily chats, theatre plays, television series and movies to caricature them. In this way, their identities were reproduced and presented as an element of discriminatory and sexist comedy. Therefore, it is more logical to think the new ayol with its new political context has emerged from as a remonstrant and critical discourse structured by LGBTQIA individuals and groups. In this sense, the locution was revealed by reversing the dominant discourse.

Graffito 50

Resist [Diren] Ayol!



Note. (“#RemindGezi with photos”, 2014).

As it can be easily seen, graffito 50, 51 and 52 have distinct contents and functions, however, the locution is used by all of them. I believe that ayol was used as the signature of LGBTQIA identity, in Gezi graffiti. Therefore, that reinforces the opinion that graffiti was produced by LGBTQIA groups or individuals. Graffito 50 announces that the LGBTQIA movement has joined the Gezi movement and resistance. It also invites people, including LGBTQIA individuals, to take part in the movement and resistance. As noted, it is assigned to LGBTQIA groups or individuals through the use of the ayol signature. Graffito 51 may have been produced to increase the social visibility of LGBTQIA groups and to contribute to the public legitimacy of their identities. Although it is far from the core context of the movement, it is structurally part of the movement since it is produced under the facilitating effect of the conditions caused by the movement. It redefines the place and status of excluded and oppressed LGBTQIA groups in Turkish society. It does this not by complaining, but by highlighting a social gain. It can be asserted that graffito 51 carries an optimistic message if we consider social reality in Turkey. Nevertheless, it announces that the LGBTQIA groups, individuals and identity no longer identifies marginalised people confined at the periphery of society. In my opinion, graffito 51 works in two ways. First, it reminds and announces the fact that sexual orientations are not identities related to other social categories. People can identify their gender in a variety of orientations regardless of what kind of social strata they are coming from. Of course, that is not a fact newly discovered by the graffito. However, the dominant socio-cultural codes in Turkey create such a perception. Therefore, Gezi graffitists may have deemed this act of reminding and announcing necessary.

If graffito 51 is interpreted more realistically, it can be seen as an articulation of the desire the ending the ordinariness of everyday discrimination against different gender identities. Because and unfortunately, LGBTQIA individuals and groups are being

stigmatised by conservative segments and the government. That is a fact. On the other hand, to my mind, the graffitist may have believed that his message would be effective by relying on another social reality: In every segment of society, there are LGBTQIA people, just like other people. Second, the graffito also can be seen as the announcement of the presence of the LGBTQIA groups in the Gezi movement.

Graffito 51

We are Everywhere, [Her Yerdeyiz] Ayol!



Note. (The graffito written in purple) (“A revolution without LGBT movement is not a real revolution, We are everywhere ayol or ay it’s a revolution for good :)), 2013).

Graffito 52 can be regarded as an example that fits with the popularity created by the humorous and sarcastic language commonly used in Gezi. Unlike graffito 50 and 51, it is directly related to the movement and mock the police while simultaneously criticising the police violence. Also, in graffito 52, we can see that identities of LGBTQIA and Gezi

protesters are fused in the Gezi movement. The graffiti can also be interpreted as an attempt to improve the protesters and the public's perception of LGBTQIA by enjoying the discursive superiority of the Gezi movement. Because, as a movement, it imitates the way the Gezi movement produces its discourse as we observe through graffiti. The only difference is the signature made with the locution ayol.

Graffito 52

Police, Do Not Appear Suddenly! You Scare Us [Polis Ansızın Gelme! Korkuyoruz] Ayol!



Note. ("Sounds on the wall", 2013).

In my opinion, such efforts as we see in graffiti 52 indicate an interaction, a bidirectional cultural flow that is very genuine for the Gezi movement. As a horizontal and mostly spontaneously organised movement, it makes sense for Gezi to have flexibility that

takes care of the presence of its constituents, thoughts and identities, and supports the expression of their demands. These constituents, such as LGBTQIA groups, benefit from that flexibility and utilise that discursive superiority both for their identities and actions. Thus, announcing and disseminating the identities, grievances and claims is fulfilled, both for the Gezi and its constituents.

Graffito 53

I Am a Homosexual, Not a Monster! [Eşcinselim, Canavar Değil!]



Note. (“#I’mnotbotheredbyhomosexuals No to homophobia!”, 2013).

There is also much graffiti that contain messages from LGBTQIA groups or individuals but do not use the word ayol. These graffiti send direct messages to the public as it can be seen in graffito 53, and they should be taken into account as the indicators of the

transformative and temporary impact created by the Gezi movement in the name of public visibility and even representation.

According to the graffiti attributed to various other movements and social groups, it can be argued that the Gezi movement has functioned as a springboard that facilitated making its constituents voices heard. Also, these groups could enjoy that springboard effect since they were useful for the movement itself. Çarşı was a definite and incontestable backup force especially for sustaining the physical resistance thanks to its experiences and crowdedness. However, the group did not contribute much to the movement's discursive development. On the other hand, Anti-capitalist Muslims made an ideal discursive contribution to fend off religious and belief-based attacks coming from the political Islamist power. Also, their resources been helpful to overthrow the government's constant religion- based polarising discourse.

Again, LGBTQIA groups were integrated with movement spatially and naturally. Aside from the effects of geographical proximity facilitating their joining with movement, they had been looking for a space of appearance (Arendt, 1958/1998) for a long time, and the Gezi movement has provided it to them. Also, they have made similar contributions like Çarşı and Anti-capitalist Muslims. It was possible to see an LGBTQIA flag at each barricade during the Gezi movement. Moreover, the pre-acquired sensitivity of these groups regarding sexist and discriminatory discourses kept the movement in the right ethical line.

By examining the graffiti pattern, it is not possible to determine whether these groups were in direct collaborative relations with each other or the movement. There is no concrete evidence that inter-group reunifications have occurred through hybrid collective identities. When the graffiti pattern is interpreted through a relational frame, it is possible to generate some ideas about their role in the movement. These groups have been already in conflict with

the power and dominant political and cultural formations before the movement. They have been oppressed, victimised or excluded in distinct contexts. Besides, their social places were far from each other.

It would be not accurate to claim that these groups were previously connected. Gendered football fan groups or Anti-capitalist LGBTQIA Muslims are not existing identities. However, as I noted, they have one thing in common; antagonism. Historicity, themes and narratives of these antagonisms are quite different from each other. Also, they vary by their targets; the power, the government, the state, or the society's cultural and social pressure. Nevertheless, the Gezi movement has accelerated the flows of autonomy and enabled the repositioning of the places allowing these distinct groups to express their unique grievances and claims regarding their relatively overlapping targets. It is possible to interpret why these groups joined the movement and took on some critical tasks in two different ways. First, the inclusionary structure of the movement was a strategic preference made collectively while the movement was continuing. Second, the social fabric and climate clustered around the movement enabled such task distributions and collaborations to emerge spontaneously. In both cases, using the capabilities of disparate groups has enabled the Gezi movement to spread, strengthen its impact and enrich its repertoire of action at a level that the government could not cope with.

Whirling Depolarisation

Among the graffiti patterns of the Gezi movement, the *Mevlevilik* (Mevleviyeh) and the whirling dervishes, rises to prominence as cultural background. Mevleviyeh, which is one of the biggest Sufist sects in Turkey, has found a place for itself in the semantic world of the movement. It was used to generate narratives and frames, and to spread the movement. However, precepts and images of the sect and its founder *Mevlana* (Rumi) were used for the

movement, only after they underwent a transformation implemented by the protesters. This transformation was based upon the appropriation of Rumi's messages under the movement's values and needs. In this way, an old cultural toolbox was utilised to mediate the messages of a brand-new political mindset. A single message from Rumi was especially popular in Gezi graffiti and was produced by graffitiists recurrently. The repeating message in the graffiti pattern is, *Sen de gel!* (You come too!), and it is derived from Rumi's world-famous poem; *Gel* (Come). To analyse and make sense of graffiti 54 in the movement's context, it is necessary to examine the Mevleviyeh. The thought it represents, how this thought was perceived in the past, and what does it mean for Turkish society today, are important aspects that should be revealed. Thus, the functions, the framing and the socio-political and cultural connotations of the pattern can be discussed thoroughly.

Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi was a Persian and Muslim poet, philosopher, scholar, theologian and mystic who lived in the 13th century. He was born in today's Afghanistan, but he spent half of his life in today's Konya, Turkey. Hence his philosophy and the sect that was formed after his death have significantly affected Turkish culture and Sufism. The Mevleviyeh has been existing for centuries as one of the important movements of Islamic Sufism. It has begun as a certain attitude and behaviour towards life, and over time it became a more systematic way of thinking. Mevleviyeh can be described as a living and thinking way to help to reach *ihlas* (a state of pure love and heartfelt commitment), which is one of the three aspects of Islamic sharia. Sufism is vastly related to the morality of Islam, and it aims to improve the moral maturation of the individual and society. Sufism's goal is to beautify the inner worlds of people from all levels, to purify their hearts and souls from destructive emotions, to offer them a life of high morality by strengthening their wisdom (Köprülü, 1986). According to Sufism, God is the only reality, and everything that exists, all events and appearances are God's reflections and manifestations. Additionally, according to the Sufi

belief, God uses the deceptiveness of human beauty as a mean for its contemplation (Pehlivan, 2015). Thus, the highest aim of human life should be trying to reach God through the *temaşa* (seeing the manifestation of God through its names, acts and attributives) and the *vecd* (the ecstasy) (Çetinkaya, 2005).

Graffito 54

You Come Too! [Sen de Gel!]



Note. (2013, June 9). Photograph taken by the author.

Sufism, in Turkey and other Muslim countries, organised in *tarikats* (dervish order). Tarikat, originated from Arabic, means the path to follow, to reach God, and it is the general

name of the Sufist schools, which are founded to clear these paths. Also, through dervish orders, Sufism has become the general name of institutionalised organisations of beliefs and opinions that are shaped around sheikhs or *çelebis*, and Mevleviyeh is one of these orders. In modern Turkey, Rumi is well-known and seen as a religious symbol, a Sufist and a thinker. He and Mevleviyeh often evoke concepts such as leniency, love, the moral evolution of humanity, unity of people, friendship and humanity. Of course, Rumi's genuine philosophy is decisive in the formation of this social perception. For instance, Mevlana expresses his thought on the social in his *Divan-ı Kebir* (the great book of collected poems) as follows:

“There are various languages, various dictionaries in the world, but all of them have one meaning. Different waters in different containers join each other when the containers are broken, then they flow together as one” (as cited in Can, 1999, p. 144). Again, it is possible to exemplify his vision about leniency with his words “You shall know how to see the rose through the thorn, a rose without thorns can be seen by anyone” (as cited in Küçükbezirci, 2013, p. 23). Mevlana's philosophy focuses on commonalities instead of differences. It is possible to multiply the examples of his concept of leniency.

“One day Mevlana asked his followers a question. ‘What you shall see when you look at a big white dress with a black point on it?’ Sufis answered that they would see no black points; they would see only a white dress.’ Mevlevis do not see the others’ deficiencies because they know that every person can make mistakes” (Jamal, 2007, p. 141).

Mevlana's leniency is based on philanthropy. As one of the greatest philanthropists in history, he says “Love all the creatures (humans, animals, plants) created by your beloved God, be kind to them, to make your soul comfortable, to live in peace or for Allah's sake” (Yakıt, 2007, p. 35). Also, the view of Mevlana on humanity is based on love and

compassion. He accepts love as one of God's qualities and says that it does not matter who or what we love, by love, we love God.

According to Mevlana's ontology, the human, the universe and God are whole and everything comes from God. God created the universe and humankind and gave them its appearance. Therefore, humankind must reveal God's secrets, which are hidden in its essence, and blend itself into the existence of God. However, to achieve that state, humans have to act virtuously and should use their souls as the sources for their behaviours (Pehlivan, 2015). Mevleviyeh is a philosophy that embraces all humankind and one bearer of the perspicacity of Islam.

Concepts of Mevlana's thought such as leniency, love and peace have a strong and positive resonance in the collective memory of Turkish society. Islamic thought of Mevleviyeh is perceived in contemporary Turkey, in this manner. Besides, the order is well known for its religious/artistic practices, such as *Sema* (Sama, a Sufi ceremony).

For centuries, the Mevleviyeh had a significant influence on culture, social life, beliefs and Sufism in Turkey. In Seljuk and Ottoman periods, the sect had good relations with the sultans and other state authorities. Leaders of the Mevleviyeh served as religious advisers or mentors for the sovereigns. At the same time, both Seljuk and Ottomans have supported the order, and many grants were provided to sustain their activities. Mevlevi *dergahs* (lodges) were schools of culture and art. Before the foundation of the republic, both by the people and the power was seen as a school of art that trains many artisans and raises the society's morality (Önkaş, 2011). In particular, from the 16th century onwards, the order increased its influence in political and cultural areas and has spread from rural to urban areas. Two years after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, in 1925, with the law of Prohibition of the Dervish Lodges, *Zawiyahs* and Shrines, all Sufist orders in the country were closed and their

activities were strictly prohibited. After this, the power of the Mevleviyeh on politics has diminished and the course of the order has shifted to the cultural areas. Because the sect's structure was reconciled to the new role of the religion designed by the republican revolution, unlike other sects, the Mevlevis has continued to have some privileges, however only in the cultural area. Moreover, Atatürk has converted the famous Mevleviyeh lodge in Konya, into a museum. That privilege was only granted only for the Mevleviyeh. Also, the Minister of Education of the period has ordered to translate Mevlana's books from Persian.

In 1943, Mevlevi music, and in 1956 Sama was permitted by the state to take place in *Şeb-i Aruz* (Reunion Night) programs (Önkaş, 2011). Sama is a famous ceremony of Mevlevi whirling dervishes. During Sama, dervishes open their arms, lift their right arms and turn their palms to the sky, as if they pray. At the same time, they turn their left palms to the earth and their left arms stay parallel to the ground. That refers to the sharing of what is taken (the right hand) from God with the people (the left hand). According to the order, Mevlevis do not do anything for themselves; they are nothing more than the semblances of existence. Dervishes of the Mevleviyeh define the Sama with these words: "We fly into skies, rain to the earth. Our existence becomes lost in the mercy of the God" ("Mevlevi Rites and Sem Ceremony", n.d.). Sama is transcendence, and about leaving the needs of the body and the mortal daily life behind. Whirling dervishes may whirl for over an hour during the ceremony, and they believe that Sama is the intersection of two worlds. In Sama, the very essence of humans and God is united ("The meaning of Sama", n.d.). The ceremony is described by dervishes as a ritual of transcendence, in which they reach the heavens and find the secrets of God.

Mevleviyeh was not only a privileged sect; it was also an officially accepted cultural heritage. For instance, Rumi was portrayed on banknotes for long years. Also, in 2005, The Institute of Mevlana Studies was established at Selçuk University in Konya, which is a state

university. Briefly, even in eras of different governments, the state was positive about Mevleviyyeh in Turkey.

Now, I will examine briefly the values that Mevleviyyeh represents, propositions of its philosophy and current perception of the Turkish society about the sect. I think understanding these values is crucial for enabling the interpretation process for the graffiti pattern. At the same time, differences between the religious discourse of the Gezi movement, which is generated through the values of Rumi, and the AKP's political Islamic discourse should be examined. This distinction will allow us to reveal the rationale behind the choices that the Gezi protesters made, and the logic of the struggle in which the movement tried to resonate its messages in public space. Comparing, the Islamic perspective represented by Mevleviyyeh with AKP's perspective can guide us to understand the mechanism of the pattern. The order, which has been not involved directly in politics after the foundation of the republic, emerges again from the Gezi graffiti like a silhouette. I believe that is a very piquant point to discuss, under the conditions of the AKP rule. At first glance, it can be claimed that the emergence of the Rumi in the Gezi graffiti stemmed from the contention between the AKP's neoliberal Islamic perspective and the movement's doxastic counter- framing. In other words, the process seemed to suggest Mevlana's thoughts and values against the government's Islamic policies. I think the genuine conflict lay elsewhere. Because religion was not the reason both the AKP and the movement referred to religious values and symbols.

It would be wrong to describe Erdoğan and his party AKP only through the policies of a political party that had seized the power in the name of political Islam. AKP is not only a political Islamic party. Party's cadres have stated at every opportunity that it has severed its links with the Islamist approach of the *Milli Görüş* (National Vision) movement (Akdoğan, 2004), even though the party has gained most of the votes of this movement (Safi, 2007).

The mission that is undertaken by the AKP is to create a link between the developmental, competitive and outward-oriented modern structures and the conservative-local sensitivities that based on Islam's social perspective. The party takes the responsibility of a large political scale involving the nationalists, the conservatives, the liberal left and the liberal right. Thus, it has to struggle with the problems and meet the demands of these groups. For this reason, AKP has tried to pull itself to the centre-right, considering that an Islamist movement cannot be pursued in politics (Akdoğan, 2004). Accordingly, at the first ordinary congress of his party in 2003, Erdoğan has announced that the AKP's political mission is to carry values and demands of the society to the centre of the politics (Bingöl & Akgün, 2005; Erdoğan, 2003). Also, AKP has maintained policies that are in line with global neoliberalism, unlike the National Vision movement. Thus, in terms of economic policies, AKP completely separated itself from the tradition of political Islam in Turkey, which defends a closed economy and claims the banking and usury are illicit (Uzun, 2016). The party seeks to complete the neoliberal transformation of Turkey. Also, it implements a critical discourse on the neoliberal economy, to keep its voters happy. AKP has always been a political party that satisfies the needs of the big capital and tries to realise the globalisation processes with the cheap labour force, rather than technological developments (Boratav, 2015), and its political Islam perspective and discourse on religion are the methods of agreeing with local communities around the axis of conservatism (Akdağ, 2012). Hence, AKP's founders and executing cadres, who are the successors of the National Vision, use the administrative experiences of zalism (Fidan, 2013).

At this point, it would be appropriate to discuss Islamism. There is no single type of political Islam and Islamism. For instance, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Taliban in Afghanistan, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ikhwan in Egypt and even ISIS are Islamist organisations. However, the Islamism of Sekarat Islam that was in close cooperation with the Communist Party of

Indonesia, or Islamism of Islamic movements, that are the bearers of anti-communism is very different.

In Turkey, AKP refers to Islam to reach its political purposes, Anticapitalistic Muslims used a similar tactic for the Gezi movement. Different Islamisms have different political orientations, social characteristics and historical backgrounds, and Islamic movements are inter-classed, populist, political formations who transform class and cultural antagonisms into cultural and religious concepts. Islamist movements can mobilise dissident classes around democratic and social demands, which are interpreted with some essentialist cultural terms, and in Turkey, Islamic political discourse has been utilised to seize the power. Therefore, political Islam can take various hybrid forms emerging from two main causalities aiming to influence society's perception; the heart of a heartless world or the opium of the society. Political Islam can involve the consent generating practices of a particular hegemony, or it can facilitate the emergence of grassroots movements of disadvantaged groups. The Islamism of neoliberal capitalism, the Islamism of the depleted petty bourgeoisie or the Islamism of plebeian strata may and would different phenomena for a social formation. Therefore, the categorisation of the Islamist political actors, organisations and movements should realise by their policies and practices. The Gezi movement was also the junction of different political goals and instruments that used political Islam for their distinct purposes in their way.

Starting with the Gezi, AKP is in moving from being an expanding hegemony - gaining consent from different social and political movements- to being a shrinking hegemony -having serious difficulties in persuading people from various segments. However, narrowing the hegemonic capacity of AKP does not change its popularity among under advantaged segments.

Because of the reduced capabilities and emerging fractures on the party's grassroots, AKP needs constant agitation, polarisation and consolidation revolving around Erdoğan's persona and the new Turkey myths. The way to meet this need is to make Islamic themes more dominant and visible (Benlisoy, 2015). In the light of such information, I believe that it would be more accurate to examine the graffiti pattern, as an attempt of the movement to oppose this polarising Islamic political agenda.

In my opinion, this polarisation, debate, contention or opposition and the graffiti which reflects that, emerges between two different political rhetoric, not between two different Islamic views; the polarising discourse of AKP and Erdoğan based on the necessity of continuous political consolidation and agitation and the embracing discourse of Sufism required for the dissemination of the movement. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the nature of discourses from both sides rather than opposition between AKP's neoliberal political Islam and Sufist Mevleviyyeh's concept of universal-inclusive Islam. Because these contending frames are the cultural manifestations of the encounter of the oppressor and the oppressed, that take positions according to this polarisation. Polarization expresses the intense gathering of two or more conflicting groups, with pre-acceptance such as us and them or right and wrong (Atlee, 2004). It is not only nurtured by the growing inequality in the distribution of money or status. It can be also generated through different ethnic, religious, cultural identities and different lifestyles. Polarisation leads group members to prioritise their identities and increase the perception of distantness with members of other groups (Kiriş, 2010).

In the context of the graffiti pattern of the section, it can be claimed that the polarisation arises between the identities affirmed by the power, the totality of representations and the excluded identities of the multiplicity that mobilised in the Gezi movement. Besides,

since religion has been one of the crucial matter of contexts of the polarisation in Turkey, this contentious relationship did not unfold independently of Islamism.

The distinctive feature of the polarisation is acrimonious alienation from the other groups and a deep group identity interaction. When members of a particular group in a polarised society, they build or define their identity through other groups, and they begin to feel separate and different socially and ideologically. Thus, polarisation has a conflict-enhancing effect (Esteban & Schneider, 2008). In terms of groups, polarisation is a process that reinforces the similarity of those who are in the same group and initiates the othering. Also, it can be enhanced and extended because of the increasing importance of cultural issues. Strategies on cultural structures can ease the collective action and provide a map for the movements, which want to find a path, but the same kind of strategic thinking can be the gasoline of the polarisation, which helps any kind of oppressive regime.

It is frequently noted that the identity claims; the contentions based on religion, ethnicity, cultural formations and gender become gradually more significant for social movements, rather than political and economic inequalities between individuals and groups. Scholars name this phenomenon as the re-identification or the identification of differences or the rise of the identities (Friedman, 1994; Conolly, 1995; Hall, 1996; Kymlicka, 1998; Castells, 2004; Keyman, 2007). Evolving of multi-faceted identities, rising of the differentiated identities, cultures and lifestyles are caused by neoliberal capitalism's infiltration into everyday life and biopolitics. That creates opportunities for the populist local or partial embodiments of opposing and hegemonic discourses that are utilised for mobilisation.

From the point of discussion of culture and identity, there is one other aspect that must be emphasised; Rumi in popular culture. The thinker has become increasingly popular

in recent years, both in Turkey and in the world. Many movies made about Rumi and Mevleviyyeh in Turkey, and he was used in promotional films of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Also, he and his dervishes were being seen in advertisements (Bölükbaşı, 2011) and the holy Sama has become a touristic spectacle (Tarhan, 2007; Akbaş, 2016). In recent years, Rumi has become popular also in the West. His books have been among the best sellers in the United States for years. Also, international organisations contributed to the generation of this popularity. United Nations, with Turkey's proposal, declared 1995 as The Year of Tolerance, inspiring by Rumi. UNESCO has declared 2007, the 800th anniversary of the birth of Mevlana, as The International Year of Rumi. The most well-known work of Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi, the Masnavi, is translated into 112 languages. In 2011, there were 242 books, 569 academic articles, 80 master's theses and 36 doctoral dissertations about Rumi and Mevleviyyehi published in the Western world (Şimşekler, 2011).

In light of this information, it can be argued that the origin of the graffiti was popular culture. In other words, through the graffiti, a popular cultural product becomes a dissident popular cultural product. In the case of the pattern, a differentiated perception of Islam is not at the centre of the mechanism. This orientation, which is also found in many other graffiti narratives, reconnects the traditional cultural elements with popular culture. It can be said that this worked for the Gezi graffiti as a significant source of narration. In my opinion, it would not be correct to claim that Gezi graffiti artists who created the pattern perceive Mevleviyyeh like Mevlevis. Mevleviyyeh is perceived as a popular cultural element, used only at that depth, and its discursive effects are operative only in that frame. Also, the Mevlevis did not participate in the movement or declare their solidarity with the movement. Gezi movement and the order were not connected politically or socially. I will support this argument with an example. Activist and performing artist Ziya Azazi has performed whirling like whirling dervishes during the occupation in the Gezi Park. He was named by the protesters as the Gas

Masked Dervish of Gezi. However, in his interview with Acar (2013), Azazi mentioned his performance as a whirling dance, and he described the performance as a dance style that is attributed to Mevleviyeh. In the interview, there is not a single reference to the order, the Rumi, or any political connectedness between the movement and the Mevleviyeh.

At this point, I believe it is necessary to mention Stuart Hall's approach to popular culture as a dynamic area of contention. According to Hall (1981), popular culture is far from being homogeneous integrity. It is a dynamic area of contention, in which both the elements of resistance and acceptance can be found. It is an area in which the past and the future, the rebellion and the subjugation, cultural elements conflicts and clashes with each other. It is the dialectic of the cultural struggle that makes the culture a permanent battlefield. For Hall, (1981) there will be never a definitive winner of this struggle; however, there are strategic positions to capture and to lose. Therefore, the graffiti pattern I examine in this section may be seen as a convenient discursive toolbox hijacked from the popular culture, involving also the appearance of the Mevleviyeh. In this way, the movement reproduces its discourse through an Islamic way. I believe that graffiti 54 tries to make a strategic move by using a cultural/Islamic narrative and imagery, which does not polarise. It opens an Islam-based alternative for the movement against the power's polarising manoeuvres.

In the pre-Gezi period, the government's power was perceived as absolute and unshakable, even by the opposition. Also, the opposition was composed of small groups that are fragmented, not well organised and constantly conflicting within themselves. One can argue that a cultural membrane was needed to cover and grasp all these small groups sensibly. This membrane should also have had a cultural incontestability to cope with the power's polarisation methods. I assume that the initiative of the graffiti is not about targeting power. It does not do what the power does for polarization. It makes an embracing call and tries to create a new space for itself and puts an effort into repositioning against the

polarisation. The discourse of Erdoğan on the Gezi protesters should be briefly examined before taking a deeper assessment of the pattern.

As I noted, for the AKP and Erdoğan, polarising populist discourse is a frequently used tool (Yıldırım, 2009). Accordingly, during the movement, this rhetoric has been used frequently through the mainstream media. From the first days of the Gezi protests, Erdoğan used very provocative and accusing language. A few quotes about this discourse can be found below.

“If the issue is to stage a protest, I can gather 200 thousand people where they can gather 20, my party can gather 1 million people where they gather 100 thousand people. We have no trouble at all mobilise people. But, they shouldn’t bring us to this point” (“I can gather 1 million people where you gather 100 thousand”, 2013).

“We don’t do what a few looters do. They burn, they clash, and this is the definition of being looters. They burn public property. They burn the shops of ordinary people. They also burn the civilian vehicles” (“President Erdoğan: We do not do what a few looters do”, 2013).

“Are they not the ones who want to disrupt public order? We will not see this? Will we just ignore it? We want our youth to know them. This is their history. Because they think they will get the result that they could not get in the ballot box, there. But they will not” (“Erdoğan speaks at Kazlıçeşme meeting”, 2013).

As seen in the quotes above, Erdoğan had been using a polarising and accusative discourse about Gezi protesters. He did not seek to create a chance for a democratic consensus, and on the contrary, he tried to merge his supporters against the opposition. Here, we see an exclusionist attitude, which uses political populism for polarisation and completely marginalises those who protest.

We can now examine the graffito which represents this pattern in which Mevleviyyeh, popular culture and political polarisation are intertwined. The graffito consists of two elements; a text that uses the phrase, *You come too!*, and a visual design that portrays a whirling Gezi protester wearing a gas mask. The phrase is taken from a rubaie attributed to Mevlana; *Come*. Although there is an academic dispute on this attribution, it is widely accepted that the rubaie summarises his philosophy. The English translation of Rubaie's is as follows:

“Come, come again, whoever you are, come!

Heathen, fire worshipper or idolatrous, come!

Come even if you broke your penitence a hundred times,

Ours is the gate of hope, come as you are” (Tosun & Erdoğan, 2013, p. 356).

The Rubaie can be described as an invitation sent by Rumi for coming together to be united. It is not judgemental and does not create any exceptions. It is a religious call telling people that they can save their souls no matter what they did before. It is never late for salvation and there is always hope. In this context, it is possible to interpret that the textual part of the graffito makes a similar embracing, non-judgemental and encompassing invitation in the movement's name. The graffito makes a call for action/participation and emphasises that there are no prerequisites for this union. With the rubaie's connotations, it can be argued that the graffito announces that the movement invites everyone to mobilise, without considering any differences based on identities, political views, beliefs, social status or social classes.

The visual part of the graffito contains a protester with a gas mask dressed and whirling like a Mevlevi dervish. With this Rumi-based component of the graffito, it is aimed

to affect the audiences through a politically re-generated popular version of a popular symbol based upon an ancient religious/cultural and widely affirmed symbol.

People's positive and respectful confirmation of Rumi and his philanthropic vision are transferred to the graffito's call, and the graffito is designed to gain approval from the people for participation and the movement itself. Besides, another interpretation can be made about the visual element. We may focus on whirling protester's gas mask.

This choice of design creates grotesque imagery, and it obtains its impact by doing that. The whirling protester wears a gas mask because he is affected by the police's disproportionate use of force. Also, he whirls like a dervish holding his right hand in the sky and turning his left hand to the ground. With this visual composition, I would allege that the graffito tries to contribute to the resistance through the connotations of Sama. The whirling protestor is shown in a transcendental state like a whirling dervish. From this perspective, the graffito may be interpreted in this way: The movement does not want anything for itself, just like a Mevlevi dervish. It gives the people back what is given to him through the pain and the pepper gas.

To my mind, the graffito emblematises the movement as a phase of transcendence, in which even the coercive powers are functionless. Because it generates a narrative in which protesters devote themselves to the movement, just like the dervishes who devote themselves to the god. So, graffito makes the movement holy, pure and philanthropic. Thus, the movement becomes presented for recognition and approval by the people.

Furthermore, I believe it should be underlined that how the graffito prefers to be connected with this religious, Sufist cultural symbol. Under the circumstances in Turkey, where political Islam and neoliberalism in power, it is remarkable to see how the movement relates itself with religion. At this point, it is possible to claim that the movement has used a

religious-cultural context for its advantage, and the de-polarisation of the society. Also, it can be assumed that the movement has tried to grasp a certain understanding of religion. However, that deed should not be perceived as propaganda for the Mevleviyyeh. Graffito tries to prove that Islam can be understood and practised in distinct ways, rather than the AKP's Islam. Also, it announces that there are already more humane, universal and embracing ways of Islam in Turkey.

When all layers of graffito 54 are correlated and examined, it is possible to argue that it makes transitions from the notional world of the order, into the notional world of Gezi. It uses a cultural/religious shared background to glorify tolerance, invite people to join the movement, and gain a structure that can embrace all segments of society. Graffito generates a narrative and a framing for the Gezi derived from Mevlana's thought that can be interpreted as the creation and utilising of a political accent, which was already familiar for the ears of the public. Also, that accent is novel because it connects two previously irrelevant places (politics and Mevleviyyeh, and it allows the graffitists, through this novelty, to make a political critique and proposal.

Interpretations of this graffiti pattern can be enriched in this way; Gezi protesters have announced that they are not against the religious people or the religion. This was one point that Erdoğan was emphasising while criticising Gezi protesters. He always tried to portray the movement as a movement disrespectful to the general values and beliefs of society.

However, through the pattern, Gezi declares that it is not a movement only of atheists. Also, according to graffiti 54, under the heavy pepper spray, protesters have continued to be around the park in transcendence, for the sake of their rights and ideals without caring about their health. So, this is something holy, like a Sama ritual, and Rumi's spirit is with the movement. In my opinion, movement through the pattern has tried to touch people's conscience and

invited them for joining. Besides, in this way, it was stressed that no individual or group participating in the movement will be judged and rejected. Gezi was open to everyone like the door of Rumi.

Another important inference that we can deduct from the graffiti is Gezi differentiates itself from the other political movements by using this inclusive language. Within the boundaries of its discourse, it does not otherwise like Erdoğan or other dissident actors. In my opinion, it is was a political preference and stance and it resonated high among the aggrieved groups clustered around the movement. Because it was perceived as an exemplary approach mixed with debates of ethic that were already started because of the power's and other political actors, which have maintained populist polarisation.

Finally, according to the graffiti pattern, I argue that the Gezi movement has replaced the populist polarisation with a populist de-polarisation. The pattern can be regarded as an indicator of needs, longings and aspirations in Turkish society for consensus, solidarity and harmony. Gezi protesters wanted to constrain the ongoing polarisation because they were the targets and victims of it. Thus, the movement can be described as a contentious episode that aims to bring back the conditions that would facilitate the consensus.

Conclusion

In this chapter, Gezi graffiti patterns obtained from the data have been interpreted and evaluated separately and concerning the relevant concepts and notions. The fragmented content of the chapter will be correlated and combined during the theory generation to be carried out in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5 – THEORY GENERATION AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

This chapter presents the grounded theory generated, discusses the implications and limitations of the study and concludes the dissertation.

The Grounded Theory

To present the generated theory, the chapter re-assesses the patterns obtained from the data relationally and re-selects them for the formation of the theory. The grounded theory is articulated in two distinct stages. First, it is written in a form in which it is built only from the patterns and their relations. Second, it is re-expressed using the concepts of the existing literature, to ensure its compatibility and to demonstrate its contribution. The relational examination of the patterns is carried out by focusing on their actions. As a result of combinations of all the categories that came out of the data, eleven different actions of Gezi graffiti have emerged. Ten of these contain answers to the problem of the research.

These are respectively as follows; using humour, identifying opponents, discussing important social and political issues, using populism, introducing and assessing the movement, talking about the movement and in the movement's name, illustrating the logic of action, reflecting the movement's newness, showing the movement's relationship with space. These reduced categories (or patterns) express what the Gezi graffiti says about the Gezi movement. The eleventh category relates to the graffiti itself and can be seen as a supportive secondary category.

Gezi Graffiti Generates Humour

Gezi graffiti mostly involves jokes. During the movement, it has made the people laugh or announced to the people what graffitiists have found funny. Also, it enabled the

graffitists and the audiences to take part in a shared act of laughter and thus kept the movement in a positive emotional mood. Apparently, the node, the surroundings of Gezi Park and Taksim Square, were filled with graffitists who make jokes, laugh at their own jokes and protesters who were accompanying them. Despite the violence, tension and intense physical struggle in the node, graffiti has emotionally supported the movement by generating humour and creating carnivalesque moments.

It is seen that all patterns of graffiti use humour to a certain extent. Humour has diffused into the entire Gezi graffiti universe and taken distinct forms per the given subject under consideration, the message intended to be conveyed and the intended purpose. The most common forms of Gezi graffiti humour are absurd, ridicule, sarcasm and mocking, and through humour, Gezi graffiti often glorifies the movement, humiliates its opponents and disapproves the discourses of some movement constituents.

The things we can laugh about are things we have noticed. This awareness frees us from being the object of the relevant situation and allows us to handle processes from a more analytical and broad perspective. All the humorous forms used by Gezi graffiti direct people to assess situations, ideas and beliefs from a fresh perspective, including the movement itself. Generation, presenting, or validating fresh perspectives is the basis of critical thinking. Gezi graffiti uses humour not only to affect emotional processes but also to criticise, to self-criticise and to invite people to criticism and self-criticism. The criticisms of Gezi graffiti move to all areas where humour can penetrate. In other words, it jokes about everything it criticises and opposes. Also, it identifies and reports its external and internal relationships through distinct forms of humour. Within the scope of external relations, patterns of *Erdoganism* and *solid, liquid and gas* can be seen as examples. The harsh cynicism and ridicule encountered in these patterns indicate that graffiti identifies the opponents of the Gezi movement. On the other hand, the pattern of *soldiers of nobody* states what kind of

opposition the movement approved and under what conditions it accepted the coalition and cooperation. In the context of internal relations, Gezi graffiti utilises humour within a critical approach that expresses and describes the opposition values and opposition styles of the movement. By determining what should be criticised through humour, tells what to approve and sets a value or ethics for the movement.

The criticism of Gezi graffiti humour becomes evident and stiff in matters that the movement had straightforward answers. The borders and goals of the directly affirming humour related to the Çarşı group within the pattern of *the unimagined coherence of the unconnected*, or the irony that established the collective identity in the *chapuling* category, are clear. However, as seen in the patterns of *deliberate political void* and *people versus people*, keep the humour in absurd, ambiguous forms since it cannot produce obvious solutions or claims about issues. At this point, humour becomes a debate launcher rather than being a critical weapon.

Besides, how Gezi humour produces meaning is not independent of the conditions of urban and cyberspaces. It is not possible to conclude by looking at the examples of Gezi graffiti whether these conditions determined the structure of humour or that humour was deliberately built in this way to take advantage of these conditions. Both estimates may apply. However, the challenging conditions in urban space did not give graffitiists much time to practice graffiti. For this reason, humour was conveyed through short, clear and striking texts, or with stencils prepared at home. Complex texts or visual designs are not found in Gezi graffiti. For this reason, the humour of Gezi graffiti is highly evocative and open to connotations. It uses existing cultural backgrounds, poetical expressions and punchlines frequently, so it can be perceived within a few seconds. The realisation of the criticism is completed with the participation of the audience. This form of humour coincides with the frequent, intermittent, repeatable, easily spreading and rapid viral humour of cyberspace. For

this reason, Gezi graffiti humour has been effective both in the walls of urban space and in cyberspace.

Gezi Graffiti Identifies Its Opponents

Gezi graffiti often mentions the opponents of the Gezi movement and determines who they are. According to the patterns, the Gezi graffiti shows that the movement had three important opponents; Erdoğan, the police/police violence and the mainstream media.

From Gezi graffiti, Erdoğan emerges as an iconic opponent, as the sole reason for all social, economic and political problems and situations that the movement draws attention to. His persona is also the target and the object of demands for social change. Gezi graffiti mostly does not describe, analyse and persuade Erdoğan. As seen in the *Erdoganism* pattern, it criticises or ridicules him harshly and recurrently. However, these criticisms and humiliations are mostly not associated with realistic contexts or explanations. Erdoğan is a demonised abstraction that replaces the concept of the leader in the Gezi graffiti. He is a target board, detached from the past and the future, and continuously aimed. He is not called to resign, and even an alternative to Erdoğan is not produced. The thing that is frequently articulated is the opposition towards Erdoğan. In Gezi graffiti it is stated strongly that Erdoğan is not wanted. However, as seen in the *deliberate political void* pattern, it is not stated who or what kind of prime minister should replace him. This part is left to more intense humour and absurdity. From this point of view, Gezi graffiti regards or shows Erdoğan as the sole political rival. It is seen that Erdoğan's persona fed by his repressive policies to realise a one-man regime is valid also for Gezi graffitists as well as his voters. In other words, the Gezi graffiti treats Erdoğan as the only competitor regarding the political field, and this is in line with Erdoğan's perception of the only man regime he tries to establish. Accordingly, the Gezi graffiti speaks little of Erdoğan's party AKP and other actors

of the established political arena. For this reason, it is seen that Gezi graffiti's view towards power does not go beyond the frame that the power tries to impose, but it has a purpose to disrupt or disturb that frame. Erdoğan's monist entity is decisive both for expressing the reasons that force the movement to emerge and for shaping the discursive opposition of the movement. Erdoğan is the ultimate concrete political enemy of the movement, and the reactions to this enemy include narrative acts formed around the mythos rather than conceptual discussions of the logos.

According to Gezi graffiti, another opponent of the movement is police and police violence. Gezi graffiti mentions the police and its coercive methods often and shows them as physical opponents of the movement in the field. The struggle between that opponent and the protesters has often depicted as if a sports competition between the two teams or a war between two sides. As seen in the *solid, liquid and gas* pattern, these encounters are associated with the concepts of victory and defeat. Among Gezi graffiti, the coercive methods of the police and the police itself are defeated constantly, and the protesters are victorious. In this context, the rivalry with the police differs from the rivalry with Erdoğan. Although Erdoğan's defeat is not directly expressed, the defeat of the police and the uselessness of its coercive methods, such as pepper gas or pressurised water, is certain. Besides, the humorous criticism of the Gezi graffiti that targeted the police and its methods is also different from its humour against Erdoğan. The police are also evidently criticised; however, it is not taken as seriously as Erdoğan and not demonised as him. Towards the police, Gezi graffiti is provocative, mocking and belittling. Briefly, it is seen that Gezi graffiti depicts the police and its methods as opponents that are constantly interacted and defeated. According to Gezi graffiti, another opponent of the Gezi movement is the mainstream media. However, the media is not seen as an existing rival like Erdoğan or the police. The media is a rival who has caused great disappointment and anger and betrayed society by not reporting about the

movement. However, for the Gezi graffiti, this opponent has already been eliminated. There is no relationship of warring factions between the mainstream media and the movement. The media's censorship practices and damage to the movement are presented as a problem that had been overcome. As can be seen in *penguins' media* pattern, gas-masked penguins manage to cause trouble for the power and do not give up. Gezi graffiti shows the mainstream media as a defeated opponent like the police and its coercive methods. That opponent is depicted as excluded and disabled. The exclusion of the mainstream media is highlighted by citizen journalism, emphasises citizen journalism, and the collective identity of gas-masked penguins. However, the mainstream media causes bigger outrage than the police, because the police do what is expected of it, but the media betrays the reason for its existence.

Gezi Graffiti Discusses Important Issues

Gezi graffiti discusses important political and social issues in Turkey. Many patterns of it address both ancient and contemporary matters and open them to discussion. *The soldiers of nobody* pattern mentions the relationship between the individual, political institutions and the state, *deliberate political void* directly criticises the established perception of the concept of politics and raises the problems of representation and political participation. *Mothers at the barricades* pattern focuses on the patriarchal, traditional and conservative state tradition. *People versus people* is concerned with how and by whom the public is defined.

Gezi graffiti's approach to these issues and its discourses on them vary in terms of contexts and forms. However, what's constant is its involvement and direct or indirect criticism for how the state and politics are organised. In this framework, Gezi graffiti involves different phases such as rejection, separation, avoiding alternative propositions, or presenting absurd irrational solutions or suggestions. *Soldiers of nobody* pattern bears an

obvious objection and justification: non-individualised political agency and sacrificing actors to political totalities is protested and rejected. Moreover, this rejection is satirically done as a response to a supporting group that participated in the movement. Here, graffiti sets a principle for Gezi and does not give up on that even when there is a risk of losing a partner. The fact that the political attitude is within the applicable limits supports this clear preference. Also, with the *deliberate political void* pattern, Gezi graffiti completely disconnects the movement from the political establishment and its procedures. It expresses this rupture both in the context of power and opposition. It refuses to generate narratives that would be compatible with existing political codes.

In the patterns of *mothers at the barricades* and *people versus people*, Gezi graffiti deals with populism and the father state. At this point, it becomes socio-political and proposes alternatives. One alternative draws a framework in which the people of Turkey integrate with the movement. The other, under the identity of the mother, establishes the rise of a novel determinant actor opposes the father state. It can be assumed that both alternatives have arguments containing critically striking and accurate determinations. However, these arguments are far from being realistic and practicable, both in terms of the scope of the movement and the depth of the issues they touch upon.

The Gezi movement did not rise from objective realities where the patriarchal state is being changed or the people revolted against all power. Graffiti reflects Gezi as a movement aware of important and profound political and social problems of the country and wants a social change in this sense, but it does not produce answers and remedies on how this change will take place, what kind of alternative should replace the establishment and how this desired alternative would be realised. Instead, the usage of irrational humour and symbolism increase as the issues under consideration become difficult to relate to objective conditions.

Gezi Graffiti Uses Populism

According to Gezi graffiti, the Gezi movement uses populism. Many patterns narratively unite people that the movement approves or mobilises and describe them through meta-concepts per various contexts. Besides, it positions these generated totalities against its opponents. This opponent is mostly Erdoğan, the elite.

The people versus people pattern is an excellent example in this sense. It derives the concept of halk from the aggrieved ones who participated in the Gezi movement and use it against the elite millet. Interestingly, the pattern does not directly attack the elite it targets. It redefines the people, but never uses the word millet or mocks with those who voted for Erdoğan. That is the indication of a tactical understanding, which avoids the reactions of Erdoğan sympathisers, or seeks for their support, and tries to maintain the spread of the movement. The elite targeted by Gezi graffiti is hidden in Erdoğan's persona.

The populism of Gezi graffiti is also observed in *whirling depolarisation*, *mothers at the barricades* and *Erdoganism* patterns. These are the categories that use the liberatory possibilities of the populism and populist discourses and use them strategically. *Whirling depolarisation* proposes a pluralist religion-related alternative against the elite political Islam, and it benefits from its widespread recognition and cultural codes. In this pattern, there is an act of populism on the level of religion and religious morality. Against the Islamist power's corrupt and elite understanding of Islam, it uses the popularly affirmed Rumi and his philosophy, which is partially coherent to the principles of the movement. Thus, it tries to shoot Erdoğan, who has become the new elite by accusing the elites of damaging religious values, with his weapon.

The pattern of *mothers at the barricades* brings the mother cult to the fore and bases its foundation on the popular affirmation of its sacredness and inexhaustible rightfulness,

similar to the Rumi example. Both categories point to populism because they place the message that they want to convey on a ground built with values that are easily approved by large masses, they try to attract crowds to their side and facilitate the acceptance of their claims through cultural and discursive manipulations. In this sense, it is seen that the patterns are generated with a prediction about the perceptual familiarity of the masses. *Erdoganism* pattern, on the other hand, is fully engaged in portraying the rival political actor as a corrupt and self-serving elite.

The populism of Gezi graffiti differentiates at some point from the populism of the power it struggles with. Except for the pattern of *Erdoganism*, it does not describe directly and defines the elite. Instead, it applies methods that culturally encode and evoke the non-elite and leaves the audience alone for the painting of the missing parts of the drawn picture. Gezi graffiti populism has a pluralistic and embracing sensitivity, drawing the lines of a frame that would be approved by anyone with a mother or all people who find Rumi's ideas respectable. There are two reasons for this. First, the movement has failed to avoid Erdoğan's decisive influence that gathers all power around his persona and keeps politics on a polarising populist axis. Against a power that reproduces itself with populism, a discursive tactic that would affect many people in a short time, and would reject to use populism, could not be found. Second, the movement has discovered the benefits of utilising pluralism as a populist discourse.

The inclusive and pluralist approach used against populist and polarising power serves for the singularizing populist discourses and contexts, such as the people, leniency or familial ties. Here, Gezi's embracing populism is against the polarising populism of the elite, and the former accuses the latter of being harmful, corrupt and profiteer.

Gezi Graffiti Defines the Movement

Gezi graffiti frequently defines and assesses the Gezi movement, makes determinations about it and presents them to the public space. This deed is almost as common as its critical humour, among its patterns. Many of the categories generated from Gezi graffiti contain implicit descriptions of who the protesters are, attributes the movement to specific groups, individuals, values and demands using its multiplicity. Almost all patterns of Gezi graffiti can be considered also as definitions or identifications. Accordingly, for the Gezi graffiti, the movement belongs to these following groups; Erdoğan's opponents, jokers, those who oppose the corruption of politics, citizens sensitive for the individualised agency, those who object to the use of religion in politics, citizen journalists, mothers, mothers' children, those who defeat the police or social media users. Such definitions are made repeatedly throughout the patterns. All these patterns make various determinations about the profile of the movement through Gezi graffiti and their unique functions. When these profiles are attributed to the movement, the social issue they deal with or the context based on the movement also defines the movement. Besides, there are also patterns that emerged specifically to define the movement, in Gezi graffiti. The graffiti belonging to *chapuling* and *material truth generated in virtual reality* patterns are the most prominent examples of such attempts. *Chapuling* produces a unique collective identity for the movement and strives to diffuse it. It constructs a new us for Gezi. *Material truth generated in virtual reality*, on the other hand, reconstructs an existing collective identity in the name of the movement and places it in the social opposition. Both patterns express whom the movement belongs to and not, for different purposes. Gezi graffiti also provides information about the different social movements or groups involved in the Gezi movement. As seen in the pattern of *the unimagined coherence of the unconnected*, it is possible to detect, update or alter the scope of the movement by learning the groups that support the Gezi movement and their functions for the Gezi movement through graffiti.

Gezi Graffiti Speaks for and with the Movement

Gezi graffiti constantly communicates with the actors of the movement and with the public space, for different purposes. *Penguins' media* pattern tries to mobilise protesters to meet the communicative needs of the movement. The patterns of *chapuling*, *people versus people*, *soldiers of nobody*, and *material truth generated in virtual reality*, announce that the contexts, stances or identities that would make protesters and audiences feel belonged to the movement are involved by the movement. *Whirling depolarisation* calls directly to everyone and invites them to join the movement.

Besides, Gezi graffiti works like a medium reporting what is going over the course of the events. *Penguins' media*, *the unimagined coherence of the unconnected*, *solid, liquid and gas*, *the space-time curvature* and *resisting smartphones patterns* include these functions of the Gezi graffiti. *Penguins' media* reports that Ethem Sarısülük was killed. *The solid, liquid and gas* publicises that the police were defeated. *The space-time curvature* announces that Gezi Park was taken, and the movement was leaping to Ankara, and *the unimagined coherence of the unconnected* expresses that other groups join the movement. Gezi graffiti is the medium of the Gezi movement and takes on functions such as making propaganda, reporting events, persuade people and change emotions.

Gezi Graffiti Expresses the Culture of the Movement

Gezi graffiti shows how movement relates to culture and cultural contexts. *Whirling depolarisation*, *the unstoppable humour of everything* and *mothers at the barricades* patterns show that the movement uses existing traditional cultural codes and connotations per their goals. According to the Gezi graffiti, the Gezi movement harmonises its calls for action, claims and definitions with these cultural codes familiar to the society and adopts them, and in this way, it gains discursive legitimacy and superiority.

Also, Gezi graffiti uses popular culture to build its narratives, as observed *in political jamming and cultural plagiarism, people versus people, and material truth generated in virtual reality* patterns. With popular culture, the content of Gezi graffiti becomes disjoint from the localness. Among patterns, world-famous films, TV series, advertising slogans, computer games and songs have been used. Gezi graffiti takes popular culture, spoils, compresses and reproduces it for use for its purposes. However, as seen in the examples where traditional cultural codes are at the forefront, it does not criticise popular culture, it only uses it for its contexts.

Gezi Graffiti Depicts the Logic of Action

Gezi graffiti shows how the Gezi movement was influenced by the conditions of cyberspace and how it benefited from the possibilities of digital activism. *The resisting smartphones* pattern shows that the movement's logic of action encompasses both cyber and urban spaces, and Gezi activism places great importance on the digitalised struggle. *Material truth generated in virtual reality* pattern shows that the social, political, and organisational attitudes and habits arising from cyberspace shape their equivalents in the urban space and this relationship is reciprocal. For the movement, both spaces interact in this sense. *Political jamming and cultural plagiarism* is a sign that movement actors frequently used the cultural contexts they obtain through the internet. The fact that culture jamming graffiti used global cultural contexts can be explained by the widespread use of the internet and digitalised media contents.

Gezi Graffiti Reveals What is New about the Movement

Gezi graffiti shows the innovative deeds of Gezi the movement and thus provides interpretive possibilities to examine the concept of the Gezi spirit. The novelties of the movement can be divided into two primary groups according to the graffiti patterns.

First, the movement generates new ways of narration, turn them into new umbrella rhetoric and carries new forms of discourses to the public space and the non-institutional fields, to discuss emergent and existing issues, problems, claims and demands. *People versus people pattern* defines a new public and presents it. *Deliberate political void* typifies this newness with its vague attitude, emphasising the disengagement from established politics and the consent that produced for the current political system and government. Whirling *depolarisation* reveals the newness because it shows that the movement derives arguments from a religious figure and approach, although it is a movement without religious-political goals. As seen in the *mothers at the barricades*, the use of motherhood and related social identities in social and political contexts as impactful social actors to point out to discuss a new understanding of the state is a first for Turkey.

The unstoppable humour of everything and *solid, liquid and gas* patterns herald that the cynical political humour has returned in a contemporary form, through the Gezi movement, and lastly *soldiers of nobody* dignifies a new logic of political participation. All these patterns show that the Gezi movement used new cultural contexts and rhetorical forms concerning social and political issues. In other words, according to Gezi graffiti, the movement produced a new discursive movement culture. However, the novelty of the Gezi movement is limited to the narrative and discursive dimensions, because these novel forms refer to the deep-rooted, old and chronic modernisation and democratisation issues, problems, aspirations and claims. Concepts, debates and conflicts on issues such as populism, the politicisation of religion, patriarchal state tradition, use of humour as a weapon of the weak against power and problems about participation in political institutions and decision-making mechanisms are not novel or new at all for Turkey. Therefore, looking at the Gezi graffiti, it can be said that the movement tackled and discussed ancient structural problems in new cultural and discursive forms.

The second newness that can be detected about the movement by looking at the Gezi graffiti, is related to the emergence of new social actors/identities and a new logic of action. *Material truth generated in virtual reality* pattern is about the emergence of the generation of gamers as new social actors. *Chapulung* contains the emergence of a brand- new collective identity. *The unimagined coherence of the unconnected* indicates new coalitions and contacts among different social groups that have never come together for shared goals or grievances. *Resisting smartphones* pattern informs the rise of digital activism and cyberspace as a field of action and movement and indicates new hybrid forms and logic. Likewise, the *political jamming and cultural plagiarism* shows that the movement uses culture jamming as a brand alternative form of action, at least for Turkey.

According to these patterns, the movement has been influenced by the cultural transformations that take place in society, realised its social and political struggle in the cultural field, and at the same time, it produced new identities and intergroup relationships on its path. These patterns are related to transformations depending on objective conditions beyond the discursive or narrative dimension, and through the meditative efforts of graffiti, these conditions can be traced.

Gezi Graffiti Depicts the Movement's Spatiality

Gezi graffiti describes the relationship of the Gezi movement with space. Accordingly, the movement's effectiveness in the spatial context revolves around three foci; the right to the city, spatial diffusion and cyberspace. The right to the city struggle and spatial diffusion manifests itself in the *space-time curvature*. *Resisting smartphones, material truth generated in virtual reality* and *penguins' media* patterns are about cyberspace and cyberspatial diffusion. According to the Gezi graffiti, the repertoire of action of the movement is also shaped by spatiality. In the *space-time curvature* pattern, the capture and occupation of

Gezi Park are emphasised. Also, the pattern shows that cyber and urban spatial diffusions were hybridised. Accordingly, the *resisting smartphones* pattern also shows that the actional spread of the movement takes advantage of the hybridised transitive capabilities between urban and cyberspace. *Penguins' media*, on the other hand, identifies another form of digital agency by the presence of citizen journalism in the movement.

Gezi Graffiti Informs about the Graffiti as a Practice

Gezi graffiti provides insights into contemporary political graffiti in Turkey. It constitutes a considerable part of the action repertoire of the Gezi movement and is embodied as the spatial performance of an urban social movement. In this sense, it can be associated with the revival of the 'to go out to write' tradition of the 1970s, in a new form. Gezi graffiti has emerged as a medium of numerous windows, opening to the node of Gezi Park and Taksim Square, and thanks to its rhizomatic structure, undertaken many functions, such as realising the intra-movement communication, informing, narrating, framing, recruiting, making propaganda, counter-narrating, counter-framing, discussing different social and political issues, generating social consent and legitimacy, moulding public opinion, creating a movement culture and directing the movement emotionally. Gezi graffiti was structured as a field of action where cyber and urban spaces intersect. It has spread in both spaces as memes. In this sense, it had a cyclical trajectory that starts in the urban space, spreads into cyberspace and returns to the urban space. Gezi graffitists practised graffiti on the walls of urban space, but also per the conditions of cyberspace. Thus, they expanded the area of the impact that they wanted to create. Therefore, Gezi graffiti possesses the features of internet memes such as longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity in cyberspace. Also, it is catchy, clear and intertextual. It hijacks, meshes and blends cultural contexts, words, phrases and ideas, and hence has been widely recognised and perceived. Besides, the success and adaptedness of Gezi graffiti in cyberspace have led it to be practised more and more in urban space. The graffiti of

Gezi graffitists are simple and easy to apply. It does not require complex artistic techniques or textual expressions. For this reason, it has become a practice or an action that many actors apply throughout the movement. Graffiti has made it easier for the actors of the Gezi movement to express their individualised ideas, views and demands, and this sped up and increased the graffiti practising.

Considering the patterns emerging from the data and their relations, the grounded theory analysis of Gezi graffiti suggests that:

Gezi movement is an unfolding. Not only as an emergence of a multi-layered movement but also as a manifestation of accumulated social grievances and demands, and new social actors, narratives and places. It has encapsulated different phases in terms of claims, actors, identities, narratives and spatialities, and has continued in a constant-diversifying structure. These stages point to a continuous movement trajectory that has expanded and faded rapidly. Because of this structure, the movement is shaped in its form and is variable, reactive and fluid. Besides, Gezi graffiti does not mention any leadership, hierarchy, or organization that guided the movement. Platforms and organizations such as Taksim Solidarity or TMMOB have no place in graffiti. In this sense, it can be said that Gezi graffiti does not cover all elements of the movement, does not consider them included in the movement or simply were not interested in them.

Gezi movement is a big and humorous wave of collective criticism. Unlimited and unceasing humorous criticism is not just a way of dealing with or expressing the problems. It is the most widespread form of action of the movement. The Gezi movement has tried to redeliberate social and political opinions through critical humour, and to build a temporary alternative public space for these discussions to take place. This is an alternative public space because Gezi does not activate the components of the shrinking old public space, or doesn't

try to embed its components into it. On the contrary, it aims to produce a new, fresh and dynamic public space physically and discursively, through the occupation and the narration. Humorous criticism also enabled the movement to present protesters as victims and to generate legitimacy in the public's eye.

Gezi movement is an anti-Erdoğan movement, and its opposition in this sense has remained unchanged throughout its path as its core dynamic. On the other hand, the movement has turned from being an anti-Erdoğan movement into an anti-Erdoğanist movement, as it has diversified and expanded enough to target the deep-rooted causes that enabled the emergence of an Erdoğanist power.

Gezi movement is not a collective manifestation of a new and emergent social spirit that was not existing before. As logically expected, it was moulded by the structural conditions and opportunities of the existed political system and the cultural fabric of society. Moreover, it has strategized itself upon them. This influence is not only about the social conflicts and discontent that the social opposition clustered around. At this point, a remarkable feature of the Gezi movement becomes crystal clear. It has utilised these conditions, opportunities and fabric paradoxically. As the movement defines or expresses itself, it tries to move away from any established notions, criteria and concepts and regards them as outdated, dysfunctional and corrupt. However, when it comes to tactical moves, it draws near them as much as possible and takes advantage of them. The established reference frames become parts of the other when they are attributed to Erdoğan and power, but those who are beneficial for the instrumental reason of the movement become appropriated and they are even glorified. The novelty brought by the Gezi movement that had been transposing into the political arena and to the shrinking old public space, whilst it was building its places, were new only for the established and conservative perspectives. The creativity, humorous criticism and communicative abilities performed, practised and demonstrated by the actors of

the movement, the uniqueness of the identities they produced to express collectivity, the performative and discursive dissimilarity of the movement did not suddenly appear with the Gezi movement. The social ground that allows the movement to be formed in this way, can be associated and explained by a multiplicity of transformative reasons, such as Turkey's economic and cultural integration to the global West and domestic migration that causes most people to start living in metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, the Gezi movement's above-mentioned features have been seen as indications of a mystified newness, because the conservative and anti-democratic political system and its embedded and tamed public space, have consistently excluded emerging new actors, groups, claims, demands and opinions. The Gezi movement has overcome these obstacles for a short time with its high resonance and volume and has facilitated all the excluded actors and issues to be discussed. For this reason, the recurrently exaggerated and romanticised novelty of the Gezi movement is about making the antagonist flows visible publicly. The movement's ability to spread on a national scale in a very short time is related to the multiplicity of these accumulated antagonist flows.

The movement struggled with its opponents in the cultural field with its authentic rhetoric and narratives, and it has been very efficient and diverse in this sense. Briefly, it is a bombardment of narratives. These narratives infiltrate areas where power is not ready to respond or produce counter-narratives and constantly redefines-, re-express and reproduce the movement. Besides humour, the possibilities of cyberspace, popular and traditional cultural codes and content generated by individual internet users are prominent. However, there is a distinct discrepancy between the narratives of the Gezi movement and the objective events and conditions. Narratives constantly talk about success stories and victories and glorify and romanticise the movement and its agents. The frequent and diverse use of narratives has allowed the movement to take discursive advantages and become superior in this sense. On the other hand, the orientation of these narratives to emotions, shared values, beliefs and

affective bonds was related to the fact that the same superiority could not be achieved in other areas. The movement continued its cultural struggle in this direction to resist violence, rejection and repression, and at least to achieve victory in the narrative space.

The Gezi movement is an urban social movement that emerged in urban spaces. In this sense, it gained its characteristics through urban spatialities and urban issues. However, such a definition will be sufficient to correctly evaluate only the starting phase of the Gezi movement. The Gezi movement has experienced a strong spatial expansion, as seen in many dimensions. Spatial spreading and the articulation of spatialities are indicative of the movement's transformation from a quality that focuses on urban problems to a structure that is meaningful in terms of historicity and transcends urban issues on a national scale. In terms of space, the Gezi movement covers three spatial interwoven levels that formed its repertoire and affected its course. First, since the movement emerged from a node that symbolises antecedent significant social mobilizations became easily remarkable in the public's eye and contemporary conditions of the node have also enabled the movement's and other discontented places' transposing into the centre. Second, the movement has occupied urban spaces and used them as areas of performances and activities. Third, cyberspace has facilitated the movement's diffusion, imitation of its performances in other spaces and transferring its spatial symbols and significances to other little nodes and their reengagement in the movement's massive central node.

The Gezi movement was strongly affected by the existing political system, the centralisation of power and constraining structures. It has emerged under the conditions of repressive policies of the government, targeted it and able to ignite a cognitive liberation for many groups and individuals who were aggrieved by the infiltration of the system into everyday life and lifeworlds. Also, since it has occurred on the node of Gezi Park and Taksim Square, it managed to present itself as a contentious episode resonating with previous social

mobilisations that started with the beginning of Turkish modernisation can be dated back to the late imperial Ottoman era. On the other hand, the Gezi movement used narratives very efficiently, so that this contentious episode connected with long historicity perceived as a novel, emergent mobilisation and become the bearer of demands for social change and the reconstruction of the political system.

The Gezi movement had to put up its struggle solely in the cultural field and at the barricades, due to the conditions programmed society and authoritarian system in Turkey. Also, its actors were deprived of improved organisational skills, capabilities and intentions that would make the arguments of the movement spill into the established political area. The rigidness of the political system in Turkey that strictly excludes novel ways of doing politics and the narrowness of the public space has both facilitated and constrained the Gezi movement's area of impact. The movement has created a massive mobilisation that breaks itself from the existing structural conditions since the gap between social reality and the political system's responses were becoming bigger and bigger. However, at the same time, since this gap is based upon objective conditions and the movement's emergence was unexpected even for its actors, it could not suggest any remedy to close that gap and put forward applicable strategies. Therefore, the massive cognitive liberation it caused has given diverse outcomes such as new collective identities, narratives, humour and other emotional strategies. Yet again, as a body of fragmented and submerged networks, it can be argued that the movement was never meant to produce such solutions, and its original rhetoric ceased to be visible for reuse in later periods of contention.

The Gezi movement keeps its feet on the ground more, in terms of space since it has generated tangible outcomes and transformations. It has managed to protect Gezi Park and proposed its conceived space, through the lived space experiences to refer to a prospective differential space. Graffiti and the occupation of the park were the exact examples of these

endeavours. Gezi movement was the first nationwide action for the right to the city of Turkey, and it has used the concept of the space as an adhesive cement for all the discontented places and by this way has expanded the movement's territories, scales and spatial networks. In these phases, the transitivity between cyberspace and urban spaces have played a crucial role.

Gezi graffiti were the cracks on the striated space that allowed the flowing of nomadic thoughts non-inherent to the dominant logic of the system, which designed for both urban and cyberspaces. They have functioned in many areas for the movement, such as spatial articulation, communication, diffusion, propaganda, political action, participation and representation. Therefore, it can be said that the graffiti of the Gezi movement is variable but with a constant significance.

Accordingly, in terms of Gezi movement literature and according to the Gezi graffiti patterns, Gezi is a supra-political movement, however that indicates a disconnection longing for an alternative political area stemmed from a legitimacy crisis about the existing ways of politics. Therefore, it does not abstain from being political to keep its comprehensiveness. On the contrary, it directly targets politics and thus, is political. Also, the movement cannot be described only by emotional reactions and explanations such as uprising for dignity, since it displayed recurrently criticism on the deep-rooted social and political problems and issues. The movement has announced the existence and escalating of huge political and social crises in terms of democracy, political participation, representation and the existing social contract. It indicates a closing political system, not an opening one.

According to Gezi graffiti, the movement cannot be described as a class movement. None of the graffiti patterns mentions any notions that we can deduct from such relevant categories and characteristics. Besides, Gezi graffiti patterns do not contain any economic

problems or demands and there are not enough empirical data sufficient to detect that the movement has sprung from class contradictions. The only shared and affirmed social distinction of the Gezi movement is the dichotomy that intensified by populist narratives and mapped the social world only through the power and the aggrieved ones.

The validity of the analyses evaluating the Gezi movement as a comprehensive democratization demand is obvious. In this context, the emphasis on the need to re-discuss the concepts of direct democracy and the state and citizenship was observed throughout Gezi graffiti. Also, the Gezi movement is transnational in terms of its action repertoire, cultural backgrounds it uses and its effectiveness in cyberspace. However, it carries intense originality and locality, as its content and scale are shaped by local conditions. There are no references to the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street or other rising social movements in Europe in the Gezi graffiti. However, its critique of neoliberalism can be seen as one of the heavily localized components of a global wave of movements in terms of demands for equality, democracy and freedom.

Analyses evaluating the movement in terms of its structural causes can be considered relatively accurate, in this sense. On the other hand, the analyses that argue the Gezi movement is an indication for a massive novel social transformation happening in Turkey, are exaggerated. According to the Gezi graffiti, the movement has been preoccupied with ancient social and political issues of Turkey. It is only innovative in terms of the way they articulate them. Moreover, it could not offer rational and applicable solutions to these ancient problems. In this sense, academic efforts are needed to successfully localize the existing concepts and notions for Gezi analyses, instead of producing new sociology for the movement.

Implications

The study has several implications for Gezi analyses and scholarship. Since the theory put forward as an outcome of an interpretative analysis focused solely on how Gezi graffitiists have interpreted, presented and evaluated the movement and used the graffiti, it provides genuine findings without being condemned to the limitations of previously accepted hypotheses. Accordingly, the data consisting of the practices and actions of the movement's actors have been theorized through the original interpretations of the researcher, and thus the study may be regarded as significant and singular. It is also rare in terms of the application of a grounded theory analysis, which includes both planned and emergent processes, in relation to a theme of the Gezi movement.

The most evident contribution and claim of the study are that the Gezi movement is not the manifestation of a new social transformation in Turkey, as alleged frequently. In contrast, the study has found that the Gezi movement was deeply related to chronic democratic problems of the country and articulated them through the new forms of expression, identities and contexts that generated during the course of the movement and strongly influenced by the existing political climate and opportunity structures.

In addition, the study can be found helpful in terms of drawing attention to Gezi graffiti as a significant, rich and interpretative data source produced by the actors of the movement. Since the Gezi graffiti is discussed intertwined with the concepts of space and movement, the study can also be seen as a suggestion on how to evaluate the graffiti produced by social movements. The study can also be regarded as a noteworthy effort to fill the gap created by the frequency of studies in the Gezi movement literature that do not rely on empirical data and generated only through theoretical inferences.

Limitations

The study is limited to interpretations, discourses and cultural contexts, just like the Gezi graffiti itself. In other words, it is a study that interprets only the interpretations of Gezi actors who practised graffiti during the movement. Also, the study is limited to graffiti data corpus that contains 984 graffiti are used. All findings are extracted from the Gezi graffiti; therefore, the study cannot evaluate the movement in terms of its components beyond this limit, and as expected, interpretations are limited by the interpretive ability of the researcher. Moreover, since the graffiti offers already completed, designed and closed content, the return of the researcher to the data after the first stages of coding did not allow the revealing of new data. This process was tried to be enriched by re-interpretation of the data in the light of emergent codes and categories and using the literature as data.

Recommendations

After the completion of the study, two main recommendations for future studies emerged. The first of these concerns the rich interpretative and liberating analytic opportunities provided by the grounded theory analysis methodology about the struggles of social movements taking place in cultural fields. I believe that the more frequent and comprehensive use of grounded theory in the field of social movements and the Gezi will make significant contributions to the scholarship.

The second recommendation concerns the composition and the quality of the scholarly analyses on the Gezi movement. In Turkey, most of the academic studies that examine the movement, are influenced by social and political conditions. Besides the pressure coming from the government, the Gezi movement is frequently mythised by dissident academics and attributed to different ideologies and pre-accepted explanations with arguments not supported by data. Therefore, Gezi literature should urgently undergo a

process of demystification, and methodologies such as the grounded theory analysis that prioritise data may be useful in this manner.

Conclusion

In this study, I aimed to generate a grounded theory on Gezi graffiti to provide a unique, processual and interpretative perspective in understanding the Gezi movement. The results of the study have allowed me to answer the research question within the scope of the study, and revealed significant and overlooked components, contexts and relations in relation to the Gezi movement that to evaluate the movement. By following every pattern of Gezi graffiti that emerged on the course of study and the complementary grounded theory, multiple explanatory aspects and a general understanding concerning the Gezi movement can be obtained.

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